Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269214/1

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE NYAYAVATARA AND THE SAMMATI-TARKA-PRAKARANA One of the conspicuous points that strikes the reader of legendary biographies of Siddhasena Divakara recorded in Jaina Prabandhas is that they generally speak of Sanskrit hymns composed by Siddhasena Divakara and of the ill fate Siddhasena Divakara brought upon himself by deciding to render the whole Jaina cannon into Sanskrit, but they neverto my knowledge -- happen to mention the title of the Nydydatara (NA) or of the Sarmati-tarka-prakarana (STP.). Does this discrepancy in the tradition find any grounding in facts? Would we be right to assume that perhaps NA. was composed by someone other than Siddhasena Divakara? In any case Abhayadevasuri, the commentator on STP.. explicitly mentions in the introductory part the title of the work as "Prabandha called Sammari" as well as its author Siddhasena Divakara." The true name of STP. is now of secondary importance. Not to assume at the outset that NA. and STP. were written by the same author, I shall tentatively call the author of the Mydydvatora Siddhasena Mahamati after the specific identification of Haribhadrasuri.! and provisionally reserve the name of Siddhasena Divakara for the author of the Sarmati-tarka-prakarana. Apart from the different languages of NA. (written in Sanskrit) and of STP. (written in Prakrit), the reader cannot fail to notice an overall difference in style. One might be quick to object that, firstly, stylistic differentiation is merely a subjective matter that depends on the reader's own taste and judgement, and, secondly, even if we are ready to assume that there indeed is such a difference in style, it may only be due to the different linguistic environment" (Sanskrit in the case of NA., and Prakrit in the case of STP.). By necessity even in the case of a person Journal of Indian Philosophy 29: 351-378. 2001. (c) 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers Printed in the Netherlands.

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PUIK BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 353 bilingual by birth his or her style, say, in English will differ from the style of Hopi or Polish. 2.1. Nevertheless, there are several other minor differences to notice. The first is the general outline and matters discussed in both works. The feature they have in common - perhaps the only one in commonis the epistemological concern. However, NA., in its 32 verses, deals with the question of epistemic validity (pramanya) and the definition of the cognitive criterion (pramana) as well as with its divisions and their definitions. Only two verses (NA.29-30) deal with the issue of multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vdda) and with the theory of viewpoints (naya-vada), but there is no mention of the method of the seven-fold predication (sapta-bhangi) whatsoever. The treatment of these issues is in a way non-Jaina, in so far as the choice of terminology and approach place the text within the tradition of such works as, e.g. Nyaya-pravesa of Sankarasvamin or Nyaya-bindu of Dharmakirti (vide infra, p. 12 ff.). In fact, as I believe I have recently proved elsewhere, NA, depends heavily on Dharmakirti and - among his other works - on his NB. in several formulations. of dravya-paryava (STP.3.2 ff., STP.3.30 ff.), guna-paryaya (STP.3.89). two nayas (dravyarthika-paryayarthika; STP.3.10-14) and their relation (STP.3.15-18), atoms and matter (STP.3.39-41), miscellaneous ethical and soteriological issues (STP.3.43 ff., 3.62 ff.), sub-categories of syad-vida (STP.3.60). The above list is not meant to be a detailed catalogue of the contents but should only serve as a provisional list of topics discussed in STP. This list, however, and a more in-depth reading could easily attest to it. should suffice to demonstrate that - despite the overall epistemological interest of the two works - the scopes of NA. and STP. by no means overlap. This is also true not only of the general scope of both treatises but also for particular topics, ideas and notions that occur in both texts. 2.3. 2.2. On the other hand, the scope of the three chapters of STP. is as follows: Chapter 1 contains a detailed exposition of the theory of multiplexity of reality (anekanta-vada), including treatment of rayas (dravyastika and paryayastika, as well as the set of seven viewpoints: rju-sutra, etc., especially STP.1.3-5, 7-18, 23, 31), niksepas (STP.1.6. 40 ff.). sapta-bhangi (STP.1.36-40), and secondary issues such as the idea of utpada-sthiti-bhanga in the case of dravya (STP.1.12, STP.3.23), ethical issues (kasayas, karman, bandha, sarisara, moksa; e.g. STP.1.18-20). the nature of atman/jiva (STP.1.51-52) that serves as exemplification of the doctrine of anekanta-vada, Chapter 2 provides the discussion on the cognitive faculties (upayoga), including their definition (STP.2.12), fivefold division of cognition (nana, STP.2.2-18) and fourfold division of insight, or conation (darsana, esp. STP.2.19-20). the claim that jana and darsana become one in case of an omniscient person (kevalin, STP.2 passim), which has become the most debated thesis of STP. among future generations of Jaina thinkers, the treatment of the three jewels" (tri-ratna, samyag-frana-darsana-caritra, esp. STP.2.3233), the state of omniscience (kevala): Chapter 3 is concerned with ontological issues, the relation of samanya-visesa (STP.3.1), the relation Besides, characteristic of NA. is a standardised pattern of definitions and justifications for such definitions in the form of hetus) pervading the whole structure of the text. viz. the term is first mentioned (uddesa) and defined (laksana), whereas the definition serves as a thesis to be subsequently proved (pratijna), this is followed by the mention of its divisions (bheda) and subsequent analysis (pariksa), which is always followed by the justification and corroboration (heru). e.g.: NAT: pratijii = laksana (praminam sv-paribhasi jricinani bidha-vivarjitam) (+ division (pravaksan sa poroksar ca uvidha) + het (megoviniscard!), or NA4: prariji laksana (aparoksatmarthasva grahakari janam Idrsom / pratsaksam) + division (itaraj jesam paroksa) + heru (grahaneksuvi). Practically, every second verse reveals such a structure. Thus, the overall approach in NA. is highly structured and analytical, the picture of the logical system it lucidly presents is very clear. Furthermore, Siddhasena Mahamati was certainly conscious of what the proper definition should consist in, in so far as he was apparently the first in the history of Jaina epistemological tradition to formulate the descriptive definition of pramana. 2.4. On the other hand, we hardly find any true definition in STP, with the exception perhaps of STP.2.1 (a definition of cognitive faculties). But even then the author of STP. does not bother to provide justifications in a systematic form of hetus. STP. has the character of a plain exposition

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354 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine; an occasional refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. Without a thorough-going, anterior knowledge of Jainism and its anekanta doctrine alongside its corollaries such as sapta-bhangi, naya-vada, niksepa-vada, one could hardly make head or tail of the exposition. Nowhere do we find any en bloc enumeration of the five subdivisions of jnana (mati, etc.) - and sporadic references to them are fragmentary or a list of nayas (not even all are mentioned by name!); there is no explanation of how niksepas work, what different kinds of karman are (even though the knowledge of the subdivisions is essential to follow the text), etc. The reader is expected to have all this knowledge beforehand in order to understand the argument. One may seem to be justified in having the impression that either NA. and STP. derive from different intellectual backgrounds or that they serve some different purposes, or both. 2.5. As far as vocabulary and particular terms or ideas are concerned, here is a list of selected topics and terms that are crucial in one text but are altogether absent from the other work, not only as being stated expressis verbis but even under a different formulation: (1) Significant terms and ideas in NA. that are neither mentioned nor implied in STP.: the distinction into svartha-anumana I parartha-anumana and svartha-pratyaksa / parartha-pratyaksa (NA.10, 11, 13), parartha-vakyam (NA.10); non-erroneousness of cognitive criteria (avibhrama / abhranti) NA.5, 6, 7); the idea of self-revealing nature of cognition (rvdnya-niscayi I sva-parabhasi jaanam, NA.1, 7, 13, 31) and and selfcognition (rva-samvedana; NA.31); the defining characteristic of the logical reason. e.g. the inseparable connection (avind-bhdva: NA.5, 13). "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupapatti / anyathanupapanna, NA.17, 22, 23) or similar, including the term anupapatti," the use of vyapti (NA.18) or antar-vyapti (NA.20); the use of paksa only in the sense of "thesis" as a logical terminus technicus (NA.13, 14, 21); cognitive criterion (pramana; NA.1, 2, 3, 5, 67, 28, 32) probandum (sadhya, NA.5,13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 29, 24, 25) probans (sadhana, NA.18, 19, 25, 26); the idea of a valid method of reasoning (prayoga; NA.14, 17);" the use of the term anumana (NA.5. 11, 13); mental representation (pratibhasa; 7, 12, 27); indirect cognition (paroksa; NA.1.4); fallacy (abhasa: NA.21, 22, 26); criticism (dusana; NA.26); testimony based on the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (sydd-vida-fruta; NA.30); the cognoscible (prameya / meya; NA.1); method / logic and methodologist / logician (nyaya and nyaya-vid; NA.20, 24, 25); doubt (sandeha; NA.22). (2) Significant terms and ideas in STP. that are not mentioned in NA.: treatment of the viewpoints (naya with its two main types: dravyastika, paryayastika, and subdivisions such as rju-sultra, etc.; STP. 1.3-5, 7-18, 31, 3.10. 14, 57); standpoints (niksepa STP.1.6, 40 ff.); the theory or origination, continued existence and annihilation that define substance (utpada-sthiti-bhanga / dravya; STP.1.12, 3.23. 