Harmless Soul

Author(s): W J Johnson, Dayanand Bhargav
Publisher: Motilal Banarasidas
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/001196/1

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Lala S. L. Jain Research Series pe HARMLESS SOULS Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umasvati and Kundakunda B0022 W. J. JOHNSON

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T Tarmless Souls considers doctrinal change and its implication for 11 religious practice in early Jainism. It focuses on evolving views about the conditions necessary for karmic bondage and the liberation of embodied souls, as described in parts of the early Svetambara canon, Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra, and the major works of Kundakunda. Particular attention is paid to the roles that knowledge and selfrealisation play on Kundakunda's path to liberation. The strategies used to preserve ascetic discipline when faced by the challenge of this emphasis on gnosis are explored in the light of various interpretations of Kundakunda's 'two truths' doctrine. It is concluded that, although significant doctrinal changes do take place, these are not permitted to affect Jaina practice, for it is just such ascetic practice which constitutes and preserves the distinctive religious and social identity of the Jaina community ISBN: 81-208-1309-X Rs. 245

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HARMLESS SOULS

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LALA SUNDAR LAL JAIN RESEARCH SERIES General Editor PROF. DAYANAND BHARGAVA Editorial Board PANDIT DALSUKH BHAI MALVANIA PROF. KIYAOKI OKUDA DR. NATHMAL TATIA DR. PADMANABH S. JAINI PROF. T.G. KALGHATGI PROF. COLETTE CAILLAT PROF. ERNEST BENDER SHRI K.C. LALWANI PROF. KLAUS BRUHN SHRI N.P. JAIN SHRI SHANTI LAL JAIN VOLUME IX

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| HARMLESS SOULS Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference | to Umasvati and Kundakunda W.J. JOHNSON MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED * DELHI

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First Edition: Delhi, 1995 (c) MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED All Rights Reserved ISBN: 81-208-1309-X Available at: MOTILAL BANARSIDASS 41 U.A. Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 120 Royapettah High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004 16 St. Mark's Road, Bangalore 560 001 Ashok Rajpath, Patna 800 004 Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 PRINTED IN INDIA BY JAINENDRA PRAKASH JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45 NARAINA, PHASE I, NEW DELHI 110 028 AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH TAIN FORM MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED, BUNGALOW ROAD, DELHI 110 007

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Sub "/ Preface Abbreviations Introduction CONTENTS Part I - EARLY JAINISM H 1 Sub -1 Bondage and liberation according to the early Svetambara canon 1.1 Early Jainism - Primary sources and chronology 4 1.2 The force of activity (yoga) in bondage: action and intention 5 1.3 Some early Buddhist and early Jaina attitudes to bondage compared 1.4 Himsa and the ascetic 1.5 The status of the householder according to the earliest texts The status of the householder Bo i) ii) Merit and rebirth 1.6 Parigraha and the origins of the kasaya doctrine i) Parigraha 301 ** ii) Kasaya iii) Kasaya and parigraha 1.7 Activity and karma before Umasvati. i) The meaning of arambha Box ii) Ascetic and non-ascetic actions and karma Part II - UMASVATI'S JAINISM HI ix xi 1 120 11 2223 26 31 34 37 33838 2 The mechanism of bondage according to the Tattvartha Sutra 2.1 Umasvati's Jainism - Primary sources and chronology 46 2.2 The mechanism of bondage according to the Tattvartha Sutra 47 2.3 Samparayika and iryapatha karma in the Tattvartha Sutra 2.4 'Activity' in the Tattvartha Sutra 57 64 2.5 Parigraha: the householder and the kasaya doctrine 72 40

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vi Harmless Souls 3 Conclusions Part III - KUNDAKUNDA: THE PRAVACANASARA N. I 4 Kundakunda: content and context 4.1 Kundakunda - Primary sources and chronology 4.2 Upayoga i) Upayoga before Kundakunda ii) Upayoga according to the Pravacanasara (i) v. 5 The mechanism of bondage according to the Pravacanasara 5.1 The mechanism of bondage 5.2 Moha 5.3 Himsa in the Pravacanasara The role of himsa in the Pravacanasara ii) Himsa, moha and upadhi iii) Himsa and compassion i) Dhyana ii) Dhyana and jnana iii) Jnana 6.5 The rationale for external ascetic practice according to the Pravacanasara 6.6 Socio-religious roles in the Pravacanasara Part IV - KUNDAKUNDA: THE SAMAYASARA 7 Kundakunda: definitions and truths 7.1 Samayasara i) Introduction ii) Samaya 6 The mechanism of liberation according to the Pravacanasara 6.1 Caritra 6.2 Samayika 6.3 Tapas and dhyana 6.4 Meditation in the Pravacanasara 7.2 Vyavahara-niscaya: the two truths doctrine 7.3 Two 'two truths' doctrines 79 91 97 97 111 124 149 156 168 176 185 188 196 201 205 210 217 224 H2 231 233 239 254

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Contents vii 7.4 Dvikriyavada 8 The mechanism of bondage according to the Samayasara i) Bhava ii) The role of intention (adhyavasana) in bondage 267 272 9 The mechanism of liberation according to the Samayasara 9.1 Liberation in the Samayasara i) Knowledge and the knower 275 ii) Self-realisation 278 iii) Discriminative knowledge 283 iv) Renunciation of bhava 288 19.2 Linga, practice and the path to liberation 295 19.3 Liberation according to Kundakunda: some conclusions 303 "Table Appendix 1: Niyamasara Appendix 2: Pancastikaya Appendix 3: Pravacanasara Appendix 4: Samayasara Bibliography Glossary and Index 311 312 313 314 321 332 343

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Preface This book is a revised version of my thesis, 'The Problem of Bondage in Selected Early Jaina Texts', approved for the D.Phil. degree at Oxford University in 1990. I am grateful to Wolfson College, Oxford, where the original thesis was written, for electing me Michael Coulson Research Fellow in Indology from 1991-1992, thus enabling me to begin work on the revised version. I am also most grateful for the support of the Boden Fund, without which I would have been unable to complete the original thesis, and which also made a grant towards the cost of producing the typescript. The Bhogilal Leherchand Institute of Indology, Delhi, provided me with a research scholarship to study in their library during the early stages of revision in 1990. I take this opportunity to thank Mr. Narendra Prakash Jain of Motilal Banarsidass, Mr. Raj Kumar Jain, and the administrators and staff of the Institute for their hospitality. My intellectual and academic debts are many - to Alan Williams and Partha Mitter, who encouraged me as an undergraduate at Sussex to believe I could go on to do research, to Jim Benson who taught me elementary Sanskrit so intensively, and to Alexis Sanderson who taught me more Sanskrit and gave generous advice on many subjects. I should also like to thank the examiners of the thesis, Friedhelm Hardy and Roy Norman for their criticisms and suggestions, which I have attempted to incorporate into the revised version. My principal and overriding debt is to Richard Gombrich, who taught me Prakrit and gave me a level of encouragement, advice and support far in excess of the most rigorous standards of professorial responsibility. I could not have hoped for a better supervisor or to have worked under a more inspiring scholar. My greatest personal debt is to my wife, Patricia, who has more than once suspended her own academic work to . .

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x Preface enable me to press on with mine. To her, and to our son, Jonathan, I dedicate this book. Cardiff 1994

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Abbreviations [material in square brackets refers to entries in the Bibliography] AN Atmakh CPD Das DN JGM JPP MN Niy PTS Panc Pravac Sam Anguttara Nikaya Atmakhyati (see Kundakunda (4), Samayaprabhrtam] Ayaramga Sutta (unless otherwise stated, references employ Jacobi's numbering system, duplicated by Schubring and Bollee) A Critical Pali Dictionary Dasaveyaliya Sutta (references are to Leumann's ed., unless otherwise stated) Digha Nikaya Jaina Grantha Mala ed. of Samayasara (see Kundakunda (4), Samayaprabhrtam] The Jaina Path of Purification (see Jaini, P.S. (1979)] Majjhima Nikaya Niyamasara (see Kundakunda (1)] Pali Text Society Pancastikaya [see Kundakunda (2)] Pravacanasara (see Kundakunda (3)] Samayasara [see Kundakunda (4)] (references are to Chakravarti's ed., unless otherwise stated) Sacred Books of the East Sacred Books of the Jainas Samyutta Nikaya Sarvarthasiddhi (see Pujyapada] Suyagadamga Sutta (unless otherwise stated, references employ Jacobi's numbering system, duplicated by Schubring and Bollee) Tattvadipika (see Kundakunda (3)] Tattvartha Sutra (numbers in brackets indicate the Svetambara text, otherwise reference is always to the Digambara version, as employed in the Sarvarthasiddhi) SBE SBJ SN SS Suy TD TS

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xii Abbreviations TV Utt Tatparya-vrtti (see Kundakunda (4), Samayaprabhrtam] Uttarajjhayana Sutta (references are to Charpentier's ed., unless otherwise stated) Vinaya Viyahapannatti (numbering is that employed by Deleu [1970]) Yoga Sutras (see Patanjali] Vin

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PARTI EARLY JAINISM Introduction The ascetic practices of early Jainism are conditioned by three different but intertwined concepts or beliefs. First, that virtually all matter is alive, in the sense of containing life-monads or souls. Second, that doing harm to living beings is wrong. Third, that actions inevitably have results which affect the future condition and future births of the actor. If souls (jiva) are ubiquitous, then it is clearly very difficult to do any action at all without harming them. Such harming action (himsa) is believed to result in karmic bondage; that is to say, the soul is invaded and weighted down by subtle matter which ensures that at death the jiva is reborn in this or another world (samsara), rather than rising to a state of liberation and omniscience at the top of the universe. Consequently, the more harm one does, the heavier the bondage and the worse the rebirth. In short, according to these beliefs, an ordinarily active life in the world will almost inevitably involve too much hinsa, and therefore bondage, for the actor to have any realistic hope of even a good rebirth, let alone liberation. On the other hand, to avoid such bondage, it is essential to observe the vow of non-injury (ahimsa) towards all creatures. The central concern of Jaina practice, therefore, is to establish a means of conducting oneself which (ideally) entails no himsa and thus no further bondage. (An important secondary concern is, of course, to get rid of the karma one has already accumulated.) Given the above conditions, this is clearly a very difficult undertaking, requiring special, ascetic restraints. It is particularly problematical for ordinary householders; in fact, prima facie, 'lay Jainism' would seem to be a contradiction in terms.

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2 Harmless Souls But Jainism did develop as a religion, as opposed to a personal soteriology - a religion which acquired lay followers and then (numerically, at least) came to be dominated by them. Therefore, it is my purpose in the first part of this work to consider the manner in which this religion developed, and I shall do so by examining both the ways in which the needs and circumstances of the laity were reconciled (in so far as they were) with early, purely ascetic doctrines, and the further problems to which such an enterprise inevitably gave rise. The first textual synthesis of Jaina doctrine, Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra, attempts just such a reconciliation of ascetic and lay concerns. It does so, as we shall see, through a mixture of doctrinal reformulation, doctrinal rejuxtaposition, and doctrinal expansion. Crucial to the new synthesis is the postulation and development of a proper (i.e. technical) doctrine of the mechanism of bondage. That is to say, the way in which karmic matter is attracted and bound to the soul is precisely delineated for the first time. This, however, gives rise to some internal contradictions: the new doctrine is apparently incompatible with certain aspects of canonical teaching. But it is precisely through the examination of these contradictions that it becomes possible to infer what is significantly new about the Tattvartha Sutra's mechanism of bondage. (For the content of that canonical teaching, and the ascetic practices which are founded on it, I shall refer to the earliest parts of the Svetambara canon, contrasting the doctrines found there with their reformulation and transformation in the Tattvartha Sutra.) In short, by examining the question of what is perceived to be the immediate cause of bondage, and considering how the answer changes throughout Jainism's early history, it is possible to chart the way in which the religion grew beyond the extreme asceticism of its roots and delineate some of the incompletely resolved tensions to which that growth gave rise. The ways in which apparently insuperable theoretical contradictions are overcome, or evaded, in the

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Introduction 3 actual practice of ascetics and laity, will be discussed in the conclusions to Part I. I begin, however, with an account of the earliest detectable Jaina view of the causes of bondage, as found in the most ancient parts of the Svetambara canon.

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Bondage and liberation according to the early Svetambara canon 1.1 Early Jainism - Primary sources and chronology To determine the earliest Jaina view of the mechanism of bondage, I have referred to the Ayaramga, Suyagadamga, Dasaveyaliya, and Uttarajjhayana Suttas, although some reference is also made to later canonical texts, especially to the fifth Anga of the Svetambara canon, the Viyahapannatti (Bhagavai).1 The Jaina canon presents considerable problems of chronology; of the texts named above, however, the Ayaramga and the Suyagadamga are almost universally agreed to be the oldest on grounds of language and metre. And within these two, the first suyakka mdha (srutaskandha) of each text is thought to contain the earliest material in each case. There is less agreement about the Dasaveyaliya and Uttarajjhayana, although both Schubring and Alsdorf accept them, at least in part, as the oldest texts in the canon, along with the two already named.? Alsdorf remarks that nothing really contradicts the idea that the doctrines contained in these most ancient Jaina texts go back to the time of Mahavira, and that even there one does not get to their roots. Any precise dating, 1 When I use the term 'canon' I am, of course, referring to the Svetambara texts. The Digambaras, as is well-known, deny that a canon survives. See, for instance, JPP pp. 49-52. 2 See, for example, Schubring 1962, p. 81; JPP p. 53; cf. Alsdorf 1965, p. 28, and in general Alsdorf's analyses of arya metre to establish chronology: aryas indicating more recent material, sloka or tristubh that which is earlier (e.g. 1966 and 1962-63). On the history of the early canon, see also Alsdorf 1977. . 3 Schubring 1962, p. 81; Alsdorf 1965, p. 28. 4 Alsdorf 1965, p. 28.

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Early Jainism 5 however, is clearly not possible. It is not even known when the Svetambaras first began to write down their canon. P.S. Jaini suggests some time prior to the second council at Mathura in the fourth century CE. But the final redaction was not made and committed to writing until the end of the fifth or beginning of the sixth century.5 Later canonical texts raise similar problems of chronology, which I shall not consider here. However, further research into these works may well help to lay bare the process of doctrinal change which occurs between the Ayaramga Sutta and Umasvati. For my present purposes it is sufficient to show that such a change has taken place, and the longer the period to have elapsed between the canonical material and the Tattvartha Sutra the more clearly that change is delineated. For that reason I have chosen here to compare the teachings of the Tattvartha Sutra with those in what are generally acknowledged to be the earliest extant canonical texts. 1.2 The force of activity (yoga) in bondage: action and intention K.K. Dixit, characterising Ayaramga 1 and Suyagadamga 1, which are generally admitted to be the earliest surviving Jaina texts, says that they put an unconditional emphasis on world-renunciation, extol the life of the monk, and have 'nothing but condemnation for the life of the householder'.6 Under such conditions it is difficult, if not impossible, for any community of monks 'to forge special links with any community of householders'. The ascetic's life, which is so hard to follow, is designed to reduce monks to a minimum of dependence upon lay society. The texts connect parigraha (attachment to worldly things / 'possession') with arambha ('violence') and treat them as 5 See JPP 6 Dixit 1978, p. 4. 7 Ibid. p. 5. pp. 51-52; Doshi pp. 26-27.

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6 Harmless Souls the two most fundamental sins; the former is the proximate cause of sinful activity and the latter the immediate cause. 8 The objects of parigraha may be either animate or inanimate - 'material goods and social relatives'.9 To satisfy the demands of this attachment to worldly things, arambha is undertaken. The objects of arambha are the six types of living beings (i.e. the totality of transmigrating jivas): 1) trasa - 'mobile' jivas with more then two senses (including humans, animals, birds, insects, etc.), and 2-6) sthavara - 'static' jivas with only one sense (i.e. those in earth, water, fire, air, and plants).10 As Dixit remarks, this understanding must have accentuated the strong ascetic tendency of Jaina speculation. 11 That is to say, one cannot undertake activity which manipulates earth, etc., indeed, given the ubiquity of jivas, almost any activity is liable to be harmful in some way or other. The later idea formulated to accommodate the laity - that violence done to the sthavara beings is less sinful than that done to trasa beings - is not found in these texts. 12 In the earliest Jaina textual treatment of 'ethical' problems, it is said of the evil-doer that, typically, he either commits a particular evil act, or has it committed by someone else, or approves of it when it is committed by someone else. Thus at Suyagadamga 1.1.1.3. we read: 'If a man kills living creatures himself, or causes them to be killed by others, or authorises / allows / approves their killing, animosity will increase for himself 13 8 Ibid. A vrabh has the basic meaning of 'to undertake', but in Middle Indo-Aryan dialects it falls together with a slabh, 'to kill'. So there is an ambiguity in Prakrit and a tendency for arambha to mean 'killing'. For a further discussion, see pp. 38-39, below. 9 Dixit 1978, pp. 6, 18-19. 10 See Ay. 1.1.2-7. 11 Dixit 1978, p. 6. 12 Ibid. 13 sayam tivayae pane aduva annehim ghayae |

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Early Jainism 7 Dixit speculates that this formulation of the characteristic behaviour of the evil-doer went through a . series of changes in the following manner.14 In the first formulation, the evil-doer either: 1) commits a particular (evil) act, or 2) has it committed by someone else, or 3) approves of (or allows?) an (evil) act when it is committed by someone else. In the second formulation, the evil-doer commits an (evil) act either: 1) through body - he does it himself, or 2) through speech - he employs an agent to do it, or 3) through mind - he approves of an (evil) act when it is committed by another. The relationship between the two formulations was, according to Dixit, eventually 'forgotten', and it became 'customary to speak of a triple evil act committed in a triple manner'.15 That is to say, an (evil) act committed through: - by oneself 1) body - by one's agent - by someone else with one's approval (This corresponds to the second formulation in its entirety.) - by oneself 2) speech - by one's agent - by someone else with one's approval hanamtam vanujanai veram vaddhei appano || Suy. 1.1.1.3.|| Bollee's edition, 1977. Tieken 1986, p. 12 ff., offers a different interpretation of this; cf. Bollee's trans., 1977, p. 54. Bollee also gives an alternative translation for veram vaddhei appano - 'his "sin" increases'. Cf. Ay. 1.1.1.5. 14 Dixit 1978, p. 88. 15 Ibid.

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8 Harmless Souls - by oneself 3) mind - by one's agent - by someone else with one's approval. What is the precise meaning of this? Is an evil act a triple act - does it require all three components to be evil - or is each component evil in itself? Crucially, is component 3), 'mind', a necessary condition for an evil act to take place? This becomes clearer if we look in more detail at one of the texts cited by Dixit, Dasaveyaliya 4.16 In Prakrit this reads: iccesim chamham jiva-nikayanam neva sayam dandam samarambhejja nevannehim dandam samarambhavejja dandam samarambhante vi anne na samanujanejja The key word here is the ambiguous samanujanejja. (Skt. samanujaniyat - (sam-) anu-vjna) - 'to fully permit, or allow or consent to, wholly acquiesce in, or approve of. 17 Dixit translates this term with the sense of approval - i.e. one should not approve of a violent action which has been 16 Leumann's ed., bottom of p. 6. 17 Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary. Cf. Pali samanunna - 'approval' - used, for example, at Samyutta Nikaya 1.1 and Majjhima Nikaya 1.159. Also cf. Pali anujanati - 'to give permission', 'grant', 'allow' (e.g. Vinaya IV, 225, 25: ekam me itthim anujanatha, 'allow me the power over her'); but when the Buddha speaks in Vinaya, the meaning is near to 'to ordain or prescribe' - see CPD and, for example, Vin. II, 254, 6: na Bhagava anujanati matugamassa ... pabbajjam. Compare also the formulation of the first parajika offence in the Suttavibhanga: e.g. 1.10.26: sadiyi tvam bhikkhu 'ti naham bhagava sadiyin ti anapatti bhikkhu asadiyantassa 'ti 'Monk, did you consent?' 'I did not consent, lord,' he said. 'There is no offence, monk, as you did not consent.' (Horner's trans. p. 62, etc.)

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Early Jainism 9 committed by someone else. 18 Schubring, however, translates na samanujanejja as '(the monk) should not allow others who perform a violent action to do so'. 19 The complete passage reads: Towards these six groups of souls (i.e. all jivas ) he should not perform any act of violence himself, nor cause it to be performed by others, nor allow others who perform it to do so. Schubring's version is clearly the more uncompromising of the two. In his reading a proper act of 'mind' is not simply a matter of disapproval (which is internal, a question of attitude), rather it is a matter of not allowing other people to perform himsa. It is possible that the Jains themselves, or some Jains (the ambiguity of the term permits different interpretations and so different responses to the viotence of others), started with the uncompromising sense - one should not allow others to commit violence if one is aware of their action - and later internalised the idea to a matter of attitude, of approval or disapproval. (Just how a monk could prevent others committing violence without causing violence himself, even if, as is possible, the injunction applies only to preventing his fellow monks from transgressing, is clearly problematic.) In this respect, the evidence of textual passages relating the Jaina attitude to Brahmanical ritual is interesting. As P.S Jaini points out, Jaina attacks on Vedic sacrifice have at times 'reached the proportions of a crusade'.20 In contrast to incidents in the Buddhist texts, where Brahmans seek out the Buddha to engage him in debate, Jaina stories frequently tell of some kind of active protest against, or interference in, Brahmanical rites. This indicates that the 18 Dixit 1978, pp. 88-89. Cf. Norman p. 14, who, in translating Utt. 8:8, renders na ... anujane as: 'One should not approve ...'. 19 Leumann's ed., p. 84. 20 JPP p. 169.

