Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

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HELMUT KRASSER
way. The motivating (pravartaka) cognition, however, is only the previous perception but not samsaya, because the object is the image in perception which already is determined in its general form. Determining the other part or second appearance (akāra) is something that doubt performs in addition (adhika) to the function of perception. Furthermore, it is only this additional appearance which is superimposed by the doubt that is removed (apaniyate) by another, later, valid cognition, but not the function of the previous perception (21,4-22,10).
The above explanations can be related only to those kinds of doubtful cognition which are directed towards the real object of perception. Doubts which do not touch the nature of the object grasped by perception at all for example, when red water is doubted to be either fire or a heap of palasa blossoms obstruct the function of perception. Therefore these perceptions are not valid (24,7-13).
In other words: when, for example, a simśapă tree that is far away is grasped and determined by perception as a mere tree, one is motivated by that perception and acts to obtain that tree. As the tree that is ascertained is not different from the simsapă, one in fact is moving towards that simsapă. If one now doubts if this tree is a simśapă or a dhava tree, this doubt on the one hand incorrectly determines a completely different tree, namely a dhava, and on the other hand it correctly determines the tree that already has been ascertained by the previous perception in its general form more specifically as a simsapā. Thus the function of perception on the "empirical level" (cf. above p. 251) is still "active" and related to the simsapă, although only in its general form. And one expects to obtain either a simśapă or a dhava. Consequently its function is not interrupted or obstructed and it is regarded as valid. However, if one doubts whether this tree is a dhava or a kadali tree, this doubt does not refer to the simśapă at all and one now expects to obtain either a dhava or a kadali, but in fact a simśapā will be obtained. Thus this kind of doubt obstructs the function of the previous perception. Although the previous perception on an "epistemological level" could be regarded as valid since its function of determining the simsapă in its general form has already been performed, Dharmottara is silent on this point. By comparing it