Dharmottaras Theory Of Knowledge In His Laghupramanyapariksa

Author(s): Helmut Krasser
Publisher: Helmut Krasser

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DHARMOTTARA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
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(prăpita).”23 Although this statement is not repeated in the Laghupramanyaparikṣā with regard to the necessary concomitance of the cognition with the object, it should also be understood here in that way. For Dharmottara has explained previously (10,13-15}; cf. above p. 250) that a cognition, in order to be pramāna, has to perform its function. And this validity, that of perception as well as that of inference, is related to the real thing (prāmānyam vastuvisayam) {10,6}.
Regarding the ascertainment of validity, Dharmottara holds the position that in some cases it is intrinsic (svatah) and in some extrinsic (paratah). However, he does not treat this problem systematically in this text, discussing only a few cases. He does not even make use of the specific term svatah, and he uses the term parataḥ only once (43,15.24
The question he deals with here at length is whether the “necessary concomitance with the object" (arthāvinābhāvitva) of the cognition, i.e. its validity (prāmānya) or invalidity, is to be inferred, or whether it is known by perception (pratyaksa) {43,9–51,14). In this context he distinguishes between those cognitions the objects of which are experienced directly (anubhūtavisaya), and those where this is not the case. And only when the object is not experienced directly is the necessary concomitance of the cognition with the object to be inferred {44,12—45,4). In all other cases, when the object is experienced directly, the arthāvinābhāva of the cognition is ascertained by perception. This includes cognitions where one doubts the object and thus the necessary concomitance of the cognition (43,13-17), as well as erroneous perceptions (43,1845,19). In these cases, of course, the validity or invalidity is ascertained by another, later, perception. While doubtful cognitions are not treated further, Dharmottara explains that the invalidity of an erroneous cognition that takes a mirage for water is ascertained by the later perception which determines the nature of the sunrays and which arises after one has failed to obtain the water. It should be understood, he states, that the cognition which ascertains the presence of the sunrays simultaneously determines the absence of water; just as a cognition of the absence of a pot from a certain place consists in a perception of that place that lacks a pot (43,18-44,7). That the invalidity of such a cognition is determined on the basis of the later cognition of sunrays is possible