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of some aspects of the Jaina doctrine; an occasional refutation of some contrary doctrines happens occasionally. Without a thorough-going, anterior knowledge of Jainism and its anekänta doctrine alongside its corollaries such as sapta-bhangi, naya-väda, nikṣepa-vada, one could hardly make head or tail of the exposition. Nowhere do we find any en bloc enumeration of the five subdivisions of jñana (mati, etc.) - and sporadic references to them are fragmentary or a list of nayas (not even all are mentioned by name!); there is no explanation of how nikṣepas work, what different kinds of karman are (even though the knowledge of the subdivisions is essential to follow the text), etc. The reader is expected to have all this knowledge beforehand in order to understand the argument. One may seem to be justified in having the impression that either NA. and STP. derive from different intellectual backgrounds or that they serve some different purposes, or both.
2.5.
As far as vocabulary and particular terms or ideas are concerned, here is a list of selected topics and terms that are crucial in one text but are altogether absent from the other work, not only as being stated expressis verbis but even under a different formulation:
(1) Significant terms and ideas in NA. that are neither mentioned nor implied in STP.: the distinction into svartha-anumana I parartha-anumana and svärtha-pratyaksa / parartha-pratyaksa (NA.10, 11, 13), parärtha-väkyam (NA.10); non-erroneousness of cognitive criteria (avibhráma / abhränti) NA.5, 6, 7); the idea of self-revealing nature of cognition (rvdnya-niścayi I sva-parābhäsi jäänaṁ, NA.1, 7, 13, 31) and and selfcognition (rva-samvedana; NA.31); the defining characteristic of the logical reason. e.g. the inseparable connection (avind-bhdva: NA.5, 13). "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupapatti / anyathanupapanna, NA.17, 22, 23) or similar, including the term anupapatti," the use of vyapti (NA.18) or antar-vyapti (NA.20); the use of paksa only in the sense of "thesis" as a logical terminus technicus (NA.13, 14, 21); cognitive criterion (pramana; NA.1, 2, 3, 5, 67, 28, 32) probandum (sädhya, NA.5,13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 29, 24, 25) probans (sadhana, NA.18, 19, 25, 26); the idea of a valid method of reasoning (prayoga; NA.14, 17);" the use of the term anumana (NA.5. 11, 13); mental representation (pratibhasa; 7, 12, 27); indirect cognition (paroksa; NA.1.4); fallacy (abhāsa: NA.21, 22, 26); criticism (duṣaṇa; NA.26); testimony based on the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (sydd-vida-fruta; NA.30); the cognoscible (prameya / meya; NA.1); method / logic and methodologist / logician (nyaya and nyaya-vid; NA.20, 24, 25); doubt (sandeha; NA.22).
(2) Significant terms and ideas in STP. that are not mentioned in NA.: treatment of the viewpoints (naya with its two main types: dravyästika, paryayastika, and subdivisions such as rju-sültra, etc.; STP. 1.3-5, 7-18, 31, 3.10. 14, 57); standpoints (niksepa STP.1.6, 40 ff.); the theory or origination, continued existence and annihilation that define substance (utpäda-sthiti-bhanga / dravya; STP.1.12, 3.23. 32-35); kaṣayas. karman and bandha (STP.1.19, 46. 2.2, 3.53); samsara and mokra (STP.1.20, 3.43-45): explicit reference to the Canon and Jaina tradition (STP.1.49) and numerous use
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of "agama": the concept of two cognitive faculties (upayoga: jñdna and darsana, STP.2.1, 20, 29, 3.3, 43); the concept of the five kinds of knowledge (jñāna: mati. fruta, avadhi, manah-paryaya, kevala: STP.2.3, 5. 6. 8. 16. 23. 27); sapta-bhangi (STP.1.36-40); the terms samanya and visesa (STP.2.1, 3.1, 57); the use of Jaina particle "no-" ("quasi"; e.g. in STP.50); the term samyañc (STP.2.33, 3.44); the idea of righteousness and misapprehension (samyakiva mityhärva; STP.3.53); the idea of "the three jewels" (samyag-jñāna-darśana-caritra, STP.3.44, 67); qualities and modes (guna paryaya; STP.3.2 ff., 3.24); ethical questions and the (im)possibility of liberation (bhdvydbhavya beings; STP.3.43 ff.); the notion of mutual non-existence (anyonyabhava; STP.3.31); STP.1.36-40: treatment of sapta-bhangi, raga-dvesa-moha (STP.2.43); six negative and positive false statements (mithyärva-sthana; STP.3.54): treatment of eight sub-categories of syäd-vada and ways of predication (dravyakṣetra-kala-bhava-paryaya-desa-sambandha, ekanta-asadbhuta and sadbhūta-aniscita:
STP.3.59-60).
The above juxtaposition of the two lists reveals that the vocabulary of both texts also does not match.
2.6.
After even a brief analysis and comparison of both lists, it is clear that NA. shares its vocabulary with the general Indian pramana tradition and is very much akin to that of the pramäna tradition or the Buddhist Sauträntika-Yogäcära school. We do not find in NA. technical terms derived directly from the Jaina tradition (with the sole exception of "kevala" in NA.27), thus the text can be easily understood even by those who are not acquainted with the Jaina doctrine and religion. Besides, the scheme and topics discussed in NA. are not restricted to matters that are of interest merely to the Jainas (e.g. the issue of omniscience and its detailed stages, divisions of karmic bondage, etc., that could hardly evoke any interest in a person not directly involved in Jainism). On the other hand, STP. rests on ideas, locutions and terminology that had to large extent been coined as early as in the Canonical literature and presupposes a closer acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine and peculiarities of expression. The choice of topics demonstrates that, at least to a certain degree, the text is directed specifically to a Jaina reader.
2.7.
Does the above situation mean that there are no similarities to be observed between the two works? The followings list summarises the very few similarities I have been able to spot:
(3) (a) the description of the absolute knowledge: sakalavaraṇa-muktama kevalam (NA.27) and sayalam andvaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalani (STP.2.17); (b) none of the texts uses the terms vikalpa, kalpand etc. in their epistemological sense of