32-35); kasayas. karman and bandha (STP.1.19, 46. 2.2, 3.53); samsara and mokra (STP.1.20, 3.43-45): explicit reference to the Canon and Jaina tradition (STP.1.49) and numerous use TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 355 of "agama": the concept of two cognitive faculties (upayoga: jndna and darsana, STP.2.1, 20, 29, 3.3, 43); the concept of the five kinds of knowledge (jnana: mati. fruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya, kevala: STP.2.3, 5. 6. 8. 16. 23. 27); sapta-bhangi (STP.1.36-40); the terms samanya and visesa (STP.2.1, 3.1, 57); the use of Jaina particle "no-" ("quasi"; e.g. in STP.50); the term samyanc (STP.2.33, 3.44); the idea of righteousness and misapprehension (samyakiva mityharva; STP.3.53); the idea of "the three jewels" (samyag-jnana-darsana-caritra, STP.3.44, 67); qualities and modes (guna paryaya; STP.3.2 ff., 3.24); ethical questions and the (im)possibility of liberation (bhdvydbhavya beings; STP.3.43 ff.); the notion of mutual non-existence (anyonyabhava; STP.3.31); STP.1.36-40: treatment of sapta-bhangi, raga-dvesa-moha (STP.2.43); six negative and positive false statements (mithyarva-sthana; STP.3.54): treatment of eight sub-categories of syad-vada and ways of predication (dravyaksetra-kala-bhava-paryaya-desa-sambandha, ekanta-asadbhuta and sadbhuta-aniscita: STP.3.59-60). The above juxtaposition of the two lists reveals that the vocabulary of both texts also does not match. 2.6. After even a brief analysis and comparison of both lists, it is clear that NA. shares its vocabulary with the general Indian pramana tradition and is very much akin to that of the pramana tradition or the Buddhist Sautrantika-Yogacara school. We do not find in NA. technical terms derived directly from the Jaina tradition (with the sole exception of "kevala" in NA.27), thus the text can be easily understood even by those who are not acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and religion. Besides, the scheme and topics discussed in NA. are not restricted to matters that are of interest merely to the Jainas (e.g. the issue of omniscience and its detailed stages, divisions of karmic bondage, etc., that could hardly evoke any interest in a person not directly involved in Jainism). On the other hand, STP. rests on ideas, locutions and terminology that had to large extent been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and presupposes a closer acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression. The choice of topics demonstrates that, at least to a certain degree, the text is directed specifically to a Jaina reader. 2.7. Does the above situation mean that there are no similarities to be observed between the two works? The followings list summarises the very few similarities I have been able to spot: (3) (a) the description of the absolute knowledge: sakalavarana-muktama kevalam (NA.27) and sayalam andvaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalani (STP.2.17); (b) none of the texts uses the terms vikalpa, kalpand etc. in their epistemological sense of

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IWU SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 357 "cohceptualisation"thus, the verses of STP.1.33, 34, 35 f. 41 use the terms nirvikalpa, hladi-vikalpa, avikalpa and servikalpa-nirvikalpa in the sense "not) distinguished without) division or in strictly ontological meaning, but with no tinge of cpistemological bearing, whereas NA. uses no derivatives of wikip at all: (c) adverbial use of krvalam (shines / arises alone. absolutely (as) absolute) in NA 27" and in STP.2.5. Such a situation makes any comparative analysis of both works quite difficult indeed, for we cannot simply pinpoint a notion or a technical term and compare how they are used in both texts. Arld if there were any difference to be observed, we might further ponder whether the difference is crucial enough to infer that both texts were written by two different persons. And if the opposite situation were the case, viz. if we did not observe any difference in usage and meaning, it might serve as quite a strong argument, though never conclusive, for the common authorship of both works. Even the positive corroboration that a particular term or concept is given precisely the same meaning both in STP. and NA. would neither prove that both works were written by one and the same person nor disprove the supposition admitting the common authorship of NA. and STP. The identical usage and understanding of a given term or idea in both STP. and in NA. could only have a supportive corroborative strength, but it would in no way be decisive, in so far as the similarity might have been merely coincidental. On the other hand, a technical term that is given an entirely different meaning in both works or a notion that rests on entirely different presuppositions could indeed be a serious indication that STP. and NA. were written by two different people. acquainted with specifically Jaina vocabulary and notions. That could explain away the fact that the argumentation of STP. is logically less rigid and less technical. In addition, one might claim that the same Siddhasena deliberately dealt with different topics in both texts in order not to repeat the same ideas. One might even refer to the famous TS.1.5: "The comprehension of these categories representing reality) is (accomplished) through ognitive criteria and viewpoints" (pramana-nayair tad-adhigarih). and conclude that NA. is devoted to the comprehension of reality through cognitive criteria" (pramanair tad-adhigarih), whereas STP. focuses on the comprehension of reality through viewpoints" (nayair tad-adhigari): hence both works are complementary. But I believe such an argument would be too artificial with no justification in the textual layer of both treatises. Such an argument would be nothing more than a hermeneutical interpretative attempt to understand the actual role of both works, after one has already accepted that they are written by the same person. In my opinion, as I shall try to demonstrate in the subsequent paragraphs, there is hardly anything in both texts that could justify such a claim. There are, however, some strong points to be found in NA. and STP. that prove the contrary thesis. Having considered the differences mentioned above, one might over hastily come to conclusion that indeed these texts have different authors. However the vice, viz. differences, could theoretically be turned into virtue. One might claim that it was indeed the strategy of Siddhasena to write a manual on logic (NA.) that, on the one hand, systematises Jaina logic and epistemology and, on the other, discloses it in a systematised form to the non-Jaina philosophic audience. That would nicely explain why the author did not employ Jaina doctrinal terminology and took recourse to general standards of discussing philosophy. It would also explain why he decided to use Sanskrit. Mutatis mutandis, STP. was composed in Prakrit in order to reach a more general and wider Jaina readership, inclined less epistemologically or philosophically but well One of these involves logical issues and the divergent application of logical concepts in STP. and NA. In the third chapter, one of the issues discussed by Siddhasena Divakara is the mutual relationship between substance (dravya) and its qualities (guna), properly defined in the spirit of anekanta.Tada as both different from and identical with each other. The author refutes two one-sided (ekarta) views, viz., that the substance and its qualities are either entirely different from each other (which is the thesis of the Vaisesika, as it has also been explicated before in STP.3.8) or that they are identical. Let us first take a look at a couple of verses of STP.3.16-22: 13.16] As a matter of fact, the one sided doctrine (propounding the absolute] difference between the class of substance and the class of quality, has already been rejected: [what now (follows is only an example 13.17:1 (This is what the propunder of a lute non-difference between substance and quality says (dra Jerner Wecantici: 'The relationship of one man [to another is like father, son grandson, heit, brother ete, and he - being the father of one person - does not become the father of the remaining ones. 13.18. Just as this man qualified by the relations (remains pod enmodified in his being a man in the same way substance possesses qualities such as colour, etc. that come into contact with respectivel sense 13.19: Rejoinder: 'But leven if a substance ce posunurporno

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HUIR DALLEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 359 . could become sweet of two kinds (flavours) and black of infinite kinds (shades). nevertheless the man does not become small or big because of the relation (e.g. as a son, etc.). (3.20: The propounder of absolute identity between substance and quality (dravya-paryayayor abhedaikanta-vddin):) says: 'If you accept the existence of the relatum (sambandhita, viz. that is related to y) on account of the relation why [do you not accept as proved this particular relatum, when this particular relation is there)? (3.21:) (The Siddhantawidin: To accept this particular relatum on the basis of this particular relation is logically correct. However, transformation (se sense datum) of a particular colour etc. does not enter a particular (sense organ such as the eye etc. [3.22] It is said (by an opponent:) "How could possibly a complex transformation (sc. sense datum) occur in one (substance)? [To answer this, the Siddhanta din says by way of application: 'It is either occasioned by something else, or not-such is the one-sided [view]". [d] this is its inherent property and (e) this stands in contradiction with (that)'." The sambandhin (the connected attribute, relatum), also called saryogin27 related by a particular relation is adduced as one of reasons in VS.3.1.8: sariyogi, samavayi, ekartha-samavayi, virodhi ca. karyan karyantarasya, karanam karanantarasya. virodhy-abhutam bhutasya, bhatam abhutasya, abhuta. abhutasya, bhutam bhutasya. Such a relation is adduced as a proof, e.g. for the existence of the soul (arman) in VS.3.1.13 and for the existence of the mind (manas) in VS.3.2.1. What is conspicuous in Siddhasena Divakara's reply (STP.3.21) is that he generally accepts this kind of reasoning: "[To accept this particular relatum on the basis of this particular relation is logically correct" ujjai sambandha-vasa sambaridhi-visesanam). There is not the slightest trace of hesitation to accept the principle (sambandhitva) of inferring the relatum x as connected with its related attribute y on account of a relation (sambandha) throughout STP., and Siddhasena Divakara seem to apply this principle uncritically This passage is followed by the exposition of the Jaina view of substance as permanence, origination and annihilation (STP.3.23). 