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10 Harmless Souls uncompromising reading of sam-anu-vjna may have been that of some early Jaina ascetics. For unless the Brahmanical rite was responsible for an influx of karma into the Jaina beholder of the ritual simply through the fact of his witnessing it, why should he be so vehement in his protest? If it were merely the Brahmans' act of violence, causing influx of karmic matter (asrava) into them (the Brahmans), the Jaina could have let it pass. But it is clear that there is some sense in which the Jaina considers himself personally responsible for it. Belief that an evil act can be committed through the activity of mind explains this. (It may also be the case that the ascetic's attitude is based on compassion for the suffering jiva which is the sacrificial material, although such a reason is not prominently advanced in the texts.) The passage from Dasaveyaliya 4 continues: While I live I (shall) not act (violently) in any of three ways, i.e. with mind, speech, and body, nor shall I authorise such action, nor allow another person to act so.21 In contrast to the suggested original meaning of the formula - that acts of body, speech, and mind all referred ultimately to particular physical actions -, this passage introduces a properly mental element. However, this is still a long way from the idea that it is mental attitude alone which is really instrumental in bondage. It is not necessary for all three components, the physical, the vocal, and the mental, to be present for an evil act to be committed; any one of these alone constitutes such an act. Violence is still evil and thus binding, whatever the mental attitude or intention of the actor. Nevertheless, if, as seems likely, the uncompromising reading of sam-anu-vjna as 'allowance' was eventually relinquished entirely in favour of 'approval', 21 javajjivae tiviham tivihenam manenam vayae kaenam na karemi na karavemi karentam pi annam na samanujanami - Leumann's ed. pp. 7-8.

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Early Jainism 11 then a precedent was established (albeit initially only with regard to the actions of others) in which attitude or intention alone was enough either to cause bondage or, more importantly, to evade it, regardless of what happened physically. A mental event was judged to have soteriological significance regardless of what happened in the external world. Thus, as in the passage cited above, which constitutes the first great vow (Dasaveyaliya 4), it became possible to speak of performing a mental act of violence. Prima facie, this would seem to increase the difficulties involved in undertaking the vow of ahimsa, since now not only actually accomplished physical acts but also mere 'evil' thoughts are defined as himsa. However, once a mental element is introduced into himsa, the way is open to introduce the further idea that acts are only 'evil' - and so karmically binding - when there is an element of intention: a mental component (viz. 'passion') has to be present. And as will be made clear, this was precisely what happened as Jainism expanded into a religion with a strong lay following. This process will be examined below, along with its doctrinal and social ramifications, but first of all it is necessary to consider in more detail what counts as a harming action according to the earliest Jaina texts. 1.3 Some early Buddhist and early Jaina attitudes to bondage compared It is useful to begin by examining the contrasting attitudes of Buddhists and Jains to what is really instrumental in bondage. Such a comparison reveals very clearly what is most important in this respect according to the earliest Jaina canonical texts, namely, physical action. Consequently, it also throws light on the original meaning of 'yoga', which in the Tattvartha Sutra is given as the technical term for all forms of physical, vocal and mental

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12 Harmless Souls action.22 In the Upalisutta of the Majjhima Nikaya (56), which describes the conversion of Upali, a lay disciple of Mahavira, by the Buddha, a dispute arises over whether the sins of the mind, as the Buddha teaches, or the sins of the body, as the Nigantha Nataputta (Mahavira) contends, are the heaviest. The Buddha asks Tapassi (a Jain) how many kinds of acts 'effect and start Demerit, according to Nataputta the Nigantha'. Tapassi replies: 'It is not his usage, Gotama, to employ the term "acts"; he speaks of "inflictions" (danda)' (namely, those of body / deed, word and mind).23 Each of the three kinds of danda is agreed to be distinct from the other two. Mahavira is reported by Tapassi to state that, of the three, those of deed (kayadanda - i.e. of body) are the heaviest. But the Buddha replies that those of mind are the heaviest; and rather than 'danda', he prefers to use the term 'kamma'. Thus, according to the Majjhima Nikaya, the Jains give a negative gloss to the word for activity itself. (Although, as Jacobi points out, the word kamma occurs in the Jaina sutras too, in the sense of 'deed'; 22 See p. 47ff., below. 23 Pali: kati pana Tapassi Nigantho Nataputto kammani pannapeti papassa kammassa kiriyaya papassa kammassa pavattiya ti... Na kho avuso Gotama acinnam Niganthassa Nataputassa kammam kamman-ti pannapetum, dandam dandan ti kho avuso Gotama acinnam Niganthassa Nataputtassa pannapetun ti - Majjhimanikaya 1, 372. The sense of danda here would seem to be 'hurtful physical acts', i.e. 'violence'. Cf. Dhammapada 129: sabbe tasanti dandassa sabbe bhayanti maccuno | attanam upamamm katva na haneyya na ghataye || 'All men tremble at violence, all men fear death. Likening others to oneself, one should neither kill nor cause to kill.' According to Chalmers (PTS ed. of MN, p. 267), Buddhaghosa 'says that the Jain idea was that citta (the mano-danda) did not come into bodily acts or into words, which were irresponsible and mechanical, like the stirring and soughing of boughs in the wind'. S -

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Early Jainism 13 danda, however, is at least as frequently used.)24 The term preferred by the Buddhists - kamma - is in essence a more neutral term than danda, in that action is either sinful or not, depending upon intention, i.e. the karmic quality of any action is determined by the quality of volition (cetana) underlying it. Nothing can be called karmically wholesome (kusala) or unwholesome (akusala) independently of volition; acts in themselves are karmically indeterminate (avyakata).25 Whether a particular volitional state is karmically binding or not depends on the absence or presence of lobha (greed), dosa (hate), and moha (delusion) - perhaps comparable to the 'passions' (kasayas) of classical Jaina thought. For this reason, the Buddha can state explicitly that 'volition, O monks, is what I call action (cetanaham bhikkhave kammam vadami), for through volition one performs [significant] action by body, speech or mind'.26 From the above, it is clear that for the early Jains physical activity is, by definition, 'hurtful' and thus binding, whereas for the Buddhists it is only binding if accompanied by the mental factors of lobha, dosa and moha. And it is perhaps significant that it is a lay disciple of Mahavira's who is converted by the Buddha, since the Buddha's view of what is karmically binding, as represented in the Upalisutta, is clearly more compatible with lay life than the view attributed to Mahavira. . It is also interesting to note that 'yoga', the Jaina term 24 Jacobi 1895, intro. p. xvii. See, for instance, Suy. 2.2 (p. 357ff. in Jacobi's trans.), where thirteen ways of 'committing sins' are treated of, and where the first five are danda-samadane and the rest are kiriyathane (i.e. kriyasthana). Cf. also Sthananga Sutra (third uddesaka) where, according to Jacobi (ibid. p. xvii), the doctrine of the three danda is expressed in nearly the same words. Norman p. 15, translating Utt. 8:10, renders damda as 'punishment'. 25 See Buddhist Dictionary, p. 122ff. > 26 Anguttara Nikaya 6.63, quoted in Buddhist Dictionary, p. 92.

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14 Harmless Souls for 'activity', is used by Buddhists, in the sense of 'yokes' or 'bonds', as a synonym for the four asavas, the four 'cankers' or 'corruptions' - viz. kamasava - the canker of sense desire, bhavasava - of (desiring eternal) existence, ditthasava - of (wrong) views, avijjasava - of ignorance.27 Thus yoga is that which binds for both the Buddhists and the Jains; however, for the former, it is clearly mental events which bind (kamasava, etc.), whereas for the latter, it is physical action which is important, for it is physical action which 'causes the influx of karmic matter (asrava). Alsdorf has suggested, convincingly, that the use of the term 'asava' by both Buddhists and Jains, is not a case of one heterodox tradition borrowing from the other, but that when the Buddhists use the term it is a remainder from an ancient, 'primitive' form of a common Indian doctrine concerning the effect and expiation of action - a doctrine which the Jains preserved whereas the Buddhists 'modernized' and 'spiritualized'.28 In other words, the 'original' belief was that the instrument of bondage, of asrava, was physical activity; the Jaina monks retained this idea, whereas the Buddhists redefined yoga and asrava in terms of mental or 'internal' events. Etymologically, however, yoga must be the juncture of two things. Caillat defines it as 'the attraction and conjunction' of the material particles which form karma with 'the spiritual monad'.29 P.S. Jaini, referring to the fully developed doctrine of the Tattvartha Sutra, says that karma generates a vibration (yoga) in the soul which brings 27 See Digha Nikaya 16, quoted in Buddhist Dictionary, p. 27. 28 Alsdorf 1965, p. 4f. 29 Caillat 1974, p. 30; cf. Caillat 1987, p. 511, where she defines yoga as the attraction of subtle matter to the soul through the vibration of its 'soul-points', presumably following the SS on TS 6:1: atmapradesaparispando yogah. See below, p. 47ff., for my comments on TS 6:1.

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Early Jainism 15 about the influx (asrava) of new karmic matter.30 He goes on to say, The vibrations referred to here actually denote the volitional activities of the individual. Such activities can be manifested through either body, speech, or mind; hence the soul's vibrations are said to be of three types, each corresponding to one of these modalities. 31 As will be made clear, I differ from Jaini on the importance of volition as an element in bondage, particularly in early Jainism; nevertheless, we may readily infer from the above that, in this context, the primary meaning of yoga is the juncture of the soul and matter (which then becomes karma), i.e. bondage. The meaning is then referred back to the cause of that bondage, either vibration of the spacepoints of the soul or the bodily, vocal and mental activities associated with it. However, since activity is the ultimate cause of vibration, it is the activity of the individual which comes to be synonymous with yoga. For reasons which will become clear, I further suggest that in these earliest Jaina texts the influx of karmic particles and their bondage to the soul is seen as being the inevitable result of activity. In other words, activity is considered binding simply by virtue of its being activity; and the fact that both meanings, 'bondage' and 'activity', can be carried by the same term, 'yoga', bears this out. In this, I have again followed the Majjhima Nikaya (56) and assumed that for early Jainism volition is not a relevant factor in bondage. But is the account of Mahavira's attitude to activity given in the Buddhist text really an accurate reflection of the early Jaina position? In the Suyagadamga (2.6.26-42), the Buddhists are 30 See JPP pp. 105, 112. 31 JPP p. 112.

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16 Harmless Souls ridiculed for saying (according to the Jains) that it is no sin to cause harm believing that one is not doing so.32 In other words, the Buddhists maintain that mistaking the object of harmful actions relieves the actor of the consequences of his act. Thus killing a man without knowing that he is a man is not sinful; unintentional harm incurs no guilt. For the Jain, however, it is axiomatic that the well-controlled man, one who is careful, does not make such mistakes. He takes care not to harm living creatures whether intentionally or unintentionally. Thus at Suyagadamga 2.2.3 thirteen kinds of karmas or activities are enumerated, including 'accidental' (akasmat) sin, and sin committed through an error of sight. And bad karma accrues to people sinning in either of these ways (2.2.11-13). *Similarly, at Suyagadamga 2.4.1, Mahavira teaches that, 'Even the fool who is unaware of the workings of his mind, speech, and body, and does not see (i.e. register) even a dream, performs evil actions'. 33 This is asserted throughout Suyagadamga 2.4 against the opponent's (Buddhist's) view that: If his mind, speech, and body are free from evil, if he does not kill, if he is mindless (i.e. without an internal organ or organ of consciousness), if he is unaware of the workings of his mind, speech, and body, and does not see even a dream, he does not perform evil actions.34 The passage goes on to say that a 'mindless' person still 32 See the passage beginning: pinnagapindimavi... Jacobi's trans. (1895), pp. 414-417. 33 bale aviyaramanavayakayavakke suvinam avi na passai pave ya se kamme kajjai - Suy. 2.4.1 34 asamtaenam manenam pavaenam asamtiyae vaie paviyae asamtaenam kaenam pavaenam ahanamtassa amanakkhassa aviyaramanavayakayavakkassa suvinam avi apassao pavakamme no kaijai - Suy. 2.4.2

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Early Jainism 17 commits sins of violence, etc., and is thus bound by his actions. Taking the argument a step further, Mahavira then states that even ekendriyas, viz. earth-bodies, etc., though these beings have neither mind nor speech, yet as they cause pain, grief, damages, harm, and injury, they must be regarded as not abstaining from causing pain, etc. (2.4.9) .... Thus even senseless beings are reckoned instrumental in bringing about slaughter of living beings ... (2.4.10).35 In other words, injury is injury, whatever the motive or lack of motive which accompanies it: what counts is the harmful effect on the object, the injured, not the subjective state of the actor responsible for the injury. Here the ethical, compassionate roots of early Jainism are laid bare: injury is bad in the first place because it is injury to others. It is only with the development of a consistent theory of bondage and liberation that the stress switches from the fact of injury to others to its consequence, namely, selfinjury through bondage. Consequently, the Suyagadamga does not make it completely clear whether the consequences for the jiva of committing a sin of the kind outlined above are the same whatever embodiment it happens to be in.36 According to the pan-Indian (although not the Buddhist) doctrine of karma and later Jaina theory, karma is only accrued in a human birth; existence in other births is just the reflex of human action. But the Suyagadamga 35 Jacobi's trans., p. 404, of: java no ceva mano no ceva vai pananam java sattanam dukkhanayae soyanayae juranayae tippanayae pittanayae paritappanayae ... iti khalu se asannino vi satta ... panaivae 36 But see Suy. 2.4.11: 'The venerable One has declared that the cause (of sins) are the six classes of living beings, earth lives etc.' - Jacobi's trans., p. 404 of: tattha khalu bhagavaya chajjivanikayaheu pannatta tam jaha pudhavikaiya java tasakaiya.

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18 Harmless Souls appears to be saying that, since intention is irrelevant to sin, and thus to karmic bondage, therefore just as the 'mindless' man binds himself by his actions alone so do jivas in all other conditions down to ekendriyas (i.e. beings who have no organs through which they can experience passion or intention). This would certainly be consistent with the view that it is action and not intention which is instrumental in bondage, and is a further indication that the instrumentality of passion (kasaya) is a relatively late addition to Jaina belief. Thus the ideal Jaina monk, according to Suyagadamga 2.4.11, is one who abstains from the five cardinal sins and all the vices, who 'does not act or kill'; he is 'wellcontrolled and restrained, avoids and renounces sins, is not active, but careful and thoroughly wise'.37 Comparing this with the standard formula given, for instance, at Suyagadamga 2.1.50 - 'A monk who does not act, nor kill, who is free from wrath, pride, deceit, greed, who is calm and happy,' etc.38 - the implication would seem to be that wrath, etc. (the four kinds of passion or kasaya) are not directly instrumental in bondage as such, but that they lead to violent action (or action of any kind?) which is binding. This probably reflects the original connection of kasaya with bondage. 39 Colette Caillat, in her study of the Cheya Suttas, 40 states that Jaina teachers are anxious to 'redeem and reform even the very impulses and intentions' of the monks. Consequently, they take trouble to 'divine these intentions 37 Jacobi's trans., p. 405 (with minor alterations), of: ...akirie alusae ... samjayavirayapadihayapaccakkhayapavakamme akirie samvude egantapandie ... 38 Jacobi's trans., p. 352, of: se bhikkhu akirie alusae akohe amane amae alohe uvasamto parinivvude .... 39 See pp. 35-36, below, for a discussion of this. 40 Caillat 1975.

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Early Jainism 19 correctly and to appreciate exactly the responsibility of the offender'. She concludes that 'One cannot then take the accusations of the Buddhists literally when they accuse the nirgrantha of not according any value to the intentions which motivate the individual'.41 She also says that passages in the Suyagadamga, such as 2.6.26 and 2.2 (quoted above), 'are not conclusive'. 42 Without entering here into the relative chronology of the Cheya Suttas and their commentaries (from which Caillat draws her evidence) and the earliest portions of the Svetambara Canon, I would point out that, according to the early texts, intention is significant in so far as it may lead to or away from physical himsa, but in terms of the mechanism of bondage it is action or restraint from action that counts. For, in any given case, the intention may be good but the fact of physical hinsa is incontrovertible evidence that it is not good enough. In other words, the emphasis in the earliest texts is not on intention or lack of it as such, but on the degree of direct involvement with himsa. Actions are judged, in the first place, according to their result, not according to the intention of the actor. The latter may be significant before the act, but afterwards it is irrelevant. It is external harm or lack of harm that matters when the soteriological consequences of an action are calculated. Caillat herself corroborates this in her comments on the Vavahara Pithika, which analyses the acts of the monk into their constituent elements in order to determine to what extent he has sinned.43 As a typical example, she cites the 41 Ibid. p. 108. 42 Ibid. fn. 1, referring to La Vallee Poussin's fn. 3, p. 2 in his edition of L'Abhidharma de Vasubandhu, IV 155, Paris 1923-31, where such passages are cited to support the Abhidharmakosa's interpretation of the Jaina attitude. 43 See Caillat 1975, p. 104ff.

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20 Harmless Souls case of a monk who picks up, or puts down, a stick. He is totally innocent if in taking hold of it or in laying it down he acts with attention and cleans it. Conversely, he deserves five days of austerity (tapas) if he is guilty of negligence on the first or second point, or on both. Nevertheless, it is still necessary that no creature should have been injured (my emphasis]. Months of tapas have to be observed for harm done to a living creature when one spits, for instance, or if one receives alms in a wet bowl; and the death of a living creature involves complete loss of seniority.44 1.4 Himsa and the ascetic From the above, it is clear that in the earliest Jaina texts yoga refers primarily to physical action, and that when it is harming it is 'sinful' (i.e. evil action - pavakamma), and thus binding, regardless of intention or consciousness. For this reason the behaviour of the Jaina monk is characterised above all by physical inactivity and restraint: An early text dealing with ascetic behaviour, the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, makes this very clear. Dasaveyaliya 4.1 reads: 'He who walks, (stands, sits, and lies down, eats and speaks) carelessly, will hurt living beings. He binds evil karman, that is his bitter reward. '45 And Dasaveyaliya.4.8 states: 'He should walk, stand, sit, and lie down carefully; if he eats and speaks carefully, he does not bind evil karman'. 46 Nothing is said about binding 'good' karman; the important thing is not to bind karman at all (i.e. all karman 44 Ibid. p. 105. 45 Trans. by Schubring, Leumann's ed. 1932, p. 87, of: ajayam caramano u pana-bhuyai himsai| bandhai pavayam kammam tam se hoi kaduyam phalam || 46 jayam care jayam citthe jayam ase, jayam sae jayam bhunjanto bhasanto pavam kammam na bandhai ||

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Early Jainism 21 is evil in so far as it leads to further bondage). The attitude is that of Ayaramga 1.3.1.4, where killing (chanam) is described as the root of karma (kammamulam) and rebirth; that is to say, karman is profoundly negative according to these earliest texts. It is clear that, for the Dasaveyaliya, himsa of any kind results in bondage, regardless of whether such 'harming' is intentional or unintentional; that is to say, there is no such thing as an 'accident' for the Jaina monk, all himsa is due to carelessness. So at Dasaveyaliya 5.1.5 a monk is warned to be careful at all times on his begging tour, since, 'By falling or stumbling a (monk, however) self-controlled, would injure moving or unmoving beings'.47 And at Dasaveyaliya 6.10, it is explicitly stated that, 'As many moving or unmoving beings as there are in the world, (so many of them) a monk should not injure or cause to be injured, either consciously or unconsciously'.48 Thus, among many other restrictions, 'he should duly (and) with exertion inspect (his) alms-bowl and cloth, his bed, the place of excretion, straw or seat' (Dasaveyaliya 8.17), and 'Excrement, urine, mucus, phlegm, (and) filth, he should put away, having, by inspection, found out a pure place' (Dasaveyaliya 8.18).49 Throughout the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, the necessity for the monk to act in a manner which does not cause 47 pavadante va se tattha pakkhalante va samjae | himsejja pana-bhuyaim tase aduva thavare || See also Das. 5.1.57-64 for the prohibition on food and drink which might have been mingled with blossoms, seeds, plants, dust and mould, fire, etc. 48 Emphasis added to Schubring's trans. (with alterations) of: javanti loe pana tasa aduva thavara | te janam ajanam va na hane no va ghayae || 49 Schubring's trans. (with minor alterations) of: dhuvam ca padilehejja jogasa paya-kambalam | sejjam uccarabhumim ca samtharam aduvasanam ||8.17|| uccaram pasavanam khelam singhana jalliyam | phasuyam padilehitta paritthavejja samjae ||8.18||

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22 Harmless Souls intentional or unintentional himsa is repeatedly stressed (see 4.1-9). This is combined with a constant awareness of the extreme difficulty of treading such a path. At Dasaveyaliya 6.4, it is described as 'the hard, difficult conduct of the Free Ones'.50 And, even more explicitly, in the following verse it is said (perhaps even boasted) that, In no other (system) has been taught anything which, among worldly people, is (so) hard to carry out; a man may adhere to a great many tenets, (but there has) never been (taught), nor will be (taught to him) anything like our principles. 51 The Dyaramga Sutta is more laconic: 'A very severe religion has been proclaimed'. 52 In all these early monastic rules, nothing is said about intention or attitude as such; for what counts for salvation is physical harm itself; what causes the harming action to arise is of secondary concern. In other words, it is harmful action (himsa) which is directly instrumental in bondage, not attitude. Attitude is only significant in so far as it leads to or away from himsa; it does not cause karmic bondage in itself. 50 Schubring's trans. of: nigganthanam durahitthiyam 51 Schubring's trans. of: nannattha erisam vuttam jam loe parama-duccaram viula-tthana-bhaissa na bhuyam na bhavissai || Das. 6.5 || The precise meaning of this verse is obscure. Lalwani (1973) gives an even freer translation: ... 'This sort of highly difficult conduct For the world of human beings Is delineated nowhere save in nirgrantha philosophy. ayaragoyaram For those covetous of moksa Such conduct has nowhere been prescribed in the past Nor will it ever be prescribed in the future.' The general meaning, however, is not in doubt. 52 Ay. 1.6.4.2: ghore dhamme udirie.

