Concept of Jiva in Jaina Philosophy

Author(s): J C Sikdar
Publisher: Z_Aspect_of_Jainology_Part_3_Pundit_Dalsukh_Malvaniya_012017.pdf
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/250054/1

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CONCEPT OF "JIVA (SOUL)” IN JAINA PHILOSOPHY
J. C. Sik dar
The Jaina conception of Jiva (Soul) occupies the first place among the doctrines of independent Soul (Svatantrajivavāda); for the Jaina view on soul seems more ancient than those held by other Indian philosophical systems. It, moreover, is comprehensible to the common people. Besides, this “sentient principle” was well established as the object of meditation for liberation of Jina Pārsvanātha in the c. eighth century B. C. In the continuum of Jaina tradition, no fundamental change in the doctrine of soul (which was anciently conceived by the Jaina thinkers through their experience in life and in Nature) came, even up to the present time (unlike in the Buddhist and Vedic traditions in regard to it) even when fresh thoughts on the problem progresively emerged in the field of Indian Philosophy.
The reference to the concept of the six kāyajivas (embodied souls or beings),prthivikāya (earth bodied being), apakāya (water-bodied being), tejakāya (fire-bodied being), vãyukāya (air-bodied being), vanaspatikāya (plant-bodied being) and trasakaya jivas (mobile beings)reveals a belief in animism in Jaina philosophy, indeed a reflection of the old concept of animism which conceived non-difference of Jiva and Sarira (Soul and body).4
There are stated to be many synonyms for Soul-Jiva, Jivāstikāya, prāņa, bhūta, sattā, vijña, cetā, jetā, ātmā, pudgala, mānava, etc. The term poggala (Skt. pudgala) stands as the synonym for Soul, just as it is used in the Buddhist texts to denote Soul or personality, according to the Vätsiputriyas. Jiva is called both poggalī (pudgalī) and poggala (puggala); just as the chatri (holder of umbrella) is known by the chatra (umbrella), the dandin (staff-holder) by the danda (staff ), the ghațrin (pot-holder) by the ghața (pot), the pațin (cloth holder) by the pața (cloth), the karin (elephant) by its kara (trunk), so is known Jiva (Soul) to be pudgalin with regard to the sense-organs of hearing, sight, smell, taste and touch, and it is pudgala with regard to Jiva. According to the commentator Abhayadeva (latter half of the 11th cent. A. D.), Jiva is called pudgala because of integration and disintegration of bodies etc. It seems that there had been a common tradition to use this word 'poggala' or 'puggala' in order to signify Soul or personality before the era of Jina Mahāvira and Gautama Buddha. The definition of Jiva becomes clear by the meanings of its synonymous words; the term 'Jiva' for instance connotes that Soul is consciousness itself and consciousness invariably is Soul. (He) whoever breathes is invariably Jiva (being); but Jiva breathes in some and does not breathe in other respecto, as it is co-extensive with the body. Kundakundācārya (8th cent. A.D.)10 clarifies the point by defining it in this way: “That which is traikālika (lived in the past, lives at present and will

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live in future) with life-essentials,-five senses, three channels of activities, duration of life and respiration,--and is fashioned by the material substance is Jiva (Soul or Sentient Principle)."11
The nature of Jiva is thus explained in the Vyākhyāprajñapti (compiled c. 3rd cent. A. D): Jivástikāya is a colourless, odourless, tasteless, touchless, non-corporeal, living, eternal and permanent, and fixed (constant) substance of the Cosmic Universe, having the attribute of consciousness, 12 Here Jiva is studied from the aspects of dravya (substance), kşetra (field or locus), kāla (time), bhāva (condition or state) and guņa (capacity or quality) in regard to its correlation with them. In it is infinite living substances (anamtāim jivadavvāim) from the standpoint of dravya; coextensive with the space of the Cosmic Universe (Lokapramāņa) from that of kşetra; eternal and permanent from that of kāla; colourless, odourless, tasteless and touchless from that of bhāva; and, finally, it is endowed with an attribute of consciousness from that of guņa, (capacity or quality). 's On the basis of the Āgamic explanation of the nature of Jiva, Umāsväti (c. 5th cent. A. D.) and the later exponents clearly define it by stating that Soul is permanent in nature, fixed in number, non-corporeal in substance and hence devoid of the characteristics of Matter, namely colour smell, taste and touch.14
Jiva is infinite in number and it is different on account of the difference of body; for, in the universe, there are infinite number of living beings having infinite different bodies. 15 The doctrine of plurality of souls, having a unity running through them as substances in regard to their substantiality of existence, is advocated in Jaina philosophy, because, it is observed that two or more sentient beings are individual observers and transformers of food; and they bind (i. e, make) separate bodies and assimilate matters or "form bodies” independently. They differ with regard to their respective senses, conditions of soul, attitude of mind, knowledge, and activities. For example, some of them have this consciousness or sentiency (such as “we absorb food-stuff'), while some of them do not have this feeling, but still they take food and so forth.16
There are countless points of space in one single soul-substance because of its coextensiveness with Lokākāśa (Universe) by expansion.17 “Pradeśa is the unit of three dimensional space which is employed in the measurement of the dimensions of the substance of the Universe. Taking this as the measure, the number of pradeśas in the Universe is said to be countless. The media of motion and rest are coextensive with the Universe and thus have a similar number of pradešas. Souls are found in different bodies of different dimensions in their mundane state, but each one of these has the capacity of expanding and filling the whole Universe by contraction and expansion of its pradeśas; a soul is capable of occupying the countless pradeśas of the Universe just like the flame of a lamp whose light can fill either a small room or a big hall”. 18 Thus the number of pradeśas in each individual soul is equal to the number of pradeśas in
the Universe, namely countless pradeśas. Jain Education national

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Among many capacities of Soul the main and most comprehensib'e of all the jñānasakti (capacity of knowledge), viryakakti (capacitiy of striving energy), samkalpasakti (capacity of volition or desire) and śraddhāśakti (capacity of right attitude of mind or belief). These capacities are non-different from it. In the machine of human body. one feels the experience of another agency which defies the laws of nature, space, and time; there is something which is not physically analysable but is distinct from the object. So it is explained in the Jaina Agama that Jiva is endowed with energy, exertion, action, strength, effort and vigour, and it manifests its sentiency (Jivabhäva) by the state of itself,20 because Soul having an inherent attribute of consciousness attains. cognition of Infinite modes of all kinds of knowledge and those of wrong knowledge, those of self-awareness, etc. 1
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As to the point that the capacities of Jiva are non-different from it, the Jaina Agama explains that Soul is knowledge" i. e. endowed with right knowledge in some respect and is also wrong knowledge. i. e. possessed of wrong knowledge in other respect and knowledge itself is invariably Soul, for consciousness (upayoga) is its inherent. quality. Similarly, self-awareness (as one aspect of consciousness) and outside objects are correlated, because Soul is possessed of the capacity of taking note of the natural external objects; it is the 'knower'. It is also invariably self-awareness (darsana) and self-awareness is invariably Soul itself."
In Jaina Philosophy Soul is studied from the following eight aspects of its capacities, namely dravyātmā (soul as substance), kaṣāyātmā (Soul actuated by passion), yagātmā (soul endowed with activity), upayogātmā (soul endowed with consciousness), jñānātmā (soul possessing knowledge), darkanātmā (soul possessing self-awareness). caritrātmā (soul existing in conduct) and viryätmā (soul endowed with energy).24 It manifests itself in and through these stages of life. There exists psychologically an inter-relation among these eight aspects of Soul, for they are interconnected as different. aspects of one and the same Soul-Substance. As for example, he who has dravyätmä has in some respect kaṣāyātmā and he has not got it in other respect. But he who is endowed with kaṣāyātmā has invariably dravyätmä,25
Life-essentials of Soul are represented by five senses, mental, vocal and bodily activities, duration of life and respiration. Whatever things and behaviours it makes, such as samskäras (forces), etc. are reflected in it, one fine material body (paudgalik sarlra) containing an impression of these forces is being formed by it, and that body. exists with it, i. e. accompanies it at the time of taking up another new body, 27 changing entity Soul always vibrates in different forms, moves further and goes to all directions, then it enters into the world; it agitates and transforms those conditions of living beings. Soul is the agent of all acts of beings, for 18 kinds of sinful acts (act of killing up to the perverted attitude of mind) and the acts of desistance from them, different states of it (bhava), perception (avagraha), retention (dhäraṇā), exertion, action, etc., up to determinate and indeterminate consciousness of being do not take place without it."