4.1. 4.2. I do not wish to discuss ontological issues here, and the reason why I have quoted these verses is to draw attention to the verse STP.3.20, which speaks of accepting a relatum by force of a relation. In fact, the verse goes back to STP.3.8:24 "Since (sense data such as) colour, taste, smell and touch are characterised by dissimilar (sc. individual) grasping, therefore the qualities abide in substance - such is the standpoint) accepted by some thinkers." The idea expressed in the verse boils down to the following: since we perceive various qualities (guna), incompatible in their nature, we must assume one common substratum for them, and this substratum, or locus, is substance (dravya). No doubt. this is a reference to the position to the Vaisesika school, which is also confirmed by the commentary of TBV2 The circumstances under which the above is asserted are further characterised in VS.4.1.9-11, where the conditions for perceptibility of visual, gustatory, olfactory and tactile stimuli, which correspond to a number of respective properties located in one and the same substratum, are described. In the context thus delimited by STP.3.8, STP.3.20 states the condition for accepting such a single substratum common to several qualities: we accept it because it is related to the qualities. The principle lets us infer one thing related to another by a relation (sambandha). Thus, the gunas as relata serve as an inferential mark, whereas the dravya is the inferred relatum. This is precisely one of possible kinds of inference mentioned in VS.9.18 (and VSU. ad loc.): asyedar karyan karanan sambandhi ekartha-samavayi virodhi ceti lainigikam. -"The discipline [based on the inferential sign (sc. inference) has the form: (a) this is its effect, (b) this is its cause. (c) this is its connected (attribute]. On the other hand, NA. formulates - following Patrasvamin, alias Patrakesarin or Patrakesarisvamin, in this regard - an entirely new definition of the logical reason "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathinupaparti, anyathanupapannava) as the basis of all inference, and thereby rejects older forms of inference. NA.22 refers to an earlier source of this idea, which is independently reported and criticised by Santaraksita in TSa. 1364 ff. (p. 405 1.) and the crucial verse is TSa. 1369.29 It is Santaraksita TSa.1364, p. 405.1 (anyathety-adina patrasveimi.malastasankate...), who explicitly mentions Patrasvamin as the first who took the notion of the "inexplicability otherwise (anyathanupapani) to be the proper definition of a logical reason. Whoever has the historical priority, whether it was indeed Patrasvamin or someone else who was followed by Siddhasena Mahamati, is irrelevant for the present issue. In any case, the author of NA. finds the principle of anyathanupaparti so important that, in such a short text as NA., he does not fail to mention it explicitly twice, reminding the reader of it (NA.22), and uses it additionally for the third time in NA.23. It would have been a highly surprising and incongruous attitude on the part of the author to vehemently advocate the novel relation of arvathanuppunti in one text, and to completely ignore it in another work, even when the occasion avails. If Siddhasena Divakara had indeed

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ 360 TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 361 known of the notion of anyathanupapati as the defining characteristic of the logical reason, his statements in STP.3.21 would have been expressed quite differently. 5.1. Furthermore, again in STP.3.22, we find the statement expressed by way of application: "It is either occasioned by something else, or not". The term wvaniya-upanila, or "expressed by way of application", is directly related to the technical term wpanaya ("application"). The word uvaniya = upanita occurs once again in STP.3.51" by way of introducing an application: "These two, however, (viz. dravarthikaand parydyarthika nayas, when applied in the anekanta exposition." become pre-eminent correct conation, because they are the means of] the elimination of the existential pain; (when) these two are taken] separately (sc. independently of each other) they do not satisfy (the needs]." Furthermore, STP.3.52 explicates this idea by applying it to a particular case, which is the case of the application proper: "Since "the pot' is not separated from earth, therefore their non-difference is logically correct. On the other hand, since the pot' was not there before, (hence] it is different from earth." The verse does not state any general rule, on the contrary, it applies a general principle of the anekanta description to a particular case. Abhayadevasuri introduces the verse with: amum eva artham wpasanthara.dvarena wpadarsayann aha (TBV.3.52, p. 710.8). Both words upanaya and upasanthara's are technical terms to denote the fourth stage of the classical five-membered proof formula (paricavayava-vakya). The two verses follow the thesis, expressed in STP.3.46, which states that the doctrine of viewpoints (naya-voda). [which (or: when it)] is completely pure, becomes a proof of the purport of the Canon only." STP.3.47 adduces the reason (heru), in other words it states the principle of the invariable concomitance (vyapti): "To such an extent opinions are a method (vahd = panthan marga) of exposition (vacana), in the same measure they become doctrines of viewpoints (naya-voda), and vice versa (caiva ... caiva): to such an extent opinions are doctrines of viewpoints, in the same measure they become the highest teachings (samaya = siddhanta = Agama)". As the next step, we have the example (drstanta) expounded in three subsequent verses. STP.3.48 refers to the doctrine of Samkhya (as dravydstika-naya / dravarthika-naya) and to the doctrine of the Buddha (as payaya-vikalpa = paryayastika-naya/parydyarthika naya). STP.3.49 criticises the doctrine of Vai esika: even though the system combines two viewpoints: dravyastika and parayastika, nevertheless, it is the case of falsehood (mithyathva) because the two nayas are treated independently: anyonya-nirapeksa. STP.3.50 mentions the followers of Sakya and Ulaka as well as the system of Samkhya again as an example. What STP.3.53 says - "Time, intrinsic nature, fate, former deed, man are partial causes, (hence) they are a case of] falschood (mithyatva): however, in a compound they become truth (samyakrva)" - can easily be taken as a reformulation of the initial thesis expressed in STP.3.46. Since this new formulation of the initial thesis links the verses STP.46 52 with a short excursus on causality and liberation, it is not surprising to see that STP.3.53 in its turn emphasises the idea of causes and causality. This is also quite evident if we consider that the section of STP.3.46-53 immediately follows a digression about the doctrine of causality Chetu-vada) and the doctrine of "non-causality" (ahetu-vada) in STP.3.43-45 with regard to soteriological issues, such as the question of beings capable of attaining liberation (bhavya) and beings incapable of it (abhavya) as well as causal predicaments and prerequisites for the attainment of liberation. The idea stated in STP.3.46 and STP.3.53 is explicitly replicated also in the phrase that "Jina's words are made of an amassment of false views" found in the final verse of STP.3.69: "prosperity to Jina's words that are made of an amassment of false views that are conducive to immortality, that are venerable, and lead to the salvific happiness."36 Since STP.3.53 seems to be kind of rephrasing of the thesis of STP.3.46 that immediately follows the application (upanaya) in STP.3.51-52, it is clearly the fifth member of the proof formula, viz. the conclusion (nigamana). Accordingly, whereas STP.3.22 is at least an allusion to, if not a direct instantiation of the five-membered proof formula (pancavayava. vakya), the verses STP.3.46-53 are an instance of such a proof formula They therefore demonstrate that Divakara not only approved of the fivemembered proof formula (paricavayava vakya), but he also employed it himself. 5.2. In contradistinction to this, we can read in NA 20" that drstanta is not an essential part of the formal reasoning (sadhanavayava), inasmuch as the relation of the internal invariable concomitance (uyapti) suffices to prove the thesis. Thereby the author of NA, not only subscribes to

