Concept of Jiva in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): J C Sikdar
Publisher: Z_Aspect_of_Jainology_Part_3_Pundit_Dalsukh_Malvaniya_012017.pdf

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J. C. Sikdar
etc., as the opponent of the Ekadesiya Buddhists. 8. It is stated in the Tattvasarngraha that "some people who regard themselves as Bauddhas describe the soul by the name of 'Pudgala' and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from the Skandha, thought-phases."88 That is the Vätsiputriyas postulate the soul under the pretended name of 'Pudgala which cannot be said to be either the same as' or 'different from the thought-phases'. These Sammitiyas or Vātsiputriyas said that there is Pudgala (personality) or Jiva-dravya (Soul-Substance) in a real sense, but when they were asked what is the existential form (astitva rūpa) as such, then they made denial of it. In this way, it is true that the doctrine of Pudgalāsti came up itself within the Buddhist Order. But it could not adjust itself with the basic central point of view of Buddha; at last its name died out consequently.
The doctrine of Pudgala-nairātnya was developing in many forms. The main thought was how could it stand before the advocates of the doctrine of eternal Soul and how could the account for rebirth and bondage, liberation, etc., be made in a comprehensive manner, besides giving reply to the charges of the opponents against it. Out of this thought there emerged Sarvāstivāda (the doctrine of the traikālika existence of all entities). The advocates of this doctrine made the application of 'nāmatattva' (the Principle of consciousness) by the word 'citta' also, and determined this citta (the aggregates of feelings, ideas, volitions and other faculties and pure sensation or consciousness) by dividing it into many co-born new comers (i. e. co-effects or issues and common and uncommon elements. This doctrine of Sarvāstivādins made the subtlest analysis of citta (mind) and of its various conditions or caitasikas (mental faculties), but in spite of adhering to its own fundamental doctrine of momentariness, it established the traikālikatā (the existence of three points of time) of each individual citta (mind) and caitasika (mental faculty) in its own manner by admitting the past and future times.87 For example, "on the ground of the gold continuing to be the same, when it comes to be regarded as something permanent to some Buddhists like Dharmatrāta and others, (they) hold (on the basis of this) that the thing (by itself permanent) passes through diverse states."$ 8
In the face of this view there began again an opposition to this doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins that Buddha was only the advocate of the doctrine of momentariness of entities and the present time, then how could the theory of the three points of time (traikālikatā) be reconciled with that view of the Master ? The admission of the existence of three points of time was only the entrance of doctrine of eternality through the back door. Out of this thought there emerged the doctrine of Sautrāntikas. It maintained the postulation of the entire developed structure of elements of citta-caitasikas (mind and mental faculties) but freed these elements (dharmas) by all means from the fold of the traikālika existence and established its view of only present existence.”
Thus, there went on a strong mutual dispute among the Buddhist in regard to Reality. Some established the doctrine of Sat (Existence); others founded an entirely