Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

SR No.: 269214
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz
Total Pages: 14
Language: English
Classification: Article
File Size: 3 MB

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370
PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP
371
5 Haribhadrasori quotes the verse NA.2 in his Astaka and refers to its author as Mahamati, d. P. Dalsukhbhai MALVANIA (1979: 287-288). UPADHYE (1971: xxiv). and DHAKY (1995: 46). The following observation of UPADHYE (1971: Exiv) further strengthens the claim that NA, and STP. had two different authors: "Haribhadra, in his Astaka, quotes the Nydyāvaldra 2, by referring to its author as Mahamati. Elsewhere, however Haribhadra speaks plainly about the author of the Sarmatia Divakara and Srutakevalin." • See BALCEROWICZ (1999: "Introduction", ii-xix) and BALCEROWICZ (2000). * See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27-28).
Eg only the avagraha stage of marijana is mentioned in STP, while the author is silent on the three remaining subdivisions, viz. tha, apdya and dharani. Nevertheless the reader is expected to know them to be able to follow the argumentation An exception is the related term upaparna occurring in ST.2.33.
sammandne niyamena dartsanan dari sane w bhayanija /
Sammannana caiman ti atthao hoi wavannant - -Right insight (exists) in right knowledge, and right knowledge should be necessarily admitted to exist) in right insight - this is explicable (upaparna) from the meaning (arthat = samarthydd)." 10 Truly, the term paksa occurs in STP, but in the more general sense of "opinion, viewpoint," eg STP.1 23: anyonya-paksa-nirapeisa naydh, and STP.2.39: aha puna pura-payutto anche sgamta pakkha-parische / taha w wydharanam inani tri heil parlainam voccha 11 - "Even though a fact has been previously adduced to refute a one-sided view, nevertheless, we will formulate a solution (remedy) in the form of the reason: "this is an example. The context for it is STP.2 37-38 and the question: "What is the relation between liberated live and its kevala cognition? They should be different form each other" " The term prayoga occurs in STP.3.32 but not in the logical sense. 1 NA. 29-30 only mention the term nay as an element of the anekdota theory
There is, however, a conspicuous similarity as regards the character of kevala (similarities are underlined): NA 27: sakalavarana-maktaima kevalantyal prakäsare /
pratyaksam sakalarthama-safata-pratibhasanam il"That whose essence is freed from all veils, which shines as something] absolute is perception representing constantly the essences of all objects." STP.2.17: ramhd calvi-bhago jujjai na nana-damsana-jinanarit
sayalam anavaranam anamtam akkhayam kevalam janhall- "Therefore it would follow that (cognition would be) four-fold (not five-fold). but there would be no separate) cognition and insight in case of Jinas, if the absolute cognition is without veils, etemal, imperishable." This verse is a rejoinder of Divakara's opponent who draws the conclusion from Divikara's thesis about the identity of cognition and insight. But this similarity is apparent and not conclusive, since it may simply be due to a general way of describing the absolute cognition " E.g. niskranta bheda-svarspa, bhedam na pratipadyante. 1 One would expect NA. to use the term (nir-sa-vikalpa or kalpani while discussing the nature of perceptioncg to take recourse to the idea of non-conceptual perception expressed by Dinaga or Dharmakirti in NB.1.4: Tatra pratyaksam kalpanapodham abhrantam. Strangely enough, NA, does nowhere refute the idea of kalpanapolha. 1 sakaldvarna-muktama krvalamit vat prakasate - i.e. it is the only cognition after all veils have been destroyed " krvala nandyarana-kharajyanit kewalan jahil månam l-after veils have been
destroved, other kinds of cognition such as the sensuous cognition, etc. are mor possible, i.e. krvala is the only cognition STP.3.16: evanta-palkho-do jo na dawa-guna-ji-bheammi/
aha pwww.padikkutho Maharanamiriam eam tu I/ STP.3.17: pia-pwita nattu-bhavaya-bhaanan eka-puris-sambandho/
na yaso ekassa piya mi sesayanan piyd holl STP.3.18 jaha sambandha visithe so puriso purise-bhavniraisao/
Taha davom imdiya-gayant rudi-wisesanan lahai STP.3.19 hojjahi duguna-mahram amama-guna-kalayan tu jam davam
na w daharao mahallo va hoi sambandhad puriso I STP.3.20 bhansa sambandha-vasd jai sambandhitanam animayante!
nanu sambandha-visese sambamdhi-visesanan siddham STP.3.21: jujai sambamdha-vasd sambandhi-visesana na una cam /
nayandi-visesa-gao niva-visesa parindimo Il STP.3.22: bhanndi visame parinayan kaha at hohil miwaniyam
tam hoi para-nimittam na wa miettha thiyanto il The above verse refers to the refutation of the thesis of absolute difference between substance and quality (dravya-pardya-bheda kanta-vida) in the preceding section Cf. Abhayadevasüni's TBV. ad loc. p. 636.17-19. kanta-vya rikthypagame
dide yah punor drevye-una-krid-thedesu soyady api paniam na pralkiptah bhedaikanto-gråhake pramandhawild abheda grdhakasya ca "saram ekami sad avisesåd videse wd vlyal kusumawad asettua-prasangar" il pradarsitat de tothepi fat-syarpe dardhyopidanarthamuddharand-matram abhidhyae - "However, even though this Vaidesika) doctrine accepting absolute difference of clit, as absolutely different with respect to the divisions of substance, quality and movement has just in the preceding been rejected because Ifirstlythere is no cognitive criterion proving (lit. making one grasp) absolute difference and secondly because a counter-proof for (lit. la cognitive criterion proving) non-difference of substance, quality and action has been demonstrated in the form): 'Everything is the one existent, because there is no distinction (among entities as regards their existence], or if there were (anyl distinction, that would lead to the undesired consequence of non-existence of [some entities that should be taken to differ from other entities considered to exist). like a skyflower - nevertheless merely an example is explicitly stated in order to provide additional) substantiation for the gist of this doctrine of the absolute differencel" Thus the dialectical structure of the whole passage is as follows the bheda-dda of 3.16 as the pana-paksa 1 (it is referred to by the abheda vidin), to which is appended its corroborative instantiation in 3.17. is subsequently followed by a rejoinder in 3.19 inexplicability of the occurrence of two different kinds of situations) and its refutation from the position of the abvedavdda of 3.20. Further, the Jaina position is established in 3.21, only to be followed by the quandary voiced by the opponent in 3.22 ab which is solved in 3.22 ed. * The idea is clear enough: if a man, as the substratum of various interpersonal and family relations, were identical with the relations qualifying him, then a particular relation, say, of his-being-a-father to a particular individual (his son) would have to by necessity bear on all other relations, insofar as they would be likewise identical with the substratum. for the relation of identity (abheda) is a transitive relation. Thus, the logical justification for the hhe i d would. in the eyes of Siddhasena Divakara, be to prevent a range of undesired consequences ensuing from the transitive character of the identity relation that underlies the ahlteder wielu
The shove verse of 3.18 projects the structural pattern of the complex whole the man and his relational modes with respect various family relations, onto the substance qualities structure. The qualities of the substance Siddhasena Divakara