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TWO SUDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP PIOTR BALCEROWICZ 362 363 11 tor the ideas expressed in Vada vidhana and Vada-vidhi of Vasubandhu to limit the number of necessary "syllogistic" members to three, but he furthermore continues this "economical trend in Indian logic and ventures to simplify the reasoning procedures in order to make them universally binding. without any need for further empirical justification other than the premises themselves. Besides, he emphasises the sole validity of the principle of anyathanupaparti inexplicability otherwise). It would be incongruous, if Siddhasena Mahamati, being such an ardent proponent of the new definition of the valid hetu in NA, had subscribed himself to the notion of sambadhin as a binding logical principle in a text other than NA My interpretation of the genuine standpoint of NA, as regards the validity of the inferences that have recourse to the idea of sambandhin, as expressed in VS.9.18, is further strengthened by what Siddharsigani says in NAV.5.2, while commenting on the Vaisesika definition of inference: [2] tathanye: ''syedam karyar karanam samyogi samavayi virodhi ceri laingikam" ini. Refering to the sariyogin part of the Vaisesika definition Siddharsigani plainly says: "By the same (argument the thesis that also a connected (attribute) leads to the comprehension (of the inferendum is censured because it is open to similar criticism." (NAV.5.3: etena santyogino 'pi gamakata praryukta, samana-dasanarvar.). Siddharsigani's clarification confirms Siddhasena Mahamati's opinion and stands in contradiction with the inference in STP. based on sambandhin / sarityogin. Thus, we encounter in STP. and NA, two conflicting attitudes towards the question of reasoning and the proof formula. It would be highly surprising if one and the same author outspokenly rejected the idea of the five-membered proof formula in one text (NA.) and used the same five-membered proof formula in another text (STP). ideas or, on the other hand, he himself was expressly critical of certain Buddhist concepts. On the other hand, I do not find even a single notion in STP. that might presuppose its author's acuqaintance with Dinnaga's, Sankarasvamin's or Dharmakirti's ideas, no criticism is raised against the viridna-vada, Yogacara, Yogacara-Sautrantika etc. The main antagonists in STP. are the Vaisesika," whereas the references to other schools are sporadic." Apart from the notions and terms mentioned above in $ 2.5 (e.g. svarthaI parartha-anumana) or the issue of samanya - visesa (vide infra, $ 6.2, p. 13 ff.) that occur in NA. and are absent from STP., there is not the slightest hint in STP. to support the supposition that its author knew of such ideas as: the doctrine of apoha, conceptualisation (kalpana); the non-verbal perception (nirvikalpaka-pratyaksa); non-erroneousness of perception (avibhrama / abhranti) coupled with crroneousness of inference (vibhrama/bhranti); the concept of trairupya and general discussion on conditions of validity of inference, the question of causation (also in the epistemological sense), including the arising of cognition as a reflection (pratibhasa) of an object as well as the actual relation between cause and effect (grahya-grahaka-bhava-sambandha) in the form of relation of causality (tad-utpatti) and relation of essential identity (tadatmya). These are only some of the topics one would expect Siddhasena Divakara to deal with in respective sections of STP. devoted to the linguistic approach towards reality (e.g. by applying sydd-vada or naya-voda) and the meaning of words, or to the exposition of causality (e.g. in the sections of STP.3.32-35 and STP.3.43-45), for instance, applied to origination of material things (dravya) endowed with qualities (guna) and modes (paryaya), or to the working of karman (when the author discusses an antiquated doctrine of determinism (niyatl) in STP.3.53). Certainly, these notions are likewise absent from NA., and I have named these ideas as an argument ex silentio. Their absence from NA. necessitates no further justification: there is no context in the discussion within NA, for them to be mentioned, whereas generally concepts and ideas that are expected to be relevant for the discussion are indeed reported there. This is not the case with STP. This is of course a negative evidence, i.e. it only proves that the author of STP. does not use these notions and terms we would expect to find in STP.. but it does not disprove the claim that the author was not aware of them. The argument rests on the supposition that if the author of STP. had been acquainted with these idcas, he would probably not have missed the opportunity to defend his views against possible criticism 6.1. As mentioned already (5 2.1. p. 2), NA. presupposes the notions, ideas and terminology developed by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti and the text gives the impression that its author tries to keep pace with the development of Indian logic. There are a large number of other Buddhist notions and quotations, or semi-quotations in NA. (see n. 6), that are consistently and deeply interwoven in the structure of the text, revealing that the author was, on the one hand, aware of possible criticism from the Buddhist side who might disapprove of his own

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364 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 365 in respective sections of his STP. But, as one could argue, he might simply have considered them irrelevant or thought it to unnecessary to refute them for some reason. Whatever the case might have been, it does not seem very plausible that one and the same person could cxhibit such divergent attitudes in both works (STP. and NA.) and be so inconsistent (either in terms of concpetual framework or in terms of approach) 6.2.2. However, the author of STP. was in fact occasionally wary of a possible misunderstanding of his position. An instance is facilitated by the discussion of STP.2.21-24: 6.2. [The prima facie position to be refuted: 1211 "Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates"(this is) a pot." (hence it becomes the sensuous cognition Just like sensation, in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute (cognition and insight is this much only: 122] the absolute] cognition is preceded by (the absolute insight, but the absolute insight is not conditioned by the absolutel cognition, hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both the absolute] cognition and the absolute) insighe. [Rejoinder:) (23-24) "If you maintain that insight is nothing but foculary" sensation [or] a qualified cognition, then, if it were so it would follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be the case with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct". [The opponent argues: "If in the case of these remaining senses only cognition is understood," in the very same way in the case on eyes fonly cognition should be understood) 6.2.1. It is in the context of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) that Siddhasena Divakara uses the terms samanya and visesa in STP.2.1: "Such insight (conation) which grasps the general [becomes cognition when characterised by the specific. This comprehension of an object is (within the scope of both viewpoints alike."43 What concerns me here is the first hemistich that characterises the nature of darsana (insight / conation) and jnana (cognition), which grasp the general (samanya) and the specific (visesa) respectively. Here the differentiation into the samanya and the visesa is not along the lines of the typical distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, jari, language and concepts, kalpand) and the particular (vyakti, svalaksana, etc.). Crucial for the distinction is the opposition between "general, indistinct, unclear" (for samanya) and distinct, specific, particular" (for visesa). What emerges is the picture of the darsana grasping the sdmdnya, and the jriana grasping the visesa. At first glance, one might have an impression that what is at stake is the often-debated division into perception (pratyaksa, which is often - even in Jaina sources - called darsana, see below 6.2.2 for the similar case) and its opposite, non-perceptual cognition, e.g. inference (arumana). What would surprise him or her would be the untypical correlation of perception (pratyaksa) to smdnya and non-perceptual kinds of cognition (such as anumana) to visesa. Such a position would immediately be liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side. in so far as it would express precisely the opposite of what e.g. Dharmakirti claimed, namely that the visese (svalaksana) is the proper object (visaya) for perception (pratyaksa), whereas the samanya (samanya-laksana) is the proper object (visaya) for inference (artumana). Naturally, a reader well acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that the text deals with the two wpayogas, not with the division into pratyaksa - anumana, or something similar From the above passage it follows that the opponent may have considered insight / conation (darsana) to be merely perception (pratyaksa), both because of the misleading terminology (see above $ 6.2.1 for a similar case) and because of the specific character of insight / conation (darsana), viz. its "operating strategy that merely brings the constatation: "this is such a thing." Precisely such a constatation is often said to be a characteristic mark of at least conceptual (savikalpaka) - perception. In other words, the opponent may have had the impression that the description of the mechanism of darsana matches that of avagraha, for "it designates"(this is) a pot" ("ghado" ti nivvannand), hence he may have been inclined to equate the two. Especially the contents of STP.2.21 and 2.23 are very suggestive in this regard. Significantly Siddhasena Divakara dismisses any supposition that darsana might be equated with avagraha and tries to prove that the affinity between Jaina avagraha and darsana is illusory. He does so, despite the fact that naturally anyone sufficiently acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that darsana and avagraha can by no means be identified! This only demonstrates that Siddhasena Divakara anticipated possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations on the part of his opponent. that he was aware of such a possibility. Accordingly. if the author of STP. had been acquainted with Dinnaga's or Dharmakirti's ideas, he would not have failed to expound on the controversial question of the proper relation between darsana - samanya