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23 Early Jainism 1.5 The householder in the earliest texts i) The status of the householder Although the doctrine of karma, with the doctrine of rebirth and liberation (moksa) as its corollary, is the most prominent feature of the earliest Jaina texts, it is not developed systematically and there is no discussion at all of its precise mechanism.53 Moreover, the earliest detectable stream of doctrine holds an uncompromisingly negative view of the householder because he is a householder. The prospect of a better rebirth in heaven or on earth, as a result of good activity which attracts good karma, is hardly admitted, and the four possible births (gatis) seem to have only a theoretical significance at this stage.54 As Dixit puts it, all action leads inevitably to a 'more or less inauspicious' rebirth, and is ipso facto bad.55 This contrasts with the position found in later doctrinal layers where the pious householder and the good monk who is not yet good enough to attain moksa are promised auspicious rebirths. 56 Given that the ultimate soteriological goal of Jainism is total liberation from samsara, the idea that any rebirth is relatively undesirable remains a constant component of doctrine. However, what is largely absent from the earliest texts is the idea that there is any gradation or progression through a series of births to ultimate liberation. Instead, what is emphasised is the critical nature of the present birth and, necessarily (since these texts are addressed to ascetics), those kinds of ascetic restraint which will ensure that there is no further rebirth. Thus Ayaramga Sutta 1.6.2, for instance, apparently considers that there are only two possibilities after death: 1) birth among hellish beings 53 See Dixit 1978, p. 9. 54 References to the gatis in the very earliest parts of the canon are few and far between and cannot be dated with any certainty. See, for example, Suy. 1.2.3.13, 2.2.60ff. and Utt. 5.19ff. 55 Dixit 1978, p. 9. 56 See ibid.

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24 Harmless Souls and animals, and 2) moksa. The latter will be the condition of the jiva of the ideal monk, and the former that of the jivas of everyone else, whether householder or monk.57 Ayaramga 1.6.2.1 reads: Though some know the misery of the world, have relinquished their former connections, have given up ease, live in chastity, and, whether monk or layman, thoroughly understand the law, they are not able (to persevere in a religious life). The ill-disposed, giving up the robe, alms-bowl, blanket, and broom, do not bear the continuous hardships that are difficult to bear. He who prefers pleasures will, now or after a short time, be deprived (of a human body, not to recover it) for an infinite space of time. And thus they do not cross.(samsara), for the sake of these pleasures which entail evil consequences and are associated with others of their kind.58 It is clear from this that anything short of full mendicancy will entail a long series of miserable, nonhuman rebirths. Similarly, as Dixit points out, 59 at Ayaramga 1.3.4.4, in a sequence which begins with anger (koha) and ends with pain (dukkha), re-birth is described not only as entry into a womb (gabbha), a new birth (jamma), and a new death (mara), but also as characterised by a birth among hellish beings (naraya), animal existence (tiriya) and pain (dukkha). In this respect, it is significant that the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, for instance, states that for a monk to return to the life of a householder apparently necessarily entails (among 57 See ibid. p. 16. - 58 Jacobi's trans., with minor alterations, of: auram logam ayae caitta puvva-samjogam hicca uvasamam vasitta bambhaceramsi vasu va anuvasu va janittu dhammam aha-taha ah' ege tam accai kusila vattham padiggaham kambalam payapunchanam viosijja anupuvvena anahiyasemana parisahe durahiyasae. kame mamayamanassa iyanim va muhutte va aparimanae bheo, evam se aataraiehim kamehim akevaliehim; avinna c'ee - Ay. 1.6.2.1 - Schubring's text (1910). 59 Dixit 1978, p. 16.

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Early Jainism 25 other disadvantages) a worse re-birth after death. Dasaveyaliya 11.7 reads: '(To return) means going down (after death)': 60 Such a fate could hardly be construed as some kind of punishment simply because he has given up being a monk, because, since influx of karmic matter (asrava) is tied to himsa, there is no karmic result from such a change of status in itself: rather, rebirth in hell is here portrayed as the inevitable result of leading the life of a householder.61 For, as Dixit points out, the idea that acts involving the employment of human or animal labour were particularly 'sinful' (i.e. binding) and others less so, does not appear in the earliest texts.62 That is to say, all acts which harmed any of the six types of living beings, whether trasa (mobile) or sthavara (immobile), were considered to be equally binding. (To be clear about this, the ethical attitude is not so much that a man is as worthless as a mango or a louse, but that a mango or a louse is as important as a man, all jivas having equal value.) Such a distinction between the binding effects of doing harm to trasa beings on the one hand, and sthavara beings on the other, only emerged in later Jaina speculation, where the concept of the 'pious householder' is defined as 'one who abstains from all violence done to the trasa beings', that done to sthavara ones being tolerated.63 As P.S. Jaini puts it, the vow of ahinsa in its partial, i.e. lay, form applies 60 Schubring translates aharagai-vasovasampaya as '(To return) means to reach a (place in hell (after death)'. Cf. Ay. 1.6.4.1: 'When they (the disciples) feel the hardships (of a religious life) they slide back, for their love of life. Their leaving the world is a bad leavingJacobi's trans. of puttha v'ege siyattanti jiviyass' eva karana. nikkhantam pi tesim dunnikkhantam bhavai. 61 Cf. Suy. 1.3ff. on the potentially fatal temptation to return to lay life. Das. 11 also stresses the social disadvantages of being an exmonk: see, for example, 11.6. See also Olivelle 1974, p. 20, on the general revulsion felt by Indians for the parivrajaka who attempts to return to a society where there is no place left for him. 62 Dixit 1978, p. 6. 63 Dixit 1978, p. 6.

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26 Harmless Souls 'only to beings with two or more senses (trasa), it is extended for the monk or nun to include the infinitely larger group of single-sense beings (ekendriya) and element bodies (sthavara )'.64 In later Jainism, it is this complete vow concerning ahimsa which marks the real distinction between the advanced lay-person and the mendicant. In the earliest texts it had similarly distinguished the practice of the Jaina monks from that of all others, but there the distinction was absolute. Thus, in the early texts, there are passages such as Ayaramga 1.1.2.2-4: Take note - there are innumerable tiny beings individually embodied in earth. Take note - there are some men who truly control themselves, safeguarding even these beings, while others, (such as the monks of other sects) fail to do so and thus are only pretending to be renunciants.65 In such a context the life of the householder inevitably entails himsa, bondage, and a bad rebirth. ii) Merit and Rebirth As we have seen, the very earliest texts (i.e. the earliest parts of the Ayaramga, Suyagadamga and Dasaveyaliya Suttas) are dominated by the idea that virtually all action is harming and therefore binding, since harming is the root of karma.66 Typical in this respect is Ayaramga 1.3.1.3, which asserts that 'action results in misery' (arambhajam dukkham). In other words, the possibility of some kind of meritorious activity scarcely arises; it is only by restraint from action that one can hope to improve one's condition 64 JPP p. 241. 65 P.S. Jaini's trans. (JPP pp. 241-242) of: santi pana pudho siya, lajjamana pudho pasa; anagara 'motti ege pavayamana jam inam viruvaruvehim sattehim pudhavikammasamarambhenam ... anegaruve pane vihimsai. 66 Ay. 1.3.1.4 - kammamulam ... chanam.

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Early Jainism 27 (i.e. one is working towards a smaller quantity of bad karma). Such continuous restraint, however, is only possible at the ascetic extreme inhabited by the Jaina renouncer; for the householder it is, by definition, impossible.67 It is not surprising, therefore, that references to merit (punya) or to activity which leads to a better rebirth in heaven or on earth, as opposed to rebirth in hell or as an animal, are hard to find in this earliest stream of doctrine, and that when they do occur they have an unemphatic and adventitious quality. And it is clear that although, according to some strands of thought, there may be a theoretical possibility of a relatively better rebirth (and perhaps in some cases a practical one for ascetics),68 for householders there is no real possibility of accumulating anything other than more bad karma and the promise of a bad rebirth. In this connection it is important to remember that what is being reported here is the ascetic's view - the view of the texts. We have no way of telling what views householders may have held. But since the specific category of 'Jaina householder' would seem to be an anachronism if applied to the period in question - for the very reasons being outlined here - then that consideration plays no part in a reconstruction of the earliest layers of Jaina doctrine. This is borne out by passages such as Suyagadamga 1.7.24-27, where the connection between the giving and receiving of alms and the giving and receiving of the teaching seems to be minimal. Least of all should the monk actually teach the Jain Dhamma, or promise to do so, in order to obtain 67 See parigraha section, p. 31ff., below. 68 See, for instance, Das. 3:14: dukkaraim karettanam dussahaim sahettu ya ke ettha devalogesu kei sijjhanti niraya || 'Having done that which is difficult to do, having forborne what is difficult to forbear, some of them (pass) to the worlds of the gods, others attain perfection unburdened [by Karman].' - Schubring's trans. Cf. Suy. 2.2.74, for example.

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28 Harmless Souls alms.69 This is interesting because it implies that there was some expectation on the part of householders that alms should be repaid with teaching, combined with the Jaina ascetic's view that any prolonged contact with householders (such as might take place during a sermon) was fraught with potential danger for him. It seems likely, in these circumstances, that the first Jaina ascetics made use of the general (i.e. pan-Indian) cultural perception that it was 'the duty of the householder to feed anyone who came to his door', 70 without subscribing to the additional idea that such giving was a means by which the householder acquired merit. Indeed, as we have seen, the earliest detectable Jaina doctrine of karma leaves no room at all for the idea of meritorious action. In this connection, there is an interesting verse at the end of a section in the Dasaveyaliya Sutta where the two ideas - the pan-Indian one that there is merit in giving, and the early Jaina one that there is none - are apparently brought together in some kind of compromise. (It should be noted that this verse, Dasaveyaliya 5.1.100, is the last one in a long chapter and could well be a later addition.) This states that, rare as it is to find such people, he who gives for nothing (i.e. the householder) and he who lives for nothing (the monk) both have a good rebirth.71 This 69 See Suy. 1.7.24: 'He who visits houses where he gets nice food, who professes the Law, desirous only of filling his belly, and brags (of himself) for the sake of food, is not equal to the hundredth part of an Arya.' - Jacobi's trans, of: kulaim je dhavai saugaim aghai dhammam ayaranugiddhe ahahu se ayariyana sayamse je lavaejja asanassa heu ||. Cf. 1.7.26: 'The servile man says pleasing things for the sake of food, drink, and other things: but wrong belief and bad conduct are worthless like chaff.' - Jacobi's trans. of: annassa panassihaloiyassa anuppiyam bhasai sevamane pasatthayam ceva kusilayam ca nissarae hoi jaha pulae || 70 Gombrich 1988, p. 75; and see ibid. for reconstruction of contact between early Buddhist monks and householders. 71 dullaha u muha-dai, muha-jivi vi dullaha || muha-dai muha-jivi do vi gacchanti soggaim || Das. 5.1.100||

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Early Jainism 29 seems to mean that householders will only benefit from giving alms if they have no intention of benefiting from them: only alms given with the understanding that the gift is not merit-making are merit-making.72 There is also an ambiguous verse in the Dasaveyaliya Sutta which may suggest that the ascetic should not even accept alms which he knows to have been given for the purpose of obtaining merit (perhaps itself a reflection of the monks' awareness that it is possible to make use of lay misconceptions about the result of giving).73 None of this, however, need seem so paradoxical if it is remembered that the Dasaveyaliya Sutta is a text composed by and for ascetics, and reflects their wariness of any kind of social intercourse. Thus Dasaveyaliya 5.1.100 (see above), rather than teaching a doctrine of motive or intention, simply reflects the monks' concern lest they themselves may come to believe that they are providing, directly or indirectly, something in return for alms, and that they might thereby encourage householders actively to seek them out, or follow them, in an attempt to obtain merit. Such behaviour would inevitably bring them into closer contact with lay life, with its concomitant temptations and himsa-fraught relationships; when possible, it was far safer, therefore, to accept only from those expecting nothing in return. This attitude, enforced by rules of monastic discipline, ensured that it was difficult, if not impossible, for any community of monks, as Dixit remarks, 'to forge special links with any community of householders'. 74 72 Cf. Anguttara Nikaya IV, 60-3, where it is said that the lowest motive for giving alms is with thought of reward in the next life. Quoted by Gombrich 1971, p. 252. 73 See Das. 5.1.49: asanam panagam va vi khaimam saimam taha|| jam janejja sunejja va punnattha pagaim imam || Schubring translates this, referring to other verses, as: 'When a monk knows or is informed that food (of any kind) was prepared for the purpose of acquiring merit, he should refuse it', etc. 74 Dixit 1978, p. 5.

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30 Harmless Souls Indeed, it is clear that the monks went out of their way to avoid the conditions which might lead to such a relationship. To summarise, we may suppose that meritorious action and a better rebirth on earth or in heaven as a result of it were concepts familiar to the householders with whom the early Jaina ascetics had their minimal contact; such ideas were part of the general cultural furniture. And although the earliest Jaina doctrine apparently denies the possibility of these consolations to the householder, nevertheless, Jaina mendicants had to take that general cultural view into account when regulating their own relations with lay persons. While their ties with the laity remained so loose, however, it was not necessary for them to make any systematic doctrinal concessions to that view. For the real possibility of a better rebirth for an ordinary lay person to be theoretically established, some doctrine of intention or motive as being, at some level, more karmically significant than action alone would have been required. And as we have seen, in the earliest texts motive is regarded either as totally irrelevant or only important in so far as it helps to engender or inhibit action. (Ideas such as the Buddhist one that there can be karmically wholesome or recommended action [punya-karma] are, of course, entirely absent, as is the related idea that individual monks and the Sangha in general are the 'unsurpassable field of merit' for the laity.)75 Only in Suyagadamga 2 (intermittently) and the Uttarajjhayana are there enough references to the selfrestrained householder who achieves rebirth in heaven or as a human to give the impression that this possibility is becoming doctrinally established.76 This is not to claim that there are no references whatsoever to merit and a better rebirth in the very earliest texts; when they do occur, 75See Buddhist Dictionary, 'punna', p. 80; cf. Collins p. 219. 76 See, for example, Suy. 2.1.13, 2.1.17, 2.2.60ff., 2.2.74, 2.2.78, 2.5.16, 2.7.36, and Ut.. 5.19ff., 7.20ff., 10.15, 12.12-17, 21.94, 36.5053.

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Early Jainism 31 however, they are isolated and, for the most part, ambiguous.77 Moreover, to talk of a 'pious' or 'meritorious' act remains largely a contradiction in terms, since ' merit', in this context, is usually taken to mean a relative lack of (bad) karma - the result of abstaining from action. 78 The references to merit and the development of the idea in early Jainism would make an interesting independent study, but there is no need here to consider the relative dating of particular sections of any one text to make my point, since the overall tenor of these works (Ayaramga 1, Suyagadamga 1, Dasaveyaliya) is self-evidently and uncompromisingly anti-householder, as I have demonstrated. That is to say, only from the secondary layers of early material is it possible to adduce firm evidence for particular lay followers who associate themselves specifically with Jaina ascetics (as opposed to all kinds of sramanas) in the expectation of gaining merit. But even here, the doctrine of merit still lacks a clear, specifically Jaina rationale. 1.6 Parigraha and the origins of the kasaya doctrine i) Parigraha As we have already noted, 79 Dixit has drawn attention to the fact that in the earliest canonical texts the two worst sins are arambha (violent activity) and parigraha (possession).80 That is to say, they perform the same function as that performed by kasaya (passion), and by the major vows (mahavratas), in later texts - they 'provide a frame work for the fundamental classification of moral virtues and vices'.81 Moreover, the two are intimately 77 See, for instance, Suy. 1.2.3.13, 1.7.16, 1.11.17-21. 78 See, for instance, Ay. 1.4.22, Suy. 1.2.13, 1.8.1-2, 1.15.10, and even the relatively late Utt. 29.37. 79 p. 5, above. * 80 Dixit 1978, p. 5. 81 Ibid. p. 7.

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32 Harmless Souls connected, for parigraha includes that complex of sins which involve a positive attitude towards a particular object, while arambha comprises those sins which involve a negative attitude. 82 Thus parigraha may be translated as 'attachment to worldly things' or 'possessiveness', as well as 'possession' itself. And such an attitude directed towards a particular object or person necessarily entails an attitude of arambha towards other objects or persons. Thus all arambha may be traced back to some case of parigraha . Or as Dixit puts it, . Taken as a whole parigraha signifies attachment for things worldly - where things include both the material goods and the social relatives, and arambha the acts injurious to others undertaken with a view to satisfying the demands of this attachment.83 (Like kasaya in its earliest sense (see below], parigraha leads to violence and thus to bondage, but it is not the direct cause of the latter - i.e. it is the cause of violence but not the direct cause of bondage.) Parigraha is thus clearly associated with the life of the householder, for it is the householder who is attached to worldly things. It is a life, moreover, which is inextricably bound up with violence, actual and potential. Thus the Suyagadamga characterises householders as sarambha and sapariggaha- 'killers' and 'acquirers of property' in Jacobi's translation.84 82 Ibid. p. 5. 83 Ibid. pp. 18-19. 84 Jacobi 1895, p. 350. See Suy. 2.1.43-46. Suy. 2.1.43 reads: iha khalu 'garattha sarambha sapariggaha, samtegaiya samana mahana vi sarambha sapariggaha, je ime tasa thavara pana te sayam samarambhanti annena vi samarambhavemti annam pi samarambhatam samanujananti 'Here, indeed, householders are killers (of beings) and acquirers of property, and so are even some Sramanas and Brahmanas. They themselves kill moving and unmoving living beings, have them killed by another person, or consent to another's killing them.' - Jacobi's trans.

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Early Jainism 33 The Jaina mendicant, on the other hand, is one who 'disowns all things not requisite for religious purposes', or who 'disowns attachment', 85 since 'he who possesses anything sentient or insentient, however slender, or allows / approves of others doing so, will not be delivered from suffering'. 86 In other words, such a person goes on killing and binding new karma.87 Similarly, Suyagadamga 1.2.2.9-10 states that: A monk should be completely familiar with the Law, and at the same time no longer be engaged in (worldly) actions (arambha). (People) who are entangled in thoughts of possessions take care of those possessions; they attain, however, no permanent property. (9) Know that (property) causes suffering in this world, and that such suffering continues in the next world. Who, knowing this, would be a householder? (10)88 In the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, this is made even more explicit in the statements: 'He who desires to hoard (things) is a householder, not a monk', 89 and 'the Great Sage has with minor alterations. 85 Alternative translations of pariggaha suggested by Jacobi at Ay. 1.2.5.3. 86 cittamantam a-cittam va parigijjha kisam avi | annam va anujanai evam dukkha na muccai || Suy. 1.1.1.2 || Bollee's ed., Vol. I 1977, p. 14. Tieken 1986, p. 10ff., offers a very different translation of this; cf. Bollee's trans. (1977), pp. 53-54. 87 See Suy. 1.1.1.3-5. 88 Based on Bollee's trans. Vol. II 1988, pp. 55-6 of his ed. of Suy. 1.2.2.9-10: dhammassa ya parae muni arambhassa ya antae thie soyanti ya nam mamaino no labbhanti niyam pariggaham 1911 iha-loga duhavaham viu para-loge ya duham duhavaham | viddhamsana-dhammam eva tam ii vijjam ko 'garam avase ||10|1. Cf. Jacobi's trans. 1895, p. 254. 89 je siya sannihi-kame gihi pavvaie na se - Das. 6:19b, Schubring's trans.

