Nakamura On Bhartrhari

Author(s): Ashok Aklujkar
Publisher: Ashok Aklujkar
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269330/1

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NAKAMURA ON BHARTRHARI
by
ASHOK AKLUJKAR
Vancouver
1.1 An article by Professor Hajime Nakamura, “Bhartshari The Scholar", was published in the fourth volume of the Indo-Iranian Journal (1960:
282-305). That article was a revised translation of a part of Nakamura's · Kotoba no Keijijogaku, which is regarded by many scholars to be Naka
mura's important contribution to the study of Vedanta in general and to Bhartshari studies in particular. Naturally I was very surprised to find in it, as I shall presently demonstrate, a large number of inaccurate translations, remarks, conclusions, and comparisons. My purpose in demonstrating what I consider to be Nakamura's mistakes is, of course, purely that of śāstra-śuddhi "purification of a branch of learning"; the positive aspects of the present article, namely the correct translations of some of the key verses in Bhartphari's Trikāņdit (TK in abbreviation) and a correct understanding of Bhartshari's position, are more important in my view than the refutation of the contents of Nakamura's article.2
1 (a) It is generally believed that the title of the work to which I refer as the Trikāndi is Vākyapadiya. In a recent article (Aklujkar, 1969: 547-555), I have argued that Vāk yapadiya was originally the title of only the first two books of Bhartshari's magnum opus and that Trikāņdi is the only ancient name that can refer to the work under study as a whole. (b) Some scholars advocate the view that the composition referred to as Vrtti (as V in abbreviation) is not Bhartphari's work and that it is much later than the verses (kārikā) which alone form the genuine TK. I see absolutely no reason to subscribe to this view. In my paper, “Authorship of the Vāk yapadiya-yrtti", read at the annual meeting of the American Oriental Society (1969) (to appear in Wiener Zeit schrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens, vol. xvi, May 1972), I have exposed the weaknesses of the arguments on which this view is based, and I have shown with unmistakable internal evidence that the traditional ascription of the V to Bhartshari cannot be doubted by any unprejudiced mind. 2 (a) My practice in the following is to quote Nakamura's words first, then to reproduce the Sanskrit original, and then to translate the Sanskrit original as I think it should be translated. In general, I do not adduce any additional evidence or refer to the ancient commentators when it is quite obvious that my translation follows the Sanskrit original more closely than Nakamura's. It should also be noted that I italicize all Sanskrit words for the sake of uniformity. Nakamura's practice, which is justifiable

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ASHOK AKLUJKAR 2.1 Incorrect translations: P. 283.16-17, fn. 5: “... so does the smrti[go on forever without interruption] though it was composed by scholars." śişțair nibadhyamānā tu na vyavacchidyate smstiḥ // (TK 1.146/1.136cd): “But the smrti is not lost (literally, cut off) if it is composed [again and again) by the elite." The verse (kärikā) expresses the view of the Mimāmsakas (Puṇyarāja (? see fn. 2 above), p. 58.4-8; V pp. 223.6-224.4, p. 226.13; cf. 5.1 below). According to them, the śruti is eternal and hence it does not require the assistance of the elite for its survival, but the smrti is preserved only by the elite.
2.2 P. 283.17-18, fn. 6: “The words of the śruti were composed a long, long time ago." śāstram atidūre vyavasthitam // (TK 3.14.74, p. 487/p. 39). Here we come across a classic instance of how Nakamura takes Bhartshari's words out of context (cf. 2.6, 12, 18 below). The entire verse runs thus: śabdā yathā vibhajyante bhāgair iva vikalpitaiḥ, anvākhyeyās tathā, śāstram atidūre vyavasthitam // It refers to Bhartshari's well-emphasized thesis that the segments of linguistic units (sentences, words, and phonemes, which correspond respectively to Sanskrit vākya, pada, and varņa) set up in grammar are convenient fictions, and that, for this reason, the science
from a different point of view, is not to italicize those words which, although of Sanskrit origin, have now become a common stock of the English language. (b) Although it has been convincingly argued as early as 1930 (Charudeva Shastri 1930: 636-644, 1934: Skt. Intro. pp. 18-26; Ramakrishna Kavi 1930: 235-241; Kunhan Raja 1936: 285-298), that the Brahma-kānda commentary published in the Benares Sanskrit Series (Nos. 11 19, and 24; 1887) and ascribed to Punyarāja is an abridgement of Bharthari's V (see fn. 1b above) on the kārikās of the first book of the Vakyapadiya, Nakamura refers to that commentary as Punyarāja's work. He also seems to have not known the two volumes of Helārāja's commentary Prakirņaka-prakāśa published under the editorship respectively of Samba-śiva Šāstri and Ravi Varma in 1935 and 1942 (see the bibliography at the end for more particulars). Those volumes give a better text of the Prakirnaka-prakāśa than the volume published in the Benares Sanskrit Series (Nos. 95, 102, 130, 160-164; 1905-37), which Nakamura has used. However, it should be noted that my criticism of Nakamura's article is entirely independent of the literature that could have become available to Nakamura but was obviously unavailable. If I refer to the editions later than the ones used by him, it is only to facilitate the locating of almost identical passages in the different editions. 3 In the place of Nakamura's abbreviation Väkyap. (for Vākyapadiya), I use the abbreviation TK (for Trikāndi, see fn. 1 above). Also, I change his Roman numerals to Arabic numerals, thus writing 1 for I and 2 for II. References according to more recent editions (see the bibliography at the end) are given after the references according to Nakamura are specified. 4 (a) pade na varnā vidyante varneșy avayavă na ca / vāk yāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana // (TK 1.73) “There are no phonemes in a word, and there are no parts in phonemes. There is absolutely no separate existence whatsoever of the words from the sentence.” iha nirbhāgeșy apūrvâpareșy abhedyeșu varņa-pada-vāk yeșu ... (V 1.85 p. 151.4); V 1.88 pp. 154.5-155.2; TK 2.13a and V; TK 2.30 and V. For morreferences to the statements of this point in the TK and its commentaries, see not.

