Nakamura On Bhartrhari

Author(s): Ashok Aklujkar
Publisher: Ashok Aklujkar

Page 11

NAKAMURA ON BHARTķHARI
171
(TK 1.131/1.121). Here again Nakamura misses the contextually appropriate meaning of the word śruti (see 2.13, fn. 11 above). The verse means: “[Even] when the cause [of the coming into currency of a denotative form, that is, the referent] is of an altogether different nature (that is, does not possess the nature of a spatially continuous thing) (then also), because of the (very] recourse to the denotative form, a cognition of the form of a thing is found in the case of "firebrand-wheel", etc."25
4.1 Incorrect conclusions: Although the central theme of Nakamura's article is to show how Bhartshari preferred testimony to logical reasoning (see 4.2 below), he drops hints throughout his article to the effect that somehow Bhartshari's advocacy of agama was half-hearted and superficial (p. 282.16-21, p. 285.33-34, p. 290.9-10, p. 299.22-24, p. 300.1-3, 5-7, p. 302.13-16). This is not only contradictory but also lacks justification in the form of supporting evidence from Bhartshari's writings.
4.2 Nakamura (p. 290.11-13, 32-33, p. 291.9-11, p. 292.2-10, p. 295.2-6) depicts Bhartrhari as a philosopher who had declared a total war against inference or logical reasoning. From the preceding sections it is clear that Nakamura's inability to interpret Bhartshari's remarks accurately has led him to this wrong view of a pioneer Indian philosopher.26 What Bhartshari actually does27 is to draw attention to the lack of guarantee about the validity of an inferential cognition and to point out the limitations of inference. An inferential cognition may turn out to be true or false. 28 Its unreliability is borne out by the perpetual differences of opinion among philosophers.29 The fact that inference is governed by three factors - perception,30 inherited lore, 31 and language32 – provides many
25 Besides the incorrect remarks pointed out in these sections, Nakamura's article contains a number of unsubstantiated remarks. For example, he does not furnish any evidence in support of the statements appearing at the following places: pp. 285.35286.2; p. 291.12-15; pp. 296.28-297.25. 26 Nakamura (p. 287.1-16; p. 298.8-15; p. 302.21-24; p. 303.3-4) criticizes Bhartshari for refuting inference with the help of inference. As there is no evidence of any wholesale refutation of inference by Bhartphari, it follows that this criticism is unwarranted. 27 The following portion of the present section is reproduced from $8 1.8-11 of my Harvard dissertation referred to in the bibliography. 28 ko hy anavasthita-sādharmya-vaidharmyeşu nityam alabdha-niscayeșu puruşa-tarkeşu viśvāsaḥ. (V 1.30 p. 86.2-3) "How can one trust the inferences drawn by [ordinary] persons -- [inferences) in which the similarity and dissimilarity (of entities) are uncertain and about which one always lacks certitude?" V 1.38 p. 96.3. 29 yatnenánumito'py arthaḥ kusalair anumātsbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate // (TK 1.34) "A point inferred with effort by skilled logicians is accounted for quite differently by other [logicians) of still greater skill." V pp. 90.9-92.3; BSS p. 285.5-6. 30 How perception figures in inference (fn. 31a below) and how it can occasionally