Jain Journal 2010 07

Author(s): Satyaranjan Banerjee
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 25

Anupam Jash: The Importance of The Jaina Theory of Anekānta
theory of the other schools of philosophy, provided it is qualifield by ‘syāt.
Let us now examine the standpoints of the anekāntavāda and syādvāda regarding some of the theories of the Indian systems, in light of what we have stated above. With respect to the ultimate reality or substance, the Vedānta says that it is one, the Sāmkhya-Yoga says the reality are two-fold viz, the Praksti or the ultimate material reality and the Purușas or souls, which are many, while according to the Nyāya-Vaisesika, the material atoms as well as the souls, as also Kāla or time, Dik or directions are the ultimate realities. In a way, it may be said that so far as the number of the ultimate realities is concrned, the Vedanta takes a strictly monistic, the Sāmkhya, a dualistic, and the Nyāya, a pluralistic view and each of these schools opposes the others. The Jainas would say that, each of these views is correct to a certain extent and each suffers from one sided partiality. They point out that if by substance we are to mean that which is the basis of all phenomenon's, and then the Vedāntic view that the substance is one is certainly right. But in consideration of the fundamental differences in their nature that is, that between the conscious and the unconscious, a dualism between the psychical and the non-psychical realities is maintainable. In view, again of their exclusiveness of each other, the material atoms, time, etc. are real, as held by the Nyāya-Vaisesika. The difference between the three views about the ultimate reality is thus a difference of standpoints only and the three schools oppose each other, because as the Jainas point out each of them regards its standpoint as the only possible standpoint and forgets that there may be other standpoints as well. From the syādvāda point of view; - 1. The ultimate reality is one (Vedānta) in some respects, 2. It is dual (Sāmkhya) in some respects, 3. It is many-fold (Nyāya) in some respects, as explained above. In the Jaina syādavāda doctrine then, “the validity-to-some-extent', to which each of three schools can rightly lay claim, is acknowledged while their mutual oppositions are avoided. In this way various instances may be given where other philosophical systems, though always taking an absolutist position, leap back from