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34 Harmless Souls said that property means delusion'.90 The desire to hoard or store things is to experience greed (lobha),91 and lobha is not simply the worst of the four sins, it in fact includes the other three: 'Anger destroys kindness, pride civility, deceit drives away friends, [but] greed destroys all.'92 It is clear from this that lobha (greed) is synonymous with one meaning of parigraha, and that it is also an inclusive term for the four sins or passions which are later understood as the components of the technical term kasaya.93 ii) Kasaya The four 'moral vices' or passions - anger, pride, deceit and greed (krodha, mana, maya, and lobha) -, which are later called kasaya (literally, 'stains'), do appear as a set in both the Ayaramga Sutta and the Suyagadamga, although they are never given any common designation, and there is no extended treatment of them.94 90 muccha pariggaho vutto ii vuttam mahesina - Das. 6:21, Schubring's trans. 91 Das. 6:19a. 92 koho piim panasei, mano vinaya-nasano | maya mittani nasei, lobho savva-vinasano || Das. 8:37||. 93 See below; Cf. JPP p. 177. 94 See Dixit 1978, pp. 7, 15, 19. In Suy. 1 there are, however, a number of instances where four vices appear under what Dixit calls 'rather peculiar and obscure designations' (Dixit 1978, p. 19). For instance, at 1.1.2.12, the Prakrit terms savvappaga, viukkassa, numa, and appattiya appear. Jacobi reads these as (Sanskrit) sarvatmaka = lobha), vyutkarsa (=mana), ... = maya), and appattiya (= krodha?) respectively. Thus his translation reads: 'shaking off greed, pride, deceit and wrath, one becomes free of karman'. (Cf. Bollee, Vol. I (1977), pp. 89-92, on these). Again, at Suy. 1.1.4.12, a wise monk is enjoined to leave off ukkasa, jalana, numa, and majjhattha. Jacobi renders these as (Sanskrit) utkarsa (= mana), jvalana (= krodha), ... (= maya), and madhyastha (= lobha?) respectively. (Cf. Bollee (1977), p. 129.) And at 1.9.11, paliumcana, bhayana, thandilla, and ussayana are named as the causes of sin. Jacobi renders these as (Sanskrit) parikumcana (= maya), bhajana (= lobha), ... (= krodha), and ucchraya (= mana), adding the note that 'these four passions are named here

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Early Jainism 35 At Suyagadamga 1.6.26, for instance, it is said of the Arhat that, having expunged the passions which defile the soul, viz. wrath, pride, deceit and greed, he does not commit any wrong, nor does he cause it to be committed. 95 This is typical in that although it sees the four passions as the instigators of wrong (i.e. harmful) behaviour they are not tied directly to bondage in any technical sense, but to himsa; and it is himsa that causes the soul to be bound by karma. This is borne out by passages such as Ayaramga 1.3.4.1, where the conquest of anger, etc. is described as the 'doctrine of the Seer who does not injure living beings and has put an end to acts and to samsara)': 96 In other words, motivation is still not seen as directly binding in itself; it is the act (killing, etc.) which remains soteriologically crucial. The important thing is control: control of physical action and therefore also control of the passions which may lead to the loss of such physical restraint and the consequent destruction of living creatures. . In the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, the term kasaya is applied to the four vices (krodha, etc.). Dixit argues that because kasaya is used in a technical sense here, a relatively late date should be assigned to the passage.97 However, whether Dixit is right about the dating or not - and prima facie his argument seems to be at best circular - kasaya still has no direct connection with bondage in the sense of providing conditions for karmic matter to stick to the jiva, which is the later technical sense of the term (see below). Thus at Dasaveyaliya 7:57 there is the passage: from the way in which they are supposed to act upon the soul' (1895, p. 302 fn. 5). These are passages which clearly need further investigation. 95 See Jacobi's trans. (1895, p. 291) of: koham ca manam ca taheva mayam lobham cauttham ajjhattadosa| . eyani vanta araha mahesi na kuvvai pava na karavei || Suy. 1.6.26|| 96 Jacobi's trans. (1884, p. 33) of: se vanta koham ca manam ca mayam ca lobham ca eyam pasagassa damsanam uvarayasatthassa paliyantakarassa. 97 Dixit 1978, p. 29.

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36 Harmless Souls (He who) speaks after consideration, controls his senses well, has overthrown the four passions, (and) is without (worldly) support, purges (his soul) of the dirt resulting from previous evil deeds (and) may gain this world and the next. 98 And at Dasaveyaliya 8:36-39, the four 'passions' and the ways to subdue them are analysed in more detail as part of a long description of the way in which a monk should behave: When he wishes that which is good for him, he should get rid of the four faults anger, pride, deceit, and greed which increase evil... Anger and pride, when not suppressed, deceit and greed, when arising: all these four black passions water the roots of rebirth.99 It should be noted that the metaphor here is of passions 'watering' the 'roots of rebirth', not of causing the jiva to become 'sticky'. 100 There is no specific link with karma, and in this case passions (kasaya) are again clearly considered to be a contributory factor in bondage and not directly instrumental: the term is evidently not yet being used in its technical sense (i.e. in the sense employed in the Tattvartha Sutra - see below). iii) Kasaya and parigraha Richard Gombrich has pointed out the close association in Indian religious thought between asceticism and the idea 98 Based on Schubring's trans. of: parikkha-bhasi susamahiindie caukkasayavagae anissie | sa niddhune dhutta-malam pure-kadam arahae logam inam taha param | Das. 7:57 ||. 99 Schubring's trans., with alterations, of: koham manam ca mayam ca lobham ca pava-vaddhanam | vame cattari dose u icchanto hiyam appano || Das. 8:36|| koho ya mano ya aniggahiya maya ya lobho ya pavaddhamana | cattari ee kasina kasaya sincanti mulai punabbhavassa || 8:39 ||. Cf. p. 47ff., below. 100

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Early Jainism 37 that emotion stands as the main obstacle to salvation.101 Jainism is exemplary in that respect. For any system which seeks to regulate physical action to the extent that early Jainism does must also seek to regulate passion or emotion. The two are so closely related as to be virtually interdependent: emotion expresses itself in physical indiscipline, physical indiscipline implies some loss of inner control, whether it be full-blown passion or mere carelessness. Physical and emotional control is therefore paramount. (Again it should be noted that, in terms of karma and avoiding it, it is the physical which takes priority here: one is seeking to control the emotions in order to avoid harmful, and thus karmically binding, actions.) For the Jaina ascetic, the distinguishing characteristic of the householder's life, with its possessions and the emotions aroused by having and wanting possessions (parigraha and lobha), is lack of control. And as we have seen, according to the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, lobha ('greed') comes to subsume all those emotions which are virtually synonymous with lack of control. This interdependence of 'possessions' (being a householder) and 'possessiveness' (thinking and acting like a householder) are seen as the himsa-causing and thus binding factors par excellence. In this respect, an inadequate monk can all too easily behave like a householder, but a householder cannot (yet) be like a monk. However, the very distinction between 'possessions' and 'possessiveness' does open up at least a theoretical possibilty of non-attachment to possessions, an attitude or intention, having a significant part to play in liberation from karma. And as we shall see, although the interdependence of the two of possessiveness and the householder's life continues to hold good from the ascetics' perspective, for the laity a gap begins to open up. Parigraha thus becomes an all-inclusive term for the inner, emotional reaction to the external world - a reaction 101 Gombrich 1988, pp. 44-45. -

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38 Harmless Souls which ensures that one remains bound in samsara. The beginnings of this internalisation were probably subject to Buddhist influence. For parigraha as 'possessiveness' is very like tanha ('thirst', 'craving', or 'grasping'), which for early Buddhism is the karmically significant (i.e. binding) factor. 102 In the Buddhist case, of course, karma is fully internalised to volition; for the Jains it is still ultimately a matter of physical action. Nevertheless, we can see here the beginnings of what later becomes a crucial doctrine for the Jaina lay person. It is only with Umasvati, however, as will be made clear, that a technical explanation in terms of the mechanism of bondage is given for the widely held perception that passion is somehow very closely linked to violence and so to continuing bondage. 1.7 Activity and karma before Umasvati i) The meaning of arambha Monier-Williams gives vrabh / rambh as an early form of the root labh / lambh. A vrabh has the basic meaning of 'to set about', 'begin', 'undertake', whereas, although a vlabh can also have the meaning 'to commence', it also has the sense of taking hold of (in a physical sense)', and 'to kill', especially 'to sacrifice'.103 In eastern Middle Indo-Aryan dialects rabh and labh fall together (r > 1). Thus there is an ambiguity in Prakrit and Pali, and for both Jains and Buddhists there is a tendency for the word to mean 'killing'. For the Jains, however, there may have been a doctrinal as well as a linguistic reason for this ambiguity. Arambha originally meant 'undertaking' / 'beginning', but, given the fact that jivas were believed to be almost everywhere (vide the sixfold objects of arambha),104 for the earliest Jaina ascetics virtually any activity was probably perceived as 102 On tanha, see Rahula pp. 29-34, and Buddhist Dictionary, pp. 218-219. 103 Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. 104 See p. 6, above.

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Early Jainism 39 causing himsa; and thus arambha as 'undertaking an action' and arambha as 'killing' or 'violence' were very likely considered synonymous. This is probably how the term arambha is to be understood in such passages as Ayaramga 1.3.1.3 (Suttagame 172): arambhajam dukkham inam iti nacca, mai pamai punar ei gabbham, uvehamano saddaruvesu ujju, marabhisanki marana pamuccai Knowing the suffering born of action, The deluded and careless person enters a womb again; Indifferent to sounds and forms, upright, Anticipating / fearing Mara one is liberated from death. Ujju (Sk. rju) means 'straight' (Sk. varj - 'to stand firm'), and so literally and figuratively 'upright'. Thus, although it can mean 'ethically upright' or 'sincere', aligned here with indifference to sadda (sabda) and ruva (rupa), ujju may have the primary meaning of being physically straight or upright (cf. rju-kaya - 'having a straight body'). In other words, it refers to the typical Jaina meditative posture, kayotsarga - literally, 'abandonment of the body', standing or sitting motionless. 105 If that is the correct reading, then, since the remedy for rebirth as a result of action is total stillness, the implication is that arambha, in this context, does mean any action. 106 105 See JPP pp. 190, 192, 225. 106 Compare, however, Suttanipata 8 (Mettasutta) where ujju (= rju) has the sense of morally upright:: karaniyam atthakusalena yan tam santam padam abhisamecca: sakko ujju ca suju ca suvaco c'assa mudu anatimani 'Whatever is to be done by one who is skilful in seeking (what is) good, having attained that tranquil state (of Nibbana): - Let him be able and upright and conscientious and of soft speech, gentle, not proud.'

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40 Harmless Souls ii) Ascetic and non-ascetic actions and karma 'Arambha', however, soon begins to acquire a more technical meaning, denoting 'purposive', 'deliberate' or 'premeditated action'. This is particularly evident in the fifth Anga of the Svetambara canon, the Bhagavai Viyahapannatti (Bhagavati Vyakhyaprajnapti).107 There, actions (kiriya, Sk. kriya) are described as being: (1) purposive (arambhiya kiriya), (2) appropriative (pariggahiya kiriya), (3) emotional (maya-vattiya kiriya), (4) implying nonrenunciation (apaccakkhana-kiriya) or (5) implying heresy (micchadamsana-kiriya).108 In other words, kiriya is here used as a term for all actions, while arambha is reserved for purposive, harming activity directed towards other beings. 109 In spite of the negative nature of the above list (5.6.2), it is clear from other passages in the Viyahapannatti that kiriya is in itself a karmically neutral term. That is to say, we are now presented with a perception that all action is not necessarily harming, and thus binding, simply because it is action (i.e., the position I inferred to be the earliest ascetic one has now been modified). This is made explicit at Viyahapannatti 7 7.1, which reads, in Deleu's summary: When a monk who is closed [against karmic influx] (samvuda anagara) moves and handles his equipment in an attentive way (auttam) he commits an action in agreement with his religious duties (iriyavahiya kiriya), not a profane action (samparaiya Text PTS, eds. D. Andersen & H. Smith, 1913; trans. V. Fausboll, SBE Vol. X, Pt. 2, p. 24 (Oxford 1881). 107 The Viyahapannatti is a long, incoherent compilation of material, some of which is probably very early - see Deleu (1970). 108 Deleu's (1970) summary of Viy. V 6.2; cf. Schubring 1962, p. 199. 109 See Deleu (1970) on Viy. V 7.7. On kiriya being employed when concrete actions are referred to, see Schubring 1962, para. 99 (p. 198).

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Early Jainism 41 kiriya) [see explanation below], because in him the four passions are extinguished (vocchinna) and he acts in agreement with the precepts (aha-suttam eva riyai).110 Furthermore, this is not simply a distinction between harming and non-harming activities, it is also an institutional distinction between ascetics and laity: just as iriyavahiya kiriya is the action of a monk conforming to the monastic rules, so samparaiya kiriya is the action of a nonascetic or lay person. And while it is considered impossible, by definition, for a non-ascetic or layman to perform an iriyavahiya action, 111 it is very easy for an inattentive monk to perform a samparaiya action. 112 Thus, with monks, actions are said to result either from 'carelessness' (pamaya, Sk. pramada) or from 'activity' (joga, Sk. yoga). 113 Yoga, therefore, is the minimal action undertaken by a monk following the monastic rule. And, crucially, the karma bound by a monk as the result of this yoga - as a result of 'discharging his religious duties (iriyavahiya kiriya)' - 'is consumed within two samayas' (i.e., virtually instantaneously).114 Deleu remarks that 'Mahavira's idea of the iriyavahiya action seems to have met with a great deal of incomprehension on the part of his contemporaries', and sometimes even puzzled his own disciples. 115 He goes on to say that the Jaina conception of iriya-samii / irya-samiti ('care in walking') was often attacked by rivals, particularly the Ajivikas, although (in Deleu's opinion) 'Mahavira's explanation of its real tenor sounds reasonable enough: if a monk hurts some small living being while walking in the prescribed way, the action is still in agreement with his 110 Deleu (1970). Cf. Viy. VII 1.6; I 10.2. 111 See Deleu (1970) on Viy. VII 1.3a. 112 See ibid. on Viy. VII 1.6. 113 See ibid. on Viy. III 3.1c. 114 See ibid. on Viy. III 3.1d. 115 Deleu 1977, p. 190.

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42 Harmless Souls religious duties'.116 Furthermore, according to Deleu, such passages as this 'somehow put the old controversial issue regarding the unconsciously committed sin (that divided as is well known the Jainas and the Buddhists) in quite a different light'. 117 There are a number of points to consider here. First, it is not certain that the Viyahapannatti reports the actual words or doctrines of Mahavira. Even if it does, it is clear that the oldest canonical texts (Ayaramga 1, etc.) contain material which is less sophisticated doctrinally and is probably even older. (If that is the case, it may be that here Mahavira is reforming a previous Jaina or proto-Jaina position, or simply excluding, through unambiguous formulation, what had been a matter for debate in earlier practice.) Moreover, regarding the controversy with the Buddhists, the Jain view is that if a monk is following the discipline properly he cannot, by definition, unconsciously commit a sin. For himsa done while the monk is conforming to irya-samiti is tolerated, not because it is unconscious, but because it is a special case, sanctioned by the monastic rule. The total amount of karma accrued from such actions is agreed to bind for a short enough time to do no real damage to a monk's prospects of liberation, providing he continues to adhere to the discipline. This, of course, allows ascetics a realistic chance of achieving liberation, and may represent the loosening of some previously very tight rule. The idea that unavoidable injury perpetrated while following the monastic rules, i.e. while acting with rigorous carefulness or awareness, is less karmically significant than injury perpetrated through neglect of the monastic rules, i.e. done out of carelessness, can be found in isolated passages in the early canon. For example, Ayaramga 1.5.4.3 states that: 116 Ibid., referring to Viy. XVIII 8.1. 117 Ibid. Cf. pp. 11-20, above.

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Early Jainism 43 On occasion, living beings are destroyed by contact with the body of a virtuous monk walking in the prescribed fashion; he will get his punishment in this life. But if it was done contrary to the rules, he should repent of it and do penance for it. Thus he who knows the sacred texts recommends penance combined with carefulness. 118 Again, this is not the same thing as saying that monks are allowed to commit what might be normally understood as 'accidental' injury. The reference is to unavoidable injury done in highly controlled circumstances; this still has karmic consequences, but of a short-term, and thus manageable nature. Although it may be noted that the consequences envisaged in this early text are apparently more serious and longer-lasting than the almost instantaneous entry and exit of karma portrayed in the Viyahapannatti (see above). 119 The invention of categories of action and karmic 'bondage' which have negligible consequences in effect makes both action and the inflow of karma neutral in themselves. The development of this is perhaps traceable from a passage in the second book of the Suyagadamga. There, at Suyagadamga. 2.2.1, thirteen kinds of activity 118 Jacobi's trans. 1884, p. 48, with alterations of: egaya gunasamiyassa riyao kayasamphasam (sam)anucinna egaiya pana uddayanti, iha logaveyanavejjavadiyam, jam auttikayam tam parinnaya vivegam ei, evam se appamaenam vivegam kittai puvvavi* - Ay. 1.5.4.3 (Suttagame 307). *Schubring's ed. prints veyavi, Suttagame punnani. 119 Note also Das. 5.1:87-89, where a monk who has collected alms and returned with them to where his guru is, should approach the latter with 'the airyapathiki formula'. This is Schubring's understanding of iriyavahiya at Das 5.1:88 (his trans., p. 93, Leumann's ed.). The formula referred to here is probably the third of the avassava / avasvaka formulae, vandanaga, which is the prescribed way of respectfully addressing a superior upon entering a place (see Schubring 1962, p. 269). Here it is clearly connected with returning from the begging round, i.e. returning from a permitted monastic activity (iryavahiya). On the 'ritualisation' of monastic discipline, see below.

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44 Harmless Souls (kiriya) are named. The last of these is iriyavahiya (translated by Jacobi as 'actions referring to a religious life'). 120 These 'subtle' or 'insignificant' (suhuma / suksma) activities of the ascetic, governed by the samiti and gupti, are described in detail at Suyagadamga 2.2.23.121 Moreover, the influence of the karma attracted to the soul by these actions is said to be only momentary, lasting but three samaya. 122 This passage on iriyavahiya-kriya is, however, concluded by the refrain which has accompanied the other twelve kinds of activity, viz. 'Through that something blameable is produced for him' (or as Jacobi translates it, 'Thereby bad karma accrues to him').123 And the inappropriateness of this here suggests that this kind of iriyavahiya activity may have been a later, somewhat mechanical addition to an original list of twelve bad actions. This conjecture is further borne out by the fact that this passage views the karma acquired from iriyavahiya actions as being more or less instantaneously destroyed, in contrast to the apparently longer process envisaged by Ayaramga 1 (see above). Through this kind of development we are brought close to Umasvati's distinction between passionate, binding activity and non-passionate, non-binding activity. (The Viyahapannatti does not, however, contain a 'kasaya doctrine' in the technical sense developed in the Tattvartha Sutra, although passages like Viyahapannatti 7 7.1, quoted above, contain all the necessary components.) 124 120 Jacobi 1895, p. 356. 121 Jacobi, in his translation of suhuma kiriya iriyavahiya nama (ibid. p. 365), takes iriyavahiya to refer to subtle actions other than those followed in the discipline, but that seems confused. 122 Cf. Viy. III 1.d, above, and Utt. 29.71 (Jacobi 1895, p.172). 123 vam khalu tassa tappattiyam savajjam ti ahijjai - Suy. 2.2. passim. 124 See also Viy. VIII 8.3a, b, where iriyavahiya- and samparaiyakamma (as opposed to just -kiriya) are specifically referred to.

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Early Jainism 45 The soteriological and social implications of such a distinction are far-reaching, and in order to examine these at greater length I shall now turn to the teachings of the Tattvartha Sutra on the subject of long and short-term karma.

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PART II UMASVATI'S JAINISM The mechanism of bondage according to the Tattvartha Sutra 2.1 Umasvati's Jainism - Primary sources and chronology As it represents the first real synthesis of Jaina doctrine, I have, for this part of my argument, used the Tattvartha Sutra of Umasvati as my point of reference. This is the earliest extant Jaina work in Sanskrit, written between 150 C.E. and 350 C.E.1 Indeed, as P.S. Jaini points out, it 'manages to synthesize virtually the entire Jaina doctrinal system in a mere 350 sutras'.2 Furthermore, it is not only the one text that both Digambaras and Svetambaras recognize as authoritative, but the commentaries on it, whether by Digambara or Svetambara authors, 'present almost identical explications of 'Jaina doctrine'.3 (In any case, the differences between Svetambara and Digambara doctrine are not significant for the present discussion, which deals with problems fundamental to both traditions.) For that reason I have used the earliest extant Digambara commentary, the Sarvarthasiddhi of Pujyapada (Devanandin) (c. fifth century C.E.), in conjunction with the Tattvartha Sutra, rather than the alleged autocommentary, the Tattvarthadhigama Bhasya (also known as the Svopajna Bhasya). There is in fact 1 See Bronkhorst p.178; also Dixit 1971, pp. 5-8. Ohira pp.135. 137, dates Umasvati to the end of the 5th century, but that seems to be too late - see Bronkhorst and Zydenbos, below. 2 JPP p. 82. 3 Bronkhorst p. 178.