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Jiva (Soul) experiences pleasure, pain, life and death through the agency of Pudgala (Matter).80 "From the empirical point of view a worldly soul draws in fine karmic matter in consequence of the activities of mind, body and speech and experiences their results.”81 Here Jaina metaphysics throws light upon the theory of transmigration of Soul in terms of karmic matter an extraordinary conception which is not found in any other Indian system of thought. While commenting on the aphorism "Sukha-duḥkhajivitamaranopagrahāśca” of the Tattvārthādhigama-Sūtra, Pūjyapāda Devanandi explains that "Not only is Matter the basis of pleasure, pain, life and death but one piece of Matter is capable of producing physical and chemical changes in another piece of Matter. This fact is connoted by the word "upagraha” in the Sūtra. The examples cited here are the purification of bronze by the addition of certain ashes, the purification of water by the addition of an organic substance nirmali and tempering of steel with the help of water."32
Jiva, even being conscious and non-corporeal, becomes corporeal by its only activity of collected (formed) corporeal body upto the moment of the existence of such body.33 In regard to the relation of Soul with mind, speech and body, it is explained that speech and mind are non-soul, i, e. matters, for they are corporeal, non-conscious and non-living, and are associated with the spiritual being-Soul.34 As to its relation with body it is defined that Soul is body, i. e, identical with it, when the former exists in the latter, and non-soul (No-ātā) is also body. It is both corporeal and non-corporeal, conscious and non-conscious, living and non-living and it is of beings and non-beings also.35 The body was destroyed in the past, it exists and undergoes transformation at present, and it will undergo transformation in future into the gross physical, gross physicai-cum-translocation, transformation, transformation-cumtranslocation, translocation, translocation-cum-karmic, and karmic bodies 36 in association with the spiritual being or self, i. e. Soul, for the dehin (possessor of body) existing in eighteen kinds of sinful acts up to determinate and indeterminate consciousness is Jiva and the very Jiva is known to be Jivātmā (Soul of being).37
Umāsvāti explains that "The mundane souls help each other.'88 Ācārya Pūjyapāda, while commenting on the aphorism “Parasparopagraho jivānāṁ" of Umāsvāti, makes it clear that the master and his servant, the teacher and the taught are the examples of mutual obligation. The master helps the servant with money and the servant repays it through his humble service; a teacher renders a great service through his sound training and advice, while the taught repays it through his good conduct."89
According to the body, parimāņa (dimension or extent) of Soul decreases and increases. The decrease and increase of its parimāņa do not affect its fundamental substantiality; its basic essence remains the same as it is; only its parimāņa increases or descreases due to the difference of nimitta (cause). This is one kind of pariņāmavāda (doctrine of transformation) and it is also Pariņāminit yatāvāda (doctrine of permanence-in-change). Its other aspect is the decrease and increase of the mani.

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festation of the quality or capacity (or power) of Soul. Even though the fundamental capacity or inherent quality remains the same in its basic form, still there takes place less or more degrees of purity and impurity (śuddhi and aśuddhi) in it as a result of effort (puru şārtha). It becomes of the nature of permanence-in-change of the capacity.40
It is revealed in the Vyākhyāprajñapti that the soul of an elephant and that of an insect (kunthu) are equal and same in respect of Soul-substance, although their bodies are different in size and extent.1 Soul pervades the body in which it exists, e. g. the whole bodies of tortoises, allegators, cows, men, buffaloes, etc., and even their inner parts cut into pieces are pervaded by the pradeśas (units) of their respective souls.4 2 “Souls are existent in every iota of space beginning with one or more countless fractions of it up to the whole universe, i. e. if space is divided into countless points, the size of a soul can be so small as to occupy one or more of these points of space and in special cases the size of a single soul can fill the whole universe."43 la the Universe there is no such a place where there is no existence of souls having fine or gross bodies. 44 This view of Jaina philosophy on the nature of Soul has been severely criticised by Acārya Sankara with the following arguments that if a soul is equal in extent to its body, it is impossible that the same soul can enter into the bodies of a fly and an elephant.45 In fact, there is controversy amongst the philosophers regarding the precise part of the body which should be assigned as the seat of the Soul. Some think it is located in the heart; according to others, it is located in the head or in some specific brain centre. If this view is accepted, it is difficult to think how one could feel the bodily affections as its own. Since body grows from a microscopical size in the mother's womb to its full proportions to reincarnate into a new seed, it follows that the size of the soul cannot remain fixed.
In the multitude of souls ( jīvarāśi) the inherent capacity of soul is accepted as one (equal); nevertheless, the manifestation of each one is not as such. It is conditional upon the strength of its efforts (puruṣārtha) and other causes. This problem is dealt with in a round about way in the Vyākhyāprajñapti in this manner that there are stated to be eight aspects of Soul, namely dravyātmā (soul as substance), kaṣāyātmā (soul having passion), yogātmā (soul having activity), upayogātmā (soul endowed with consciousness), jñānātma (soul endowed with knowledge), darśanātmā (soul endowed with self-awareness), cāritrātmā (soul existing in conduct), and vīryātmā (soul endowed with energy).16 It means that the basic capacity of Soul is one, namely consciousness, but it manifests itself in and through these stages. Soul is neither heavy nor light in regard to the weight of the material substance which maintains a specific gravity.4? It is imperishable, immortal and impenetrable; none can cause pain or destruction to it nor can cut its inner points (units) by touching it with hand or cutting it with a sharp weapon or burning it with fire; no weapon can enter into it. +8 The same views in regard to its imperishability, immortality and impenetrability are embodied in the Srimad Bhagavadgitā in this way: "The soul is never born nor

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dies; nor does it exist on coming into being for, it is unborn, eternal, everlasting and primeval; even though the body is slain, the soul is not.4 9 Weapons cannot cut it nor can fire burn it; water cannot drench it nor can wind make it dry 50, for this soul is incapable of being cut; it is proof against fire, impervious to water, and undriable as well."51
It is explained in the Vyākhyāprajñapti that Soul is eternal from the point of view of time (kāla) and non-eternal from that of the state of existence (gati), as it is studied from its substantial and modal aspects, for it was in the past, is at present and will be in future, i. e. it is traikālika, and it undergoes change or transformation (pariņāma) from one birth to another respectively.52 The similar view is also embodied in Srimad Bhagavadgitā: "This soul is eternal, omnipresent, immovable, constant and everlasting” 03 “As a man, discarding worn-out clothes, takes other new ones, likewise the embodied soul, casting off worn-out bodies, enters into others which are new. 54
Soul in finite from the aspects of dravya (substance) and kşetra (field or locus) and infinite from those of kāla (time) and bhāva (condition), because it is one single substance from the point of view of dravya and it is possessed of countless points (pradeśas) and immersed in countless points of space of the Universe from that of kşetra; and it is infinite from that of kāla and bhāva, for it is traikālika and endowed with infinite modes of knowledge, self-awareness, conduct, neither heaviness nor lightness, etc. 65
In a nutshell the nature of Jiva conceived in Jaina Philosophy is this that it is supersensuous, imperishable, immortal, impenetrable, non-corporeal, eternal as well as non-eternal, infinite but also finite, and dynamic in nature. It is to be observed here that there is the sameness of Jaina Ātmatattva (Principle of Soul) all along the course of its development. The tradition of Jina Pärsvanātha and Jina Mahävira regarding Soul is continuing up to the present day, but the concept of Soul has changed to some extent, as is evidenced in the evolution of the doctrine "Tajjivam tacchariram” and that of the theory "Tam jivam tam sariram". In the early period the common people had simple thoughts and views : "That which is Jiva (Soul) is šarira (body).” Following this conception Cārvāka maintains that Jiva (conscious being) and sarira (body) do not exist after death, for he did not accept the doctrine of rebirth. But the Jainas admit soul as distinct from body and the theory of rebirth; hence they also accept both gross and fine bodies. As a result, they conceive the idea of the fine body (Kārmaņaśarira) from the doctrine of rebirth of Jiva and accept the gross body, together with soul, from the conception of the prthivikāya (earthbody) up to the vanaspatikāya (plant-body) and trasakāyika (body of mobile being). But later on it is found that body and soul of worldly beings ( saṁsāriņaḥ ) are nondifferent. 56 Gradually the concept of Jivātmā and Paramātmā also was accepted by them. Consequently, they admit the degree (or difference=tāratamya) of the mind of the one-sensed being. In the current of thought of men there took place the

