Neuroscience and Karma

Author(s): Jethalal S Zaveri, Mahendramuni
Publisher: Jain Vishva Bharati

Page 36

experiencing are inherent in the soul. Knowledge can be born or rather emerge with or without the help of sense-organs and mind which are, however, only external instruments, the different states of the soul being their spiritual counterparts. The soul could never be bereft of conscio ness. Even one-sensed organisms, such as plants, do possess the feeling of touch and can experience pain. These organisms are asamjñii.e., they do not possess a brain or mind. But by suitable electronic apparatus, not only the pain but their awareness and expression of the pain can be recorded and studied." 2. Soul and Mind
Many psychologists, metaphysicians and others use the terms 'mind' and 'soul' as virtually interchangeable names of the object studied by psychologists. So far as there is any definite distinction of meaning between the terms as currently used by English writers, 'soul' seems to carry with it more of the implication of substantiality and relative independence than 'mind'. Some writers prefer to use the term 'spirit' for soul in the sense here suggested.
Those who do not believe in the ultimately real dualismi.e., separate existence of the two systems — the (mechanical) physical system i.e. the body and psychical entity or system i.e. the soul — cannot find the connection which subsists, as an actual fact, between body and soul but are forced to invent a connection in keeping with the general scheme of physical and psychological hypotheses.?
1. Secret Life of Plants by Peter Tompkins. 2. Compare the following striking passage from Avenarius, menschliche weltbegriff,
p.75 : "Let an individual M denote a definite whole of 'perceived things' (trunk, arms and hands, legs and feet, speech, movements, etc.) and of 'presented thoughts' as I, ..... then when M says 'I have a brain', this means that a brain belongs as part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as I. And when M says 'I have thoughts' this means that the thoughts themselves belong as a part to the whole of perceived things and presented thoughts denoted as I. But though thorough analysis of the denotation of I thus leads to the result that we have a brain and thought, it never leads to the result that the brain has the thoughts. The thought is no doubt, a thought of 'my ego' but not a thought of 'my brain' any more than my brain is the brain of 'my thought'. i.e., the brain is no habitatioin, seat, generator, instrument or organ, no support or substratum of thought. Thought is no indweller or commander, no other half or side, and also no product, indeed not even a physiological function or so much as a state of a brain."
(xxviii)