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146. First Steps to Jainism
of knowledge, such as perception, inference, comparison and the words of a reliable person (yathā vā partyakşānumanopamånapravacanaiḥ pramāņaireko 'rtbaḥ pramiyate svavisayaniyamāt, na ca tā vipratipattayo bhavanti tadvan nayavādā iti). This is followed by an elaborate desciption of the nayas and their relationship with the epistemological system of early Jainism. Umāsväli's definition of the sat (a real) as consisting of origination, cessation and continuity (V. 29 : utpäda-vyayadhrauvya-yuktam sat) gives the fundamentals of anekāntavāda in a nutshell. The dravya (substance) is defined as 'what is possessed of qualities and modes' (V. 37 : guna-paryāyavad dravyam), indicating the relation of identity-cumdifference between the substatance and the modes (including qualities. The pitya (permanent) is defined as 'what does not lapse from being and would not do so at any time' (Bhāşya, 1.30 : yat sato bhāyān na vyeti na vyeşyati tan nityam iti). All these concepts are brought by Umāsvāti (Bhāşya, 1 31) under four heads--dravyāstika, mātņkāpadāstika, utpannastika and paryāyāstika which appear to stand respectively for the viewpoints of substance, categories of substance, the inmediate present, and the past-cum-future modes. From the first viewpoint, negation does not exist (asannāma nästy eva dravyästikasya), because it takes note of only what is existent and positive in character. Negation appears with the classification of the substance into mātřkäpadas categories), and consiguently here we get both affirmation and negation, (sat and asat), as classification implies both affirmation (inclusion of lower categories under a higher category) as well as negation (mutual exclusion of the categories). The utpannāstika, being concerned withe the immediate present alone is also the negation of the past and the future and as such gives rise to the duality of affirmation and negation. Similarly, the paryāyāstika, which is the viewpoint of the past and the future. is the negation of the present, and as such gives rise to the same duality of affirmation and negation. In the last three cases we also get a third mode which cannot be described either as sat or asat (oa vācyam sad iti, asad iti vā). This is the third bhanga called 'indescribable'. Umāsvāli concludes this discussion with the statementdeśādesena vikalpayitavyam iti, which may imply the remaining four bhangas of the saplabhangi.
6. (b). Siddbasena Divākara : The application of the anekānta principle to ontological problems raised in the different school of philosophy was made, most probably, for the first time by Siddha:
sena. This was done by means of the nayas “Kapil's (Sankhya) Jain Education International For Private & Personal Use Only
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