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as non-different from the Brahman. The relation between the Absolute and the world is to be identity-cum-difference. An advantage of accepting this view is that there is no necessity of denying any one of the felt facts, the world and its cause the Absolute. 53
Again, the unreality of the world cannot be proved. Argument of the Vedantins is that, real is real always, remains constant at all the times and is free from origin and destruction, increase and decrease. But things of the world are subject to constant change, decay and death Thus they are unreal. This Vedantic position can be put in the following syllogistic form : "World is unreal, because it is an apparent reality, that which is apparent is unreal, (as for instance) silver in a shell, therefore, this world is unreal, because of its apparent nature.'54 This word "unreality" of the Vedantins can be understood in three alternative ways : absolute non-existence, mistake for one thing appearing as another and indescribable. The first two meanings are denied by the Vedantins because, the former view leads to asatkhyāti, which is accepted by some Buddhists and latter view is viparitakhyāti, which involves two reals : the thing which is mistaken and the thing as it is mistaken. The third alternative that it means 'indescribability' is also not plausible because everything has corresponding expression for it in language, for instance, 'this is a table', 'this is a Sarala tree' etc. and what gives birth to an expression in language is either an object or a piece of knowledge. Again, an object must be either real or unreal, to deny both the alternatives to a thing is meaningless, only one of them can be denied. If indescribability of thing means 'nihsvabhāvattva' (i.e. un-substantial) i.e., it is not what it appears to be then it leads to vi paritakhyāti. If it is understood in the sense of un-knowability, then the very argument that a thing is un-substantial because it is unknowable indicates that the thing is not absolutely un-knowable. And again, this apparent world cannot be talked about due to unknowability and it cannot be made the subject of the syllogism such as the 'world is unreal, because it is an apparent, etc. If the world is un-knowledge, then it could not be predicated of the world. Thus, unknowability is inconsistent with the hetu i.e., pratiyamánatva, If un-knowability means that a thing is not really as it appears to us, then it cannot be said as un-knowable, because, here, a thing is known differently from what it is, which is again principle of viparitakhyāti un-acceptable to Vedantins.
53 54
A.S., p. 163. (a) S.M., p. 78. (b) Ratnakaravatarika (R.K.), p. 34, ed. Hargovindas, pub. Dharmabhyudaya
Press, Benares, Vira Samvt. 2437.
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