Jaina View of Life

Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Jain Sanskruti Samrakshak Sangh Solapur

Page 38

Approach to Reality
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propositions is well described in Pañcāstikāyasāra of Kundakundācārya and Aptamimamsă of Samanțabhadra. Siddhasena Divā kara, Akalanka and Vidyānandi are among the later writers who have given a systematic exposition of the doctrine.
Syādvāda shows that there are seven ways of describing a thing and its attributes. It attempts to reconcile the contradiction involved in the predications of the thing. It is possible to describe a thing in seven ways.
1. Syād asti asserts the existence of the thing. The word syāt is difficult to translate. It is very often said that it connotes “perhaps' or probability. But it would be more appropriate to say that it refers to the special context. syāt would then mean “in the context'. From the point of view of the substance, place, time and nature, we may say that a thing is. For instance, the jar exists, as it is made of clay in a particular place and time. Thus substance (dravya), attribute (bhāva), time (kāla), and space (kşetra)—from the context of these relations existence and other attributes are predicated. A house exists, i. e., it is a house as builtup and as long as it is occupied for the purpose of residence.
2. But the affirmation of an attribute necessarily involves the negation of its opposite; and such a negation is a logical necessity. Then we get the predication syād nästi. It means in the (other) context the thing does not exist. The jar does not exist if it is to mean that it is made of metal. The house is no longer a house if it be used as a godown. The existence of the house is denied in different contexts. Thus, if existence and non-existence are to be understood in different relations and contexts, there would be no opposition between them. One is a necessary concomitant of the other. These predications are necessary and compatible in another sense. The affirmation of existence and denial of non-existence are meant to rebut the possibility of unqualified and absolute existence and nonexistence. Thus the predications are logically necessary.