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Umasvati's Jainism 47 considerable doubt whether the 'autocommentary' was written by Umasvati himself; indeed, Bronkhorst has presented a convincing case for attributing it to a Svetambara of the fourth century C.E. (at the earliest) who, in the manner of the Yoga Sutra and Yoga Bhasya, incorporated the sutras into his own work, the Tattvarthadhigama Bhasya.4 Furthermore, the Sarvarthasiddhi, although composed perhaps a century later than the Tattvarthadhigama Bhasya, may be using a version of the Tattvartha Sutra which is at times closer to the original than that used in the Bhasya.5 There is also some evidence that the Tattvartha Sutra itself was composed in a Digambara milieu, while the Bhasya has marked Svetambara features. In any case, since the commentaries only differ on a few sectarian issues which are not significant for the present discussion, one may take either as authoritative, in the sense that each represents Jaina doctrine in a non-controversial manner which is not at variance with the prima facie meaning of the Tattvartha Sutra itself. The Sarvarthasiddhi, however, often develops the logical implications of doctrines which are merely stated or formulated in the Tattvartha Sutra, as will become apparent. 2.2 The mechanism of bondage according to the Tattvartha Sutra Tattvartha Sutra 6:1-4 (= 6:1-5) states that: Yoga is the activity of body, speech and mind. [6:1] It is influx. [6:2] 4 Bronkhorst p. 179. See also Zydenbos pp. 9-12, who dates the Tattvarthasutrabhasya to the 5th century; for the Sutra itself, he suggests the end of the 3rd century. 5 Bronkhorst p. 172. 6 Ibid. p. 177; see also R. Williams pp. 2-3. 7 See JPP p. 82.

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48 Harmless Souls Good activity is the cause of (the influx of) meritorious (karmic matter), and bad activity is the cause of (the influx of) demeritorious (karmic matter). [6:3 (3/4)] (There are two kinds of influx, namely) that of persons with passions, which brings about rebirth, and that of persons free from passions which has no effect on rebirth. [6:4 (5)]8 To expand this: Umasvati teaches that yoga is the vibration of the soul caused by the activity of speech, the mind and the body. This vibration is in turn the cause of the attraction of groups of karmic particles (although, strictly speaking, this matter only becomes karma as such when it adheres to the soul). Thus, when activity occurs, influx (asrava) is inevitable: yoga causes the soul to act like a magnet, drawing in karmic matter. All three instigators of yoga can be either good or bad, potentially the causes of the influx of meritorious as well as demeritorious karma. There are two kinds of asrava, depending upon whether one acts out of passion or not: that activity accompanied by kasaya (passions) results in the influx of samparayika karma (rebirth-causing karma), that activity which is free from passions results in the influx of iryapatha karma (short-term karma which has no effect on rebirth). In other words, yoga attracts (karmic) matter to the soul, and kasaya causes that matter to adhere to the jiva and to bind it.10 The source materials used in Tattvartha Sutra 6 (concerning yoga, asrava, etc.) are widely dispersed in the canon, deriving from passages in the Bhagavai, the 8 kayavanmanahkarma yogah [TS 6:1] sa asravah [TS 6:2] subhah punyasyasubhah papasya [TS 6:3 (3/4)] sakasayakasayayoh samparayikeryapathayoh [TS 6:4 (5)] 9 Cf. SS on TS 2:25: yogo vanmanasakayavargananimitta atmapradesaparispandah 'Yoga is the vibration of the space-points of the soul caused by the group speech, mind and body.' 10 See TS 8:2 (2/3), quoted p. 55, below.

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Umasvati's Jainism 49 Thanamga, and the Uttarajjhayana, among others. 11 These show that at Tattvartha Sutra 6:1 Umasvati changed the traditional sequence of the threefold yoga (manas, vac, kaya) into kaya, vac, and manas. According to Ohira, he probably did this because he attached most importance to kayikakriya. 12 But leaving aside the likelihood that the most important element would in fact be placed last, all the evidence points in the opposite direction: in the canonical texts the emphasis is on the physical and material, and it is Umasvati who starts to switch the emphasis to 'internal' action. The change in order is therefore probably not significant. (Devanandin, commenting on Tattvartha Sutra 2:25, uses the order vac, manas, kaya.) More importantly, Ohira points out that the definition of asrava as threefold yoga is given for the first time in the Tattvartha Sutra (at 6:2).13 (Tattvartha Sutra 6:2 can mean that yoga is either the cause of asrava or that it is itself asrava; but there is no real ambiguity here, since it is clear that yoga and asrava are pragmatically synonymous, in the sense that any activity automatically causes the influx of karmic matter.) A further innovation of Umasvati's is to classify yoga as subha ('virtuous' or 'good'), giving rise to punya (merit), or asubha ('wicked' or 'bad'), giving rise to papa (demerit) (Tattvartha Sutra. 6:3).14 11 See Ohira p. 61. The identification of Umasvati's sources in what follows relies mostly on this work. 12 Ibid. p. 62. 13 Ibid. 14 See ibid. Ohira claims that yoga belongs theoretically to a 'neutral category', but that Umasvati reads it in terms of subha-asubha on the basis of the absence or presence of kasaya (ibid.). However, this analysis seems to be wrong on both counts, since, first, it is Umasvati himself who makes yoga into a 'neutral category' precisely through the introduction of the kasaya doctrine. The underlying feeling of early canonical Jainism, as has been made clear, is that virtually all yoga leads to asrava and bondage, and is thus ipso facto to be avoided. Only when the kasaya doctrine (that the binding power of action depends upon the internal state or attitude of the individual) is introduced, is it possible to conceive of yoga as being either binding or not (i.e.

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50 Harmless Souls The Sarvarthasiddhi, commenting on Tattvartha Sutra 6:4, states that karma is of two kinds: 1) samparayika, leading to samsara, and 2) iryapatha, caused by vibrations. Samparayika is caused by yoga and kasaya combined, and iryapatha by yoga alone. However, it is evident that what are being referred to here are not two different types of karma as such, but two different conditions of the jiva whether it has, or is associated with, kasayas or not. Particular karma or karmic matter is not inherently more or 'neutral'). This statement of Ohira's is also wrong in that it claims that Umasvati reads yoga in terms of subha and asubha on the basis of the absence or presence of kasaya, i.e. that subha yoga leads to iryapatha karma and asubha yoga to samparayika karma. But it is clear that the two categorizations of karma are not synonymous. At TS 8:25, punya karmas, the result of subha yoga, are listed as: 1) sadvedya - pleasure bearing karma 2) subhayu - good age-karma 3) subha-nama - good body-making karma 4) subha-gotra - high family-determining karma. (These are divided into forty-two sub-classes of aghatiya or 'nondestructive' karmas.) [On aghatiya-karmas, see JPP p.132.] All other karmas are papa (TS 8:26). This list shows that punya karmas are those which determine a good rebirth: So they cannot be synonymous with iryapatha karma, since that has no karmic effect and is certainly not a cause of rebirth. Rather, both punya and papa karma are forms of samparayika karma. That is to say, both subha and asubha yoga lead to rebirth of some kind; they are actions motivated by some kind of kasaya. What is new about Umasvati's thought here is the idea that there can be such events and categories as subha yoga and punya karma; such a technical division of yoga and karma was inconceivable in the ascetic milieu which is reflected in the doctrines propounded in the earliest parts of the canon. (As we have seen, in the earliest passages virtually all yoga is asubha and causes papa karman; i.e. all activity binds and so threatens a lower rebirth.) So, for Umasvati, the category of samparayika karma contains punya as well as papa karma, a concept which brings the Jaina view of karma into line with the view held by other Indian religions. This, as we shall see, is essentially a lay rather than a monastic or ascetic doctrine. The ascetic is not so much concerned with the possible effects of various types of karma, but with stopping the influx of any kind of karma whatsoever.

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Umasvati's Jainism 51 less binding than any other karma; rather, it is passion which is instrumental in bondage. (A possible explanation for this puzzling terminology will be discussed below.) Thus the emphasis is not on activity as such, but on the accompanying mental or emotional state - on the internal rather than the external. The reason why 'short-term' (iryapatha) karma is posited at all, since it has no effect, will emerge later. Here, I suggest that while to begin with virtually all activity caused bondage, for reasons connected with the growing importance of the laity it eventually became necessary to differentiate the relative amount of bondage caused by different actions. 15 How does the Tattvartha Sutra's contention that the decisive instrumental factor in bondage is kasaya fit with the main teaching of the earliest canonical texts, namely, that to cause harm (himsa), by any means whatsoever, to any of the innumerable jiva which populate the physical world, is the binding sin par excellence? At Tattvartha Sutra 7:13 (8), himsa is defined as pramattayogat pranavyaparopanam, 'the destruction of life due to an act involving negligence'. 16 The Sarvarthasiddhi comments: Pramada connotes passion. The person actuated by passion is pramatta. The activity of such a person is pramatta-yoga.17 Thus the Sarvarthasiddhi differentiates between activity engendered by passion, which results in himsa, and 15 S.A. Jain echoes this historical and institutional divide when he remarks, 'From the real point of view, it is no doubt true that all activities are undesirable, as every kind of activity is the cause of influx and bondage. But from the empirical point of view there is a difference.' - p. 168, fn. 2. 16 Sukhlalji's trans., p. 267. 17 S.A. Jain's trans., pp. 196-197, of: pramadah sakasayatvam tadvanatmaparinamah pramattah pramattasya yogah pramattayogah.

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52 Harmless Souls passion-free activity, which does not (i.e. himsa is only himsa because it has been engendered by passion). This interpretation is clearly tendentious; the technical meaning of pramada is 'heedlessness', 'carelessness', or 'negligence', derived from vmad + pra, 'to be intoxicated'. 18 Here, therefore, the use of pramada is comparable to its use in, for instance, the Yoga Sutras (for example, at 1:30, where pramada is included in a list of citta-viksepas, 'distractions of the mind-field'). And as we have seen, the stress in the earliest canonical sources is on physical 'carefulness', in contrast to the Buddhist concept of appamada, which has the connotation of 'mindfulness'.19 In the Sarvarthasiddhi , however, the whole emphasis of himsa is shifted on to the internal state of the agent, i.e. on to passion and its effect on the agent: himsa is always himsa to oneself. This goes much further than a literal reading of the sutra allows; however, as will be seen later, the space for such an internalised doctrine of bondage is cleared by Umasvati in the Tattvartha Sutra, if not completely developed there. The Sarvarthasiddhi simply takes Umasvati's thought a step further. Mere injury, according to the Sarvarthasiddhi, even killing, does not stain one with the sin of himsa; i.e. it is not himsa as such, and does not bind. Apparently quoting from Kundakunda's Pravacanasara, Pujyapada (Devanandin), in his commentary on Tattvartha Sutra 7:13, affirms that: When a monk goes on foot with carefulness, sometimes small insects get crushed under his feet and die. Still there is not the 18 Cf. TS 7:4, where the five observances of the vow of ahimsa are all couched in terms of 'carefulness'; and the SS itself (on TS 8:1) defines pramada as 'misinterpreting' injunctions, and indifference in relation to kriya (action). 19 See, for instance, the Buddha's last exhortation (Digha Nikaya 16): ... appamadena sampadetha - 'strive diligently'; also see Buddhist Dictionary p. 22: 'In the commentaries (appamada) is often explained as the presence (lit. "non-absence") of mindfulness (satiya avippavasa)'.

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Umasvati's Jainism 53 slightest bondage of sin in this case. ['Carefulness' being the opposite of pramada or 'negligence'.]20 The emphasis here is clearly on the state - what amounts to the mental condition - of 'carefulness', not on the physical injury as such. This is confirmed by Pujyapada when he goes on to express the converse argument that a 'mere passionate attitude even without the severance of vitalities constitutes violence'.21 Again the Sarvarthasiddhi quotes a verse that also occurs in the Pravacanasara which summarises this line of argument: He who acts with negligence commits injury whether death is caused to organisms or not. And he who proceeds with proper care 20 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 197, of: uccalidamhi pade iriyasamidassa niggamatthane | avadejja kulimgo marejja tajjogamasejja || nahi tassa tannimitto bamdho suhumovi desido samaye || This is to be found in Jayasena's recension of the Pravacanasara at 3:17 (1-2), Upadhye's edition (see Appendix 3, Pravacanasara 3.17b). Given the compilatory nature of the Pravacanasara (see below), it cannot be certain that such quotations originate there. The attribution is made by P.S. Shastry (ed. SS, Banaras 1955), but it is possible, even likely, that Pujyapada and Kundakunda are quoting from a common source. Indeed, Upadhye in his translation of Pravacanasara 3;17 (1-2) assumes that this is a quotation without identifying the source. In fact, Upadhye speculates that these are very old traditional gathas, belonging to both Digambaras and Svetambaras (1935, p. liiiff.). Moreover, the fact that Pujyapada also quotes here a verse which appears as Pravacanasara 3:16 in Amrtacandra's recension (see below), indicates that he had access either to an earlier version of the Pravacanasara than Amstacandra's (the earliest we possess), i.e. the one from which Jayasena drew as well, or that he is quoting directly from Kundakunda's source. (See also Viy. XVIII.7.1, where the same idea is presented in a more technical way.) It is therefore not desirable to draw conclusions about the dating of the Pravacanasara from this coincidence. 21 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 197, of: pranavyaparopanabhave 'pi pramattayogamatrad eva himsesyate - SS on TS 7:13.

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54 Harmless Souls does not contract bondage of karma by mere injury.22 Pujyapada concludes: He who has passions causes injury to himself by himself. Whether injury is then caused to other living beings or not, is immaterial.23 This argument is derived from the assertion that himsa, the activity which binds, is actually produced by passions. Similarly, P.S. Jaini, using the Sarvarthasiddhi as his. source, notes that the subtlest forms of the passions are called samjvalana ('the smouldering'). These are not sufficiently strong to prevent one entering the mendicant's path, but they induce 'an insidious state of apathy or inertia (pramada), a lack of drive with regard to the actual purificatory practices enatailed by that path'.24 To summarise, Pujyapada is claiming that 'negligence' (pramada), and thus himsa, is only produced when passions are involved. Consequently, bondage can only occur when there is some kind of volitional activity motivated by passion.25 This is essentially in agreement with the definitions of bondage given by Umasvati at Tattvartha Sutra 8: Wrong belief, non-restraint, carelessness, passions and 22 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 197, of: maradu va jiyadu va jivo ayadacarassa nicchida himsa | payadassa natthi bamdho himsamittena samidassa 11 Pravacanasara 3:17 || See Pravacanasara 3:16; and see p.156ff., below, for a further discussion of this gatha. 23 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 197 of: svayam evatmana "tmanam hinasty atma pramadavan purvam pranyantaranam tu pascat syad va na va vadhah || This is in fact a quotation from a Sanskrit source which I have not been able to identify 24 JPP pp. 120. See SS on TS 8:9; cf. TS 10:1. 25 See JPP pp. 112-113.

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Umasvati's Jainism 55 activities are the causes of bondage. [8:1] Because of its connection with passion, a soul takes on particles of matter liable to become karma. This is bondage. [8:2 (2/3)] Bondage is of four kinds, according to the nature of karmic matter (prakrti), the duration of karma (sthiti), the intensity of the fruition of karma (anubhava), and the quantity of space-points of karma (pradesa). [8:3 (4)]26 According to the commentaries, prakrti and pradesa are caused by yoga, sthiti and anubhava by kasaya. It is yoga which attracts karma to the soul in the first place, deciding its type and quantity, and kasaya which causes it to adhere, deciding its duration and intensity. Thus, according to Tattvartha Sutra 8:2, it is kasaya which underlies all bondage (i.e. it is the cause of all himsa and thus the cause of all pramada as well). However, in the list of the five causes of bondage given at Tattvartha Sutra 8:1, kasaya and pramada are listed as independent causes of bondage. According to a modern commentator, there are three traditions regarding the number of the causes of bondage: viz. there are either five causes, as given above, or four (pramada is excluded), or there are just two, kasaya and yoga.27 But these traditions can be harmonised by taking pramada as a type of either avirati or kasaya, and then by viewing mithyadarsana and avirati as not essentially different from kasaya. This leaves kasaya and yoga as the only distinct causes of bondage, which is Umasvati's conclusion. In some canonical texts the five causes of bondage 26 mithyadarsanaviratipramadakasayayoga bandhahetavah [TS 8:1] sakasayatvaj jivah karmano yogyan pudgalan adatte sa bandhah [TS 8:2 (2/3)] prakstisthityanubhavapradesas tadvidhayah [TS 8:3 (4)] 27 Sukhlalji's trans. and commentary on TS, p. 298f.

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56 Harmless Souls (bandhahetavah), enumerated at Tattvartha Sutra 8:1, occur as asravadvaras - causes of (literally, 'entrances for') asrava.28 As Ohira points out in connection with this, theoretically there is no difference between the root causes of asrava and of bandha,29 but Umasvati took yoga to be the root cause of asrava (on the basis that the threefold yogas are present in all the other causes), and then classified yoga as causing both iryapatha asrava and samparayika asrava while placing the rest of the canonical asravadvaras (viz. mithyadarsana, avirati, pramada, and kasaya) in the category of samparayika asrava only. The crucial alteration here, however, is Umasvati's division of yoga into that which stems from kasaya and involves mithyadarsana, avirati, and pramada, and that which is free from kasaya, i.e. it is only one kind of yoga which causes bondage - the other (passionless) kind does not bind. Thus Umasvati has in effect made a distinction between the causes of asrava and the causes of bondage: whereas both kinds of yoga (passionless and passionate) cause asrava, only one kind causes bondage. The canonical idea that mithyadarsana, avirati, pramada, kasaya, and yoga, as the causes of asrava, are indistinguishable from the causes of bondage, makes it clear that before Umasvati there is no technically formulated conception of any kind of asrava which does not bind.30 At Tattvartha Sutra 8:9 (10) the four kasaya are included in a list of twenty-eight deluding karmas (as caritra-mohaniya, 'right-conduct deluding karmas'), but they are not mentioned there as the specific cause of karmic matter adhering to the jiva. It is clear that Umasvati is here 28 See, for example, Sthana 5.2.517, and Samavaya 16, cited by Ohira, p. 62. 29 Ibid. 30 See the discussion, p. 14, above, of the ancient meaning of asrava according to Alsdorf (1965), indicating that asrava was probably originally synonymous with bondage.

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Umasvati's Jainism 57 taking over an earlier list without any attempt to integrate it with later doctrines.31 That is to say, the four kasaya are functioning here as they did before Umasvati collated them with the principle of instrumentality. The relevant sourcepassage from the Uttarajjhayana makes this clear: The two kinds of mohaniya referring to conduct are: 1) what is experienced in the form of the four cardinal passions (kasaya); 2) what is experienced in the form of feelings different from thein (no-kasaya or 'subsidiary passions'). 32 According to the Sarvarthasiddhi, the caritra-mohaniya karmas both cause the passions and are caused by them (i.e. the passions are at the same time both the result of delusive conduct and what lead to further delusive conduct).33 But even within the circularity of this later commentarial gloss, it is clear that the passions are understood as leading to bondage only through the indirect route of conduct which is deluded - i.e. activity which is harmful in some way. 2.3 Samparayika and iryapatha karma in the Tattvartha Sutra As has been seen above, 34 yoga accompanied by kasaya gives rise to the influx of samparayika karma, i.e. karma which binds and thus leads to rebirth - literally, it is the 'passage to the other world' (samparaya). At Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6), Umasvati subdivides samparayika karma into four types, corresponding to the five causes of bondage at Tattvartha Sutra 8:1. Thus samparayika karma is caused 31 In fact this passage is probably directly derived from Utt. 33 - see Ohira p. 64, and below. 32 Based on Jacobi's trans. (1895, p.194) of Utt. 33.10: carittamohanam kammam, duviham tu viyahiyam | kasayamohanijjam tu nokasayam taheva ya || 10 || 33 See SS on TS 8:9 (10) and S.A. Jain's trans., p. 223-224. 34 See above, p. 47ff. ,

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58 Harmless Souls by the activity of: 1) the 5 senses (indriya) - touch, taste, smell, sight, hearing, 2) the 4 passions (kasaya) - anger, pride, deceitfulness, greed, 3) the non-observance of the 5 vows (avrata), 4) the 25 activities (kriya). These correspond to the 5 causes of bondage (Tattvartha Sutra 8:1) in the following way: 1) the 5 indriyas correspond to pramada (indriya, as Ohira points out, is explained in the bhasya on 6:5 (6) as panca pramattasyendriyani),35 2) the 4 kasayas correspond to kasaya, 3) avrata corresponds to avirati, 4) the 25 kriyas correspond to mithyadarsana (mithyadarsana is included as the twenty-fourth of the twenty-five kriyas, and mithyatva occurs as the second of the twenty-five).36 The fifth cause of bondage, yoga, is, as has been shown, defined by the other four (i.e. it is yoga with 'passion'), and it is activity (yoga) in the four categories enumerated which gives rise to samparayika karma. Comparing these two classifications, the question arises why it is that, when he comes to list the causes of samparayika karma (Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6) = the 5 causes of bondage (Tattvartha Sutra 8:1]), Umasvati substitutes a list of 25 kriya for mithyadarsana, which is only one item on that list. According to Ohira, kriya is repeatedly propounded in the early canonical works as the cause directly inviting asrava, 'so Umasvati must have wanted to lay emphasis on it by counting twenty-five in all in place of mithyatva which is just part of them.37 But as Ohira herself has 35 Ohira p. 62. 36 See J.L. Jaini's list in his trans. of TS (1920) p. 126. 37 Ohira pp. 62-63.