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of grammar is far removed from the permanent, unitary linguistic units, which constitute the linguistic reality.5 As is obvious from the context as well as Helārāja's crystal-clear comments, the verse has nothing to do with the śruti or the Veda. It should be translated as follows: "Linguistic units should be derived in grammar in accordance with how they are segmented by the imagined parts, (for) the science (of grammar] remains far away [from the linguistic units]."
2.3 Pp. 283.30-284.4, fn. 8: "... the composition of the smrti writings are multifarious: some are clear as to their aim and purpose (for instance the writings on medicine); some are vague and difficult to follow (as for example the writings on what foods should and should not be eaten). But all the smrti writings were propounded by the Vedic scholars (Vedavid) following the special characteristics (linga) of the Vedas.” smstayo bahurūpāś ca drșțâdsta-prayojanāḥ / tam evâśritya lingebhyo veda-vidbhiḥ prakāśitāḥ | (TK 1.7). Here drsta-prayojana and adrșța-prayojana should have been translated respectively as “having mundane purposes” and “having non-mundane (otherworldly) purposes”, and linga as “indications"; see V 1.7, pp. 28.4-29.4; Vịşabha, p. 28.16-17, 22-23; V 1.11, p. 40.6; Tripādī,6 p.35.20. It is a thesis accepted by many schools of Indian philosophy that the smrtis must have some supporting indications in the Vedas in order to qualify as authoritative sources of knowledge; cf. V 1.7, p. 30.1-2.
2.4 P. 284.16-20, fns. 16-17; "... the śruti perishes only to grow like 4.19b-d of my Harvard dissertation referred to in the bibliography. (b) The following passages establish that, on the level of analysis, Bhartphari assumes the sentence to be made of words and that, on that level, he thinks of the word in itself as identical with its counterpart in a sentence: V 1.24-26 p. 65.4-5; Vrşabha, p. 79.21-22; TK 2.10cd; BSS p. 91.14-15, p. 132.17-20, p. 143.19-21; vyāptimāmś ca laghuś caiva vyavahāraḥ padâśrayah / loke śāstre ca kāryârtham vibhāgenaiva kalpitaḥ//(TK 2.344) “The linguistic activity centering around words, which allows generalization and achieves economy (of effort), is brought about in ordinary life and in the science (of grammar) for the sake of the [desired] purpose only through the analysis (of sentences]." BSS pp. 167.15168.3, p. 186.17; TK 3.1.1, Helā. p. 2.3. (c) For a similar consideration applied to the word and the sub-word units, see yathā pade vibhajyante prakyti-pratyayâdayah / (TK 2.10ab); V 2.164-165; TK 3.1.1d, Helā. p. 2.3-4, 7-8. 5 TK 2.226-238 and V; especially, śāstresu prakriyā-bhedair avidyaivopavarnyatel anāgama-vikalpā tu svayam vidyopavartate // (TK 2.233) “With different analyses and derivations, it is only avidyā (knowledge of a unitary entity as non-unitary) that is put forth in (all) sciences; vidyā, which is free of agama (see 3.2 below) and intellectal constructs, approaches on its own (that is, is not acquired as a direct product of the study of sciences)." 6 Modern scholars generally give the name of Bhartshari's commentary on the Mahābhāsya as Mahābhāşya-dipikā. In a forthcoming article, I shall argue that the evidence for this name is very scanty and that the commentary should be referred to by the name Tripädi (The Adyar Library Bulletin, 1971).

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seeds (bija) out of the Vedas again. It is our fixed belief that the agama was produced out of some source or other. When all the āgama [sic] have perished, the three Vedas will remain like seeds to give new birth to the āgama.”? tāni[=veda-vākyāni]purvâgameșu vicchinneşų anyesu pranetrşu āgamântarânusamdhāne bijavad avatişthante. (Punyarāja(?) on TK 1.134/ 1.124, pp. 51.20-52.1) na jäty akartȚkam kaścid āgamam pratipadyate bijam sarvâgamâpāye trayy evâdauo vyavasthitā // (TK 1.134/1.124). The correct translation of Punyarāja's (?) remark is: “After the earlier schools of thought (agama; see 3.2 below) have perished, they (the sentences of the Veda) remain like seeds for the bringing into currency of new schools of thought on the part of different (new) proponents (of schools]." Also, verse 1.134 should be translated thus: “No one (no proponent of a school of thought) is ever of the view that (his) school is non-manmade (eternal.) In the beginning (see fn. 9 above) when all schools of thought have perished, only the Vedic Triad remains as a seed (for the future schools of thought]."
2.5 P. 286.17-20, fn. 22: “Therefore the excellent scholars began to teach the significance of words according to the Vedas which were not created by man, and, according to the smrti, which laid down the rules (on the usage of words)." tasmād akstakam śāstram smrtim vālo sanibandhanām / āśrityârabhyate śişțaiḥ śabdānām anuśāsanam || (TK 1.43) “Therefore the instruction of linguistic units is begun by the elite by depending on the non-manmade science (śruti) and (see fn. 10 above) the smộti which has support [in the śruti or in the conduct of the elite].” Cf. Vịşabha, p. 99.19-22.
2.6 P. 286.29-30, fn. 25: ... [grammar is] the highest among the studies of the three Vedas which are made up of many branches of study." aneka-tīrtha-bhedāyās trayyā vācah param padam || (TK 1.144/1.134). If Nakamura had taken into consideration the first line of this verse, the word vācaḥ, or Punyarāja's(?) commentary, he would have noticed that the verse does not say anything about the three Vedas. What Bhartshari here speaks about are the three levels, aspects, or phases of language
? It is impossible to reconcile these lines of Nakamura's article with the remarks in the preceding lines of the same paragraph. In particular, it is not clear what distinction of reference he sees between śruti and Veda, and how he separates agama from the three Vedas once (p. 284.11-13) he has remarked that agama includes śruti. 8 Subramania Iyer's edition of the unabridged V (see fn. 2b above) has the following reading: tāny agamântarāņām pranetȚşu vicchinneșy agamântarânusamdhāne bijavad anutişthante. However, the purport of the passage is not affected by this reading. • The reading of Subramania Iyer's edition is evâto. 10 Vrsabha reads ca, which Subramania Iyer rightly accepts as the correct reading.