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366 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 367 and jnana - visesa stated in STP.2.1 (vide supra $ 6.2.1), for he would have been aware that his statements are not only liable to some misreading but may easily trigger pertinent criticism. This further strengthens the supposition, expressed above in $ 6.1, that STP. was written before Dinnaga. wik come directlle e entities hoe dit to the cognit Another case of disagreement between NA. and STP. concerns different typologies of cognitive faculties (upayoga) and cognitive criteria (pramana). In NA. we find two subdivisions of pramdna: (1) perception (pratyaksa), divided into sensory an supra-sensory (kevala), and (2) indirect cognition (paroksa) that comprises inference (anumana) and verbal testimony (Sabda). With the exception of the kevala pratyaksa mentioned in NA.27. Siddhasena Mahamati's understanding of pratyaksa conforms to the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs in the first place. His pratyaksa (perception) departs from the Jaina tradition that regarded pratyaksa to be direct and of exclusively supra-sensory character. There is no reference to the idea of upayoga in NA., instead the main concern of Siddhasena Mahamati is the enquiry into the character of pramana. His examination culminates in formulating the first descriptive definition of pramana in the history of Jaina epistemology and one of the first in India. In sharp contrast to NA. is the classification outlined in STP. Surprisingly the idea of cognitive validity (pramanya) and of cognitive criterion (pramana) is absent there, and so are such terms as pramina, pramiri, mdna, pramd, or their equivalents. Instead, what predominates in the epistemological scheme of STP. are the two upayogas investigated esp. STP.2.1-5, 18 ff., 30), divided traditionally into five kinds of judna and four kinds of darsana. The idea of the fivefold division of jnana into mari, fruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya, kevala is present e.g. in STP.2.5-6, 2.16, 2.23 and 2.27. There can be no doubt that Divakara recognised the four divisions of caksur-darsana, acaksur-darsana, avadhi-darsana, kevala-darsana (see STP.2.20), with the proviso of STP.2.30-31 (vide infra, p. 16).56 Surprisingly, the division into pratyaksa-paroksa is nowhere mentioned explicitly in STP. And - with the exception of STP.2.28-29 - the terms pratyaksa, samaksa, saksat etc. as well as their opposites never occur in the text. The same goes for paroksa. Nonetheless we can easily - in the verses that outspokenly speak of pratyaksa - find hints that the author did conceive of the upayoga scheme as bifurcating into the complements of direct and indirect cognition: "(27) In (case of a conditioned person (i.e. in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sensuous cognition and testimony, there is no insight in any one of them; what from (should there be) insight in them)? (28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping (them) directly, therefore the word 'insight' does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all. [29] Since entities not (directly touched (by senses) (asprsta) become directly cognisable) for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word 'insight' is (correctly employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia."97 The next two verses of STP.2.30-31 state that at the level of an omniscient person (kevalin) both the cognitive faculties, viz. kevala-darsana and kevala.jrana are identical (avisesa), since they arise at the same time. Furthermore, Siddhasena Divakara accepted the sensuous cognition (mati-jnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) himself, alongside its four traditional stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (ha), perceptual judgement (apaya) and retention (dharana), and classified it as the paroksa type cognition (nana). Thus, the structure of the cognitive faculties propounded in STP. corresponds basically to what I call Model 1:6 upayoga: (1) jnana: (1) abhinibodhika-jnana with its four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) iha, (c) apaya, (d) dharana, (2) fruta-jnana, (3) avadhi-jrana, (4) manahparyaya-jnana. (5) kevala-jnana, (II) darsana: (1) caksur-darsana, (2) acaksur-darsana, (4) avadhi-darsana, (5) kevala-darsana. Significantly as it were, not only is this structure incompatible with NA., but also the notion of the sensuous cognition (matijnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) does not fit into the framework of NA 62 In NA. Siddhasena Mahamati develops the idea of svartha-vakya and parartha-vakya (NA 10) and svartha-pratyaksa and parartha.pratyaka (NA.11), elaborating upon the well-known division of svarthanumana and pararthanumana developed by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. It is precisely in the context of his attempt to prove that the epistemic idea of efficacy for others (pararthya) and efficacy for oneself (svarthya) is applicable to both perception (pratyaksa) and inference (paroksa) that one should read his statement of NA.12: "And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation. 164

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368 * PIOTR BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 369 His thesis of parartha-pratyaksa boils down to saying that things can also be directly cognised through verbal means, and verbal utterances can be classified as cases of perception under special conditions, viz. if they contribute to the generating of knowledge in the hearer that corresponds to the speaker's cognitive states derived perceptually. In contradistinction to the above statement of NA., STP.2.28 explicitly declares that "objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping (them) directly" (paccakkha-ggahanam na inti suya-nanasammiya attha). In other words, for Siddhasena Divakara verbal communication is incompatible with the notion of direct cognition (pratyaksa), hence must by definition be indirect (paroksa). Here we have a clear case of two contradictory concepts when one and the same sphere of verbal communication is either attributed (NA.) or denied of (STP.) the efficacy of direct cognition. Apparently Siddhasena Divakara could not have been aware of the concept of parartha-pratyaksa. of the direct, i.e. perceptual character (pratyaksa) of verbal utterances and the question whether things communicated verbally can be grasped directly (vide supra 8).. To this list I could add some more points of divergence, discussed already in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), namely: (8) the assignment of either sensory (NA.) or suprasensory (STP.) character to pratyaksa, taken either as perception (NA.) or as blanket term "direct cognition" (STP.):67 (9) the importance of the essential unity of jnana and darsana at the kevala stage for the author of STP. and complete indifference to the question in NA, as well as a different treatment of kevala in both works; (10) different attitudes to the authority of the Agamas, either faithfulness to the Agamic tradition (STP.) or search for novel solutions (NA.). I believe these points of divergence clearly demonstrate that not only were the Saunati-tarka-prakarand and the Nyayavatara conceived by two different persons, but also at two different historical periods. As regards the Sarmati tarka-prakarana, it is rather dubious whether the name of its author was indeed Siddhasena Divakara, but since I see no better alternative, I would suggest keeping the name, especially in view of Abhayadevasuri's identification (vide supra n. 4). Since there is no indication that Siddhasena Divakara as the author of the Sanimati tarka-prakarana might have been familiar with the terminology of Dinnaga's school, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 C.E. Since the Nyayavatara was definitely composed after 620/660 C.E. (Dharmakirti) and Patrasvamin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasuri). its author cannot be the same Siddhasena. To distinguish the two Siddhasenas, I follow the identification by Haribhadrasuri and refer to the author of the Nyayavatara as Siddhasena Mahamati." As I have tried to demonstrate on the preceding pages, there is a number of points that make the common authorship of STP. and NA. highly debatable, namely (1) the general outline, vocabulary and matters discussed (vide supra $5 2.1-2.2.5-6); (2) presence in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of the structured pattern of definitions and justifications (vide supra $$ 2.3-4); (3) various principles on which inference is based, viz. inference of the relatum (sambandhin) by means of a relation (sambandha) - i.e. the application of sambandhin as hetuaccepted in STP. and rejected in NA., and the "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupaparti) - i.e. the proper hetu- as the basis of all inference propounded in NA. (vide supra $ 4); (4) acceptance in STP.) or rejection (in NA.) of application (upanaya) as a member of the proof formula (nyayavayava, sadhana), and therefore the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the classical five-membered proof formula (paricdvayavavakya) (vide supra SS 5.1-2); (5) presence in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of notions that presuppose the authors' acquaintance with Dinnaga or Dharmakirti (vide supra SS (2.1,6.1), especially the case of the proper relation between darsana - samanya and jnana - visesa (vide supra $56.2.1-6.2.2): (6) different typological schemes of cognitive faculties (upayoga) or cognitive criteria (pramana), the question of the feasibility of assigning room to the sensuous cognition (mati-jana, abhinibodhika jnana) in such a classification, as well as different interpretations of the true character of pratyaksa (vide supra $ 7); (7) the controversy NOTES The Prabhavakacarita of Prabhicandra - dated from 1277 C.E. (see GRANOFF (1989-1990: 1, 329)) - seems to be the only exception, see GRANOFF (1989-1990: II, 292): "The Prabhakacarita is the only text to name in addition Siddhasena's manual of logic, his Nycyanatara.. : See GRANOFF (1989-1990. 1. 336): "The work that modem scholars consider to be Siddhasena's main philosophical work, his Sanmaritarka, is nowhere mentioned in the biographies in the prabandhas and in related sources." See UPADHYE (1971: xxiii). Its = N avatara - P.B.) constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the Sanmari and consequently its date have to remain open questions for a number of reasons." TBVL (introductory pirt). p. 1.17-18. Sicelhasena-Divakarah r apidvalita Sarunuty-ako-prakarana kare ..

