Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia, Dev Kothari
Publisher: Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 1289

•
68
Karmayogi Sri Kesarimalji Surāņā Abhinandana Grantha : Seventh Part
O4
Wednesdays etc. are all there. They all exist. It is not because of different senses of exist that it is good or bad joke to say in one breath that both Wednesdays and number exist. It is one, if at all, because number and Wednesdays are quite different sorts of things. Hence, it is clear from these statements made by Addis that Ryle himself is confused in using several senses of 'exist'. One main reason why Ryle engages in constructing argument for the existence of minds and bodies is that he wants to assure himself that his belief in the existence of minds and bodies are rationally grounded. But the situation is radically different; the minds and bodies are ontologically different categories and this is also manifested in Rylean analysis of the concept of mind.
Again troubles are many for the philosophers pertaining to the concept of "category". His concept of the category-mistake presupposes a particular concept of category which has specific kinds of features. But unfortunately, he has not given us clear idea as to what he means by "category'. He only says that, a category means a type (analogous to Russell's type which can legitimately be called meaningful within a universe of discourse. What can or cannot be asserted about something will form the boundary line of one category as opposed to other. But such a generalised theory is not applicable to each and everything. If it is accepted as a fact then certainly there may be many categories as there are or there can be actual or possible objects and ideas. Hence, we cannot ever imagine of grouping things together except in the case where the relation of identity holds. For such reason G. J. Warnock in his book Philosophy since 1900 remarks, "If one is not prepared to say what is a category and what the categories there are, can one really be entitld to employ the term category. This statement of Warnock exhibits that Ryle's concept of "category' is incompatible with its nature.
Stuart Hampshire in his review article on The Concept of Mind (Mind 1950) says that "Professor Ryle has from the beginning confused a general feature of common language with a particular metaphysical theory; it is never clear precisely whom he is attacking when he attacks the Ghost and therefore what weapons are appropriate. His own explanations of his method (pp. 1, 8, 16, 17, 21-23) unfortunately involve such notoriouve obscure expressions as ‘Logical Category Logical Type' and 'The sort of thing which is meant by ......... ; obscure, because they at first look like distinctions in actual grammar (see p. 101) but, where attacked with counter examples, turn into some ideal 'Logical grammar' (p. 244); in fact behind this ideal grammar there is implied this literalist theory of language, which betrays itself in many of the arguments used!'. We agree with Hampshire that the purposes of metaphorical statements are only to make sense to spectators to understand some specific concepts. It is never used in literal senses of meaning. It would be a big mistake to use metaphorical statement in literal sense. Ryle could not understand this fact and has taken seases of metaphorical statements in literal senses of meaning which is completely undesirable and unacceptable. Whenever traditional philosophers and followers of the official doctrine have used this term "ghost' for mind, the purpose was only to show that the mind is not perceptible through our naked eyes or empirical instruments. Senses have no power to know it, because all kinds of knowledge presuppose its existence. Hence, as Hampshire has tried to show, it follows that Ryle is not protesting against philosophical theory of mind but against a universal feature of ordinary language itself. Again, in the same article Hampshire proclaims that Ryle himself claims that Categorical-Hypothetical distinction is not sufficient for explaining certain concepts. He himself claims that such translation in case of emotional agitations and soliloquies are not always possible. In the original plan of the book he himself has made Categorical-Hypo
O