Nakamura On Bhartrhari

Author(s): Ashok Aklujkar
Publisher: Ashok Aklujkar

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ASHOK AKLUJKAR
grounds for possible error; none of these factors assures a valid knowledge of reality. Moreover, it is often found that an event or result predicted through inference does not take place because of some change in the environment.33 Further, there are branches and stages of philosophical inquiry in which the unrestricted validity of inference cannot be accepted. In deciding non-mundane matters like whether a specific kind of knowledge or conduct causes merit or demerit, inference cannot be given a blank cheque. Such questions arise if at all one is ready to accept the authority of some scriptural lore; if one's logical instincts forbid one to believe in any tradition, these problems do not exist.34 Once, however,
lead to an invalid inference is pointed out in the following remark: ... pākâdyanumănârthāni kriyā-višeșeșu pratiniyatāny angāni vipralambhârthāny api kaiścit kathañcid upādiyante (V 1.34 p. 92.4-5) "Some people somehow take to (start the performance of) those components (of actions] which are regularly related to specific actions and which are intended for (to lead someone to the inference of actions like cooking even for the purpose of deceiving (someone)". In the light of the explanation given by Vrsabha (p. 92.24-27), the purport of this remark is as follows: To deceive someone, say, a mendicant, one may start performing actions which are usually performed in the process of cooking. Thinking that he will get a sumptuous meal, the mendicant may stay around only to find that he has been cleverly deceived. Thus, his inference based on perception makes him a laughing stock. 31 (a) ... tad-avirodhad evânumāna-siddhih. yad vânumite 'pi tāvan na niściyate yāvat pratyakşâgamābhyām na pratitam iti (Vrşabha, p. 92.23-24) “An inference becomes valid only when it does not conflict with them (namely, perception and agama; for the latter see 3.2 above). Or, even when [an entity] is inferred, a definite conclusion (concerning it] is not reached as long as [it] is not borne out by perception and āgama." (b) It seems that, according to Bhartshari, one acquires most of the āgama without one's noticing it. In its most general sense, "inherited lore" (see 3.2 above) agama pervades language entirely; in fact, it is nothing but language understood in an abstract sense, as a totality of signs and sign-combinations, as paśyanti; and, in its particular sense, "tradition" or "traditional thought of a philosophical school", it affects language considerably (V 1.24-26 p. 65.3-4; V 1.121 p. 199.3-4; Vịşabha, p. 199.16-17; TK 2.134-137; BSS pp. 138.8-139.11; TK 2.235-237 and V, TK 3.11.6, 9). As the first language that one learns, at least, is internalized without one's being conscious of it, so also are the inherited lore and traditional thought contained in it. Inferences of logicians, therefore, cannot be totally independent of either. 82 (a) Bhartphari (TK 1.129 V p. 209.2-3) points out that inference means determining what a linguistic unit can mean in the case of those thinkers who use inference only to interpret scriptural lore. (b) For the influence of language on inferences, see fn. 31b above. 88 avasthā-deśa-kālānām bhedad bhinnāsu saktișu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā || (TK 1.32) "It is extremely difficult to establish [the existence, or nature, of] things on the strength of inference, as the capacities (of the things) become different in different states, regions, and times." V pp. 88.5-89.6; TK 1.33 V p. 90.3-6. 84 V 1.27 p. 82.3-4; nâgamăd ste dharmas tarkeņa vyavatisphate / (TK 1.30b) “Merit (favorable non-mundane result) cannot be determined with logical reasoning, without āgama." adrstârthānām karmaņām phala-niyame sva-bhāva-samvid āgama-pratibaddhā (V 1.30 p. 86.1-2) “In determining the fruits of actions intended for non-mundane results, the knowledge of the nature (of the actions, that is, the knowledge whether the