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Umasvati's Jainism 59 already pointed out,38 the inventory of kriya 'has been worked out independently in the long Agamic period', so this list is not Umasvati's invention. Rather, he is trying to integrate canonical material into his own division between binding and non-binding yoga - yoga with and without kasaya.39 This process is revealed when the list of 25 kriya is examined in detail, for not all the activities listed are compatible with their classification as giving rise to samparayika asrava and further bondage in samsara. The fourth kriya in the list is given as 'iryapatha'.40 The term 'iryapatha' has first occurred in this context in the previous aphorism (6:4 [5]) as the kind of asrava which does not lead to transmigration, viz. that kind experienced by persons free from passions (in opposition to samparayika asrava, it gives rise to short-term karma). What then is its meaning at Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6), where it appears among the list of kriya which give rise to samparayika karma? If the meaning is the same, the two sutras contradict each other. Iryapatha is derived from the root ir (II), meaning 'to go', 'to move'. Thus the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 6:4 (5) comments, 'Iranam means irya, yogo or movement (vibrations). That karma which is caused by vibrations is called iryapatha',41 i.e. it is that (non-binding) karma which is caused by yoga alone, as opposed to that (binding) karma which is combined with passions (kasaya). Similarly, Sukhlalji comments: The reason why this karma of a duration of one samaya is called iryapathika is that in the absence of all passion it is bound down merely through the patha or instrumentality of irya or acts like 38 Ibid. p. 62. 39 On kiriya / kriya, cf. p. 40ff., above. 40 See J.L. Jaini, (TS 1920) p. 125, on TS 6:5. S.A. Jain's trans., p. 169, of: 41 iranam irya yogo gatir ity arthah | taddvarakam karma iryapatham.

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60 Harmless Souls coming and going. 42 However, when he comes to deal with iryapatha-kriya at Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6), Sukhlalji glosses it in exactly the same way, as 'kriya which causes either the bondage or the experiencing of iryapatha karma - that is, karma of a duration of one samaya'. Such a reading leads to the incompatibility between the two sutras outlined above (i.e. how can this be included in a list of samparayika karma / asrava, when it is apparently of the other type of asrava / karma - iryapatha?). Sukhlalji is aware of the problem, but is unable to resolve it. He comments on the exceptional position of iryapatha kriya on this list: Of the kriyas ...(mentioned above)... there is only one - viz. iryapatha kriya - that is not asrava for a samparayika karma: as for the remaining ones since they are all impelled by kasaya they are all cause-of-bondage for samparayika karma. And when all these kriyas are here called asrava for a samparayika karma that is done simply because most of them (really all of them except iryapathiki) are in fact so.43 In other words, he can offer no explanation at all. But this does highlight the problem, and indicates that the list of kriya was probably taken over in its entirety from an earlier source which does not fit the later division into samparayika and iryapatha asrava. In the context of a list of kriya , the correct interpretation of Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6) is probably that of the Sarvarthasiddhi , viz. 'iryapathakriya is walking carefully, by looking on the ground (for living beings which may be trodden and injured)'. 44 But this in turn raises two problems: 1) why does the same term apparently 42 Sukhlalji (TS 1974), p. 233. 43Ibid. p. 236. 44 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 170 (cf. J.L. Jain (1920) p. 125) of: iryapathanimitteryapathakriya - SS on TS 6:5.

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Umasvati's Jainism 61 have two different technical meanings? 2) what does Tryapatha kriya ('walking carefully') have to do with kasaya and bondage? (How can 'care in walking' be said to be characteristic of a jiva which has passions?)45 Suhklalji attempts to solve the first problem by running the two meanings together (as discussed above), but at the cost of making the two sutras incompatible. The Sarvarthasiddhi's commentary on Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6), that the 5 senses, the 4 passions, the 5 kinds of vowlessness, are the causes of influx, and that the 25 kinds of activity (kriya ) are the effects, similarly fails to remove the incompatibility between the two sutras.46 Again iryapathakriya as defined (and samyaktva kriya ) is out of place in such a list. One incoherence is replaced by another. This incompatibility of Tattvartha Sutra 6:4 (5) with 6:5 (6) indicates that Umasvati is attempting to run together two different categories or lists, one developed later than the other (i.e. one containing the term 'iryapatha' as used at an earlier date and with a different meaning). In other words, Umasvati is taking over lists of kriya from earlier sources - as Dixit remarks, all four categories of activities listed at Tattvartha Sutra 6:5 (6) were in 'more or less extensive use' independently of each other in the texts available to Umasvati47 - without attempting to make them fit his definition of samparayika asrava (that pertaining to persons with passions), which he merely superimposes. It is interesting to note that at Tattvartha Sutra 9:5 iryasamiti, 'proper care in walking', is named as one of the 45 There is a similar problem in explaining the presence of samyaktva kriya - 'that which strengthens right belief - in the list of kriya (no.1). The other 23 kriya are at least negative, although they are by no means obvious characteristics of the 'passionate'. 46 See S.A. Jain p. 171: etanindriyadini karyakaranabhedadbhedamapadyamanani - SS on TS 6:5. 47 Dixit in the preface to Sukhlalji (TS 1974) pp. 7-8.

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62 Harmless Souls five types of samiti ('carefulness' or 'awareness'),48 and that samiti is listed at Tattvartha Sutra 9:2 as one of the means to samvara. The latter is defined at Tattvartha Sutra 9:1 as asravanirodhah 'the stoppage of inflow' - presumably of that karmic matter which binds, since all activity causes asrava as such. Thus the types of samiti clearly cannot belong to the category of samparayika karma / asrava. This provides further evidence that the linkage of Tattvartha Sutra 6:4 and 6:5 by Umasvati is incoherent, and that the original meaning of iryapatha was 'care in walking', and only at a later date acquired the general meaning of 'short-term karma'. It is perhaps significant that in Buddhism iryapatha (Pali: iryapatha) is more or less a technical term for 'the four postures' - walking, standing, sitting and lying.49 If we apply this to the Jain case, it is easy to see that iryapathakriya would be care in all bodily movements, since the four postures cover all eventualities. Of the four, walking would of course be the most dangerous, but the others are presumably included as moments when a monk might easily do harm. Consequently, as iryakriya refers to all an ascetic's movements, then it covers all the physical harm he might do, and thus it is responsible for the totality of his karma. From this it is possible to see how iryapatha's change in meaning may have taken place. 'Care in walking', a term which includes all controlled ascetic activities, causes so little himsa (although some is inevitable given the distribution of souls), and gives rise to such slight asrava, that the quantity of karma accrued in this way is small enough to be shed in a single lifetime, and thus it does not lead to another birth (samparayika). A distinction is therefore made between activities which lead to the influx of long-term karma, which is binding, and 48 See p. 69, above, for the other kinds of samiti. 49 See Buddhist Dictionary p. 81. They form a subject of contemplation and an exercise in mindfulness in the Satipatthana Sutta.

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63 Umasvati's Jainism those which lead to an influx of short-term karma, which is not. Such activities are all related directly to himsa and non-himsa, and especially to physical activity. That is to say, the behaviour of the ascetic is being distinguished absolutely from that of the non-ascetic or lay-person in terms of soteriological consequences.50 There are, therefore, two types of asrava: that which occurs to jivas in lay bodies, and that which occurs to those in the bodies of monks. The difference arises from the difference in behaviour between ascetics and others. Similarly, iryapatha and samparayika are, strictly speaking, two different quantities of karma, one accrued by mendicants and the other by householders. But the distinction is considered to be so fundamental that they become in effect two different types: short-term, and that which leads to a further rebirth. And in these soteriological terms, the division is absolute. In this way iryapatha acquires the general meaning of 'short-term karma'. At a later stage, it is given a specific technical definition, by Umasvati, as that influx of karma which is short-term because it is free from passion; it is therefore no longer directly linked to the amount of (physical) himsa caused, but to internal states, motivation, etc. In other words, Umasvati's definition of himsa - 'Injury is the destruction of life out of passion'51 - bears witness to the development of a less exclusive, i.e. more laycompatible ethic in the intervening period.52 If this modei is correct, then the concept of iryapatha karma developed in the period when asrava and the resulting bondage of the jiva by karmic matter were still seen as the results of physical activity alone. In that case the instrumentality of kasaya would be a later accretion, based upon the 50 51 See the passages quoted from the Viy., etc., p. 40ff., above. pramattayogat pranavyaparopanam himsa - TS 7:13 (8) and SS. 52 Cf. SS on TS 7:22, where TS 7:13 is quoted as a justification of lay sallekhana.

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64 Harmless Souls supposition that 'passion' or 'intention' can to some extent be controlled by someone who goes about his worldly business (i.e. it is a matter of attitude), whereas restraint of physical activity demands a particular kind of 'extraworldly' ascetic discipline. And as will now be made clear, the practice of monks and nuns remains unaffected by this internalisation, which effectively comes to function as a means of giving the laity a theoretical foothold on the path to salvation. 2.4 'Activity' in the Tattvartha Sutra According to Tattvartha Sutra 6:7, jiva (what is sentient, i.e. the soul) and ajiva (what is insentient) constitute the adhikaranah - the 'substrata' - of influx; in other words, the causes of influx. Or as the Sarvarthasiddhi puts it, being adhikarana is 'the condition of being the instruments of injury and so on', and thus the condition of being instrumental in the influx of binding karmic matter.53 Commenting on this, Sukhlalji says that 'both jiva and ajiva are called adhikarana - that is to say, a means, implement or weapon of karmic bondage'.54 This seems to make 'karmic bondage' the active principle which needs the adhikarana in order to express itself, rather than the jiva being the active principle. But by the very fact of being available for asrava, the jiva is in a sense instrumental in its own bondage. Karmic bondage can only become 'active' if the jiva behaves in certain ways (enumerated at Tattvartha Sutra 6:8), and it is in this sense that the jiva is the 'substratum' - a reading which is compatible with the usual meaning of adhikarana as 'that in which anything happens'. The ways in which a jiva can cause injury are numbered as 108, as follows: The substratum of the living is planning to commit violence, 53 S.A Jain's trans., p. 172, of: himsadyupakaranabhava. 54 Sukhlalji's commentary on TS, p. 239.

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Umasvati's Jainism 65 preparation for it and commmencement of it, by activity, doing, causing it to be done, and approval of it, and issuing from the passions, which are three, three, three and four respectively. [Tattvartha Sutra 6:8 (9)]55 (These are the causes of the influx of karma in general; specific types of karma * have, of course, the same general causes but also have specific causes which are subtypes of the general causes.)56 With the help of the commentaries,57 Tattvartha Sutra 6:8 (9) can be presented in a schematic form (see Table). The notably new thing about this schema or formulation, compared with those associated with its component parts (which, as we have seen, are scattered throughout the early Svetambara canon), is that whichever way one reads it, left to right or right to left, passion (kasaya) is instrumental in causing violence, and thus asrava and bondage. Note that nothing is said here of action without passion; it is clear that for Umasvati arambha means premeditated, violent action (himsa). In other words, the action which binds is violent action engendered by passions; from which it may be inferred that passionless, non-violent action does not bind (although it does cause an influx of matter into the soul in the form of iryapatha karma). And it is clear from Tattvartha Sutra 6:4-6 that this enumeration of the 108 ways in which influx can be caused to a jiva refers specifically to the person who is actuated by passions (sakasaya) (Tattvartha Sutra 6:4). This is further clarified by the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 6:8 which, taking for its example 'bodily impulsion' (kaya-samrambha), i.e. the determination to do violence through bodily activity (one of the three yogas), 555. A. Jain's trans., p. 172, fn. 1, with minor alterations of: adyam samrambhasamarambharambhayogakrtakaritanumatakasayavisesais tristristriscatuscaikasah [TS 6:8 (9)]. 56 See TS 6:10f. 57 See SS, J.L.Jaini (1920), Sukhlalji (TS 1974).

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1 66 Harmless Souls subdivides it as follows: Bodily impulsion performed (krta) by anger (krodha) Bodily impulsion performed by pride (mana) Bodily impulsion made by deceitfulness (maya) Bodily impulsion made by greed (lobha) (i.e. all done by oneself) Bodily impulsion instigated (karita) by anger by pride by deceitfulness by greed (i.e. done by one's agent) Bodily impulsion approved (anumata) by anger by pride by deceitfulness by greed (i.e. done by others with one's approval). It is also interesting to note that it is no longer simply the act of doing violence which is binding, but also the impulsion or intention to do it, and the preparation for it (samrambha and samarambha) (Tattvartha Sutra 6:8). This threefold division of himsa may be seen as the logical corollary of, or complement to, the development of the idea of the instrumentality of kasaya as the binding agent, for passion may be as strong or stronger in intention and preparation as in outcome (actual violence).58 Tattvartha Sutra 6:9 (10) deals with the adhikarana of 58 These three- samrambha, samarambha, and arambha - are also to be found at, for instance, Utt. 24.19ff., although their meaning there may be somewhat different if Jacobi's trans. (1895, p. 135) is followed. Schubring quotes the commentary which understands the terms to mean - as in the TS - 'two stages of preparation and the performance of forbidden thinking, speaking and acting' (1962, para. 173 / p. 304). But again there is no connection with a technical mechanism of bondage such as Umasvati's kasaya doctrine.

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Umasvati's Jainism 67 the ajiva type. It would seem to refer to pudgala (matter) which can in some way aid, or be manipulated by the individual to bring about karmic influx. This substratum is divided into: 2 (kinds of) nirvartana ('production' / 'performance'): i) mulaguna - of body, speech, mind, inhalation, exhalation, ii) uttaraguna - making objects of wood, clay, etc., pictures and statues. (That is to say, the mulagunas are what the body performs naturally, and the uttaragunas are what the body does by extension.) 4 (kinds of) niksepa ('placing' / 'putting down'); i) apratyaveksita - 'without seeing' ii) duspramarjita - 'without cleansing of dust, etc.' iii) sahasa - "hurriedly' iv) anabhoga - 'inattentively/putting something where it ought not to be put'. 2 (kinds of) samyoga ('combining' / 'mixing up'): i) bhaktapana - 'food and drink'/ different foodstuffs' ii) upakarana - 'mixing up things - implements, clothes, etc.' 3 (kinds of) nisarga ('movement'/ 'urging'/ 'operating'): i) kaya - 'by body ii) vacana - 'by speech' iii) manas - 'by mind' [Definitions taken from Sarvarthasiddhi.] As Ohira has pointed out, the materials used in Ch. 6 of the Tattvartha Sutra are widely dispersed throughout the canonical texts.59 And it would seem that in dividing the substratum (adhikarana) of influx into two, jiva and ajiva, Umasvati is either drawing on two different canonical lists or, more likely, in making this division he is expanding his 59 Ohira p. 61.

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68 Harmless Souls own kasaya doctrine in the first adhikarana - that of jiva - and merely repeating the received (ascetic) adhikarana of influx in the ajiva list. In other words, the division of the mechanism of bondage into two types of karma, that which causes bondage - which 'sticks' or adheres - and that which does not, is prepared for or justified by this division into two types of adhikarana ; mere physical action of a mechanical kind, and motivated, impassioned action, are separated. Such a separation would not be necessary unless the soteriological consequences of there being two substrata of influx (i.e. two types of karma producing action) were perceived as different. Both can bind, but Umasvati, in attempting to combine the two, puts emphasis on the first: it becomes a question of behaviour and attitude, not just of behaviour. This opens the way for the later commentators and their preoccupation with attitude. Furthermore, there is no logical reason why there should be influx of two types of karma - binding and non-binding - unless the kasaya doctrine is a later addition. For if the idea that it is only passionate action which binds had been there in the earliest form of the doctrine, there would have been no reason to posit a complex doctrine of 'stickiness', etc.: Jains would simply have been able to say that activity accompanied by passion causes influx of karma and other activity does not. (The original doctrine must have been that physical activity alone was the source of karma and thus binding.) It is clear, therefore, that there are two layers of doctrine here, and that the superimposition of one upon the other marks a change for which there are historical rather than logical (i.e. strictly doctrinal) reasons. Returning to the adhikarana of the ajiva type enumerated at Tattvartha Sutra 6:9 (10), it is probable that this list is based upon the original rules for ascetics in their wandering life. In fact all the categories are to do with himsa caused by physical activity, and relate very closely to the 5 samiti. These are enumerated at Tattvartha Sutra 9:5, where they are listed as one category of the modes of

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Umasvati's Jainism 69 behaviour which lead to samvara, the cessation of influx (Tattvartha Sutra 9:2).60 The 5 samiti are: i) irya-samiti - care (awareness) in walking, ii) bhasa-samiti - care in speaking, iii) esana-samiti - care in accepting alms, iv) adana-niksepana-samiti - care in picking things up and in putting them down, v) utsarga-samiti - care in performing excretory functions. 61 Comparing this list with that of the four divisions of the adhikarana of the ajiva type, given above, the following correspondences can be discerned: 1) irya- and bhasa-samiti correspond to the 2 nirvartana, 2) esana-samiti corresponds to samyoga, 3) adana-niksepana-samiti corresponds to niksepa, 4) utsarga-samiti corresponds to nisarga. That is to say, the 5 samiti are the antidotes to the 4 adhikarana of the ajiva type: they advocate care in relation 60 It is worth noting that, according to Ohira p. 65, samvara is not defined in the canonical texts in the fashion expressed by Umasvati at TS 9:1 (as the stoppage of the inflow of karmic matter into the soul - asravanirodhah samvarah). Nor do the sixfold samvaradvaras (TS 9:2) occur as a set category in the canon; rather, they were formulated by Umasvati. They are, nevertheless, predominantly physical in character. The first among them is gupti, defined at TS 9:4 as samyagyoganigraho gupti - 'restraint / prevention is proper control (nigraha) over yoga' (i.e. over the activities of body, speech and mind). Thus it is still restraint of activity which is seen as the pre-eminent means to release (as opposed to attaining a better re-birth), rather than restraint of 'passions' as such. Also note that gupti here, as restraint / control of the three yogas, would appear to have the meaning normally assigned to 'yoga' in other schools. 61 Cf. Pali sati, the 'mindfulness' or 'awareness' of early Buddhism. Samiti may be a backformation from this, therefore having the sense of 'awareness'.

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70 Harmless Souls to matter. Taking each of these in turn: 1) irya-samiti and bhasa-samiti refer respectively to care in walking and care in speaking. The connection of these with the ajiva-adhikarana nirvartana ('performance'), which is divided into mulaguna and uttaraguna, seems at first to be only partial. That is to say, the connection holds in so far as, if mulaguna refers to what the body performs or does naturally, simply by being the body, and uttaraguna to what it does by extension, then irya and bhasa-samiti correspond to the first two mulaguna, the 'performance of body and speech i.e. one should take care in walking and speaking). This would leave the mulaguna of mind, inhalation and exhalation, and the uttaraguna as later additions to, or elaborations of, the original doctrine, probably to meet with circumstances previously unforeseen (e.g. the manufacture of images, etc.). ('Mind' may well have been added simply because the formula 'body, speech, and mind' had become a cliche.)62 2) esana-samiti refers to care in accepting alms, and clearly corresponds to the ajiva adhikarana samyoga, although the latter has the extended sense of mixing up or (literally) contact with implements, clothes, etc. (upakarana), as well as mixing up or contact with food and drink (bhaktapana). 3) adana-niksepana-samiti corresponds to the ajiva adhikarana niksepana, again elaborated into four ways of putting things down carelessly. 4) utsarga-samiti is the rule of conduct which 62 Note that mulaguna in this context should not be confused with the '8 basic restraints' prescribed for the Jaina layperson, also known as mulaguna, viz. abstaining from partaking of meat, alcohol, honey, or any of five kinds of figs (see JPP p. 167). This definition of mulaguna does not occur in the TS.

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Umasvati's Jainism 71 prescribes care in performing excretory functions. The ajiva adhikarana nisarga is defined by the commentators as 'urging', 'movement', and 'operating!.63 Thus, according to the Sarvarthasiddhi, 'Urging (behaviour) is of three kinds, urging the body, speech and mind to act'.64 It should be noted, however, that this threefold division is not made by Umasvati himself, and that nisarga as well as utsarga can have the meaning 'evacuation of excrement'. This may indicate that Umasvati's commentators (and possibly Umasvati himself) had the samvaradvara gupti in mind when they defined the ajiva adhikarana nisarga in this way. Gupti is defined (at Tattvartha Sutra 9:4) as samyagyoganigrahah, proper control (nigraha) over activity (yoga) - i.e. control over the activities of body, speech, and mind, which would be the antidote to urging the body, speech, and mind to act (the three kinds of nisarga). The likelihood that nisarga originally referred to evacuation of excrement is strengthened by its incompatibility (as it is defined by the commentators) with the other adhikarana-ajiva. For the presence of manas, regarded as denoting the operation of the mind of an individual, introduces the idea of intention, of internal 'action' into a list which refers to the physical manipulation of matter (pudgala).65 It is possible to conclude, therefore, that of Umasvati's categories ajiva and jiva adhikarana, the former was derived from the original monastic rules concerned with preventing the influx of binding karma, since it is occupied 63 S.A. Jain p.174; J.L. Jaini (1920); Sukhlalji (TS 1974). 64 S.A. Jain's trans. p. 174 of SS on TS 6:9: nisargas trividhah - kayanisargadhikaranam vag... mano..., etc. 65 Such incompatibility is, of course, reduced if yoga is read in the sense suggested by Dixit (see above) - viz, as doing an act oneself, having it done through one's agent, or allowing it to be done by someone else; but that is not the way the commentators take it.