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birth of meditation as a result of which the fourteen stages of spiritual development (guņas thāna) was considered for the spiritual attainment, for when they accepted rebirth, then there arose the question of karmakānda (action), pāpa (demerit or vice) and punya (merit or virtue), svarga (heaven) and naraka (hell), austerity and meditation on Soul.
The Jaina view and the Sāmkhya-Yoga conception of the nature of Soul
The study of the Samkhya-Yoga system of thought reveals that like Jaina Philosophy it accepts each individual soul endowed with beginningless and endless inherent consciousness.67 It admits the existence of infinite souls (i. e. plurality of souls) by conceiving soul as distinct due to the difference of body. That is to say, “The plurality of the spirits is established, because birth, death and organs are allotted separately, because there is no activity at one time, and because there are different modifications of the three attributes"8
The Jaina and Samkhya-Yoga systems differ on the point that the latter does not admit Soul's capacity of contraction and expansion as being equal to the extent of the body or pariņāmitva (changeability) in consciousness from the point of view of substance as maintained by the former, but both of them accept the reality of consciousness (cetana-tattva) as unchangeable permanent (kuțasthu-lutya), eternal and all-pervading. The Samkhya-Yoga philosophy does not conceive any kind of guņa (quality or attribute) or possibility of dharma (characteristic or change in Jivatativa (Sentient Principle) because of non-acceptance of kartstva-bhoktstva (doership and enjoyership) and gunuguņi-bhava (relation of attribute and substratum of attribute), or dharmadharmi-bhāva (relation of characteristic and possessor of characteristic), just as the doership and enjoyership in Soul, the decrease and increase or change in Quajities (gunas) as purity and impurity in it are found in the Jaina tradition. The Samkhya says: "And from that contrast it follows that the spirit is endowed with the characteristics of witnessing, isolation, indifference perception, and inactivity. Therefore, the non-intelligent linga becomes as if intelligent on account of its contact with that (spirit). And although the activity belongs to the Attributes, yet the indifferent (spirit) seems as if it were an agent”.55
Jaina metaphysics admits one material subtle body being formed around Soul, for it is regarded as the receiver of the impression of all karma-pudgalas (karmic matters) fallen on it as a result of auspicious or inauspicious mental effort or apprehension (adhyavasāya). That material body (kārmaņa-śarira) becomes the container or the medium (material agency) of Soul from one birth to another. In the Sāṁkhya-Yoga system, inspite of having accepted Soul or consciousness itself as unchangeable or immutable (apariņāmi), indifferent spectator (alipta), devoid of

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doership and all-pervading, the conception of each individual subtle body (lingasarira) per self (purusa) has been made to the cause of its rebirth. That subtle body itself only is the doer and enjoyer, the substratum of qualities, such as, knowledge and ignorance, merit and demerit, etc., like the soul of Jaina Philosophy; and it is having change as its decrease and is endowed with the capacity of contraction and expansion just as the Soul of the Jaina system possesses. In short it can be said that except the inherent capacity of consciousness, all those whatever characteristics (dharmas), quality (guna) or modification (pariņāma) are existent in the Soul of Jaina metaphysics are accepted in the intellect (buddhitattva) or subtle body (lingasarira), of the Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy. "The subtle body (lingasarira), formed primevally, unimpeded, permanent, composed of intellect and the rest down to the subtle elements incapable of enjoyment, migrates and is endowed with disposition."""
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According to Jaina Philosophy, Soul, though non-corporeal in its natural state, can become 'corporeal' in actuality by the non-different relation (tädätmya-yoga) of the corporeal karmic body, while the Sentient Principle (cetana-tattva) of the SamkhyaYoga is accepted to so much extreme point of view that no impression (reflection) of the non-living substance or of corporeal subtle physical matter, which always exists in its contact, falls on it, but the reflection of Purusa (Self) on the transparent intellect (buddhi-tattva) and that of the characteristic existing in the intellect (buddhigatadharma) on Puruşa (Self) are admitted by this system of thought because of their mutual relation of nearness (sannidhya), it is only supposed to be unreal and phenomenal for this reason. As for example, just as there does not take place any real shadow or impression of a portrait (citra) on the looking glass or mirror (ākāśa), just so the impression of Puruşa (Self) on the intellect (buddhi-tattva) and vice versa should be regarded. "Therefore, not only (spirit) is bound or liberated, nor (does any) migrate. It is the Nature, abiding in manifold forms that migrates or is bound or liberated,"
The Jaina metaphysics accepts such capacities like knowledge, energy, selfawareness, etc., while the Sämṁkhya-Yoga regards them as existing in the subtle body. like intellect (buddhi-tattva), but not as inherent in the self (cetana-tattva).
In the Jaina system of thought, even though there being the capacity of each. individual soul as equal, its manifestation is accepted according to the effort (puruşartha) and cause (nimitta). Similarly, in the Samkhya-Yoga the subtle body or the intellect is regarded as the cause. That is, although all the intellects are having equal capacity in the natural form, still again, their manifestation is conditional upon the strength of distinction between body and Soul, effort and other cause."
The Jaina-Samkhya Views and the Nyaya-Vaiseṣika Conception of the Nature of Soul Like the Samkhya-Yoga Philosophy, the Nyaya-Vaiśeşika conceives beginningless and endless, infinite soul-substances as distinct by the difference of body; but having not accepted Soul as intermediate dimension (madhyama parimaņa) like the Jaina

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metaphysics, this system admits it as all-pervasive just as the Samkhya-Yoga regards it.& 8 The Nyāya-Vaišeşika, having denied the idea of madhyama-parimana or contraction and expansion of Soul, accepts it as unchangeable permanent (küțastha-nitya) 67 from the point of view of substance like the Samkhya-Yoga, otherwise in that case it would have been non-eternal. Nevertheless, the Nyāya-Vaišesika agrees with Jaina Philosophy in regard to the relation of quality and substance (guņa.guņi or dharmadharmi) having fallen apart from the Samkhya-Yoga system in this respect, which accepts cetana (Self) as partless and devoid of any kind of quality (guna) or characteristic (dharma). It accepts Soul as the substratum of many qualities.68 In spite of there being its agreement with Jaina metaphysics in this respect, the NyāyaVaiseșika appears to differ from the former in other respects.
The Jaina Philosophy, having accepted inseparable capacities like inherent eternal consciousness, bliss, energy, etc., in soul, admits theit ever newer modes at every moment, whereas the Nyāva-Vaišeșika system does not admit such inseparable inherent eternal capacities like consciousness (cetanā), etc. in the Soul-Substance; nevertheless, it accepts knowledge, bliss, pain, desire, hatred, effort, merit, and demerit, etc., as the qualities possessed by Soul.60
The existence of these qualities continues up to the relation (i. e. existence) of the body and they are produced and destroyed. 70 These nine qualities of the SoulSubstance, namely intelligence, bliss and others conceived by the Nyāya-Vaiseșika are of the status of the modes of the inherent capacity of Soul as formulated in Jaina Philosophy. Nevertheless, the basic difference between these two systems is that, according to the latter, the pure mode or transformation of the capacities like inherent consciousness (or sentiency) bliss, energy, etc., in the Soul-Substance or the continuous whole of their modes in it is taking place even in such state of its liberation when released from the body (videha-muktāvastha) also, though there may not be the physical relation, connection or activity (śarira-yoga), whereas from the NyāyaVaišeşika point of view there is no possibility of any such pure or impure, momentary or permanent qualities like intelligence (buddhi), etc., in the Soul-Substance at the state of liberation from the body or the separation from the body, 71 because this philosophy does not accept the capacities like inherent consciousness, etc., in it like Jaina metaphysics. Here, though the Nyāya-Vaišeșika Philosophy agrees with the Sāṁkhya-Yoga on one point, it differs from the latter on the others
The Sāmkhya-Yoga system accepts the Self as absolutely partless (niramśa) and unchangeable, permanent in itself (kūțastha-nitya) anl self-manifested consciousness (svayam-prakāśa-cetana-rūpa). Hence, just as this philosophy regards it is devoid of any kind of relation of qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc. in the worldly condition, so it is in the liberated state, whereas the Nyāya-Vaiseșika philosophy does not accept Soul as natural consciousness; nevertheless, it conceives Soul as endowed with the qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc. in the physical condition. But at the time of