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(vāk), namely vaikhari, madhyama, and pasyanti. Each of these levels becomes different in numerous (aneka; in fact, innumerable; see V p. 214.2, p. 215.3, p. 220.4) ways because of the difference in loci (tīrtha). The science of grammar is the great abode of such three-fold language.
2.7 P. 287.1-3, fn. 26: "As the species of the meanings of all words are subject to their forms (ākṛti), the study of grammar is the original source of all studies (vidya) in the world." yathârtha-jätayaḥ sarvāḥ sabdâkṛti-nibandhanāḥ | tathaiva loke vidyānām eṣā vidyā parâyaṇam || (TK 1.15) "Just as all meaning-universals are tied to the universals of linguistic forms, so also this science [grammar] is the ultimate path (or merging point) of [all] sciences in the world." In certain contexts Bhartṛhari does not distinguish between jāti and ākṛti; cf. Tripādī p. 3.17-20, p. 17.21-22, p. 18.11-25; V 1.23 pp. 52.1-57.2, p. 58.5-7; Sreekrishna Sarma, 1957: 56-57. For the point of the first line in this verse, see TK 3.1.6. It is also important to note that Bhartṛhari does not assign the highest position to grammar for any partisan or sectarian reasons; grammar is the science of sciences for the simple reason that exact expression and correct understanding depend on it. See Vṛṣabha, p. 49.24; V pp. 48.649.5; Punyarāja (?), p. 8.14-17.
2.8 P. 287.3-5, fns. 27-28 (cp. p. 288.17-22): "It is the foundation on which all other studies are based and can be likened to a purifying fire." "Being a purifying fire to all study, it shines brightly over all bracnhes of learning." pavitram sarva-vidyānām adhividyam prakāśate || (TK1.14cd) "A purifier (remover of errors) of all lores [through the teaching of what expressions are best suited for the intended meanings], it (the lore of grammar) shines at the top of [all] lores." See conclusion of 2.7 above.
2.9 P. 288.11-12, fn. 35: "... The rules of this sacred study have been handed down in an unbroken chain to the educated." avicchedena siṣṭānām idam smṛti-nibandhanam || (TK 1.143/1.133). This passage can be translated in three different ways, but certainly not in the way in which Nakamura translates it. From the words etad and tad in TK 1.144/1.134 and 1.145/1.135, which stand for vyakaraṇa, it is clear (cf. Vṛṣabha, p. 212.20) that the word idam in this passage also refers to vyākaraṇa. The three possible and justifiable translations, therefore, are: (a) "Because of the unbroken chain of the elite, this (grammar) has its roots in the preserved [reliable] knowledge." siṣṭānām avicchedena idam smṛti-nibandhanam. Cf. V. p. 213.1-2. (b) "For the elite, this (grammar) is always a bond [called] smrti." siṣṭānām idam avicchedena smrtinibandhanam (=smṛti-rupam nibandhanam). Cf. V p. 212.8-9. (c) "This composing of the smrti on the part of the elite is without break (that is,

