Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

SR No.: 269214
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Total Pages: 14
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

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364
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP
365
in respective sections of his STP. But, as one could argue, he might simply have considered them irrelevant or thought it to unnecessary to refute them for some reason. Whatever the case might have been, it does not seem very plausible that one and the same person could cxhibit such divergent attitudes in both works (STP. and NA.) and be so inconsistent (either in terms of concpetual framework or in terms of approach)
6.2.2. However, the author of STP. was in fact occasionally wary of a possible misunderstanding of his position. An instance is facilitated by the discussion of STP.2.21-24:
6.2.
[The prima facie position to be refuted: 1211 "Insight is nothing but sensation, because it designates"(this is) a pot." (hence it becomes the sensuous cognition Just like sensation, in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute (cognition and insight is this much only: 122] the absolute] cognition is preceded by (the absolute insight, but the absolute insight is not conditioned by the absolutel cognition, hence we rightly conclude that there is difference between both the absolute] cognition and the absolute) insighe. [Rejoinder:) (23-24) "If you maintain that insight is nothing but foculary" sensation [or] a qualified cognition, then, if it were so it would follow that insight is nothing but the sensuous cognition, and such would necessarily be the case with the insight derived through the remaining sense organs. But this is not correct". [The opponent argues: "If in the case of these remaining senses only cognition is understood," in the very same way in the case on eyes fonly cognition should be understood)
6.2.1. It is in the context of the cognitive faculties (upayoga) that Siddhasena Diväkara uses the terms samanya and višesa in STP.2.1: "Such insight (conation) which grasps the general [becomes cognition when characterised by the specific. This comprehension of an object is (within the scope of both viewpoints alike."43 What concerns me here is the first hemistich that characterises the nature of darśana (insight / conation) and jnana (cognition), which grasp the general (samanya) and the specific (visesa) respectively. Here the differentiation into the samanya and the visesa is not along the lines of the typical distinction of the universal (as related to the class notion, jari, language and concepts, kalpand) and the particular (vyakti, svalaksana, etc.). Crucial for the distinction is the opposition between "general, indistinct, unclear" (for sámánya) and distinct, specific, particular" (for visesa). What emerges is the picture of the darśana grasping the sdmdnya, and the jriana grasping the visesa.
At first glance, one might have an impression that what is at stake is the often-debated division into perception (pratyaksa, which is often - even in Jaina sources - called darsana, see below 6.2.2 for the similar case) and its opposite, non-perceptual cognition, e.g. inference (arumana). What would surprise him or her would be the untypical correlation of perception (pratyaksa) to smdnya and non-perceptual kinds of cognition (such as anumāna) to visesa. Such a position would immediately be liable to censure not only from the Buddhist side. in so far as it would express precisely the opposite of what e.g. Dharmakirti claimed, namely that the višese (svalaksana) is the proper object (visaya) for perception (pratyaksa), whereas the sámánya (samanya-laksana) is the proper object (visaya) for inference (artumāna).
Naturally, a reader well acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that the text deals with the two wpayogas, not with the division into pratyaksa - anumana, or something similar
From the above passage it follows that the opponent may have considered insight / conation (darśana) to be merely perception (pratyaksa), both because of the misleading terminology (see above $ 6.2.1 for a similar case) and because of the specific character of insight / conation (darsana), viz. its "operating strategy that merely brings the constatation: "this is such a thing." Precisely such a constatation is often said to be a characteristic mark of at least conceptual (savikalpaka) - perception. In other words, the opponent may have had the impression that the description of the mechanism of darsana matches that of avagraha, for "it designates"(this is) a pot" ("ghado" ti nivvannand), hence he may have been inclined to equate the two. Especially the contents of STP.2.21 and 2.23 are very suggestive in this regard.
Significantly Siddhasena Divakara dismisses any supposition that darśana might be equated with avagraha and tries to prove that the affinity between Jaina avagraha and darsana is illusory. He does so, despite the fact that naturally anyone sufficiently acquainted with Jaina tradition would immediately recognise that darsana and avagraha can by no means be identified!
This only demonstrates that Siddhasena Divakara anticipated possible misunderstandings or misinterpretations on the part of his opponent. that he was aware of such a possibility.
Accordingly. if the author of STP. had been acquainted with Dinnaga's or Dharmakirti's ideas, he would not have failed to expound on the controversial question of the proper relation between darśana - samanya