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liberation, because of there being the absence of such qualities in it, Soul becomes devoid of qualities (nirguna) in one respect just like the Self (Purusa) of the SamkhyaYoga. That is to say, in the liberated condition?? Soul, having been bereft of qualities with the marks of origination and destruction by all means, becomes attributeless substance like the Self (Purusa) of the Samkhya-Yoga. Similarly, according to the NyāyaVaišeşika philosophy, the liberated Soul becomes ākāśa-kalpa. But between these two systems, the difference is this much only that ākaša, being a non-corporeal even, is accepted as material (bhautika),78 while Soul is non-corporeal and non-material. There is no iota of difference between the emancipated soul and ākāśa (space or ether) from the point of view of the absence of inherent consciousness and the qualities like buddhi (intelligence), etc., or of their modes. Ākāśa is one single whole, while the liberated Soul is infinite in number. This numerical difference comes into thought.
The Nyāya-Vaišeșika system has the remarkable similarity and dissimilarity with the Jaina and Sāṁkhya-Yoga Philosophies in regard to many other aspects of the nature of Soul. Jaina metaphysics accepts the natural doership and enjoyership in Soul; so do the Nyāya-Vaišeşika admit such capacities in it. But the doership and enjoyership of Soul of the former system continue even in its perfect liberated condition, while such is not the case with the latter.74 So long there is the body, the origination and destruction of the qualities like knowledge (or intelligence), desire, etc., take place in Soul, there exist the doership and enjoyership in it up to the end 78, but there does not remain any trace of them in its liberated state. Similarly, Soul as conceived in the Nyāya-Vaišeşika becomes identical with the Self (Puruşa) of the Sāmkhya-Yoga in its liberated condition.
The concept of the doership and enjoyership in Soul of the Nyāya-Vaišeșika is of different kind. It accepts the Soul-Substance as unchangeable permanent (kūtasthanitya); hence the doership and enjoyership of any kind can not be explained to take place in it directly. For this reason, this philosophy brings about such doership and enjoyership in it by accepting the origination and destruction of the qualities in it. It says: “When there is the inherence of the qualities like knowledge, desire, effort, etc., in the soul, then it is the doer and enjoyer."76 But in the absence of these qualities by all means in the liberated condition of Soul, there does not exist any perceptible or conceivable doership and enjoyership in it. Nevertheless, such usage was made from the point of view of the past.
Like the Jaina system the Nyāya-Vaišeşika, even having accepted the doership and enjoyership of Soul, can explain its kūțastha-nit yatā (unchangeable permanence), for, according to its views, the qualities like knowledge, etc. are by all means distinct from it (Soul-Substance). Therefore, there take place origination and destruction of its qualities, even then this system brings about its absolute permanence conceived by its own theory because of the view of distinction of the quality and its substratum. The Samkhya tradition does not accept the existence of any kind of qualities in the Self for explaining its absolute permanence. And there where comes up the question of change
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or another state brought about by the relation of another one, it is done or devised by this system analogically or imaginatively. Whereas the Nyāya-Vaišeşika explains the absolute permanence of Soul by another method. It has admitted the qualities as inherent in the Soul-Substance; even though they are subject to origination and destruc tion, still this system has denied any kind of real change in the substratum-substance, taking place due to them. Its argument is this that the quality is by all means different from the substratum-substance, hence its origination and destruction are neither the origination and destruction nor another state of the Soul-Substance. In this way the Sāṁkhya-Yoga and Nyāya-Vaišeșika systems propounded the theory of the unchangeable permanence of the real entity-Soul in their respective manners, but the basic current of the doctrine of absolute permanence in regard to it is preserved as one and the same in these two traditions.
Like the Jaina Philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaišeşika accepts this view also that saṁskāra (impression or force of the past action) of a being falls on the Soul-Substance because of the auspicious and inauspicious or pure and impure actions of an individual being, but as the Jaina system explains the fine material body (kārmaņa-śarira) having the reflection or shadow (chāyā) of that samskāra (impression or force), the Nyāya. Vaišeșika does not do so, nevertheless, it had to conceive something because of its accepting the doctrine of rebirth of Soul. In accordance with this view it admits that Soul cannot go and come on account of its being all pervasive, but one atomic mind?? (or atom-like mind) is associated with each soul; it goes by moving to the place of taking up another body on the destruction of one body (i.e. the previous body). This change of place by the mind is the rebirth of Soul. According to the Jaina Philosophy, Soul itself goes to another place of its rebirth along with its subtle material body (kārmaņa-śarira), while the Nyāya-Vaišeşika maintains that the meaning of rebirth is not the change of place of Soul, but the change of place of the mind.
Here the process of determining rebirth of the Samkhya-Yoga system compares well with that of the Nyāya-Vaišeşika, for the former conceives that the intellect (buddhi) or the subtle body (linga-sarira) which is the substratum of the qualities like merit and demerit, etc., and which being madhyama-parimāņa (intermediate dimension) is also motive at the time of death; it goes from one place to another by giving up the gross body, 18 while the Nyāya-Vaišeșika, having accepted eternal atomlike mind as motive, but not such subtle body of the Samkhya-Yoga, has accounted for the process of rebirth of Soul. According to Jaina metaphysics, Soul has been admitted as making movement with the subtle karmic body for rebirth, but there is no place for capacity of making any kind of motion in Soul conceived in the SāmkhyaYoga and Nyāya-Vaišeșika systems of thought. They maintain that the rebirth of Soul means the going and coming of its upādhi (attribute).
Like the Jaina Philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaišeșika admits the real elevation or rise and fall of Soul according to the dimension-magnitude of knowledge, belief (right

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attitude) and energy, i. e. effort or purity-impurity of human effort in it, but not like the Samkhya-Yoga tradition, as supposed by the relation of the attributive subtle body.?!
The Nature of Soul : Buddhist View
In order to deal with the nature of Soul in the Buddhist Philosophy, it is to be noted that the central idea of Lord Buddha that he could not perceive the permanence of any entity or substance made a tremendous influence on the later entire retinue of his followers. So, one undivided theory in regard to the nature of Soul did not remain fixed in the Buddhist Nikāyas as it happend in the case of the Jaina, SāmkhyaYoga, and Nyāya-Vaišeşika systems of thought.
In the history of the Buddhist Philosophy or the Buddhist determination of reality in regard to the nature of Soul there are found five divisions: (1) Pudgalanairātmyavāda, (2) Pudgalāstivāda, (3) Traikālika-dharmavāda and Vartamāna. dharmavāda, (4) Dharma-nairātmya or Nihsvabhāva or Sūnyavādá, and (5) The Vijñanavāda.co The Pali Pitaka says in one voice that the reality whose determination the other thinkers make in the form of Soul is like the momentary combination of mutually undivided feelings, ideas, volitions and other faculties and pure sensation or general consciousness." That is to say, there is no Soul apart from feelings, ideas, volitions, etc.92 The Buddhists make mention of it by the term 'nāma'. In the Upanişads88 the words 'näma-rupa' appear jointly and also a reference is there that any fundamental reality manifests itself in the nature of nāma (name) and rūpa (form). Lord Buddha did not accept any such different fundamental reality from which there may be the manifestation of nāma, but he admitted 'nāma' as an independent reality like the rupa; and this reality also is beginningless and endless because of being first indicated as aggregate (samghāta-rupa) and bound in issues (santatibaddha). Prof. Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya this way explains the point : "By name 'nāma' we understand primarily the mind (citta, vijñāna, manas (consciousness) and secondarily the mentals (caitasika dharmas), i. e. feeling, perception, and the co-effects of consciousness (vedana, samjna, samskära). As the mind with the mentals 'inclines' (namati) towards its objects, it is called nāma”. 84 It can be observed in the evidence of the Pitaka that the stream of the aggregate of feelings, ideas, volitions and other faculties and consciousness is continuously flowing.
This theory is known as Pudgala-nairātmyavāda because of there being no place of the permanent reality of the Soul-Substance (Pudgala dravya) in this consciousnesscentred current. But on the other side, there were four groups of the Buddhist order and many of the advocates of the doctrine of eternal Soul. When there might have begun the charge of Soullessness (nairātmya) from their quarters (four groups of the Buddhist order) and some people holding the view of the doctrine of eternality of Soul, might have joined the Buddhist order, then they again established the doctrine of Soul in their own manner. This doctrine is met with is the Kathāvatthu; the Tattvasaṁgraha