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the elite compose the smrti called vyäkarana again and again)." śiştānām idam smsti-nibandhanam avicchedena. Cf. V p. 213.1.
2.10 P. 289.10-11, fn. 42: "The knowledge of the inner self cleans dirt from the body, from speech, from the mind and can be compared to a healing process.” kāya-vāg-buddhi-viṣayā ye malāḥ samavasthitā) / cikitsa-lakşaņâdhyātma-śāstrais teşām viếuddhayaḥ || (TK 1.148/1.138) “Those which are impurities of the body, the speech, and the intellect are removed by the sciences (respectively) of medicine, grammar, and yoga." Nakamura has somehow failed to notice the yathāsamkhya “respectively” construction in the verse. He also seems to be unaware of the fact that Sanskrit authors many times refer to the system of their present concern with the word lakṣaṇa; cf. V 1.12 p. 43.6.
2.11 P. 290.17-19, fn. 45: "Various divine powers such as demons, pitys and vampires which exist outside the realm of perception and inference (employed by the ordinary man) are the result of certain processes such as asceticism.” pratyakşam anumānam ca vyatikramya vyavasthitāḥ / rakṣaḥ-pit?-piśācānām karmajā eva siddhayaḥ // (TK 1.36) "The extraordinary capacities of the demons, manes, and goblins, [capacities] which remain beyond perception and inference, can only be results of actions [in the previous lives).” The verse is intended, as is obvious from the verses 1.35, 37, 38, and 39, to point out that there can be extraordinary means of knowledge, means which are not exhausted by perception, inference, and testimony; cf. Vrsabha, p. 93.20. Its context and wording do not in any way support Nakamura's (p. 290.19-23) interpretation of it.
2.12 P. 290.23-26, fn. 46: "There is no ordinary linga to prove the existence of the universal and the form, the essence and the species. Therefore some other source (i.e. that of the sacred books) is used.” sāmānyam ākstir bhāvo jātir ity atra laukikam / lingam na sambhavaty eva tenânyat parigrhyate // (TK 3.14.323 p. 605 / 3.14.320 p. 143). Here we come across one more (see 2.2 above) instance of how Nakamura interprets the TK verses out of context. The present verse is intended to restate Patañjali's (on Panini 4.1.3) observation that the grammarians cannot afford to confuse the ordinary meaning "sex" of the word linga with the meaning "gender”, that they cannot accept determination of gender by sex. As an illustration of this point, attention is drawn to the words sāmānya, akyti, bhāva, and jāti. All these words denote the universal, but sämänya is a neuter word, bhāva a masculine, and äkrti a feminine. As one and the same entity, which is the universal in this instance, cannot actually possess mutually contrary properties resembling the sex distinc

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tions, it is clear that the genders of words are not related to the sex (laukika linga) distinctions. The grammarians, therefore, accept alaukika (anyat) linga; that is, they understand the word linga in a specific, technical sense as denotative of some non-actual distinctions expressed by the words.
2.13 P. 291.1-2, fn. 47: "... the meaning of things is indeed determined by the sacred scriptures.” tayā hy artho vidhīyate // (TK 1.130d/1.120d). Here Nakamura overlooks the fact that śruti can mean “sound”, “word”, or "formal aspect of a linguistic unit as opposed to its semantic aspect”, 11 and that artha can mean "entity" or "thing” as in 2.17 below. What Bhartshari points out in this line is that words give rise to entities lacking physical existence (e.g. sasa-vişāņa or Pegasus), that words shape, fashion, or determine entities. This is clear even from Punyarāja's (?) commentary (p. 50.1-4) which Nakamura claims to have followed here.
2.14 P. 291.18-22, fn. 52: “Therefore as the spirit (in the doctrine of subjectivity) is not harmed by anything), so will those who follow the ways of agama handed down to us without interruption meet with no refutation from the schools of logic (hetu-vāda)." caitanyam iva yaś câyam avicchedena vartate / āgamas tam upâsino hetu-vādair na bādhyate || (TK 1.41) "One who adheres to this agama (see 3.2 below) which exists without break like sentience, is not moved from his position by the talk of [logical] reasons as in the case of sentience.” The phrase caitanyam iva serves two purposes in the present verse. It points out that the continuity of agama is like the continuity of sentience, beginningless and natural (V p. 98.3; Vșşabha, p. 98.14), and that just as, with the help of reasoning, one cannot talk a man into believing that he does not exist, so also one cannot, with logical reasoning as means, make an agama-advocate give up his reliance on agama (Punyarāja (?), p. 19.5-7; V p. 98.3-8).
2.15 P. 295.20-21, fn. 69: “When a person does not doubt his knowledge even as he does not doubt his senses, how can anyone persuade him?” yo yasya svam iva jñānam darśanam nâbhisankate / sthitam pratyakşa-pakşe tam katham anyo nivārayet || (TK 1.39) “How can the other person (using reasoning] prevent X [from accepting as truths those matters which lie beyond ordinary cognition] who does not doubt the [extraordinary] perception on the part of Y as if it were his own expe
11 For example, see: V 1.9 p. 37.3; V 1.12 p. 42.2; V 1.34 p. 92.3; V 1.44 p. 101.6, p. 102.4; TK 1.46; TK 1.60 V p. 119.7; V 1.62 p. 120.9; V 1.68-69 p. 131.2, p. 132.3, 5; V 1.74 p. 139.8-9; TK 1.87 V p. 153.8; V 1.92 p. 158.2; V 1.93 p. 159.4; V 1.102 p. 168.3; V 1.107 p. 175.3; V 1.115 p. 189.3; V 1.116 p. 191.2; TK 1.120 V p. 197.4, 7; TK 1.121 V pp. 198.3-199.1; V 1.134 p. 213.6; V 1.143 p. 232.3. See also 3.7 below.

