Note On Concept Adrsta As Used In Vaisesika Sutra

Author(s): A Wezler
Publisher: A Wezler

Page 10

Aruna Bharat
Concept of Adyga
the importance of the connection between linga and lingin, he could not bave expressed himself the way he actually does, nor argued in the manner of 2.1.9 f.! That is to say, my own interpretation of 2.1.15 ff. implies that the author of 2.1.8 ff. (which belong to an earlier stratum of the VS) was like the author of NS 1.1.5*-aware of the fact that inference presupposes perception, but was yet unable to recognize what was, to be sure, discovered only later and called avinabhava, vyäpti, etc., i.e., he had taken the step from linga, "characteristic mark", as used in everyday language, to the logical term linga, "conclusive mark", but had not yet clearly realized what is implied unconsciously by the laukika word, viz, that the connection of the mark with its possessor should have been perceived previously.
Inspite of the apparently higher level of reflexion revealed by desian lingam as understood by the author of VS 2.1.15 (ff.) it has to be admitted that bis denial of the existence of a perceived mark" makes sense-not on SCHUSTER's assumptions, but-only if in the foregoing this
existence had been asserted either explicitly or implicitly. The only kr sūtra he can be said to is 2.1.10. Therefore, one cannot but arrive at
the conclusion that SCHUSTER's interpretation of this sätra does not correpond to its original intention.
(the other invisible or inperceptible entities, i.e., 'substances', being excluded because in order to prove their existence other specific marks are adduced). As to syntax, I take adrsalingo to be equivalent to adyste or adratasya liagam yasya sah and to be the subject of the sentence. The construction is admittedly a bit awkward: nevertheless, it is, to be sure, not only possible, but also the only one that really makes sense in the narrower and wider context. The complexity of this formulation was apparently felt also by the commentators; as only too often, they do not, however, try to explain it literally, but confine themselves to reformulate its gist.
2.2.4. After what has been said in the foregoing it need hardly to be emphasized that this hypothesis passes muster more easily than that framed by SCHUSTER. But my hypothesis also leads to further questions. Thus, what should perhaps be stressed is that there is every appearance that the conception of linga evident in VS 2.1.8-10 forms the oldest stage in the development of the Vaiseșika theory of inference. This conception is-similar to that of the NS-characterized, as already suggested, by a palpable lack of reflexion on the true nature of logical reason, and this is why it was rejected by later logicians, c.g., by Dinnaga.
The analysis of 2 1.8-10 has, however, yielded the result that here the author distinguishes de facto between a mark that allows to infer something which is in principle itself perceivable and a mark by which the existence of something can be inferred that by its nature lies beyond the range of perception. Nevertheless, this distinction like that of NS 1.1.5 between purvavar and sesavat on the one hand and samanyato drscom on the other-does not imply that the logical character of the linga and its connection with its possessor had already been reflected upon; on the contrary, e.g., the Nyasabhasya on NS 1.1.5 clearly shows that this was not the case, and the further development of Indian logic no less corroborates this assumption.
2.2.3. Thus, the way is cleared for another and, I think, much better interpretation of VS 2.1.10. I propose to translate it thus : "But (ca) since touch (or tangibility) is not a charactefistic and conclusive mark] of [entities]" that are seen (i.e., perceived), that of which [this] conclusive mark (namely touch, or tangibility) (allows inference) is (an entity] not seen (.e., perceived), (namely] wind".
That is to say, I take the sutra to be a rather complex, pregnant argument in three steps, viz. : (1) sparsa is not a characteristic and conclusive mark of visible or perceivable entities; (2) therefore, it must be that of something invisible or not perceivable; (3) the invisible or imperceptible entity the existence of which can be inferred by sparsa is wind
In
However, it may be questioned whether in the VS, e.g. in 2.1.20 and 3.2.4, a still older stage is attested, one characterized by the fact hat not even the perceptibility or imperceptibility of the object to be
50. Cf. my article "Dio droifache" Schlussfolgerung im Nyayasatra 1.1.5" in LIJ
XI (1969), pp. 190-211, 51. Quoted above. 52. It looks very much as though VS 2.1.10 is based on the assumption that it has
still to be determined to which category these entities belong: ses below. 53. Candrananda adds by way of explanation : yadi khaly ayante kpiryadisparlo
'bhavispad gandharasarapai sahopalabhemahi....'
54. That is to say, my translation is, for stylistic reasons, not in every respect
faithful to the original. A literal translation would be: "....(i. c. perceived). ..that of which the characteristic mark (i.e. touch or tangibility) is one that
allows to infer wat is not seen (i. c. not perceived), is wind."