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370 PIOTR BALCEROWICZ TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 371 5 Haribhadrasori quotes the verse NA.2 in his Astaka and refers to its author as Mahamati, d. P. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287-288). UPADHYE (1971: xxiv). and DHAKY (1995: 46). The following observation of UPADHYE (1971: Exiv) further strengthens the claim that NA, and STP. had two different authors: "Haribhadra, in his Astaka, quotes the Nydyavaldra 2, by referring to its author as Mahamati. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Sarmatia Divakara and Srutakevalin." * See BALCEROWICZ (1999: "Introduction", ii-xix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000). * See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27-28). Eg only the avagraha stage of marijana is mentioned in STP, while the author is silent on the three remaining subdivisions, viz. tha, apdya and dharani. Nevertheless the reader is expected to know them to be able to follow the argumentation An exception is the related term upaparna occurring in ST.2.33. sammandne niyamena dartsanan dari sane w bhayanija / Sammannana caiman ti atthao hoi wavannant - -Right insight (exists) in right knowledge, and right knowledge should be necessarily admitted to exist) in right insight - this is explicable (upaparna) from the meaning (arthat = samarthydd)." 10 Truly, the term paksa occurs in STP, but in the more general sense of "opinion, viewpoint," eg STP.1 23: anyonya-paksa-nirapeisa naydh, and STP.2.39: aha puna pura-payutto anche sgamta pakkha-parische / taha w wydharanam inani tri heil parlainam voccha 11 - "Even though a fact has been previously adduced to refute a one-sided view, nevertheless, we will formulate a solution (remedy) in the form of the reason: "this is an example. The context for it is STP.2 37-38 and the question: "What is the relation between liberated live and its kevala cognition? They should be different form each other" " The term prayoga occurs in STP.3.32 but not in the logical sense. 1 NA. 29-30 only mention the term nay as an element of the anekdota theory There is, however, a conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined): NA 27: sakalavarana-maktaima kevalantyal prakasare / pratyaksam sakalarthama-safata-pratibhasanam il"That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects." STP.2.17: ramhd calvi-bhago jujjai na nana-damsana-jinanarit sayalam anavaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalam janhall- "Therefore it would follow that (cognition would be) four-fold (not five-fold). but there would be no separate) cognition and insight in case of Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, etemal, imperishable." This verse is a rejoinder of Divakara's opponent who draws the conclusion from Divikara's thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. But this similarity is apparent and not conclusive, since it may simply be due to a general way of describing the absolute cognition " E.g. niskranta bheda-svarspa, bhedam na pratipadyante. 1 One would expect NA. to use the term (nir-sa-vikalpa or kalpani while discussing the nature of perceptioncg to take recourse to the idea of non-conceptual perception expressed by Dinaga or Dharmakirti in NB.1.4: Tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam. Strangely enough, NA, does nowhere refute the idea of kalpanapolha. 1 sakaldvarna-muktama krvalamit vat prakasate - i.e. it is the only cognition after all veils have been destroyed " krvala nandyarana-kharajyanit kewalan jahil manam l-after veils have been destroved, other kinds of cognition such as the sensuous cognition, etc. are mor possible, i.e. krvala is the only cognition STP.3.16: evanta-palkho-do jo na dawa-guna-ji-bheammi/ aha pwww.padikkutho Maharanamiriam eam tu I/ STP.3.17: pia-pwita nattu-bhavaya-bhaanan eka-puris-sambandho/ na yaso ekassa piya mi sesayanan piyd holl STP.3.18 jaha sambandha visithe so puriso purise-bhavniraisao/ Taha davom imdiya-gayant rudi-wisesanan lahai STP.3.19 hojjahi duguna-mahram amama-guna-kalayan tu jam davam na w daharao mahallo va hoi sambandhad puriso I STP.3.20 bhansa sambandha-vasd jai sambandhitanam animayante! nanu sambandha-visese sambamdhi-visesanan siddham STP.3.21: jujai sambamdha-vasd sambandhi-visesana na una cam / nayandi-visesa-gao niva-visesa parindimo Il STP.3.22: bhanndi visame parinayan kaha at hohil miwaniyam tam hoi para-nimittam na wa miettha thiyanto il The above verse refers to the refutation of the thesis of absolute difference between substance and quality (dravya-pardya-bheda kanta-vida) in the preceding section Cf. Abhayadevasuni's TBV. ad loc. p. 636.17-19. kanta-vya rikthypagame dide yah punor drevye-una-krid-thedesu soyady api paniam na pralkiptah bhedaikanto-grahake pramandhawild abheda grdhakasya ca "saram ekami sad avisesad videse wd vlyal kusumawad asettua-prasangar" il pradarsitat de tothepi fat-syarpe dardhyopidanarthamuddharand-matram abhidhyae - "However, even though this Vaidesika) doctrine accepting absolute difference of clit, as absolutely different with respect to the divisions of substance, quality and movement has just in the preceding been rejected because Ifirstlythere is no cognitive criterion proving (lit. making one grasp) absolute difference and secondly because a counter-proof for (lit. la cognitive criterion proving) non-difference of substance, quality and action has been demonstrated in the form): 'Everything is the one existent, because there is no distinction (among entities as regards their existence], or if there were (anyl distinction, that would lead to the undesired consequence of non-existence of [some entities that should be taken to differ from other entities considered to exist). like a skyflower - nevertheless merely an example is explicitly stated in order to provide additional) substantiation for the gist of this doctrine of the absolute differencel" Thus the dialectical structure of the whole passage is as follows the bheda-dda of 3.16 as the pana-paksa 1 (it is referred to by the abheda vidin), to which is appended its corroborative instantiation in 3.17. is subsequently followed by a rejoinder in 3.19 inexplicability of the occurrence of two different kinds of situations) and its refutation from the position of the abvedavdda of 3.20. Further, the Jaina position is established in 3.21, only to be followed by the quandary voiced by the opponent in 3.22 ab which is solved in 3.22 ed. * The idea is clear enough: if a man, as the substratum of various interpersonal and family relations, were identical with the relations qualifying him, then a particular relation, say, of his-being-a-father to a particular individual (his son) would have to by necessity bear on all other relations, insofar as they would be likewise identical with the substratum. for the relation of identity (abheda) is a transitive relation. Thus, the logical justification for the hhe i d would. in the eyes of Siddhasena Divakara, be to prevent a range of undesired consequences ensuing from the transitive character of the identity relation that underlies the ahlteder wielu The shove verse of 3.18 projects the structural pattern of the complex whole the man and his relational modes with respect various family relations, onto the substance qualities structure. The qualities of the substance Siddhasena Divakara

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ 372 TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 373 has in mind are colour and other sensations (visaya) related to the five senses. If a substance as the substratum for its qualities were in the relation of identity to its qualities, then eg the relation substance-visible-form, which further relates the substance to a particular sense (here: sense of vision), would be passed onto other relational complexes substance - sensation - sense organ: in consequence, the distinction between the character of sensory data would be blurred and disappear, the distinction between them being merely nominal. Cr. Abhayadevasari's TBV. ad loc. p. 636.23-27. yatha pradarsita ambandha-virintah pir-ddi-vyapadesam difrityisom purus-rapatay niranisayo 'pi san tahd drayyam api ghuning-rasand-cakrus-vaksrotra-ambandham andpya ripresa-gandha-sparia-sabda-vyapadedamdam labhate dravo svarprovisistam api nahi sakrendradi-dada-bhedad girano-ndthayeva ripadi-sabda-bhedat vastu-bhedo yuktas tada dravyddiaitaikanta-sthiteh karhancidbhedabheda-vado dravya-gunayor marya-wida Isl. - "Just as a man qualified by a specified relation, who is determined in his relational status] by the designation 'father', etc., still remains) unsurpassed (se unmodified) - viz. existent - in his human form, in the same manner also the substance - having entered a specific relation with the [faculties of smell, taste, vision, touch and hearing - receives the designation alone (that refers to its) colour, taste, smell, touch and sound, even though the substance remains the same in its intrinsic nature of [being] a substance. For it is not sound [to assume that an entity (refered to) is different on account of the difference of referring) terms (such as 'colour, etc., analogous to the non-difference of one and the same male deity despite the difference of (referring terms (such as) Sakra'. 