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rience, and [thus) stands on the side of perception (that is, thinks of the matters being disputed as self-perceived truths if Y says that he cognized them)?” In this verse Bharthari points out that inference or logical reasoning cannot be an effective tool in changing the views of a person who firmly believes that he has received his information from a highly reliable person gifted with extraordinary capacities of cognition.
2.16 P. 298.24-27, fn. 77: “Though all men are able through the āgama to understand things the fruit of which is yet to be experienced, what is stated in the āgama can be interpreted in the contrary meaning." sarvo 'drsta-phalān arthān agamāt pratipadyate / viparītam ca sarvatra sakyate vaktum ägame || (TK 1.142/1.132) “All come to know the matters of non-mundane consequences [only] through āgama (see 3.2 below). And it is possible to voice opposite views [as regards the consequences) in the case of all āgama." Cf. Punyarāja(?), p. 55.4-5; V p. 212.1-4.
2.17 P. 301.8-11, fn. 89: "Therefore the wise observe correctly with the mind even those things which can be directly perceived by the senses. As intuition should be true knowledge, we should not present the things which we perceive.” tasmāt pratyakşam apy artham vidyān ikșeta yuktitaḥ / na darśanasya prāmāṇyād drśyam artham prakalpayet // (TK 2.143) “Therefore, a wise man should examine with reasoning even that thing which is perceptible. He should not form his ideas about a perceptible thing believing in the validity of his perception."
2.18 Fn. 96: "If the words were founded upon the darśana (=pratyakşa) there would be no need for inference. Indeed when the darśana is established why should be need for inference?” na câlam anumānāya śabdo darśana-pūrvakaḥ12 / siddhe hi darsane kim syād anumāna-prayojanam // (TK 3.13.12 p. 436 / p. 142). Here again (see 2.2 above) we notice Nakamura's utter disregard of the contexts of Bharthari's remarks. As Helārāja explains, the real purpose of the present verse is to reiterate Patañjali's (on Pāṇini 4.1.3) objection anyonya-samśrayam tv etad directed against those who hold that actual distinctions corresponding to the distinctions in genders exist in the entities (see 2.12 above). A more accurate translation would be as follows: "The word (having a distinction in the form of its gender) is not capable (i.e. does not serve as a valid tool) of inference [that an actual distinction corresponding to the genderdistinction must exist in the denoted entity] if it is preceded by a perception [of that actual distinction]. For what purpose is there for (employing]
12 Sāmba-siva Šāstri's edition accepts the reading sabdo 'darśana-pūrvakaḥ, that is, with an avagraha or akāralopa in between the two words. But Helārāja's commentary does not seem to support that reading.

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169 an inference when a perception (of the entity to be inferred] has already] materialized?"13
3.1 Incorrect remarks: P. 284.6: "Frequently however the term śāstra refers to the Vedas in a broad sense, ..." In the verses TK 1.43 and 1.137/1.127, to which Nakamura refers as evidence, we find that the words akstaka śāstra and veda-śāstra denote the Vedas as a phrase and as a compound expression. It is evident then that śāstra alone does not stand for the Vedas as far as Bhartshari is concerned. Nakamura's identification of that word with the śruti or Veda results info wrong translations and wrong understanding of Bhartshari's statements on p. 302.4-10.
3.2 P. 284.11-12: “But in the Vākyapadiya the term āgama refers to the books of the pure orthodox Brahmanic schools ..." This statement is 'contradicted by Nakamura's footnotes 14 and 15 which show that agama can mean "something which has been handed down from ancient times." and that "it can stand for books such as those of the Vaiseșika school.” There is no point, therefore, in taking the statement seriously, but I may seize the opportunity provided by it to explain Bharthari's concept of āgama.14 A study of the occurrences of the word āgama shows that it possesses a host of related meanings which can be divided into at least three strata or groups. The most general meaning can be said to be “inherited lore", "conceptual inheritance", "knowledge that one inherits because of birth in a particular biological species or linguistic community”, or “lore of the forefathers”.15 Next, in those contexts in which awareness and preservation of knowledge is assumed, come the meanings: "tradition", 16"traditionally inherited body of knowledge”,17 "traditional instruction of
13 This section concludes the demonstration of the eighteen glaring mistakes of translation that are found in Nakamura's article. Of relatively less importance are the following errors: (a) dharma = laws (p. 291.24). In the context of TK 1.30, dharma means "ritually beneficial action", "conduct leading to favorable consequences", or "merit, punya". (b) rūpa = colour; tangible, material contents of the sacred books (p. 299.12-16, fn. 80). In the context of TK 1.137/1.127, the word rūpa quite obviously means “form (of a word or expression)". (c) apta-vacana = Intuition of the Brahman (p. 302.29). I do not know how Nakamura derives this meaning from the etymological and generally accepted meaning "testimony, statement(s) of a trustworthy person". 14 The following exposition is in all essentials a reproduction of $ 0.13 of my Harvard dissertation referred to in the bibliography. 15 TK 2.118ab, 151. 16 sistānām yad idam avicchinna-pāramparyam smaraṇam sa āgamaḥ. (Vrşabha, p. 81.19-20); V 1.27 p. 82.1, 4. 17 TK 1.30 V p. 86.2, 4.

