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Anekanta 145
ment with such trends of thought as are conductive to the advancement of knowledge and revelation of truth, and fully supports the realistic approach of Udayana to the problem of reality. 6. Umāsvāti, Siddhasena Divākara and Mallyādin, Jinabhadra
and Kundakunda
We have been till now discussing the stages of evolution of the doctrine of anekānta in the Āgamas and its parallels in the literature and schools contemporaneous with them. Now we have arrived at the transition period when the Jaina thinkers were establishing contacts with their counterparts in the alien systems of thought and composing treatises in the Sanskrit language which was then the only powerful medium of conimunication between the intelligentzia. The Prakrit was also of course, along with the Apabhramsa, an important medium. But its influence was gradually waning, although Siddhasena Divākara's Sanmati and the works of Kundakunda and Jinabhadra, written in Prakrit in those days were monumental treatises of abiding value and profound intercst.
6. (a). Umāsyāti : Among Jaina authors of the period of transition, Umāsvāti stands first and foremost. His Tattvärthādhigamasūtra with Bhāsya is a compendium of the Āgamas, which leaves nothing of philosophical importance out of consideration. Its comprehensive thoroughness can be compared with that of the Buddhist Abhidharmakoşa (with Bhaşya) of Vasubandhu. In adition to giving a summary of the traditional lore, Umāsvāti gives a critical shape to the anekāntavāda through his exposition of the nayas, nikşepas and the nature of the sat (a real), and dravya (substance). He also introduces the elements of saptabhange in his own way which is reminiscent of the same in the Bhagavati Sūtra mentioned above. Umāsvāti is not much concerned with the nonJaina views. He raises the question whether the nayas are the proponents of alien pbilosophies or independent upholders of opposition, inspired by diverse opinions, and answers that they are only different estimates (literally, concepts derived from different angles of vision of the object known (Bhāşya, 1.35: kim ete tapträntariya vādina āhosvit svatantrā eva codakapakşagrābiņo matibhedena vipradhävitä iti. Atrocyate, naite tanträntarlyä näpi svatantra matibhedena vipradhävitāḥ, jñeyasya tv arthasyā 'dhyavasāyantarāṇy etāni). It is also asserted in this connection that there is no contradiction between them, just as there is none between
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