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Presidential Address
787
llelism of matter and mind, difficulties which Occasionalism could not solve, the consequent Monism of Spinoza, and its break-up into Lcibnitzian Pluralism of Spiritual Monads-all of these, with their thesis and antithesis have their counterparts in Sāmkhya, Śamkara, Post-śamkara śāmkara and Rāmānuja schools. Similarly, turning to England, one finds that the Idealism of Berkeley and the psychological Phenomenalism of Hume can be read in many a work of Post-Sankara śāmkara Vedānta and in the earlier Buddhistic writings. Kant's Thing-in-itself is 37f89196a of śāın kara Vedānta, and the difficulty encountered in reconciling it with his idealistic position is equally felt by Indian commentators. Kant's criticism of Rational Psychology is easily paralleled by the Vedantic criticism of Nyāya, and his unity of apperception, if it is not an empty logical process but an ideal reality, is the faia-315AT of Vedāntic epistemology. Moreover, the distinction between the transcendental and the empirical ego, or to put it somewhat differently, between the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and the empirical existence of the finite subject-a distinction which it has been the pride of modern European Philosophy to have drawn-is as old in India as the age of Sankhya and Vedānta in which purusha, kūtastha and sakshi are distinguished from ahamkāra and- jīva. Kant's criticism of Rational Theo. logy reminds one of Rāmānuja's criticism of the Naiyāyıka proof of the existence of God, His famous declaration that "the starry heavens above and the moral law within"' convinced him of the existence of God may be matched by the two consecutive sūtras;