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72 Harmless Souls entirely with physical activity and the himsa caused by it. In other words, the list of ajiva-adhikarana is based on the canonical rules for those wandering ascetics whose primary concern was not with a particular attitude of mind, or intention, but with the avoidance of any physical action which might cause harm to any of the myriad jivas by which they were surrounded. The latter (jiva-adhikarana) is added by Umasvati to account for the proliferation of karmic positions that less than perfect ascetics, or lay people, can find themselves in. 2.5. Parigraha: the householder and the kasaya doctrine In the developed kasaya doctrine (the one which is presented by Umasvati) what was once a single instrument of bondage (viz. violent or harming activity engendered by lobha and parigraha) has now become two: bondage is caused by passion (kasaya) and harming activity. It is no longer simply the case that passions, or lobha, etc., lead to violent activity, rather violent activity is now not even considered 'violent' unless it is accompanied by passion; and thus, without passion, it is no longer binding either. The notion, expressed in the earliest textual layers, that even accidental himsa is binding, has been removed. How is this development, which is at the heart of the tension between later doctrine and practice, to be explained? As has been shown, in the earliest texts parigraha or lobha is considered, along with violence (arambha), to be the worst kind of behaviour, and such parigraha or 'greed' is inextricable from the life of the householder. Indeed, for the composers of monastic texts such as the Dasaveyaliya Sutta, parigraha is precisely what defines the state of being a householder. Thus, according to these sources, there is very little possibility other than a bad rebirth for a householder. The householder's state is one of parigraha, and thus of arambha, simply because he is a householder;

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Umasvati's Jainism 73 only the monk or nun has the potential to cease from parigraha and arambha, and thus attain moksa. The idea that acts involving the employment of human and animal labour were particularly sinful, and others less so, does not appear in the earliest doctrinal layer. There, all acts which harm jivas are considered to be effectively binding. Indeed, the householder only puts in an appearance in these texts to act as a kind of lighthouse, warning the ascetic away from, or at least setting severe limits to, social contact. The householder's inevitable rebirth and suffering are pointed out, like wreckages, as a warning to those who come too close or are tempted to return to life in the world. In later Jaina theory, however, the pious householder is considered to be on the same soteriological continuum as the monk: the former may take partial vows (anuvrata) which are seen as preparing him or her for the eventual assumption of the mahavrata of the mendicant.66 Thus while the anuvrata of ahimsa, which applies only to trasa beings, can never be soteriologically sufficient - it cannot lead in itself to liberation - it is nevertheless a step upwards on the ladder which leads to moksa; one can expect at least a better rebirth. Such a progression is never contemplated in the very earliest textual layers, where the idea of a 'pious' householder is not even admitted. Indeed, such a concept would be a contradiction in terms. Moreover, according to later Jaina doctrine, parigraha is defined as murccha,67 'infatuation' or the 'delusion of possession'. 68 In the Sarvarthasiddhi murccha is glossed as 'not turning away from the aims of acquiring and keeping conscious and unconscious externals, such as cows, buffaloes, jewels, pearls, possessions, etc., and 66 See JPP p. 160ff. 67 TS 7:17. 68 JPP p. 177.

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74 Harmless Souls internal conditions, such as desire, etc.'.69 The Sarvarthasiddhi goes on to say, delusion 'is the root of all imperfections. When someone has the idea "This is mine", the need to take care of it, etc., (also) arises. And from that violence necessarily follows'. 70 And as P.S. Jaini points out, the term parigraha is 'further made synonymous with the four passions (kasaya) and nine sentiments (no-kasaya) ...; these are known as the "internal possessions" and their renunciation (the avoidance of activities which generate them) constitutes the essence of the aparigrahavrata' (the fifth anuvrata of the layman according to later Jaina doctrine).71 This kind of renunciation is, however, not considered possible until a person has detached himself from the 'external possessions' - land, houses, silver, gold, etc. So the layman expresses his seriousness about aparigraha by setting limits to what he may own (i.e. he gives himself less to be attached to and, at the same time, engenders an attitude of non-attachment towards what he already has). 72 (It is interesting to note, however, that, even at this relatively late doctrinal stage, the renunciation of passion is approached, not via a direct confrontation with the internal state, but through the renunciation of activities | 69 bahyanam gomahiyamanimultaphaladinam cetanacetananam abhyantaranam ca ragadinam upadhinam samraksanarjanasamskaradilaksanavyavrttir murccha - SS on TS 7:17. 70 tanmulah sarve dosah || mamedam iti hi sati samkalde samraksanadayah samjayante tatra ca himsa 'vasyambhavini |- SS on TS 7:17. Cf. J.L. Jaini (1920) on TS 7:17: ...'worldly objects are said to be Parigraha because they are the external causes of internal attachment'. 71 JPP p. 177; the anuvrata aparigraha is defined variously as 'non-possession', 'non-attachment', 'the delusion of possession', 'harbouring false notions of "this is mine'', etc. See discussion of Das. 8:37, p. 37ff., above, for the relation of parigraha and kasaya. Nokasaya, 'sentiments', are nine subsidiary passions, such as laughter, fear sexual cravings, etc. - see JPP p. 120 for a full list. 72 See JPP p. 177.

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Umasvati's Jainism ' 75 which are thought to generate it.) As P.S. Jaini puts it: By undertaking the aparigrahavrata, a Jaina layman systematically reduces his tendencies to fall into such passions; thus he protects his soul from increased karmic entanglement and lays the groundwork for complete nonattachment, the path of the mendicant. 73 How does this change in attitude towards the householder relate to the development of the kasaya doctrine? The following hypothesis is offered. In the early karma doctrine, only one train of events is necessary for karmic bondage: parigraha or lobha (including the other passions) causes himsa, and himsa causes bondage. (It should be noted that parigraha is by no means the only way in which himsa can be brought about, but it is seen as being the major threat to the monk, and the one most difficult to counteract.) In the developed doctrine, presented by Umasvati, for bondage to take place (i.e. for karma to attach itself to the jiva) there have to be two separate occurrences: 1) there has to be yoga ('activity') which causes an influx of karmic matter, and 2) there has to be kasaya which causes that karmic matter to adhere to the jiva. Thus 'greed' (lobha or parigraha) - the passion subsuming all others in the earliest texts -, which was previously seen as being synonymous with a particular way of life (the householder's), becomes in the later doctrine (under the technical term 'kasaya') an internal process or attitude. From being the defining characteristic of a particular way or condition of life, it comes to denote anattitude towards life; the emphasis is shifted from the external to the internal, from the social to the individual. In effect, renunciation is partially internalised. 73 JPP p. 178.

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76 Harmless Souls In this way, what was once an anti-householder doctrine becomes one which accommodates and compromises with the householder's way of life. In other words, parigraha and aparigraha have been redefined as attitudes, inner states; therefore it is possible, at least in theory, to retain possessions without necessarily incurring bondage. With the right attitude (non-attachment), possessions do not necessarily lead to himsa and bondage. Nevertheless, Jaina monks and nuns, by definition nonhouseholders, continue to concentrate on behaviour: their attitude to the external world is significant predominantly in so far as it governs the way in which they behave in that world. Thus, in practice, for the ascetic, attitude remains a contributory rather than a necessary factor in liberation or bondage, in the same way that kasaya was in the earliest doctrine. (But as with kasaya, that of course makes it is no less demanding of the most careful attention.) It can be seen from this that the later doctrine, which accommodates the householder, is never completely integrated with the earlier one. And as we have shown, there are instances in the Tattvartha Sutra where the latter pushes through the surface of the former to bring about an apparent inconsistency. To take a relevant example, at Tattvartha Sutra 9:6 sauca (purity) is named as one of the constituents or types of that 'dharma which, in turn, is one of the causes of samvara (the stoppage of karmic influx). Commenting on this, the Sarvarthasiddhi specifically defines sauca as 'complete freedom from greed'.74 As has been made clear above, greed (parigraha / lobha) was considered by the earliest surviving canonical sources as one of the two worst sins; moreover, it was considered to be the defining characteristic of the householder's way of life. It is greed which causes a person to undertake prakarsapraptalobhan nivrttih saucam - SS on TS 9:6. 74

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Umasvati's Jainism 77 harming activity. Thus absence of greed means the absence of harming activity and of the potential for it. It is this condition which is considered to be a state of purity, and by definition it is only the monk or nun who experiences this greed-free state. In other words, in the earliest texts greed is seen as the polluting, himsa-initiating, bondage-causing vice. This connection is retained in the Tattvartha Sutra, where lobha is, by implication, synonymous with impurity, and freedom from greed is defined as sauca, although now the context has been internalised, in that the emphasis is placed on the stoppage of kasaya, the attitude which is seen as instrumental in bondage. However, it is clear that originally the distinction between 'pure' and 'impure' was an existential distinction between the life of the monk and the life of the householder. And this earlier distinction resurfaces in the Sarvarthasiddhi when sauca is defined as 'freedom from greed'. There may also be a suggestion here of a polemical statement aimed at Brahmanical ideas of what constitutes purity and dharma. That is to say, the Jains are reinterpreting sauca in a manner which shows that they are the truly pure, and it is the brahmans who are succumbing to greed, the antithesis of purity, just when they claim to be most pure. In both cases, impurity leads to further karmic bondage; the difference arises over how purity is defined. Brahman sacrificers cause himsa, therefore they are impure. Himsa (= impurity) is generated by greed, i.e., greed for results from the sacrifice. It is sacrifice, the characteristic mark of the srauta brahman, which makes the brahman impure in the Jaina's eyes. And from the Jaina ascetic's point of view, the brahman is doubly impure, for in order to be qualified to sacrifice he has to be a householder. In short, the behaviour of Jaina ascetics continues to be conditioned by the earliest beliefs about the conditions under which bondage takes place. (This is, of course,

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78 Harmless Souls progressively true of advanced lay behaviour, as it approaches, through the pratimas, etc., the ascetic ideal.)75 They remain, above all, concerned with the effects of physical activity. Thus, while from the ordinary householder's point of view there is a continuum between his anuvratas and the mahavratas of the monk, from the monk's point of view there is still an absolute distinction. This basic incompatibility of the two ways of life underlies Umasvati's attempt in the Tattvartha Sutra to reconcile them. 75 See JPP p. 186 for a full list if the eleven pratimas. Note especially: 8) arambhatyaga-pratima, the stage of abandonment of household activity, and 9) parigrahatyaga-pratima, the stage of abandonment of acquisitiveness (by formally disposing of one's property).

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Conclusions Commenting on the juxtaposition of the archaic and the classical in Jaina doctrine - on the tradition's incompletely worked-out philosophy and its tendency to fantastic proliferation - Frauwallner concludes that all this is the result of fundamental adherence to the doctrines proclaimed by Mahavira.1 Because the Jina is omniscient, his doctrines, once uttered, could not be changed or displaced, and that 'explains the many antique features which the system has preserved'.2 There was no room for consistent developments in thought, or for 'the erection of a uniformly compact doctrinal edifice'.3 In these circumstances, according to Frauwallner, it is not surprising that wherever the 'traditionally handed-down dogmatics showed a lacuna', fantasy was allowed to flourish without a check.4 In short, Jaina thought after Mahavira was paralysed by the need to preserve the often archaic content of Mahavira's teaching in more sophisticated religious and philosophical circumstances. There is evidently some truth in this analysis, but as it stands it remains an inadequate explanation because Frauwallner has divorced Jaina beliefs and doctrines fro: practice; he is concerned with Jainism as a 'philosophy rather than as a religion. The two levels of doctrine regarding activity, the influx of karma and bondage, which are imposed upon each other and which fit so incompletely, are the result of two different historical processes - within Jainism and within Indian religion in general - which come together over a particular period. These two processes may, for short, be labelled 'Early Jainism' and 'Umasvati's Frauwallner (1973) Vol. II, p. 213. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. p. 214.

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80 Harmless Souls Jainism'. By 'Early Jainism', is understood that exclusively ascetic, mendicant path to liberation which appeared at approximately the same time as other heterodox systems, notably Buddhism, partly as a reaction to Brahmanical religion, but, in Jainism's case, perhaps mostly as a refinement of an even earlier, archaic asceticism.5 'Umasvati's Jainism', on the other hand, belongs to a much wider social world, in the sense that it is an attempt to systematize, as far as possible, Jaina doctrine for the whole Jaina community, and perhaps most of all for a growing lay audience. That is to say, Umasvati is attempting to reconcile the social fact of an active lay following, and the need to preserve such a following, with a body of canonical texts, the oldest and most important components of which (containing perhaps the teachings of Mahavira himself) were directed specifically at ascetics who had renounced the householder's world precisely because, as the doctrines expounded in those texts make clear, there was no possibility whatsoever of obtaining liberation within it. It is also significant that Umasvati is writing in Sanskrit. Thus he is not writing simply for the benefit of his own community, but also in order to dispute with outsiders, proponents of rival darsanas. In other words, for Jaina practice to be preserved and defended, its doctrinal superstructure has to be defended. Moreover, since Jaina renouncers keep moving, and are unlikely to know or learn Sanskrit, the very nature of Umasvati's enterprise suggests that it is concerned with problems in the wider society. The whole history of Jaina doctrinal development is one of the struggle to prevent the clearly delineated but extremely demanding requirements of the ascetic's path coming into direct conflict with the life led by the Jaina layperson, when the practice of both ascetic and laity is recoded in doctrinal terms. It is precisely this conflict and the need to avoid it which leads, on the one hand, to the *See Basham for some discussion of 'Jainism' before Mahavira; also R. Williams 1966, pp. 2-6.

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Conclusions 81 proliferation of doctrines to do with karma and bondage, and, on the other, ensures that no complete systematization is possible. As has been made clear, in the very earliest texts, where there is effectively no alternative to extreme asceticism other than a bad rebirth, there is no need for doctrine to be worked out in any great detail. From the ascetic point of view, which is the 'Jain' point of view at this stage (the earliest texts were composed by and for ascetics), the chance of a lay person attaining a heavenly rebirth is considered so remote as to be practically impossible. Proliferation of heavens and hells tends to occur only when a system becomes concerned with something more than simple liberation, i.e. when it acquires a lay doctrine. And only then do ideas like that of subha yoga leading to punya karma become intelligible. (When the path to liberation is as demanding as the Jain one, ascetics too, of course, become interested in the higher samsaric worlds.) Given the basic teachings of early Jainism on the multiplicity of jivas, ahimsa, and the bondage of material karma, then the ascetic's path is theoretically very clear: he or she must give up all harming activity. Whether this in effect means all activity, or whether there is a distinction between activity of different kinds, is not clear from the earliest texts. It is probably taken for granted that in this context any action which harms jivas is meant, and thus potentially, at the very least, any physical activity is harmful. There is, therefore, a sense in which, beyond a few normative teachings of early Jainism, all doctrinal elaboration is aimed at a lay audience, both to justify their position as laity and to put them on the soteriological 'ladder'. This is reflected by the fact that doctrines concerning the internalization of significant action, which if carried to their logical conclusion might be thought to undermine, or even be fatal to ascetic practice, actually make no difference to the ways in which monks and nuns behave. They go on acting as though the overwhelmingly

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82 Harmless Souls important thing is physical activity, or the lack of it, in the external world: attitude is only important in so far as it leads to certain kinds of behaviour. The doctrinal content of the earliest canonical literature is simply intended to reinforce ascetic practice. The problem for Umasvati is to reduce the incompatibility of a purely ascetic 'doctrine' with the householder's life, without juxtaposing them in such a way that they are seen to be openly opposed. In other words, he has to systematize, but he has to do so incompletely or imperfectly. It is this necessary incompleteness which gives rise to much of the problematic and poorly fitting terminology in the Tattvartha Sutra. Two different historical layers, reflected in two different kinds of behaviour, are imperfectly systematized in the one work by a process of partial internalization, and therefore of gradation, of the path to liberation. This is most evident when Umasvati takes earlier 'lists', or concepts, and attempts to deposit them without change in new categories. It is not surprising, therefore, that later commentators have struggled without success to integrate then fully, and that in the process original meanings have been obscured or lost. The problematic nature of some Jaina terminology thus arises out of the need to revise earlier ideas in, and for, a more sophisticated and complex religious milieu, while retaining that canonical authority which is expressed in the ideal of ascetic practice. In other words, such terminological problems stem from the extreme asceticism of early Jaina practice and its incompatibility with lay practice: the two positions are so antithetical that they cannot both be preserved and at the same time fully incorporated within the same system. The extent to which Umasvati internalizes earlier doctrine, and the effect of this process on both lay and ascetic practice, requires some further discussion. According to classical Jaina theory, it is possible for a lay person to ascend by stages to the threshold of total asceticism, and then pass through mendicancy to liberation.

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Conclusions 83 This is expressed theoretically by a soteriological gradation or ladder, whose rungs are the 14 gunasthana, the stages through which an individual passes on the way to moksa.6 Most, although not all, of the component parts of the gunasthana doctrine are known to Umasvati, but they are not assembled into a sreni or 'ladder' by him; while various karmic states are described individually, they are not placed in a hierarchy.7 According to the developed theory, the aspirant gradually eliminates the passions, and it is only finally, in the instant prior to his death, that yoga, the last cause of bondage, comes to an end. 8 Thus the problem of action - of how not to jeopardize one's ultimate liberation while at the same time acting to a greater or lesser extent in the world - is overcome by making 'activity' as such (i.e. unmotivated, unimpelled activity, even down to the beating of the heart) a barrier to liberation only on the final rungs of the ladder, which are usually taken as meaning the last moments of life. (There are more immediate barriers to be overcome before that stage is reached.) One of the reasons theoreticians after Umasvati are able to shift yoga up the ladder in this way is because the kasaya doctrine makes the lower rungs the province of passions and their elimination. In other words, such a doctrine makes room for the theory of a graduated path of spiritual development, culminating in the elimination of all activity. This should be compared with the earliest, ascetic 'Jainism' - that of the Jaina monks - where the elimination of harming activity, the vow of total ahimsa, is regarded as the pre- or accompanying-condition of any spiritual development. The stages of spiritual progress which lead the layman 6 For the full list, see JPP pp. 272-3. 7 See Ohira pp. 99-103. Also on the evolution of the gunasthana doctrine, see Dixit 1971, pp. 14-15. The doctrine as later developed is mentioned in the Bhasya, which, as we have seen, is probably later than the TS and not by Umasvati (p. 46-47, above); the SS on TS 9.1 has a complete list. 8 See JPP p. 273.

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84 Harmless Souls into the sixth gunasthana, which is the stage of taking the ascetic's vows (mahavrata), are further subdivided into 11 pratima.9 In other words, certain kinds of behaviour and attitude will enable the aspirant to make some progress towards liberation, but these have to be superseded or improved upon as he moves up to the next 'rung'. The theoretical stress on internal discipline as the chief means of ascending the ladder clearly reflects the difficulty of achieving a completely inactive state short of death (i.e. short of the ideal goal of ritual death by fasting, sallekhana). 10 It is true that to achieve final liberation the complete cessation of first external activity and then all activity has to be achieved, but only at the very end of life. For the laity, therefore, yoga has been effectively downgraded as a force in bondage - or, to be accurate, 'upgraded' so far that it is only to be reckoned with at the top of the soteriological ladder. It seems that they scarcely have to worry about it. For the ascetic, however, the emphasis of the earliest doctrine on the centrality of physical action vis a vis bondage, keeps its force. The partially internalized doctrine, where what counts most is intention, is at a lower level soteriologically than the physical and material concerns of the monk. What distinguishes the monk most clearly from the lay person in 'classical' Jainism, in terms of daily practice, is still the strength of the monk's vow (vrata) concerning ahinsa.11 And the authority for this mahavrata of ahimsa is derived predominantly from the earliest canonical texts (the Ayaramga, etc.), i.e. it is the original doctrine concerning non-violence, aimed exclusively at renunciants. It should be remembered, however, that the canonical texts, which reflect the monks' view of the world, and the Tattvartha Sutra, which (as I argue) reflects a wider view, 9 See JPP p. 186 for a full list; and R. Williams 1963, pp. 172-181. 10 On sallekhana, see JPP pp. 227-223. 11 See JPP p. 241.