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conduct”, 18 "body of knowledge and views preserved by the adherents of a system”,19 "traditionally preserved view”, 20 “sources of testimony”, "authoritative literature”, 21 and “imbibed or internalized results of the activity of systematization". 22 Most particularly, in sufficiently transparent contexts, agama denotes the śruti and smrtis.23
3.3 P. 287.6-7: "Sometimes it (the grammar] is likened to a light in the darkness (tamasi jyotis).” Obviously Nakamura has in mind TK 1.18cd: yad asminn eva tamasi jyotiḥ śuddham vivartate //. But from TK 1.17-22, it is evident that the line describes brahman, not vyākaraṇa. Cf. Vrşabha, pp. 50.19-51.10, p. 51.21-24. -
3.4 P. 288.9-10, fn. 34: “According to Bhartshari the sacred study of grammar aimed at continuity (nitya) and correctness of language.” TK 1.29, to which Nakamura here refers as evidence in support of his remark, runs thus: nânarthikām imāņ kaścid vyavasthāṁ kartum arhati | tasmān nibadhyate nityā24 sädhutva-vişayā smrtiḥ //. How can nityā be translated as "continuity” or be construed as an adjective of language? It is obviously an adjective qualifying smrti.
3.5 P. 288.22-24, fn. 38: “Bhartshari illustrates this point that there cannot be an understanding of the real nature of words without grammar] by means of the simile of the mirror which reflects the images of various objects.” As pointed out in 3.3 above, TK 1.20 is about brahman, not grammar.
3.6 P. 288.30-32, p. 301.23 (cp. p. 301.30-31): “... [Bhartshari) came to the conclusion that words were component parts of the Brahman and therefore on the same level as it.” This is a gross misrepresentation of Bhartshari's metaphysics, but considerations of space prevent me from including here a proof to that effect. For my understanding of Bhartshari's position, I refer the reader to my Harvard dissertation (1970).
3.7 P. 292.4-6, fn. 56: “He [Bhartshari] holds, too, that something which may be quite difficult to exist in actual life must nevertheless be acknowledged if it is laid down in the sacred āgama." atyantam atathā-bhūte nimitte śruty-upâśrayāt drśyate 'lāta-cakradau vastv-ākāra-nirūpaņā // 18 anādir agrhyamāņa-kärana ācāropadeśa āgama ity āgama-laksanam. (Vrsabha, p. 82.15). 19 TK 1.26d; V 1.74 p. 139.7; TK 1.124 V p. 203.7-9; V 1.125 p. 204.3-4; TK 2.482484, 486-487. 20 V 1.108 p. 178.1; TK 3.7.164ab; TK 3.8.23. 21 V1.11 p. 41.1; V 1.127 p. 205.6, p. 206.1-2; V 1.130 p. 210.5; TK 1.132 V p. 212.3-4. 22 V 1.24-26 p. 65.3; V 2.235; TK 3.11.6, 9. 28 päramparyenávicchinna upadeśa āgamaḥ śruti-lakṣaṇaḥ smrti-lakṣaṇaś ca. (Tripadi p. 8.17-18); TK 1.41 V p. 98.5. 24 The correct reading is śişțaiḥ. See V 1.29 pp. 84.6-85.3; Vţşabha, p. 84.17-25.

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(TK 1.131/1.121). Here again Nakamura misses the contextually appropriate meaning of the word śruti (see 2.13, fn. 11 above). The verse means: “[Even] when the cause [of the coming into currency of a denotative form, that is, the referent] is of an altogether different nature (that is, does not possess the nature of a spatially continuous thing) (then also), because of the (very] recourse to the denotative form, a cognition of the form of a thing is found in the case of "firebrand-wheel", etc."25
4.1 Incorrect conclusions: Although the central theme of Nakamura's article is to show how Bhartshari preferred testimony to logical reasoning (see 4.2 below), he drops hints throughout his article to the effect that somehow Bhartshari's advocacy of agama was half-hearted and superficial (p. 282.16-21, p. 285.33-34, p. 290.9-10, p. 299.22-24, p. 300.1-3, 5-7, p. 302.13-16). This is not only contradictory but also lacks justification in the form of supporting evidence from Bhartshari's writings.
4.2 Nakamura (p. 290.11-13, 32-33, p. 291.9-11, p. 292.2-10, p. 295.2-6) depicts Bhartrhari as a philosopher who had declared a total war against inference or logical reasoning. From the preceding sections it is clear that Nakamura's inability to interpret Bhartshari's remarks accurately has led him to this wrong view of a pioneer Indian philosopher.26 What Bhartshari actually does27 is to draw attention to the lack of guarantee about the validity of an inferential cognition and to point out the limitations of inference. An inferential cognition may turn out to be true or false. 28 Its unreliability is borne out by the perpetual differences of opinion among philosophers.29 The fact that inference is governed by three factors - perception,30 inherited lore, 31 and language32 – provides many
25 Besides the incorrect remarks pointed out in these sections, Nakamura's article contains a number of unsubstantiated remarks. For example, he does not furnish any evidence in support of the statements appearing at the following places: pp. 285.35286.2; p. 291.12-15; pp. 296.28-297.25. 26 Nakamura (p. 287.1-16; p. 298.8-15; p. 302.21-24; p. 303.3-4) criticizes Bhartshari for refuting inference with the help of inference. As there is no evidence of any wholesale refutation of inference by Bhartphari, it follows that this criticism is unwarranted. 27 The following portion of the present section is reproduced from $8 1.8-11 of my Harvard dissertation referred to in the bibliography. 28 ko hy anavasthita-sādharmya-vaidharmyeşu nityam alabdha-niscayeșu puruşa-tarkeşu viśvāsaḥ. (V 1.30 p. 86.2-3) "How can one trust the inferences drawn by [ordinary] persons -- [inferences) in which the similarity and dissimilarity (of entities) are uncertain and about which one always lacks certitude?" V 1.38 p. 96.3. 29 yatnenánumito'py arthaḥ kusalair anumātsbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate // (TK 1.34) "A point inferred with effort by skilled logicians is accounted for quite differently by other [logicians) of still greater skill." V pp. 90.9-92.3; BSS p. 285.5-6. 30 How perception figures in inference (fn. 31a below) and how it can occasionally

