Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth

Author(s): Nathmal Tatia, Dev Kothari
Publisher: Kesarimalji Surana Abhinandan Granth Prakashan Samiti

Page 1286

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
. e
d
.
.
.
.
.
RYLE'S CONCEPT OF THE
CATEGORY-MISTAKE
OJAGAT PAL Lecturer in Philosophy, Jain Visva Bhārati.
LĀDNU
The present well-known and widely used phrase, “The Category-Mistake' was coined and introduced by Ryle in The Concept of Mind (C. M. 1949). He employed it in order to point out a serious fallacy which is allegedly involved in a sort of metaphysical thinking, which according to Ryle, is best represented in cartesian philosophy. But it is, nevertheless, not confined to mere pointing out this kind of mistake in the writings of Descartes alone. It is applicable to many instances of similar kinds of philosophizing in pre-and-pose cartesian times. "The Cartegory-Mistake asserts a logical point which is much wider in scope and may be compared with Moore's “Naturalistic Fallacy" and Sankara's concept of Adhyāsa' or 'Superimposition'.
In pointing out the particular examples of the commission of the category mistake', Ryle has in fact, made a good attempt towards dealing with the mind-body problem; but unfortunately, he did not fully succeed and ultimately, opened a bag of troubles for philosophers, of course, there is no doubt that he has provided us with new techniques of analysis to deal with typical controversial philosophical problems. But a careful examination reveals a lot of inconsistencies and incompleteness underlying his basic principle which is itself based on certain untenable assumptions. The purpose of this paper is to show the inconsistencies and shortcomings underlying Ryle's formulation of the concept of the category-mistake and to defend the ontological status of mind, which is different from the body, though mind is indeed typically involved in bodily process. It further makes it difficult to know “mind,' apart from bodily activities. We shall try to explain why Ryle's usual examples do not help us to understand the relation between mind and body. For this purpose, let us, however, start with the presentation of Ryle's views before pointing our own ideas.
Ryle's claim that mind is not the name of another person functioning behind impenetrable screen, it is not the name of another place where work is done or games are played, it is not the name of another tool with which work is done or another appliance with which certain objects are made. Mind does not demonstrate an entity or substance, hidden in the human personality, operating upon human behaviours in certain specific manner. The word 'mind' does not stand for a thing which is located in particular space as is the case with the body. It is only an organised set of functions (thinking, feelings, volitions, emotions, desires, will and so on). Besides these