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Anekanta 139
taken the vow of desisting from committing injury to all sentient beings is a bonafide observer of the vow or a malafide imposter, Mahāvira replied that if such person was incapable of distinguishing bet: ween the sentient and the insentient, or between the mobile and immobile living beings, he is the latter, but otherwise he is a true observer of the vow (op. cit., VII. 2.27). Similarly, on being asked by Jayanti which of the two, viz. slumber and wakefulness, was preferable, he replied that for the sinful, it was the former, while for the virtuous the latter (XII.2./53-55). These and similar instances which are in galore in our text are obviously case of answer by division. It should be noted here that the alternative answers to the divided issues are sometimes introduced in the Agama by the particle siya (Skt, syād) meaning 'in a certain reference'. The expression siyāvāya in the Sūtrakřtānga (1 14.19): na yāsiyāvāya viyāgrejja 'one should not explain anything without taking resort to siyāvāya (Skt, syādvāda, that is the principle of conditional predication)' also deserves mention. It is obviously synonymous with the expression vibhajjavāya noted above and is the forerunner of the syādvāda of later times. This also confirms our view of vibhajyavāda as the earliest phase of anekāntavāda.
3. (b). The Nayas : The nayas (standpoints) constitute the second stage of thc evolution of the concept of anekānta. The earliest and most important way of judging the nature of things was to consider them under four heads viz. dravya (substance) kşetra (space). kāla (time) and bhāva (mode). Thus in the Bhagavati Sūtra (II. 1.45), the loka (inhabited cosmos) is considered as finite in substance and space, but infinite in time and modes. There were also other heads such as guņa (op.cit., II. 10.126), bhāva (XIX. 9.102) and samsthāna (XIV. 7.80) which were analogous to bhāva, But all these heads were not called nayas. The expressions used in connection with the nayas were however dravya and paryāya (equivalent of bhāva). The material atoms are thus stated to be eternal qua dravya (davvaļķhayae) and non-eternal qua paryāya (pajjavebim, XIV. 4-49-50) and the souls are characterized as eternal qua dravya (davvatthayae) and non-eternal qua bhāva (bhāvatthayãe, VII. 2.58-59). Another pair of nayas, viz. avvocchitti naya (Skt avyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of non-interception) and vocchitti-naya (Skt. vyucchitti-naya, the standpoint of interception) are also mentioned in the Bhagavati Sūtra (VII. 3.93-94). Thus the infernal beings are eternal from the standpoint of non-interception (of their existence as souls), but they are non-eternal from the stan
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