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PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP
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and jnana - visesa stated in STP.2.1 (vide supra $ 6.2.1), for he would have been aware that his statements are not only liable to some misreading but may easily trigger pertinent criticism. This further strengthens the supposition, expressed above in $ 6.1, that STP. was written before Dinnāga.
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come directlle e entities hoe dit to the cognit
Another case of disagreement between NA. and STP. concerns different typologies of cognitive faculties (upayoga) and cognitive criteria (pramana). In NA. we find two subdivisions of pramdna: (1) perception (pratyaksa), divided into sensory an supra-sensory (kevala), and (2) indirect cognition (paroksa) that comprises inference (anumana) and verbal testimony (Sabda). With the exception of the kevala pratyaksa mentioned in NA.27. Siddhasena Mahämati's understanding of pratyaksa conforms to the general Indian epistemic tradition that took it to be the cognition directly derived through and with the help of sense organs in the first place. His pratyaksa (perception) departs from the Jaina tradition that regarded pratyaksa to be direct and of exclusively supra-sensory character. There is no reference to the idea of upayoga in NA., instead the main concern of Siddhasena Mahamati is the enquiry into the character of pramana. His examination culminates in formulating the first descriptive definition of pramāna in the history of Jaina epistemology and one of the first in India.
In sharp contrast to NA. is the classification outlined in STP. Surprisingly the idea of cognitive validity (prāmánya) and of cognitive criterion (pramana) is absent there, and so are such terms as pramina, pramiri, mdna, pramd, or their equivalents. Instead, what predominates in the epistemological scheme of STP. are the two upayogas investigated esp. STP.2.1-5, 18 ff., 30), divided traditionally into five kinds of judna and four kinds of darśana.
The idea of the fivefold division of jñana into mari, fruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya, kevala is present e.g. in STP.2.5-6, 2.16, 2.23 and 2.27. There can be no doubt that Divakara recognised the four divisions of cakşur-darsana, acakşur-darsana, avadhi-darsana, kevala-darsana (see STP.2.20), with the proviso of STP.2.30-31 (vide infra, p. 16).56 Surprisingly, the division into pratyaksa-paroksa is nowhere mentioned explicitly in STP. And - with the exception of STP.2.28-29 - the terms pratyaksa, samakşa, saksāt etc. as well as their opposites never occur in the text. The same goes for paroksa. Nonetheless we can easily - in the verses that outspokenly speak of pratyaksa - find hints that the author
did conceive of the upayoga scheme as bifurcating into the complements of direct and indirect cognition: "(27) In (case of a conditioned person (i.e. in the state of bondage) the comprehension of objects is occasioned by the sensuous cognition and testimony, there is no insight in any one of them; what from (should there be) insight in them)? (28] Since objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping (them) directly, therefore the word 'insight' does not apply to the cognition through testimony at all. [29] Since entities not (directly touched (by senses) (asprsta) become directly cognisable) for the cognition through telaesthesia, therefore the word 'insight' is (correctly employed with regard to the cognition through telaesthesia."97 The next two verses of STP.2.30-31 state that at the level of an omniscient person (kevalin) both the cognitive faculties, viz. kevala-darsana and kevala.jrana are identical (avisesa), since they arise at the same time.
Furthermore, Siddhasena Divakara accepted the sensuous cognition (mati-jñana, abhinibodhika-jnana) himself, alongside its four traditional stages, viz. sensation (avagraha), speculation (ha), perceptual judgement (apaya) and retention (dharaná), and classified it as the paroksa type cognition (ñana).
Thus, the structure of the cognitive faculties propounded in STP. corresponds basically to what I call Model 1:6 upayoga: (1) jnana: (1) abhinibodhika-jñana with its four stages: (a) avagraha, (b) iha, (c) apaya, (d) dhäranä, (2) fruta-jñana, (3) avadhi-jrana, (4) manahparyaya-jñana. (5) kevala-jnana, (II) darsana: (1) cakşur-darsana, (2) acakşur-darsana, (4) avadhi-darsana, (5) kevala-darsana.
Significantly as it were, not only is this structure incompatible with NA., but also the notion of the sensuous cognition (matijnana, abhinibodhika-jnana) does not fit into the framework of NA 62
In NA. Siddhasena Mahamati develops the idea of svartha-vakya and parartha-vakya (NA 10) and svārtha-pratyaksa and parartha.pratyaka (NA.11), elaborating upon the well-known division of svarthänumāna and pararthanumana developed by Dinnaga and Dharmakirti. It is precisely in the context of his attempt to prove that the epistemic idea of efficacy for others (pårarthya) and efficacy for oneself (svarthya) is applicable to both perception (pratyakşa) and inference (paroksa) that one should read his statement of NA.12: "And such an utterance that demonstrates an object recognised through perception is called perception, because it is the external factor for the representation. 164