Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

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HELMUT KRASSER
only because the incorrect cognition is still "functioning" at that time (cf. above p. 251).
In this connection he vehemently refutes the possibility that the invalidity of the previous incorrect cognition could be inferred on the basis of the later correct perception as a logical mark. And one also cannot base such an understanding on formulations of Dharmakīrti such as PVin I v.2a (pramānetarasāmānyasthiter), which says that valid and invalid cognitions are ascertained as such in their general form, or on PVin I 36,58.25 which says that something, when it is known due to a corresponding similarity, is nothing but an object of inference. For these statements can only be applied to those cognitions the objects of which are not experienced directly (ananubhūtavisaya), but not to all cognitions, i.e. those the objects of which are experienced directly {44,8-45,19).
Dharmottara further refutes an opponent who maintains, with the above mentioned passage PVin I 36,5f. in mind, that when a cognition is determined as valid due to its similarity to a previous cognition, the determining cognition must be an inference (46,1f.. For in that case, he says, we do not think that the later cognition is similar to the previous one, but its validity is determined on the basis of experience (vyavahāra). This means that such a cognition has previously been experienced several times and thus one knows immediately when it takes place that it is correct. On this occasion he distinguishes between two kinds of similarity: a perceivable one (drsya) and an imagined one (kalpita) and shows that neither can be used as logical marks (linga or hetu) in the case under discussion. Moreover, he demonstrates that the fact of the cognition being the effect of the object cannot be inferred but only remembered and that an effect (karya) can by no means be inferred from the cause (kārana) {46,1-51,4).
As a last point in the discussion on prāmānya Dharmottara introduces the objection that there would be the mistake of a mutual dependence (itaretarāśrayadosa) between acting and ascertainment of validity when one doubts the validity of a cognition, for one acts when the cognition is ascertained as valid and the cognition is ascertained as valid after one has acted. He disproves this argument with reference to the fact that a person who aims at something acts towards the thing that shows itself due to the cognition which is endowed with the image (pratibhāsa) of the thing.