'Indra', etc. Hence, since the doctrine of the absolute unity of substance is proved the doctrine (propounding conditional difference - cum-non-difference between substance and its qualities is a false doctrine 2 Abhayadevasuri introduces the refutation with the words arya Wirakanindya. and further explicates (TBV. ad loc. p. 636.29-637.5). yadi nama dmrddi-drawiam rva rosana-sambandhad rasa iri vyapadefa matram daddayet dvigue-madharam masalah kuto Whaver fath Haydn-sambandhad yadindma "krsnam bhavel anantapuskrsnar far kuah syd vanamiya-bheddvagafer nayanadi-sambandh mdorld asambhavdr. Rath, putridi-sambandha-corena pir-adir eva purto have alpo mahdin veri yukta visesa-pratipafter upacaritate mithydive Samanya prariparty api tatha prasekter iri bhavah. - "Suppose that a singular substance such as mango fruit. etc, could acquire the designation alone 'taste due to its) relation with the faculty of smell, how could it become sweet of two kinds (sc. possess two sweet flavours, if the determining relation substance-sense is singular) with respect to taste? Similarly, suppose that due to the relation with the faculty of vision - Something could be called] 'black', how could it be black of infinite kinds (sc. how could it be characterised by innumerable shades of black, if there is only one substance-sense relation)? This should not occur], because the recognition of difference within the complex consisting of various flavours / shades) would not be possible due to the mere (sc. singular) relation with the (faculty of vision, etc Similarly, it is sound to maintain that a man who is precisely the father, etc., by way of Chis) relation to this son, etc., could become either small nor big. because such should be the lexpected) unwelcome consequence if on account of the apprehension of the particular there could also arise the apprehension of the general, either mctaphorically or falsely. Such is the idea". What is implied here, I believe, is that in the first case, a singular substance (mango fruit, a black object) is the bearer of a number of indistinct and particular cognate qualities (distinct sweet flavours a range of particular shades of black), even though there is only one general relation (connection) between the substance and the respective sense organ (faculties of taste of vision) that is accountable for the respective general blanket-terms such as "sweet" or "black", whereas in the second case the substance (the man retains its this) singular character, even though one should by analogy expect him to appear diversified, since it (he) enters a number of relations For the specific meaning of visam particularised complexity / individualised charactersee NAV.29.23: Tasmaltad eva santvedanam pasarjani-ksta veisanta pradhani-krtarkokdrar samanyam grhndifty meyale... ("Therefore, it is taught that the very same sensation in which the particularised complexity is made subordinate and in which one (common form is made the main import grasps the universal...") and NAT 29 ad NAV 29.23: pasarjanity-adi wpasarjani-krtam gauni klarte valsamyam visesa-rupand send tal-Gatha. 23 STP.3.23: dewasa thal jammed-vigand ya guna-lakkanariti vattavat evam sal kevalino ju jai tam no u davyassa // STP.3.8: tarasgandha phasa asamdnd-sgahana lakkhand jamhd/ Faha davvanugaya guna tri le kel icchamill TBV. ad 3.8. p. 633.1-2. ripe-rasa-gandha-sparsah asandra-grahan-laksand yasmit tato davatrid guna iti kecanavaisesid . > VS.4.19-11:9) aneka-dravena drayvena samanayad rupe-visesc capalahdhih. 110 ctena s andhrspardesu nam khatam (11) And-abhydd avyabhicdrah The idea is further specified in PBh (236). p. 44: perasagrandha-sparses aneka-drava.smide swagata-wisesdir svdsnya sannikarin niyatendriya-nimittam pratvakram - P.B. wpadyate. + VSV9.18sambandhi-Sahden saryogino grahanan dhamadehanyad vyakhya Suntgliditate. See the reading of the sutra in NAVS: ardom karyam kerana Samogi scaminai vidhi ceti ligikam. * The relevant section is edited and translated in KUNST (1999: 11-53). converhimpapanaw patra Mare Trevena kim amalupipinnatiram yarra faire travena km / The verse is also found in TSVA. p. 203. TBV, vol. 11, p. 569.28-29 and in PMI 2.1.9 33: p. 45.17-18. In the reading of TSa the p e ab are interchanged with the pidus cd! On the authenticity of this verse, see BALCEROWICZ (1999. xx. m. ix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000 45. n. 72). Patrasvamin's treatise in question is his lost Tri-laksana kadarthana. See DHAKY (1995: 43). NA. 17ab: hetos tathpapanya va spar prayogo "nathapi vi / NA.22ab: anythinupapan aivan hetor laksanam iram. I quote the whole passage of STP.3.46-53, which is relevant for further discussion: STP.3.46: pari dhe ndyo-vaso damnath-sha hoi 50 ca dunigine donni w pakkhe vidhanimel STP.3.47: jail rayon-vaha lavanvi ceva hominid / Moviy may vaya kivaiya cha para-sama l STP.3.48 jam kablanit darisanan air darvarhivassa vartowanit/ Suddhodna-lanaassa parisuddho pejava-viappo Il STP.3.49: dohi vi chi rin sathan aliena taha si micchana jane servisapphanattanena R inne STP.3.50: je s tva-dose sakkolsyd bhonamni samkhanani samitha was de resim ve vi te sacral STP.3.51: Warumom sek sama terme lui/ Tribhova-dukkha-rimokkham de vi na prireniti prikkarit // STP.3.52: marthi padhe-visittho gludo i jari tena jujjai and j u gado por medisi pudharta STP.353: klesala siya paya-ra purisa keras michaam te ceva mai mom Here: hr hujuma = vivus melata. M

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14 Here: visitha viflista bhinna. Cf. TBV. ad loc.: nasti sad-dravya-mrt prthivitvadibkyo vilisto bhinnah so 'pi va... On the meaning of the term visittho cf. also: (1) STP.2.42: Jivo annai-nihano "jiva" ni ya niyamao na vattavvo / jam purisauya-jivo devaiya-jiviya-visitho II (TBV. ad loc. has: jivo 'nadi-nidhano jiva eva videza-vikala iti niyamato na vaktavyam yatah purusayuska-jivo devayuska-jivad vidisto jiva eva iti...) and (2) jaha sambandha-visittho so puriso purisa-bhavaniraiasao I taha davvam imdiya-gayam rival-visesanam lahai // (TBV. ad loc. has: yatha pradarfita-sambandha-visistam pitradi-vyapadesom airitydsau purusa-rupataya niratidayo 'pi san tatha dravyam api ghrana-rasana-caksus-tvak-frotra-sambandham avapya rupa-rasa-gandha-sparta-sabda-vyapadefa-matram labhate...), NBh.1.1.38: udaharandpeksas tathety upasamharo na tatheti va sadhyasyopanayah. 36 STP.3.69: baddam miccha-damsana-samaha-maiyassa amaya-sarassa / jina-vayanassa bhagavao samvigga-suhdhigammassa II 37 NA.20: antar-vydpryaiva sadhyasya siddher bahir-udahrtih/ vyartha syat tad-asadbhave 'py evam nydya-vido viduh !! 38 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957). 39 See STP.3.8 (the question of the gunas as located in a dravya) and the refutation of Vaisesika in STP.3.9 (there are parydyas in addition to gunas), STP.3.14, 3.24, 3.31 (the notion of anyonyabhava, or mutual non-existence), STP.3.39-40 (the Vaisesika notions of anu, dvy-anuka and try-anuka, combination and disintegration of the atom). STP.3.49-50. Samkhya in referred to in STP.3.48, Buddhists in STP.3.48 and 3.50. 41 STPT ad loc. correctly explains visesiyam as visesitam ini videsa-grahanam. 42 Le. the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (dravyarthika-naya, dravyastika-naya), and attributive, or mode-expressive viewpoint (paryayarthika naya, paryayastika-naya). See STP.1.3. 43 STP.2.1: jam samanna-ggahanam damsanam eyam visesiyami* nanam / donho vi naydna eso padekkam attha-pajjao II TBV, ad loc. correctly explains visesiyam as videsitam ini videsa-grahanam. "STPT ad 2.21 (p.617.27) correctly supplies: mati-jnanam. 45 The verse STP.2.22 refers, in my opinion, to the alleged distinction between kevala-jnana and kevala-darsana in view of the second hemistich of STP.2.21 that introduces it: "Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute (cognition and insight] is this much only...". In view of the phrase sesimdiya (sesendriya) in STP.2.24, the sensation here must refer to caksur-avagraha (*cakkhuggahia alocana). The form gheppai corresponds to ghrp I ghrpryate, a root paralel to grbk (see: PISHEL (1981: SS 212. p. 182, SS 534. p. 434 and SS 548, p. 441). a The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be only respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (ghrana-jnana), and the idea of an olfactory insight (ghrana-darsana) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (cakyur-jnana) and reject the idea. of ocular insight (caksur-darsana). In the preceding section (STP.2.20) Divakara - following tradition recognises cakur-darsana as one of four subdivisions of darsana. STP2.21-24: danisanam oggahamettam "ghado" ni nivvannana havai nana! jaha ettha kevalana vi visesanam ettiyam ceva ll damsana-puvvam ninam nana-nimittain tu dainsanan natthi I tena suvinicchiyamo damsana-nanana annatton IWU SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP jai oggahamettam damsanam ti mannasi visesiam nanam/ mai-nanam eva damsanam evam sai hoi nipphannam II evar sesimdiya-damsanammi niyamena hoi na ya juttam / aha tattha nanamettam gheppai cakkhummi vi taheva II 575 50 Cf. NBh.1.1.4: ripam iti janite rasa iti janite [p. 20.8] and rupam iti jnanam rasa iti jnanam iti (p. 21.4-5): and NBh.2.1.2 [p. 220.1-2): caksusy asati rupam na grhyate sati ca grhyate, yac ca yasminn asati na bhavati sati (ca) bhavati tasya tad iti vijnayate... See also the claim of NBh.2.1.30: yad idam indriya-sannikarsad utpadyate jnanam "vrksah" iti etat kila pratyaksam (p. 119.7), with regard to which the doubt is immediately raised (tat khalu anumanam - kasmar? - p. 119.7-8) and eventually resolved (tasmad vrksa-buddhir anumanam na bhavati - p. 120.6). Cf. PBh.2.12.2.a [234] (p. 44): dravye tavat tri-vidhe mahaty aneka-dravyavattvodbhuta-rupa-prakasacatustaya-sannikarsad dharmadi-samagrye ca svarupa-locana-matram (this statement goes back to VS.4.1.6). See also the discussion on the non-conceptual and conceptual kinds of perception in NAV.4.4: svalaksana-visayendriyaja-nirvikalpaka-jnana-sadbhave 'pina tavad idam-tayanidam-taya vartha-vyavasthitir, yavad