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THE JAINA GAZETTE contradiction, it seems to us would disappear if we remember that an Atom is said to be of one colour, one taste, etc., only in reference to the gross thing, of which it is a constituent part. A Paramanu in itself, is a potentiality for any of the sense-phenomena. Thus, in the technical terms of the Jaina epistemology, we may say that from the view-point of their Dravya or essential substance, all the atoms are similar and there is no qualitative difference among them but that from the view-point of their Paryaya or modifications in gross material things, an Atom has only one single taste, smell etc. so that there is to be admitted a qualitative difference among the Atoms.
While expounding the above view of ours, we are not unmindful of what Akalanka states in this connection. "The Paramanu," he says, “ is to be known as of one taste, one smell, Why? Because it has no varied parts." He argues that while a peacock, as a gross thing may have different colours you cannot attribute more than one colour to the Atom. Closely viewed, the theory of Akalanka does not go against what we have stated. When he says that a peacock has varied colours, all that he means is that the different parts of a peacock's body have different colours. We agree with Akalanka in admitting that a particular colour,--and no other colour-is to be attributed to those Atoms which constitute that part of the peacock's body which bears that particular colour. But this does not mean that these atoms are eternally of that particular colour only and that they are never capable of producing any other colour. Akalanka must have meant that when those atoms combined to make that parti. cular part of the peacock's body, they developed only that one single colour,-the capacity for producing other colours being allowed to remain dormant rather in abeyance, in them, for the time being.
[To be continued.] HARISATYA BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., B.L.
Shree Sudharmaswami Gyanbhandar-Umara, Surat
www.umaragyanbhandar.com