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grounds for possible error; none of these factors assures a valid knowledge of reality. Moreover, it is often found that an event or result predicted through inference does not take place because of some change in the environment.33 Further, there are branches and stages of philosophical inquiry in which the unrestricted validity of inference cannot be accepted. In deciding non-mundane matters like whether a specific kind of knowledge or conduct causes merit or demerit, inference cannot be given a blank cheque. Such questions arise if at all one is ready to accept the authority of some scriptural lore; if one's logical instincts forbid one to believe in any tradition, these problems do not exist.34 Once, however,
lead to an invalid inference is pointed out in the following remark: ... pākâdyanumănârthāni kriyā-višeșeșu pratiniyatāny angāni vipralambhârthāny api kaiścit kathañcid upādiyante (V 1.34 p. 92.4-5) "Some people somehow take to (start the performance of) those components (of actions] which are regularly related to specific actions and which are intended for (to lead someone to the inference of actions like cooking even for the purpose of deceiving (someone)". In the light of the explanation given by Vrsabha (p. 92.24-27), the purport of this remark is as follows: To deceive someone, say, a mendicant, one may start performing actions which are usually performed in the process of cooking. Thinking that he will get a sumptuous meal, the mendicant may stay around only to find that he has been cleverly deceived. Thus, his inference based on perception makes him a laughing stock. 31 (a) ... tad-avirodhad evânumāna-siddhih. yad vânumite 'pi tāvan na niściyate yāvat pratyakşâgamābhyām na pratitam iti (Vrşabha, p. 92.23-24) “An inference becomes valid only when it does not conflict with them (namely, perception and agama; for the latter see 3.2 above). Or, even when [an entity] is inferred, a definite conclusion (concerning it] is not reached as long as [it] is not borne out by perception and āgama." (b) It seems that, according to Bhartshari, one acquires most of the āgama without one's noticing it. In its most general sense, "inherited lore" (see 3.2 above) agama pervades language entirely; in fact, it is nothing but language understood in an abstract sense, as a totality of signs and sign-combinations, as paśyanti; and, in its particular sense, "tradition" or "traditional thought of a philosophical school", it affects language considerably (V 1.24-26 p. 65.3-4; V 1.121 p. 199.3-4; Vịşabha, p. 199.16-17; TK 2.134-137; BSS pp. 138.8-139.11; TK 2.235-237 and V, TK 3.11.6, 9). As the first language that one learns, at least, is internalized without one's being conscious of it, so also are the inherited lore and traditional thought contained in it. Inferences of logicians, therefore, cannot be totally independent of either. 82 (a) Bhartphari (TK 1.129 V p. 209.2-3) points out that inference means determining what a linguistic unit can mean in the case of those thinkers who use inference only to interpret scriptural lore. (b) For the influence of language on inferences, see fn. 31b above. 88 avasthā-deśa-kālānām bhedad bhinnāsu saktișu / bhāvānām anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā || (TK 1.32) "It is extremely difficult to establish [the existence, or nature, of] things on the strength of inference, as the capacities (of the things) become different in different states, regions, and times." V pp. 88.5-89.6; TK 1.33 V p. 90.3-6. 84 V 1.27 p. 82.3-4; nâgamăd ste dharmas tarkeņa vyavatisphate / (TK 1.30b) “Merit (favorable non-mundane result) cannot be determined with logical reasoning, without āgama." adrstârthānām karmaņām phala-niyame sva-bhāva-samvid āgama-pratibaddhā (V 1.30 p. 86.1-2) “In determining the fruits of actions intended for non-mundane results, the knowledge of the nature (of the actions, that is, the knowledge whether the

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some authority is accepted, inference can properly be used only for the purposes of interpretation and justification; it cannot be used to oppose or uproot the authoritative source. It is always possible to deduce through some inference a conclusion contradictory or detrimental to that of a scripture, 35 but so doing, one contradicts one's own initial acceptance of the validity of the scripture. For this reason, in transcendental matters, inference is to be restricted to the interpretation and justification of the accepted authority.36 Just as it is incapable of contradicting scriptural lore, for the two do not belong to the same sphere, in the same way it is incapable of contradicting or invalidating a cognition derived from extraordinary perception.37 Furthermore, it cannot be used to question the nature of the final postulates of a theory or system. There is a limit to which one can answer the question, “Why is it so?” At some level, it is inevitable that one will be forced to say, “Well, this is the very nature of the thing(s); it cannot be otherwise." We cannot go on questioning the postulates of a theory indefinitely with a "why". If, for example, an atomist (Vaiseșika) were asked, “Why is it that the smallest particles combine in a particular way?” he would point out that specific particles attract certain other particles only. But this is just another way of phrasing the point in question; it does not answer the "why". 38
5.1 Incorrect comparisons: As I have demonstrated so far, there are serious flaws in Nakamura's understanding and statement of Bhartshari's views. Consequently, his comparisons are of little value. I shall touch upon only one. Nakamura (p. 283.25-27) remarks that Bhartphari's position on the eternality of the Vedas is "precisely the same as” that of the Mimāmsakas. But in fact there is an important difference. According to Bhartshari, after the dissolution of the universe, the Veda remains in a
actions are capable of non-mundane results and, if they are capable, what type of non-mundane result they produce) is tied to (is derived only from) agama." TK 1.132ab. 35 See TK 1.142cd/132cd in 2:16 above. 36 (a) tasmäd ägamam kañcit pramānikrtya vyavasthite tasmin yā kācid upapattir ucyamānā pratipattāvi upodbalakatvam labhate (V 1.132 p. 212.4-5) "Therefore, any piece of logical reasoning which is stated after an āgama has been accepted and well established, serves to strengthen one's understanding (or acceptance, or determination to practice the teaching [of the āgama)." (b) Bharthari realizes the fact that some persons misinterpret āgama intentionally (V 1.31 p. 88.1-2). 87 atindriyān asamvedyān paśyanty ärşeņa cakşuşā / ye bhāvān vacanam teşām nânumānena bādhyate // (TK 1.38) "The statement of those who, with their seer's eye, see entities that are beyond senses (and) beyond feeling, is not invalidated by inference." V pp. 95.6-96.5. 88 sarve hi vādino dūram api gatvā sva-bhāvam na vyativartante. (V 1.30 p. 86.1); Vrşabha, p. 86.7-14; TK 3.1.95, Helā. p. 95.11-20; cf. V 1.127 pp. 205.8-206.1.