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etc., as the opponent of the Ekadesiya Buddhists. 8. It is stated in the Tattvasarngraha that "some people who regard themselves as Bauddhas describe the soul by the name of 'Pudgala' and declare it to be neither the same as, nor different from the Skandha, thought-phases."88 That is the Vätsiputriyas postulate the soul under the pretended name of 'Pudgala which cannot be said to be either the same as' or 'different from the thought-phases'. These Sammitiyas or Vātsiputriyas said that there is Pudgala (personality) or Jiva-dravya (Soul-Substance) in a real sense, but when they were asked what is the existential form (astitva rūpa) as such, then they made denial of it. In this way, it is true that the doctrine of Pudgalāsti came up itself within the Buddhist Order. But it could not adjust itself with the basic central point of view of Buddha; at last its name died out consequently.
The doctrine of Pudgala-nairātnya was developing in many forms. The main thought was how could it stand before the advocates of the doctrine of eternal Soul and how could the account for rebirth and bondage, liberation, etc., be made in a comprehensive manner, besides giving reply to the charges of the opponents against it. Out of this thought there emerged Sarvāstivāda (the doctrine of the traikālika existence of all entities). The advocates of this doctrine made the application of 'nāmatattva' (the Principle of consciousness) by the word 'citta' also, and determined this citta (the aggregates of feelings, ideas, volitions and other faculties and pure sensation or consciousness) by dividing it into many co-born new comers (i. e. co-effects or issues and common and uncommon elements. This doctrine of Sarvāstivādins made the subtlest analysis of citta (mind) and of its various conditions or caitasikas (mental faculties), but in spite of adhering to its own fundamental doctrine of momentariness, it established the traikālikatā (the existence of three points of time) of each individual citta (mind) and caitasika (mental faculty) in its own manner by admitting the past and future times.87 For example, "on the ground of the gold continuing to be the same, when it comes to be regarded as something permanent to some Buddhists like Dharmatrāta and others, (they) hold (on the basis of this) that the thing (by itself permanent) passes through diverse states."$ 8
In the face of this view there began again an opposition to this doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins that Buddha was only the advocate of the doctrine of momentariness of entities and the present time, then how could the theory of the three points of time (traikālikatā) be reconciled with that view of the Master ? The admission of the existence of three points of time was only the entrance of doctrine of eternality through the back door. Out of this thought there emerged the doctrine of Sautrāntikas. It maintained the postulation of the entire developed structure of elements of citta-caitasikas (mind and mental faculties) but freed these elements (dharmas) by all means from the fold of the traikālika existence and established its view of only present existence.”
Thus, there went on a strong mutual dispute among the Buddhist in regard to Reality. Some established the doctrine of Sat (Existence); others founded an entirely

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opposite doctrine of Asat (Non-Existence); some did both; some established the theory of anubhava (experience or realization). Similarly, many groups, holding Reality as permanent, non-permanent, both (permanent and non-permanent), not-both and one, many, both one and many), not-both, etc., were continuing. It appeared to Nāgārjuna that it was not proper to fall in the line of these groups in accordance with the middle path of Buddha. This thought led him to the direction of Reality (tattva) which was free from these catuṣkoțis (groups or points of disputation). And consequently he established Sünyavāda (the doctrine of essencelessness or voidness of all appearances) out of this deliberation. 'Sünya' means dharma-nairātmya or niņsvabhāvatā. It was not the middle path to be bound in any Dharmin (substratum) or Dharma (element) and in this or that side. That which is Transcendental Reality is free from points of disputation or groups (catuskoțis) and is only apprehensible by knowledge. For this reason, even while determining sünyavāda, he maintained madhyamapratipada or the doctrine of spiritual elevation also.
After this came at last the Yogācāra school to which it appeared as such that Šūnyavāda did not make a determination of any Reality by bhāvātmaka (thoughtful or emotional) or methodical way. Consequentiy, nama-tattva of Buddha, which centred on consciousness; also became as void (śünyavat) in the views of the people. Certainly, such a thought led the Yogācärins to the side of the doctrine of consciousness. They established nama, citta, cetanā, or ātmā (mind, consciousness or soul), whatever one calls them, as the only vij napti (consciousness or beginningless root ideas or instinct of mind). The speciality of this theory from the first four doctrines as discussed above is this that the early Buddhists, having accepted the actual existence of the external matter apprehended by pure sensation or the senses (vijnanabahya-indriyagrāhya-bhūtabhautika-tattva), used to think on the problem, while the Vijñānavādins-old and new, did not admit the separate existence of such external matters and said that the corporeal reality (mūrtatattva) which the Buddhist and other than the Buddhists called 'Rüpa' (Matter) is one aspect of nature of consciousness itself (vijnana) only, but it appears to be different froin consciousness due to ignorance (avidya) desire (vāsanā) and hypocrisy (samvrti). In this way the Buddhist tradition regarding the nature of Soul at last became established in the Vijñānavāda of the Yogācāra School, after having crossed many stages, and Dharmakirti, śāntarakṣita, and Kamalasila made successful attempts to make it comprehensible by the intellect.o 1
Whatever branch of the Buddhist Philosophy may be the real distinction of the issues of citta (Citta-santāna) of its own doctrine or of Jiva (Soul) by the difference of body is desirable to it. The Vijñānādvaitavādins, who did not accept anything other than consciousness as real, also followed the postulation of the distinction of Soul by the difference body,'% having accepted the real mutual distinction of the issues of consciousness. This postulation was one general characteristic of the Sramanic tradition.
In regard to the dimension of Citta, Vijñāna-santati or Jiva, the Buddhist tradition did not bring forward any real thought by which it can certainly be said in this

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way that it is anuvādin (the advocate of the atomic dimension of soul) or deha-parimānavadin (the advocate of the doctrine of the dimension of Soul up to the extent of body). Nevertheless, it is stated in some places in the Buddhist works that 'Hadayavatthu' (heart-entity) is the seat of substratum of Citta or Vijñāna. From this fact it can be said that, though the Buddhists might not have made any genuine consideration of Citta or Jivatattva from the point of view of dimension, they still might have accepted the impact of consciousness in the form of feelings like pleasure, pain, etc., pervading the whole body.
It appears that, as the systems of thought like the Jaina, Sāṁkhya-Yoga, etc., admit the subtle body, moving from one place of birth to another, in order to explain the process of rebirth in their respective manners, so too the Buddhists might have accepted a similar process from the beginning. If anybody, having died, is just to be reborned at another place, then a Gandharva 98 waits up to seven days for a favourable occasion. On the basis of the conception of Gandharva, the discussion on the antarabhava-sarira (the body of intermediate stage of life) has been made by the Buddhists, and the view was supported by Vasubandhu and others.9While Buddhaghosa explained the utpatti (production or birth) of pratisandhi by giving some example, without accepting any such antara-bhava-sarira.
The Upanişadic view on the Nature of Soul
In regard to the nature of Soul and of the Brahman difference of conception and of thought is noticable in different early Upanişads and several times at different places of the same Upanişad. It can then be said that the voice of the entire Upanişads is not one and the same in this respect. For this reason, many separate developments of thought on the nature of Soul went on from the very start among the thinkers holding the basis of the concept of Soul in the Upanişads. Out of these developments Vādarāyaṇa composed the Brahmasutra for the establishment of his own cherished views and mentioned also some other views which previously were current. Many commentaries were being written on it, and the bud of thought, which was in existence from the beginning, blossomed forth in the form of further explanations, but these early commentaries today are not found just as they originally were.
As soon as Ācārya Sankara wrote a commentary on the Brahmasūtra, etc., and established the doctrine of Māyā (Illusion), a reaction started again. The thinkers to whom this Māyāvāda was not acceptable wrote commentaries on the Brahmasutra by opposing this doctrine, having followed the path of any one of the previous teachers. There is more or less mutual difference of views in their thoughts; some difference of views is found in the application of definition and example : Even then all of them are agreed upon one point that Sankara, says that such Soul has only the illusory (māyika) experience, not real, for it is also real, and this Soul having the real existence is also distinct by the difference of body and permanent. 96