vidhi-pratisedha-dvarena vikalpa-yugalakam pacaryam nodayate... ("even if the non-conceptual cognition, [which is] produced by the senses [and] whose province is an individual thing, is present, so long there [can be] no determinate cognition of an object [in the form:] "it is this [object]" or "is it not this [object]", as long as a pair of conceptualisations is not resolved by means of confirmation and negation..."). In fact, the constatation of the kind "this is] a pot" ("ghado" tti nivvannana), etc... constitutes a part of the Nyaya definition of perception (NS.1.1.4) and corresponds to what is technically called vyavasdya. This defining characteristic of pratyaksa is described in NBh. ad loc. [p. 22.4-91: durac caksusd hy ayam artham pasyan navadharayati dhama iti va renur iti va tad etad indriyartha-sannikarsotpannam anavadharana-jnanam pratyaksam prasajyate ity dha vyavasayamakam iti... Clearly, this defining characteristic of perception corresponds to the Jaina stage of perceptual judgement (apaya, avaya), see TBh.1.15 and SSi.1.15: [2] Tha: yatha suklam rupam kim balaka pataka veri ("[Speculation questions:] 'Is [this], say, white form a crane or a banner?"); [3] avaya: utpatana-nipatana-paksa-viksepadibhir balaka evayam na pataketi ("[Perceptual judgement resolves:] 'due to beating with wings, etc., this [white form] is nothing but a crane, not a banner, due to the upward and downward flight"."); [4] dharand: avetasya kalantare 'vismarana-karanam dharana yatha sivayam balaka purvahne yam aham adraksam iti ("Retention is the cause of not forgetting. [even] when some time elapsed, for instance: This is exactly that very crane I saw this morning"."). 51 Avagraha-as the first stage of the sensuous cognition (mari-jnana) - unequivocally implies that the author of STP. accepted the remaining three stages, viz. iha, apaya and dharana 52 Cf. TATIA (1951: 77): Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized darsana as "avagraha, simple and pure', and jnana as 'determinate description" of the form 'This is a jar..... Cf. SSSS 2.1-2.2 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). Here I merely recapitulate the conclusions of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), where I dealt with this question at length in SSSS 3-5. 35 See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27-28). Typically, manah-paryaya is explicitly denied its darsana counterpart (nirdista= nirdarsana). cf. STP.2.19: jena mano-visaya-gayana damsanam natthi davva-jayana | to manapajjava-nanam niyama nanam tu niddinham II

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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ 210 SAN TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP 377. ! 8). 57 STP.2.27-29: mai-suya-nana-nimitto chaumatthe hoi attha-uvalambho / egayarammi vi tesim na damsanam damsanam kutto? Il jam paccakkha-gahanam na inti suya-nana-sammiya attha / tamha dansana-saddo na hoi sayale vi suya-nane | jam aputtha bhava ohi-nnanassa homti paccakkha / tamha ohi-nnano dainsana-saddo vi uvayutto II 58 See STP.2.6, 23, 27, 32. 59 See STP.2.21 and 2.23-24. 60 See $ 6.2.2 above and n. 47 as well as $ 4.3 and SS 5 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). 61 See & 4.1 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). The model is found in the Agamas, e.g. in Bhagavai 8.2.22-23 (p. 336): ...pamcavihe nane pannatte, tam jaha - abhinibohiyanane suya-nane ohi-nane manapajjava-nane kevala-nane. ... abhinibohiya-nane catuv. vihe pannatte, tam jaha - uggaho iha avao dharana; Bhagavai 2.10.9[2] (p.115): ...jive nam anamtanam abhinibohiya-nana-pajjavanam evam suta-nana-pajjavanam ohinana-pajjavanam manapajjava-nana-pajjavanam kevala-nana-pajjavanam mati-annanapajjavanam suta-anhana-pajjavanam vibhanga-nana-pajjavanam cakkhu-dam sanapajjavanam acakkhu-dam sana-pajjavanamohi-damsana-pajjavanam kevala-damsanapajjavanam uvaogam gacchari, upayoga-lakkane nam jive...; and in Nandi 6[28-29) and 8 (pp. 6, 9): ...nana-damsana-gunanam... nana pamcaviham pannattan. tam jaha - abhinibohiya-nanam suya-nanam ohi-nanam manapajjava-nanam kevalananam. 62 For details see $ 4.2 and 5 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). 6! See JACOBI (1926: iii, n. 1), VAIDYA (1928: xviii-xx), BALCEROWICZ (1999: "Introduction, vii ff.) and BALCEROWICZ (2000: 20 ff.). G1 NA 12: pratyaksa-pratipannartha-pratipadi ca yad vacah / pratyaksam pratibhasasya nimittatvat tad ucyate II 65 Meanings / things that can be verbally conveyed to other people, or 'communicable entities' (prajnapaniya bhavah), are said in STP.2.16ab to be directly related to the verbal knowledge (sruta-jnana): pannavanijja bhava samatta-suya-nana-damsanavisao 1. 66 Cf. SS 6.2 in BALCEROWICZ (2000). 67 For details see $$ 3.1-3.2 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). For details see $ 3.3 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). 69 For details see SS 7 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming). 10 On the date of the Nyayavatara see BALCEROWICZ (2000: 49). 7 On the name of the author of NA see: BALCEROWICZ (1999: xxxiv-xxxvi) and n. 5 above. the International Conference on Sanskrit and Related Studies to Commemorate the Centenary of the Birth of Stanislaw Schayer (1899-1941). Poland: Warsaw University. October 7-10, 1999. Studia Indologiczne (Warsaw] 7 (2000), 17-57. Balcerowicz, Piotr (forthcoming) (2000). 'On the Relationship of the Nyayavatara and the Sammati-tarka-prakarana'. Presented at the Xlth World Sanskrit Conference, Turin, April 3rd-8th. Forthcoming (to be published in the Proceedings). Bhagavai. Viyaha-pannatti-suttam (Bhagavai] (Vyakhya-prajnaptih (Bhagavati]). Edited with the Bechardas J. Doshi assited by Maritlal Mohanlal Bhojak. Jaina-Agama Series No.4 Part VII. Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, 1974/1978. Dhaky, M. A. (1995). "The Date and Authorship of Nyayavatara', in M. A. Dhaky, Jitendra Shah, Ahmedabad (eds.), Nirgrantha 1, pp. 39-49. Frauwallner, Erich (1933). "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyayavarttikam, Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Morgenlandes 40: 300_304. (reprint: Frauwallner (1982: 479-483)). Frauwaliner, Erich (1957). "Vasubandhu's Vadaviddhi', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ostasiens: 104_146. (reprint: FRAUWALLNER (1982: 716-758)]. Frauwallner, Erich (1982). Kleine Schriften. Hrsg. von Gerhard Oberhammer und Ernst Steinkellner, Glassenapp-Stiftung 22. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag. Granoff, Phyllis (1989-1990). "The Bibliographies of Siddhasena - A Study in the Texture of Allusion and the Weaving of a Group Image', Part I: Journal of Indian Philosophy 17 (1989): 329-384. Part II: JIP 18 (1990): 261-304. Jacobi, Hermann (1926). 'Introduction and Contents', Haribhadra: Samaraicca-kaha A Jaina Prakrta Work; Volume I: Text and Introduction, BI, Calcutta: pp. i-cxxx. Malvania, Dalsukhbhai (1979). 'Parisista 1. Nyayavatara ki Tulana. NA. Siddhasena Divakara: Nyavavatara. (1) See BALCEROWICZ (1999). (2) Edited With Siddharsigani's Vivrti and Devabhadra's Tippana by Bhagavandas Harakhchand. Patan: Ahmedabad, 1917. (3) Edited with Siddharsigani's Vivrti and Devabhadra's Tippana by P. L. Vaidya, Shri Jain Shwetamber Conference. Bombay, 1928. (reprinted in Vaishali Institute Research Bulletin 1, Vaishali 1971: 1-95). Nandi-suttam and Anuoga-ddaraim (Nandi-sutra and Anvoga-dvarani) (1968). Editors. Muni Punyavijaya, Dalsukh Malvania, Amrital Mohanlal Bhojak. Jaina-Agama Series, No. 1. Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya. NAT. Devabhadra: Nyayavatara-tippana. See: NA. NAV. Siddharsgani: Nyayavatara-vivrti. See: NA. NB (1971). Dharmakirti: Nyaya-bindu, in Pt. Dalsukhbhai Malvania (ed.), Pandita Durveka Misra's Dharmottara-pradipa [being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyaya-bindu-tika a commentary on Dharmakirti's Nyaya-bindu), Patna: Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, Research Institute. NBh. Vatsyayana Paksilasvamin. Nyaya-bhasva. See: NS. NS (1986). Mahamuni Vatsvavan's Nvaya-bhasya on Gautama-Nvava-sutras With Prasannapada Commentary of Pt. Sudarsanacarya Shastri. Dvarikadas sastri, SS 10. Varanasi: Sudhi Prakasanam. PALV. Ananta Virya. Pariksamukha-lagu-yrtti. See: PA. Pannavanasuttam (1969-1971). Editors. Muni Punyavijaya, Pt. Dalsukh Malvania, Pt. Amritlal Mohanlal Bhojak. Jaina-Agama-Series, No. 9, Parts 1-2. Bombay: Shri Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya. PBh (1994). Bronkhorst, Johannes and Ramseier, Yves (eds.), Word inder to the Prasastapadabhasya: a complete word inder to the printed editions of the Prasastapadabhasya. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Pischel, Richard (1990). A Grammar of the Prakrit Languages. Translated from German by Subhadra Jha. Second Revised Edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. (Grammatik der Prakrit-Sprachen. Band 1. Heft 8. Grundriss der Indo-Arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde. Strassburg 1990.). REFERENCES Anuoga. See: Nandi. Balcerowicz, Piotr (1999). Jaina Epistemology in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Critical Edition and English Translation of Logical-Epistemological Treatises: Nyavavatara, Nyavavatara-vivrti and Nyayavatara-tippana with Intro. duction and Notes. Doctoral Dissertation: University of Hamburg. Forthcoming to be published in Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien Band 53, 1+2, Franz Steiner Verlag 2001. Balcerowicz, Piotr (2000). "On the Date of the Nycravatara', in Piotr Balcerowicz and Marek Mejor (ed.). On the Understanding of Other Cultures. Proceedings of