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unitary, subtle form which is not different from the language-principle, śabda-tattva-brahman.39 It again appears as a diversity with main and subsidiary divisions after the creation of the universe. The Mimāņsakas, on the other hand, hold that even the divisions of the Veda are eternal, that it remains with divisions even in the event of the dissolution of the universe. See TK 1.5cd, V. pp. 24.2-26.5; V 1.6 p. 27.8-10; V 1.136 pp. 223.6-224.3; V 1.137 pp. 226.1-227.7.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Khw.ca) Tripädi, Idge, Mass. (Unbaris Trikāndi”.
Aklujkar, Ashok, 1969. "Two Textual Studies of Bhartphari", Journal of the American
Oriental Society (New Haven), 89.547-563. - 1970. “The Philosophy of Bhartshari's Trikāņdi". Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard
University. Cambridge, Mass. [Unpublished.] Bhartphari. (a) Tripädi. See fn. 6 above. Mahābhāşya-dipikā of Bhartshari, Part I. (Eds.)
K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye) (= Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Postgraduate and Research Department Series, No. 8) (Poona, 1967). I have received the forms of the second part. The particulars of publication are the same. (b) Trikāndi. See fn. 1 above. (i) kānda 1. (Ed.) K. A. Subramania Iyer, Vākyapadiya of Bhartshari with the Vrtti, and the Paddhati of Vrşabhadeva (= Deccan College Monograph Series, No. 32) (Poona, 1966). (ii) kāņda 2. (Ed.) Gangādhara Šāstri Mänavalli, Väkyapadiyam ... Sri-Bharthari- ... viracitam Sri-Punyarāja-krtaprakāšakhya-ţikäyutam (=Benares Sanskrit Series, Nos. 11, 19 and 24) (Benares, 1887). The numbering of the Vāk yapadiya verses in this edition is quite often incorrect. My references to the second kāņda assume a correction of those inaccuracies. Unfortunately the Vrtti of the second kāņda is yet to be published in its entirety. I have, therefore, been forced to refer to my hand-written copy of that Vrtti. See Aklujkar, 1969: 555-561. (iii) kända 3. With Helārāja's commentary Prakirņaka-prakāśa. Samuddeśas 1-7: (Ed.) K. A. Subramania Iyer (= Deccan College Monograph Series, No. 21) (Poona, 1963). Samuddeśas 8-13: (Ed.) K. Sāmbaśiva Šāstri (=Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, No. CXVI) (Trivandrum, 1935). Samuddeśa 14: (Ed.) L. A. Ravi Varmā (= University of Travancore Sanskrit Series,
No. CXLVIII) (Trivandrum, 1942). BSS. See Bhartshari (b) (ii) above. Charudeva Shastri, 1930. "Bharthari: a Critical Study with Special Reference to the
Vākyapadiya and its Commentaries”, Proceedings and Transactions of the Fifth
Indian Oriental Conference, Vol. I (Lahore), pp. 630-665. - 1934. (Ed.) Vāk yapadiyam Prathamam Kāņdam (Lahore, Ramlal Kapoor Trust). Helārāja. See Bharthari (b) (iii) above. Kunhan Raja, C., 1936. "I-tsing and Bhartphari's Vākyapadiya”, S. Krishnaswami
Aiyangar Comm. Volume (Madras), pp. 285-298. Punyarāja. See fn. 2b and Bhartphari (b) (ii) above.
89 V1.5 p. 24.2-4 (cp. V 1.134 p. 216.1-2, p. 219.6-7), p. 25.2, p. 26.5; V 1.6 p. 27.8-10; TK 1.9 V p. 37.3-8; TK 1.10a V pp. 38.3-39.8; TK 1.11a V p. 40.1; TK 1.112 V p. 184.2; chandah-śabdena param vāk-tattvam āha. (Vrşabha, p. 183.21-22); TK 1.137ab V p. 227.3-4.

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NAKAMURA ON BHARTkHARI 175 Ramakrishna Kavi, M., 1930. "The Discovery of the Author's Vrtti on the Vak yapa diya", Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society, 4.235-241. Ravi Varma. See Bharthari (b) (iii) above. Samba-siva Sastri. See Bhartshari (b) (iii) above. Sreekrishna Sarma, E. R., 1957. "The Words Akrti and Jati in the Mahabhasya", The Adyar Library Bulletin (Madras), 21.54-65. Subramania Iyer, K. A. See Bartshari (b) (i) and (iii) above. Trikandi, TK. See Bharthari (b) above. Tripadi. See Bhartshari (a) above. Vrsabha. See Bharthari (b) (i) above. Vrtti, V. See Bhartshari (b) (i) and (ii) above.