Book Title: Jaina View of Life
Author(s): T G Kalghatgi
Publisher: Jain Sanskruti Samrakshak Sangh Solapur

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Page 44
________________ Approach to Reality Syādvāda a variety of scepticism. If all our knowledge concerning reality is relative, they say (the old Indian critics like Samkara, Rāmānuja etc.), the Jaina view must also be relative. To deny this conclusion would be to admit, at least, one absolute truth; and to admit it would leave the doctrine with no settled view of reality, and thus turn it into a variety of scepticism.85 But it may be pointed out that the conditions of doubt are not present in this assertion. For instance, a man sees a tree in the dusk and doubts whether it is a man or a branchless tree. This is due to the lack of determination between the specific features of the object as the perception is faulty. But in the case of the sevenfold presentation the attributes of existence and non-existence are each defined by their specific determinations. The condition of these determinations makes doubt impossible. 29 2. It is said that the sevenfold predication of the Jainas is beset with contradictions. Affirmation and denial of the attribute in the same object is not logically possible. It would be a self-contratiction. In this context we may refer to the criticism of Samkara and Ramanuja. Samkara's criticism can be analysed into three stages. 1) He tries to point out the intrinsic impossibility of the predication because of the inherent contradictions involved in it. Mutually contradictory and conflicting attributes cannot exist together. But if we take into consideration the different contexts referred to, we may say that the contradictions can be easily reconciled. In experience we get examples of co-existing conflicting attributes. For instance, the branches may be in motion but the tree does not move. The same individual may be father in relation to X and son in relation to Y. 2) He points out the futility of the doctrine because the doctrine is indefinite. The unlimited assertion that all things are of non-exclusive nature gives 35. Hiriyanna (M.) The Essentials of Indian Philosophy, (Allen and Unwin) 1949, p. 69. Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only www.jainelibrary.org

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