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Every Ācārya like Sankara and others took mainly the basis of the Upanişads in support of his views and produced one and the same reading in different places in different manners. Like this many diverse development of thoughts are found in the Upanişads but it can be said by making their classification that the first is the party of Ācārya Sankara, the second is that of Madhva, and all the remaining Acāryas are in the third group.
Sankara, not concending that there is any really real existence except Brahman, explains the multiplicity of individual souls as experienced in practical life in terms of Māyā (Illusion) or Avidyāśakti (power of Nescience). This power also is not independent of the Brahman. Hence, according to his view, the mutual distinction between Soul and Brahman, is not real°7 (tāttvika). Madhva maintained an opposite view to that of Ācārya Sankara in regard to Soul by asserting that it is not imaginary but is real, and it is also distinct from the Brahman. In this way the view of Madhva finds place in the doctrine of infinite eternal Souls.8* Bhāskara99 and all other Ācāryas actually accept Soul, but as a modification, an effect or a part of the Brahman. The modification, effect, or part, however, may be due to the power of the Brahman, but they are not at all illusory. Thus, the development on the concept of Soul went on progressing in the thinking of different Ācāryas.
The current of the Vedantic thought regarding the concept of Soul has continued in the traditions of aiming at Monism, namely, Kevalādvaita (Absolute Monism), Satyopādhi-advaita, Višiştādvaita, Dvaitadvaita, Avibhāgādvaita, Suddhādvaita and Acintabhedābheda, and it is also finding support in the form of Dvaitavāda (Dualism).
Soul is nothing independent of the Brahman. (It is nothing at all). Hence, according to Sankara, the (multiplicity of) individual Souls and their mutual difference are both unreal. Sankara, admitting the Brahman to be the only real Reality, explains the multiplicity of individual souls as also the multiplicity (i. e. the multiplicity exhibited in) the world in terms of Māyā (Illusion). Hence, according to his view, individual soul is not independent and real entity. It is rather #mere appearance of the really real Brahman, an appearance due to the association of Māyā, Avidyā (Nescience) or Antahkarana (internal organ). Even this appearance ceases to be there with the individual soul's realization of its own identity with the Brahman, Absolute Monism has to make a possibility of mutual distinction of individual souls just as it has to make a possibility of the relation of Soul with the Brahman because of there being only pure and undivided consciousness as its objective. Besides this, it has to determine the transmigration of Soul from body to body in order to effect rebirth. At the root, when there is only one transcendental reality and many kinds of distinction are to be made, then its only way is left to take the support of Māyā or Avidyā.

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The disciples of Ācārya Sankara and his commentators conceived many ideas about the nature of Soul; they appear to be contradictory to one another many a times. Some of their conceptions are given below :
Pratibimbavāda :-Soul is conceived by some Ācāryas like idyāranya Svāmi and others in their respective manners as the reflection of the Brahman. Some accept such reflection as existing in (or deriving from) ignorance (avidyāgata); some admit it as existing in the internal sense-organ or the mind-substance (antahkaranagata); the third one regards it as existing in non-intelligence (ajñānagata). Thus, Pratibimbavāda (Doctrine of the reflection of the Brahman) has been supported in different forms. 100 :
Avacchedavāda :-Some Ācāryas, having put the word 'Avaccheda' in place of 'Pratibimba' say that the Brahman reflected an the antahkarana (internal senseorgan or mind-substance), etc., is not Soul but the Brahman narrowed or conditioned by the limitations of the antaḥkaraņa (antaḥkaraṇāvacchinna-Brahman) only is the nature (svarūpa) of Soul. 101
Brahmajivavāda :--This doctrine maintains that Soul is neither the reflection (pratibimba) of the Brahman or its limited condition (avaccheda), but the unmodified Brahman itself is respectively Soul due to the cause of the spiritual ignorance as well as the Brahman because of the knowledge of spiritual truth.102 Thus, these three views are mainly prevalent among the Kevaladvaitavādins in regard to the nature of Soul.
According to Bhāskara, the Brahman transforms Itself into Soul like the universe by Its various kinds of powers. So Soul is the modification of the Brahman and is endowed with activity, i. e. it is true because of being born of satyopadhi (limitation or condition of truth).103 Even though the Brahman is one, still Its modifications may be many; there is no contradiction between oneness and manifoldness or multiplicity. 104 Just as one and the same sea is perceived as many in the form of waves, so is Soul the part and modification of the Brahman and there is the real existence of it insofar as it exists in association with ignorance, desires, and actions. 105 On the cessation of ignorance this Soul, which is atomic in nature, realises oneness or identity with the Brahman.
Rāmānuja, the advocate of Višiştādvaitavāda (qualified Monism), having conceived Soul, like the universe as the unmanifest body of the Brahman at the root, explains that unmanifest to be the manifest Soul and manifest prapanca in succession. All these that the unmanifest power of consciousness (cit-sakti) attains the form of the manifest soul and acts also, happen due to the cause of Parabrahma Nārāyana 106 who exists in both fine and gross, inanimate and animate substances by pervading them. "The Self is often called jñāna, or consciousness, because of the fact that it is self-revealing as consciousness.”107 As the individual souls and the inanimate

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creation are parts of the Brahman, “so their identity (abheda) with Brahman”, becomes primary as their difference (bheda), inasmuch as the substance may be considered to be different from its attributes.”108
As Dvaitādvaitavādin (advocate of the doctrine of the Absolute as unity in difference), Nimbărka accepts the modification of Parabrahman in the form of infinite souls, even though he regards Parabrahman as non-different essence or nature (abhinnasvarūpa). "Just as the life force or prāņa manifests itself into various kinds of conative and cognative sense-functions, yet keeps its own independence, integrity and difference from them, so the Brahman also manifests itself through the numberless spirits and matter without losing itself in them."109 These souls are not imposed (āropita), as the Brahman is at once one with and different from the souls.
According to the doctrine of Avibhāgādvaita of Vijñānabhikṣu, Puruşi (Self) is beginningless and independent like Prakrti, even then it cannot exist as separate or distinguishable from the Brahman 110 All souls exists as undivided with It and are regulated by Its power. 111
Vallabha, the Buddhādvaitavādin, says that like the Universe, Soul too is the real modification of the Brahman. It has manifested Itself by Its own will with the preponderance of the elements of being consciousness, and bliss (saccidananda) in Its three forms as matter, soul, and the Brahman. In spite of such modification born of Its will, It exists only as unmodified and pure. 112
According to Sri Caitanya also, the Brahman manifests Itself as infinite souls by virtue of Its Jivasakti (the power represented by the pure selves). The relation of these souls with the Brahman is bhedābheda (identity-cum-difference), 113 but it is unthinkable (acintaniya), for the Brahman exists one with Itself and yet produces the universe through Its own unthinkable, indeterminable, and inscrutable power.114
All the doctrines from that of Bhāskara to that of Caitanya maintain that Soul is atomic in nature and size; it becomes liberated, when there takes place the destruction of ignorance by knowledge, devotion, etc. In the liberated condition it realizes identity or oneness with the Brahman, i.e. Its true nature, in one or other form. 115 All the Acāryas, having advocated anujīva (atomic soul) makes the tenability of rebirth of Soul brought about by the subtle body.
Madhva, even though being a Vedāntin, does not take recourse to any kind of Monism or non-difference (identity). On the basis of Upanişads and other works he establishes a theory that Soul is atomic(aņu) and infinite, but because of being independent and eternal, it is neither the modification of Parabrahman, nor its effect, nor its part. When Soul becomes free of ignorance it realizes the lordship of the Brahman or Vişnu.116
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A critical study of the nature of Soul as conceived by the Indian systems of thought reveals that the Jaina conception of Soul appeals to the common sense, besides its metaphysical value. Its importance lies in the fact that it reflects the doctrine of animism by admitting six käyajivas pervaded by Soul, namely prthivikäya-jiva (earthbodied being), apkāya-jiva (water-bodied being), tejakaya-jiva (fire-bodied being), vayukaya-jiva (air-bodied being), vanaspatikāya-jiva (plant-bodied being) and trasakayajiva (mobile being), as they exist in Nature.
114
References
1. Bharatiyatattvavidya, p. 80.
2. Ibid.
3. VP., 34. 12-24, 702-715; also Gommaṭasara, "Jivakända"
4.
VP., 202, 664,
5.
Kecit Saugatammanyä apyātmānam pracakşate pudgalavyapadešena tattvänyatvädivarjitam/-Tattvasamgraha, 336.
6.
VP, 8, 10. 361.
7. Püranad-galanäcca sarirädinām pudgalāḥ /", Ibid., 20.2. 664 (comm), 8. Jive tava niyamä jive jivevi niyamā jive (" Ibid., 6. 10. 256.
Jivati tava niyama jive, jive puna siya jivai siya no jivai " Ibid., 6, 10, 256, 10 This date is recently arrived by M. A. Dhaky. Cf. His paper in this
volume. Earlier conceded date was early centuries of Christian Era.
11. "Imdiyapäņo ya tadha balapāņo taha ya aupāņo ya
Anappäṇappāņo jivāņam homti pänä te/"-Pravacanasara, II. 54. 12. "Avanne java arüvi jive säsae avatthie logadavve/", VP., 2. 10. 118. 13. Ibid., 2, 10, 118.
14. Nityavasthitänyarüpāņi /", TS., V. 4.
15.
Jivadavvä Goyamā! no samkhejjä no asamkhejjā aṇamtā ", VP., 25.2.720. 16. VP., 20,1.661; "Sa amte jive anamte jive". Ibid., 2.1.91. 17. "Asamkhijja dhammatthikaya paesā
jivatthikayapoggalatthikäyävi evam
ceva", Ibid., 2.10.119; Sthänänga, 4.3.334; see also Tattvärthasara, 3.19;
TS., V. 8.
18. "Pradeśasamhäravisargābhyäm pradipavat /", TS., V. 16; See also; Tattvär thasara, 3, 14.
19. "Nāņaṁ ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo tahā /
Viriyam uvayoga ya eyam jivassa lakkhanam //"
-Uttaradhyayana-Sutra, 28.11.
20. "Jive nam savirie
sapurisakkaraparakkame ayabhāveṇaṁ Jivabhāvaṁ uvadamseti /, VP., 2.10.120; 13.4.481.
21. Ibid., 2. 10. 120; 13.4.481.
22. "Aya siya nane siya annāṇe nane puna niyamaṁ āyā",

