Indian Society for Buddhist Studies

Author(s): Prachya Vidyapeeth
Publisher: Prachya Vidyapeeth

Page 64

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Epistemology—the concept of pramāņa is refuted, all other knowledge claims made on the basis of pramāņa stand refuted.
While standing against the Naiyayika's position regarding pramāna, Nāgārjuna gives some possible objections which are, again, criticised by Gautama and his successors as well as their answers to the raised Nagarjunian objections are also criticised by the Nagarjunians. The main point of the Nagarjunian objection regarding pramāņa is—how pramāņa as an independent category (padartha) is justified at all? Nāgārjuna argues that if the Naiyayikasstandpoint regarding pramānais justifiable by another pramāna, then they involve to the blemish of infinite regress (anavasthadosa), for to justify the given pramāņa, a special pramāņa is always needed. If, on the other hand, pramāņa is called selfevident, then by the same logic prameya does not require pramāņa for its establishment. If this is accepted, then pramāņa becomes proof of nothing. If to avoid this difficulty, pramāna is considered as privileged and sacrosanct, then it would admit dogmatism, if prameya is not allowed this special treatment. This shows that the role of prumāņa becomes redundant. In reply to Nāgārjuna's objections, the Naiyayikas give the analogy of the weighing instrument (tula) which is, again, criticised by Nāgārjuna and well answered by the Naiyayikas with reference to the light analogy (pradipa). And, it is the follow-up of Nāgārjuna's strong criticism, we find that the later Naiyayikas interpret Gautama's light analogy (pradipa) in different ways, according to the context and also criticised by Nāgārjuna with reference to darkness analogy (lama). And, if pramāna is not established, all claims to the possibility of true and certain cognition (pramā) of the Naiyayikas will fall flat.
In this way, their argumentation is going in the form of thesis and anti-thesis basis. This present paper will concentrate on understanding the moot points of the traditional debate between Gautama and Nāgārjuna regarding pramāņa episode with inherent their methodological approaches, which gives food for thought in the history of development in Indian Philosophy through vada tradition.
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