Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia, Dev Kothari
Publisher: Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 1237

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Karmayogi Sri Kesarimalji Surāņā Abhinandana Grantha : Seventh Part
produces maximum balance of good over evil but its breaking. Though Jaina Acāryas allow breaking of the moral rules in exceptional circumstances on utilitarian basis, yet they have warned us time and again that breaking of the rule should not be made common, since it may lead to the weakening of faith in rules which are in a way the basis of social order and living.
The Niśitha Sūtra is a compendium of exceptions to moral rules. This work has very carefully laid down the principles of breaking the rules. This implies that Jaina ethics does not allow superstitious rule-worship but at the same time, holds that scrupulously conscientous caution is to be exercised in breaking the rules. Thus rule-utilitarianism like rule-deontologism does not find favour with Jaina ethics. Rules are merely guiding principles in common circumstances, but when the circumstances are exceptional, we have not to look to rules for making any moral decision, but to situations and particular action from the point of view of producing greater balance of good over evil. This goes to show that every time, as the act-utilitarian suggests, we have not to calculate anew the effects of each and every action on the general welfare.
The whole discussion brings us to the view that both acts and rules relate specific situations and general principles are to be taken into account for deciding the rightness or wrongness of actions. This may be called modified act-utilitarianism which cannot allow a rule to be followed in particular situations when following is regarded as not to have the best possible consequences. This means that Jaina ethics accepts the possibility that sometimes general moral principles may be inadequate to the complexities of the situation and in this case, a direct consideration of the particular action without references to general principles is necessary. Thus, according to the Jaina ethics acts are logically prior to rules and the rightness of the actions is situational. The corrollary of this view is that duty is not self-justifying and that it is not an end in itself. It is good as a means. Its rightness is dependent on the fact of producing a greater balance of good over evil in the universe.
Here, it may be said that rightness or wrongness of an actions does not depend upon the goodness or badness of consequences, but upon the motive or motives from which it is done. We can find reference in Jaina ethical texts wherein good motives are given prime importance for the performance of action producing good consequences. So long as good motives issue in right action productive of good consequences, there is nothing wrong in accepting the dependence of rightness of action on good motives. Jaina ethics seems to tie good motives with the rightness of action producing good consequences. Its conviction is that if there is good motive, like kindness or charitable disposition, right actions are bound to occur. At one stage in man's moral evolution it may be possible, but at ordinary man's level this may not happen. Since Jaina ethics, it seems to me, could not evenly face the problem arising from the fact that sometimes good dispositions are not able to produce right actions, issuing in good consequences it made rightness of action productive of good identical with good motives. But the point is that such actions are not so blameworthy as they would have been if they had been done from bad motives. No doubt the agent deserves praise for acting as he did, but the action is wrong. Jaina ethics seems to confuse that to call an action morally praiseworthy is the same thing as to say that it is right, and to call it morally blameworthy the same thing as to say that it is wrong. '1 In point of fact, these two judgements are not identical. It so often happens that a man may act wrongly from a good motive., i. e., conscientiousness may lead to fanatical cruelty, mistaken
1 Moore : Ethics, p. 116 (Oxford University Press, London)