Ibid., 12.10.468.

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115
23. "Āyā niyamam damsaņe damsaņevi niyamam āyā //”, Ibid., 12.10.468. 24. "Atthavihā āyā pannattā, tamjahā-daviyāyā kasāyāyā jogāyā,
uvaogāyā nāņāyā damsaņāyā cārittāyā viriyāyā /”, -VP., 12.10.467.
Ibid. 26. "Imdiyapāņo ya tadhā balapāņo taha ya āupāņo ya/ Ānappāņappāņo jivāṇam homti pāņā te ll”,
Pravacanasāra, II. 54. 27. "Vigra hagatau karmayogah -TS, II. 26. 28. Jive nam sayā samiyam eyate jāva tam tam bhāvam pariņamai”,
-VP., 3.3.153. 29, VP., 20.3.665. 30. "Sukhaduḥkhajivitamaranopagrahāśca 11”,-TS., V. 20. 31. "Kartā bhoktā ātmā padgalakaramago bhavati vyavahārāt /"
- Niyamasāra, 18 (Chāyā). 32. Sarvārthasiddhi, p. 289. 33. “Ganadharavāda” (3), gāthā, 1638. 34. "No āyā bhásā annā bhāsā....rūvi bhāsā no arūvi bhāsa acittā bhāsā, ajivā bhāsā, jivāņam bhāsā no ajivānam 1/”,
-VP., 13.7.493; "No āyā maņe anne mane, jahā bhāsā tahā mane vi jāva ajivānam mane l”,
-VP., 13.7.493-4. 35. “Ayávi käe annevi kāc...... rüvi vi käe arūvi vi kāe........sacittevi kāe acittevi
kāe, jivevi kāe ajivevi käe jivānavi kāe ajivānavi kāe /", VP., 13. 7. 495. 36. Pūvvimpi kāe, kāijjamāņ vi kāe kāyasamayaviikkastevi kāe....pūvvimpi
kāe bhijjai kāijjamāņevi kāe bhijjai, kāyasamayaviikkamete vi kāe bhijjai”,
VP., 13. 7. 495. 37. Evam khalu pāņāivāe jāva micchādasaņasalle vattamāṇassa sacceya jive
sacceva jivāyā jāva aņāgārovaogo vastamāṇassa sacceva jive sacceva jivāyā/
Ibid., 17. 2. 596. ; 38. “Parasparopagraho jivānām”, TS., ch. V. 21. 39. Sarvārthasiddhi, pp. 289-90. 40. “Asamkheyabhāgādiņu jivānām/"; "Pradeśasamhāravisargābhyām pradipa
vat |”, TS., V. 15. 16. 41. Slatthissa ya kunthussa ya evam same ceva jive /", VP., 7,8.294. 42. VP., 8. 3. 325. 43. "Asamkhyeyabhāgādişu jivānām /"-TS., V. 15; "Anugurudehappamāņo' uvasamhārappasappado cedā l”,
Dravyasamgraha, 10. 44. GS., "Jivakanda”, 583. 45. Šamkarabhāşya on Brahmasūtra II, 2. 34. 46. VP., 12. 10. 467. 47. Ibid., 1. 9. 73.

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48.
49.
50.
J. C. Sikdar
Ibid., 8. 3. 325.
"Na jāyate mṛyate vā kādācinnāyaṁ bhūtvā bhavitā vā na bhūyaḥ / Ajo nityaḥ śāśvato'yam purano na hanyate hanyamāne sarire //", Gita, II. 20.
"Nainam chindanti sastrāņi nainam dahati pāvakaḥ / na cainaṁ kledayantyapo na śoşayati marutaḥ //", 51. "Acchedyo'ayamadahyo'ayamakledyo 'asoşya eva ca Nityaḥ sarvagataḥ sthanuracalo' ayam sanātanaḥ 52. VP, 9. 33. 387.
Ibid., II. 23.
Gitā, II. 24.
53: "Nityaḥ sarvagataḥ sthānuracalo 'ayam sanātanaḥ 54. "Vāsāmsi, jirṇāni yathā vihāya navāni gṛhṇāti naro'aparāņi / Tathā sarīrāṇī vihāya jirṇānyanyāni samyāti navāni dehi //", Ibid., II. 22.
Gitā, II. 24
55, VP., 2. 1. 91.
56. "Atha matam-jñānasya samaväyikāraṇamātmā, na śariram, atastasya kāryaikadeśatā na yukteti, tacca na śarirātmanorekantenāvibhāgāt Samsarinah /",--Viseṣāvaśyakabhāṣya p. 12.
57. "Hetumadanityamavyāpi sakriyamanekamāśritaṁ lingam /
Savayavaṁ paratantraṁ vyaktaṁ viparitamavyaktaṁ //", SK., 10. 58. "Jananamaraṇakaraṇāṇāṁ pratiniyamādayugapatravṛtteśca / puruṣabahutvam siddhaṁ traigunyaviparyayaccaiva ||", SK., 18. 59. "Tasmacca viparyāsāt siddham sākṣitvamasya puruṣasya/
Kaivalyam madhyasthyam drastṛtvamakartṛbhāvaśca //", SK., 19. 60. "Pūrvotpannamasaktaṁ niyataṁ mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam/
Samsarati nirupabhogam bhāvairadhivāsitam lingam//", SK., 40; See also the preface of Ganadharavada, pp. 12, 21.

61. "Tasmāt na badhyate napi mucyate napi samsarati kaścit /
Samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ //", SK., 62; "Citram yathāśrayamṛte sthāṇvādibhyo yathā vinā chāyā / Tadvadvinā viseṣaih na tiṣṭhati nirāśrayam lingam ||", Ibid., 41. 62. Ibid., 62.
63. Ibid., 40.
64. "Puruṣārthahetukamidaṁ nimittanaimittikaprasangena / Prakṛtervibhutvayoganna ṭavadvyavatiṣṭhate lingam ||" Ibid., 42.
65. "Vyavasthāto nānā ", VS., 3.2.20; "Sastrasāmarthyācca", Ibid., 3.2.21. "Vibhavanmahānākāśastathācātmā ", Ibid., 7.1.22.
66.
67. "Anāśritatvanityatve cānyatrāvayavidravyebhyaḥ /",
PPBhi., "Dravyasādharmyaprakarana", Setu, p. 390.

