Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

Page 21

DHARMOTTARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
267
This is also the case when one doubts the object as well as when one doubts the validity. He already (22,1-5) stated that if people did not act in the case of a doubt they should have to abstain from acting when there is doubt. But as one can see that they act, a doubt does not prevent them from acting (51,5-14).
In concluding this description of Dharmottara's theory of knowledge I would like to explain, as far as it is possible, the process of cognizing a visible object through a valid perception by showing how the different phases (ksana) of cognition and object are related to each other. Causes like light, etc., which are also necessary in order that something can be perceived are not taken into consideration. The following diagram may serve as a starting point.
A-ki A-k2
A-k3
A-k4
A-kn
arthasantāna
-
0
cittasantāna
C-ki C-K2
C-k3 C-k4
C-kn
A = artha (object)
C = citta (mind)
k = ksaņa (phase)
The first phase of the object (A-ki) produces in C-k2 together with the first phase of cognition (C-ki) a perceptual cognition which consists of the image (pratibhāsa) of the object (A-ki) and lacks conceptual construction. This first phase of perception (C-k2) produces in C-k3 a determining (adhyavasāya) which takes as its direct object the image (pratibhāsa) of the object in C-k2 and determines this as the continuum (santāna) of the object (A-ki - A-kn). Phase C-k2 is that which is regarded as pramāna. In phase C-k3 the function (vyāpāra) of this perception, that is indicating, determining, motivating, etc., is performed. This phase is identical to that of the effect (phala) of this perception. This effect is said to consist on the one hand of "determining" (niscaya) and on the other hand of "activity" (pravrtti). As phase C-k2 which is regarded