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Concept of "Jiva (Soul)" in Jaina Philosophy
68. "Prāņāpānanimeşonmesajivanamanogatindriyāntaravikārāḥ
sukhaduḥkhecchādveșa prayatnāscātmano lingāni ", VS., 3.2.4; See also Atmaprakarana of PPBhā. “Tasya guņāḥ buddhisukhaduḥk hecchādveşaprayatnadharmādharmasamskārasa mkhyāparimāņaprthaktvasamyogavibhāgāḥ /”
PPBhā., Atmaprakaraņa; see also VS., 3.2.4. 70. PPBhā., Atmaprakarana. 71. “Tadatyantavimokso’apavargah”, NS., 1.1.22; NBha., 1.1.22;
'Moksa means separation of or shedding off the karmapudgalas from soul'
"Introduction to Ganadharavāda”, p. 17. 72. VSU., 1. 1. 4. 73. PPBhā., Ātmaprakarana, p. 30. 74. "Atthi avināsadhammi karei veu atthi nivväņam / Atthi ya mokkhovão cha ssammattassa thāņam //
Sanmatiprakarana, 3.55. (Sanmati Tarka) 75. “Na kāryāśrayakartsvadhāt / Nyāyavārtika, 3. 1. 6;
"Vaikalyam pramāpaņam veti //”, Ibid.; p. 509; "Ekavināśe dvitiyavināśānnaikatyam ) Vināšāvināšalakşaņayiruddhadharmādhyāsānnānātvamityarthaḥ /”,
Ibid., 3. 1. 9., p. 510. 76. Jñāna (1) cikīrşāprayatnānām samavāyāḥ kartstvam,
sukhaduḥkhasamvitsamavāyo bhoktstvam, etattu na śarire, nimittatvāt kartpšariramucyate Nyāyavārtika, 3. 1. 6, p. 559;
see Bhāratīyatattvavidyā, p. 87, Pandit Sukhlalji Sangahvi. 77. “Tadabhāvādaņu manaḥ ", VS., 7. 1. 23; VSU., 7. 12. 78. Bharatiyatattvavidyā, pp. 81-90. 79. Ibid., p. 90. 80. See Buddhist Logic, Vol. I., pp. 3-14 and The Central Philosophy of Buddhism
p. 26, for the three Bhūmikās introductions) of the Buddhist Tattvajñāna
(Epistemology), vide Bhāratiyatattvavidyā, p. 94. 81. Visuddhimagga, 4. 33;
see Samyuttanikāya, III. 16;
Introduction to Ganadharavāda, pp. 82-87. 82. The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 23, Prof. Stcherbatsky. 83. Taddhedam tarhyavyākstamásit / tannāmarūpābhyāmeva vyākriyata //
Brhadāranyanaka Upanişad, 1.4.7;
see also Chandog yopanişad, VI, 2.2.3; VII, 14.1. 84. The Basic Conception of Buddhism, pp. 87-88; Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya 85. “Paudgalikasyāpi avyākştavastuvādinaḥ pudgalo api dravyato astīti",
Abhidharmadipa, p. 258; "Nagnātapakṣe prakseptavyāḥ /", Ibid., p. 257; See also Tattvasangraha, 336.

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86. Tattvasaṁgraha, 336. Šāntaraksit, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. XXX,
XXXI, (Vols, I, II), 1926. 87. “Hemno anugamasāmyena sthiratvam manyate tadā / Avasthābhedavānbhāvaḥ kaiścidbauddhairapişyate ||”
TS., 1786, p. 503; “Sarvamasti pradeśo' asti sarvam nāstiti cāparaḥ / Avyäkstāstivāditi catvāro vādinaḥ smstaḥ /
Abhidharmadipa (AbdD), kā. 299, p. 257, Vimala Mitra Ibid. (comm). 88. Tattvasamgraha, 1786 f. 89, See Abh.K., Kā. V. 24-6, vide The Central Conception of Buddhism, pp. 64-80. 90. Madhyamika Kārikāvịtti, pp. 16, 26 and 108 and 275, Kārikā 5.7 thereon
SM., 17; Madhyamakakārikā, 5, 7.8, vide Bhāratiyatattvavidyā, pp. 97-8; "Vinā pramāņam paravanna Śūnyaḥ svapakşasiddheḥ padamašnuvita Kupyet-kstānataḥ sprśyate pramāṇamaho' sudsştam tvadasūyidsstam”
-Syādyādamañjari 17, p. 144. 91. Pramāņavārtika, 2. 327 etc; Tats. 1965-1969 ff. pp. 550.82. 92. See Dharmakirti's Santānāntarasiddhi. 93. Dighanikāya, p. 206, 'Gandhabba'. 94. Milindapañho supra, p. 46, No. 2; Ibid., p. 142 (Țippaņa), p. 132;
See the Tibetan books of the dead; vide Bhāratiyatattvavidyā, pp. 9041. 95. Tayidam pākatena manussacutipațisandhikkameņa pakasayissāma”,
VM., 17. 163, p. 389;
See Bharatiyatattvavidyā, pp. 90-99. 96. “Cit-svabhāva ātmā vişayi jadasvabhāvā buddhindriya-deha visayā vişayāh/”,
Bhāmati, vide BS., p. 231; "Aham pratyaya-vișaya-kartsvyatirekeņa tat sākşi sarva-bhūtasthaḥ sama ekaḥ küțastha nityaḥ puruşa.... sarvasyātmā /" $Bha., on BS., 1.1.4; All the Non-Sankarite Vedāntins agee in holding (1) that Sankara is wrong when he says that an individual soul is an illusory (māyik), not real existence, for it is real and (ii) That individual souls are different in different bodies
and (iii) that individual souls are eternal. 97. "Jiva Brahmaiva nāparah l”, Brahmasiddhi, p. 9;
See also Bauddhadarśana and Vedanta, Dr. C. D. Sharma, p. 224. 98 Sarvadarśanasaṁgrahagala Pūrņaprajñādarsana, p. 55. 99. "Kāryarūpeņa nānātvamabhedaḥ kāraṇātmanā / Hemātmanā yathā abhedaḥ kundalyätmanā bhidā ||”
Bhāskara on BS., p. 18; “Brahmakāryatvāt prapancasya / vastutyam Brahmaiva hi kāraṇātmanā kāryātmarrávyavasthitamityuktaṁ ”, Ibid.

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Coneept of "Jiva (Soul)" in Jaina Philosophy 119 100. Vedantasiddhantasuktimanjari, "Prathama pariccheda", 28-40. 101. "Ghatasamvitamityadisrutiyuktisamasrayat Anye antahkaranenavacchinnan jivam babhasire 1)", Vedantasiddhantasuktimanjari, Prathama pariccheda, 41. 102. "Kaunteya iva radheyo jivah svavidyaya parah Nabhaso napyavacchinna ityahurapara budhah ||", Ibid. 1.42. 103. Bhaskarabhasya, II. 1. 27; also 1.4.25. 104. Abheda --dharmasca bhedo yatha mahodadherabhedah sa eva taranga dyatmana vartamano bheda ityucyate, na hi tarangadayah pasanadisu drsyante tasyaiva tah saktayah sakti saktimatosca ananyatvam anyatvam copalaksyate........tasmat sarvam ekanekatmakam natyantam abhinnam bhinnam va /", Ibid., II. 1.18. 105. Ibid., I. 4.21; vide H. I. Ph., Vol. III, p. 6, S. N. Dasgupta. 106. See Ramanuja's Bhasya, XI, 3. 40-41. 107. Ibid., II. III. 29-30, vide H. I. Ph, Vol. III, p. 160. 108. Jivavata psthak siddhyanarha visesanatvena acidvastuno Brahmamsatvam; visistavastvekadesatvena abheda-vyavaharo mukhyah, visesanaisesyayoh svarupasvabhava-bhedena-bheda-vyavaharo' api mukhyah", Sri Bhasya, III, 2. 28, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. III, p. 195. 109. H. I. Ph. Vol. III. pp 405-6; see also Srinivasa's commentary on Nimbarka's Vedanta Parijata-Saurabha on Brahmasutra, I. i, 1-3, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. III, p. 406. 110. "Bhedabhedau vibhagavibhagarupau kalabheden1 aviruddhau anyonya. bhavasca jiva-brahmanor atyantika eval", Vijnanamstabhasya, I. 1. 2, vide H. I. Ph., vol. III, p. 461. 111. Ibid., 1. 1. 2. vide H. I. Ph., vol. III, p. 459. 112. Sat Sandarbha, p. 254, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. IV, p. 404. 113. Ibid., p. 260, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. IV, p. 407. 114. Ibid., p. 675, vide H. I. Ph., Vol IV, p. 428. Ibid., p. 678, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. IV, p. 429. 115. History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. IV.. pp. 155-6. 116. Nyayasudha on Anuvyakhya, vide H. I. Ph., Vol. IV, p. 317; Brahma sutra-bhas ya, 1. 1. 1.