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Conclusions 85 co-exist. The latter does not replace the former. This reflects the way in which the two doctrines concerning bondage co-exist within the one religious system. There are two different authoritative references, depending upon whether one is a householder or a monk; but these only conflict when they are viewed together, theoretically; in practice, the perspective is always from within one or the other of these. Nevertheless, even within the new soteriological gradation, it is only necessary to look at the vows (vrata - literally, 'restraints') which constitute even the lay pratima, in order to see what is considered important in terms of practice, as opposed to theory. The emphasis of these is heavily ascetic, i.e. they involve above all the restriction of physical activity. In fact they constitute a progression towards the full asceticism of the monk or nun, carrying the vratin further and further away from ordinary householder existence.12 So whatever the theoretical stress on internal discipline or dispassion, in terms of actual conduct there is no remission of physical asceticism; rather such conduct is extended into the lay sphere. The ladder is lowered from above, not erected from below. P.S. Jaini, commenting on the Chedasutras, writes that they 'provide valuable insight into the numerous restrictions imposed upon itself by the [monastic] community, mainly in order to preserve its integrity in the face of increasing dependence upon the laity'.13 I would add to this that another way to annul such a threat is for the ascetics to encourage the laity to become more like them. more ascetic. Whatever one's internal 12 See JPP p. 187 for a list, and ibid. pp. 157-187 for a discussion of how these relate to the pratima. Jaini relies here upon R. William's study of mediaeval sravakacara texts, Jaina Yoga (1963) OUP. See also TS 7:19ff. for householder vrata; these have been identified by R. Williams 1963, p. 2-3, as essentially Digambara vrata, whereas the 'autocommentary' is markedly Svetambara in tone (ibid. p. 2, fn. 1), providing further evidence that the TS and its bhasya are not by the same hand. 13 JPP pp. 63-64.

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86 Harmless Souls state, the only way of confirming it or expressing it, either to oneself or to others, is through external conduct. (I shall return to this idea in my discussion of Kundakunda.) 14 As P.S. Jaini remarks, 'even the clerics of many religions do not live so strict a life as these rules [of lay conduct] demand'.15 Consequently, as he goes on to say: the partial vratas and the pratimas, while theoretically set down for all laymen, tend to constitute an ideal path followed only by a highly select few ... it is a rare individual who actually vows to accept the restraints or perform the holy activities described there. 16 It is clear from this situation - one which only develops fully in the post-Umasvati period - that Umasvati's internalization of discipline, through his kasaya doctrine, does not or is not allowed to influence ascetic behaviour. In so far as the monk or advanced lay person takes on internalized doctrines, he does so in addition to his original vrata, not instead of the latter or as a version of them. A further consideration which may be mentioned here - again, I shall return to it in my discussion of Kundakunda - is the 'ritualisation' of ascetic conduct. By this I mean the idea that if one follows the prescribed action to the letter, the result in the Jaina case, liberation) is guaranteed. Correct thinking and correct feeling may be essential to the correctitude of a ritual, but the only way these can be monitored or expressed is through external behaviour. The iryapatha-samparayika division in the Viyahapannatti apparently reflects at least a degree of such ritualisation. There the initial division between the two modes of asrava / karma is not so much based upon the results of two modes of behaviour available to the same individual, as upon the institutional distinction between two modes of life, 14 See, for example, pp. 217-224, below. 15 JPP p. 188. 16 Ibid.

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Conclusions 87 incorporating two roles (that of the lay-person and that of the monk) which are mutually exclusive and which, in soteriological terms, inevitably have different outcomes. Umasvati's introduction of a technical kasaya doctine, linked to the iryapatha-samparayika distinction, would, however, seem at the very least to make room for a less mechanical and more attitude-dependent approach to ascetic conduct. For in theory, the kasaya doctrine bridges or blurs the institutional distinction between ascetic (iryapatha) and lay or non-ascetic (samparayika ) activity, since greater or lesser degrees of bondage now depend on the degree of passion accompanying or motivating an action, not on who performs it. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion the kasaya doctrine would seem to undercut the rationale for ascetic behaviour altogether. (Clearly, internalisation can only go so far before it threatens the whole basis of a monastic system grounded in severe physical restraint, and with it any specific 'Jaina' identity.)17 But as we have remarked, it has no such effect, and it is probably not intended that it should have. What then is its purpose? I suggest that the real importance of Umasvati's kasaya doctrine is for the ordinary lay person (i.e. the majority of the Jaina community), in that it provides a rationale for ordinary lay conduct. That is to say, once the principle that bondage is the ineluctable result of physical harm done to jivas has been modified, and the principle that only actions motivated or actuated by passion are binding has been accepted, then it becomes possible for one to lead a good life, with good soteriological prospects, without necessarily abandoning one's position as a householder. Thus by controlling one's passions or attitude while performing a particular action, one can reduce or avoid the karmic effect associated with it. Or, to put it in the overlapping but not entirely integrated terminology, one can accrue punya as 17 See Kundakunda sections below, passim, for a full discussion of this.

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88 Harmless Souls opposed to papa karma. In other words, when they are allied to internal control, one's actions in the world are not necessarily counter-productive. A householder's life can now be viewed positively: there is such a thing as a (relatively) good action. This is particularly significant with regard to aparigraha: an attitude of non-possession while living in the world is not necessarily a contradiction in terms, providing the emotions associated with possession of objects are controlled. (And it is interesting to note that the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 7:19 refers to a 'psychical home' (bhavagaram) - home-focused thoughts (caused by conduct-deluding karmas), the abandonment of which constitutes true 'homelessness'.) As we have seen, the gunasthana and pratima ladders formalize in theoretical terms the idea of gradation in spiritual - in practice, increasingly ascetic - progress. The householder is now at least on the same ladder as the ascetic. Umasvati's kasaya doctrine supports this in a tangential way; but, potentially, it is of most significance for those on the very first rungs of that ladder, the majority of the Jaina community. Through it, their affective subscription to Jainism's distinctive ethical code (preserved by the ascetics and exemplified in their behaviour) is not disqualified by their status as householders. In other words, their identity as 'Jains' is given theoretical (effectively doctrinal) validation. Some of this Jaina majority will, of course, make progress up the pratima / gunasthana ladder, and as they do so - as their lives become more ascetic - the greater will be the importance of external conduct and the less relevant internalization on its own. It is possible to conclude, therefore, that the doctrines found in the Tattvartha Sutra concerning the mechanism of bondage and the significance of yoga are aimed at the Jaina community as a whole. From the fact that Jaina ascetics continue to behave in the manner enjoined in the earliest canonical literature, it is clear that Umasvati's incomplete systematization is not so much evidence of a compromise between lay and ascetic life - indeed, the ascetic cannot

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Conclusions 89 compromise in this respect without abrogating the whole import of the canonical doctrine of ahimsa - as evidence of the need to construct a common doctrinal framework in which both ways of life are justified without nullifying each other by too close a contact. (The ascetic's authoritative reference remains, of course, the canon and/or the tradition which is embodied in ascetic practice.) It may be that this process goes hand in hand with the need for the Jaina community to live in concord with Brahmanical society as a whole, while retaining its individuality. The reaction against Brahmanism evidenced in the canonical texts is a reaction of ascetics against specific Brahmanical practices. But for the laity to survive, there was an increasing need to over-code Jaina behaviour and doctrine to present a more Brahmanical front, while at the same time preserving the true purport of Jaina teachings. The beginning of this process may perhaps be seen in the development of the gunasthana theory, which, in terms of its function, seems analogous to the orthodox asrama doctrine. The culmination comes with Jinasena's attempts to integrate the Hindu samskaras into Jaina lay practice in his Adipurana (perhaps written to justify an already existing state of affairs).18 But it is in Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra that the first real attempt is made to present Jaina doctrine as an autonomous religious system which includes both monks and laity, rather than simply the teachings of a heterodox renouncer. It is here that one first has the sense of a community being addressed, rather than a collection of individual monks. And it is here too that Jainism can be seen consciously addressing outsiders. In other words, it now turns to face the wider Indian religious world which surrounds and threatens to infiltrate it. With the works ascribed to Kundakunda we find Jainism somewhere near the centre of this terrain, subject to both internal and external pressures and developing social 18 See JPP p. 291ff., and R. Williams 1963, pp. 274-275.

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90 Harmless Souls and philosophical strategies for dealing with them. And it is to these that I now turn.

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PART III KUNDAKUNDA: THE PRAVACANASARA 4 Kundakunda: content and context 4.1 Kundakunda: primary sources and chronology In this and the following part I shall examine two of the major Prakrit works ascribed to the Digambara acarya Kundakunda, the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara. Giving even an approximately accurate date to Kundakunda presents formidable problems. The revered and influential position he holds within the Digambara tradition only adds to the difficulties. Traditionally, two dates are ascribed to Kundakunda: the middle of the third century C.E. (fl. 243 C.E.), and the first half of the first century C.E., the latter being the more popular. Upadhye shows that the traditional evidence for these dates is drawn largely from much later commentators and is totally inadequate. Moreover, the idiosyncratic nature of some of Kundakunda's teaching in the context of the rest of the Jain tradition makes comparison with such texts as the Tattvartha Sutra unhelpful in this respect. And as we shall see, the nature of Kundakunda's texts is such - they are clearly compilations of older material held together by new philosophical and soteriological strategies - that it is difficult to remain confident that all or even any of them should be ascribed to a single author or redactor. Conversely, there are close enough thematic links between the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara to make it obvious that they originated in the same religious and philosophical milieu. They can, therefore, profitably be studied together. The evidence for Kundakunda's date has been most 1 Upadhye 1935, p. xff.

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92 Harmless Souls extensively reviewed by Upadhye in his introduction to the Pravacanasara.2 Here I shall confine myself to a brief summary of Upadhye's main arguments, and then offer some criticisms. Upadhye remarks that Pujyapada, the earliest Digambara commentator on the Tattvartha Sutra, quotes (at Sarvarthasiddhi 2:10) five gathas which are found in the same order in the Barasa-Anuvekkha (25-19), a work ascribed to Kundakunda. Pujyapada, however, 'does not say as to from what source he is quoting'.3 Nevertheless, Upadhye thinks that their context and serial order indicate the genuineness of these quotations, i.e. Pujyapada is quoting from Kundakunda. If this is so then it would set a later limit to the age of Kundakunda since, according to Upadhye, Pujyapada lived earlier than the last quarter of the fifth century C.E.4 Upadhye then reduces this upper limit by reference to the Merkara (Mercara) copper plates of saka 388 (466 C.E.) which mention a Kundakundanvaya, giving the names of at least six acaryas of that lineage.5 This 'indicates that Kundakunda will have to be put at least a century, if not more, earlier than the date of the copperplates' (i.e. c.350 C.E.).6 Upadhye then assumes that the lineage of a saint does not begin immediately after his death, and so takes the date back a further 100 years. Thus his later limit is now c.250 C.E. He concludes, however, 'I am inclined to believe, after this long survey of the available material, that Kundakunda's age lies at the beginning of the Christian era' (his italics).8 In other words, he reverts to the traditional dating, albeit for 2 Ibid. pp. x-xxiv. 3 Ibid. p. xxi. 4 Bronkhorst p. 161, says that he lived 'not long after 455 A.D.'; see above, p. 46. 5See Upadhye pp. xix - xxii, where he refers to Epigraphia Carnatica I, Coorg Inscriptions No. 1., B.L. Rice, Madras, 1914. 6 Upadhye p. xix. 7 Ibid. p. xxii. 8 Ibid.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 93 different reasons to those traditionally advanced.9 In support of this, Upadhye offers some linguistic evidence, namely, that the Prakrit dialect used in the Pravacanasara, for instance, seems to be earlier than that of the Prakrit portions of the Natyasastra of Bharata (usually assigned to the beginning of the second century C.E., but, as Upadhye admits, the date is uncertain).10 He also claims that not a single Apabhramsa form is traceable in the Pravacanasara, possibly indicating a period when Prakrits had not yet developed Apabhramsa traces.11 (He has already noted the strong influence of Sanskrit on the Prakrit dialect of the Pravacanasara dubbed 'Jaina Sauraseni' by Pischel: e.g. it retains intervocalic 'c' and even 'p' at times; desi words are also conspicuously absent.)12 I see the following problems with Upadhye's arguments. First, the ascription of the Barasa-Anuvekkha to Kundakunda can itself only be made on traditional grounds. Furthermore, as Upadhye himself admits, 13 the text may be a compilation of traditional gathas, and nothing in the content of the verses quoted by Pujyapada indicates that they are necessarily non-traditional material.14 Consequently, we do not know that Pujyapada is quoting from Kundakunda. On these grounds, even the upper limit is uncertain. Second, the Mercara copper plate inscription is now considered to be a forgery of the eighth or ninth century. Chatterjee describes these plates as 'definitely spurious'.15 9 Cf. Keith's 1936 review (pp. 528-9) of Upadhye's edition of the Pravacanasara. He concludes from Upadhye's own evidence that Kundakunda 'may be placed not later than the fourth century A.D.', but how much earlier than that is not clear. 10 Upadhye p. xxiii. 11 Ibid. 12 See ibid. pp. cxx-cxxi, cxxiv. 13 Ibid. p. xl. 14 See SS on TS 2:10. - 15 Chatterjee p.234, referring to Epigraphia Carnatica (revised ed.) 1972, Vol. I, Introduction pp. xf.

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94 Harmless Souls He goes on to argue that even if this plate were a genuine copy of an older record, by assigning twenty-five years to each of the six monks named, the earliest, Gunacandra, would not be before 325 C.E. So, on the basis of Pujyapada quoting from the Barasa-Anuvekkha, Chatterjee assigns Kundakunda to the fourth century C.E. He remarks, however, that 'the anvaya of Kundakunda appears only in the records of South India, which were inscribed after 900 A.D.'. 16 Even if the Mercara copper plate were genuine, it only shows that there was an acarya called Kundakunda, it does not indicate that the works we have that are ascribed to 'Kundakunda' are, either in toto or in part, necessarily by this particular teacher. Indeed, as Upadhye points out, 17 the only mention of Kundakunda's name in any of the works attributed to him is in the last gatha of the BarasaAnuvekkha, a verse which is not even found in some manuscripts. 18 Moreover, Amstacandra, his first extant commentator (c. tenth century C.E.) does not mention Kundakunda's name, and it is only with Jayasena (twelfth century C.E.) that a firm attribution is made. Third, the linguistic evidence is highly approximate and largely depends upon unsure relative dating. It clearly needs much further research, but even then it would be unlikely to yield any chronological certainty.19 Schubring, however, in his article 'Kundakunda echt und unecht',20 compares the form and style of the Atthapahuaa collection of texts (which are attributed to Kundakunda) with the form and style of other texts, particularly the Samayasara. By 16 Chatterjee p. 325. 17 Upadhye p. ii. 18 See ibid. p. xl. 19 See F.W. Thomas, intro. to Faddegon's trans. (Kundakunda (3)] 1935, p. xix. Thomas puts Kundakunda in the third or fourth century C.E.; cf. P.S. Jaini, JPP p. 79, who favours the second or third century. See also Frauwallner 1973, p. 183 - fourth century C.E., Caillat 1987, p.508, dates Kundakunda to the first century C.E. without comment. 20 Schubring 1957, pp. 537-574.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 95 doing so, he shows that the Atthapahuda texts are much younger. He concludes, therefore, that the Atthapahuda should no longer be considered a product of the classical period of Digambara literature and should not be classified as a work by Kundakunda.21 From their relative freedom from Apabhramsa forms, he takes works such as Samayasara, Pravacanasara, and Pancastikaya to belong to a genuine Kundakunda, whom, elsewhere, Schubring dates to the 2nd-3rd century C.E.22 None of this, however, brings us closer to a convincing date for the author(s) / redactor(s) of the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara. As Upadhye admits, 'we have to grope in darkness to settle the exact date of Kundakunda'.23 There is, however, some internal evidence as to the nature and chronology of these texts. E.H. Johnston in his study of early Samkhya notes in passing that: Kundakunda's use of the terms parinama and paramanu are more appropriate to a date in the neighbourhood of the third or fourth century A.D., and similarly in the Samayasara .... 124, 127, and 356-361, he refers to the Samkhya doctrine of the connection between soul and prakrti in language that could hardly have been used at a much earlier date.24 My own research shows that the technical way in which the term samaya itself is used in the Samayasara indicates a relatively late date (early fifth century or later) for that text.25 Furthermore, the way in which Kundakunda uses the two truths doctrine (vyavahara-naya and niscaya-naya) seems much closer to Sankara's distinction than to the 21 Ibid. p. 574. 22 Schubring 1966, p. 36. Upadhye accepts the Pahudas as genuine Kundakunda (see pp. xxvi-xxxvii), but Schubring convincingly dismisses this (1957, pp. 567-568). 23 Upadhye p. xix. 24 Johnston p. 14, fn. 1. 25 See below, p. 233ff.

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96 Harmless Souls Buddhist one. This alone might make one wonder how early parts of the Samayasara can be dated. And a close examination reveals that this two truths doctrine is utilised in the Samayasara in two different and ultimately conflicting ways - a clear enough indication that we are dealing with a composite text. In other words, the text as we have it has been subject to substantial modification and addition, probably as a result of non-Jaina philosophical influences. This leaves as open questions the identity and date of the 'original' Kundakunda. But even if it were possible to answer these, it is unlikely that our understanding of the texts as we have them now would be significantly advanced. Moreover, my purpose here is to chart a particular development within Jaina thought and religion, and to define its practical limits. And for that project a cursory inspection of the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara shows that they are related within the same broad tradition, and so may be fruitfully examined in tandem regardless of specific authorship. Nevertheless, within that context, it is important to bear in mind the above problems and to assess each work, and even to some extent each gatha, individually. As Upadhye admits, 'the compilatory character of Kundakunda's works nullifies the criterion whether a gatha fits a particular context or not'. 26 He goes on to say that the available manuscripts are all accompanied by various commentaries and so are already 'under the bias' of particular commentators.27 In this respect, I shall refer in particular to the first extant commentaries on the Pravacanasara (the Tattvadipika) and the Samayasara (the Atmakhyati), both by Amrtacandra, who is tentatively dated by Upadhye to the end of the tenth century C.E.28 I shall also occasionally refer to Jayasena's 26 Upadhye p. 1. 27 Ibid. p. li. 28 Ibid. pp. c-ci. Cf. R. Williams 1963, p. 24, and F.W. Thomas, intro, to Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)], p. xxiv, for other possibilities.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 97 commentaries, which were probably written in the second half of the twelfth century C.E.29 There is therefore a considerable time-lag between the texts and their first commentaries. This may not, however, be as great as has usually been thought. In what follows, I shall for convenience refer to both the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara as the works of Kundakunda, while keeping the above reservations in mind. 4.2 Upayoga At the heart of Kundakunda's soteriology in the Pravacanasara is the doctrine of upayoga (Pk. uvaoga). I shall begin this section, therefore, with a brief examination of the way in which this term is used in texts prior to, or approximately contemporary with, those attributed to Kundakunda. I shall then look in detail at the ways in which the meaning of the term was modified and developed by Kundakunda in the Pravacanasara. i) Upayoga before Kundakunda Among the earliest surviving texts there appears to be no direct reference to upayoga in the Ayaramga, the Suyagadamga, or the Dasaveyaliya Suttas. The term does appear, however, at Uttarajjhayana XXVIII.10, where it is said that the characteristic of the jiva is manifestation (or application) through (or with) 'knowledge, perception, happiness and suffering'. 30 It is not clear whether upayoga, which can have the meanings 'application', 'manifestation', 29 See Upadhye p. liv. 30 jivo uvaogalakkhano nanenam damsanenam ca suhena ya duhena ya || Utt. XXVIII.10|| Jacobi translates this as 'The characteristic ... of the soul [is] the realisation (upayoga) of knowledge, faith, happiness and misery' - 1895, p. 153. For the meaning of damsana (darsana), see p. 98, below. P.S. Jaini (JPP p. 97) defines darsana as 'insight ... into the nature of reality (along with faith in this view)'. Cf. Panc. 115, quoted p. 187, below.

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98 Harmless Souls or 'employment', should be taken here in its full technical sense of 'application' or 'manifestation of consciousness'. The passage could mean that nana, damsana, etc., are particular types of upayoga, or that upayoga is one of a number of characteristics of the jiva; but in either case it need not mean 'consciousness' as such, although the assumption among commentators and translators is that it does. In the following verse (Uttarajjhayana XXVIII.11), which has a different classificatory system, it is clear that uvaoga (upayoga) is one among a number of characteristics of the jiva, and not yet the defining characteristic: The characteristics of the soul are knowledge, faith, conduct, austerities, energy and application (uvaoga).31 This verse (11) seems to be a mixture of the prescriptive and the descriptive. It is also worth noting that damsana (darsana) can mean either 'faith' or 'perception', and although it is not clear which sense is being applied here, it is probable, since they imply each other, that it is being used in a non-exclusive way. Nevertheless, between them these two verses do contain in embryo all the elements of the later upayoga doctrine, although they are not yet or not explicitly arranged in a causal hierarchy. That is to say, they contain upayoga, jnana and darsana, as well as subha and asubha (assuming that sukha and duhkha result from punya and papa which, in the later doctrine of Kundakunda, are the products of subha- and asubhaupayoga respectively). Thus these verses clearly originate from a period before the upayoga doctrine was fully developed, despite the fact that as a whole Chapter XXVIII was a relatively late addition to the body of the - 31 nanam ca damsanam ceva carittam ca tavo taha | viriyam uvaogo ya eyam jivassa lakkhanam || Utt. XXVIII.11 || Jacobi (ibid.) translates uvaoga here as 'realization (of its developments)'.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 99 Uttarajjhayana. This is borne out by the fact that the formal division of upayoga into jnana and darsana has not yet been made here, although, as we shall see, that particular classification can be traced back at least as far as the Pannavana Sutta.32 References to upayoga in the Viyahapannatti (Bhagavati) take us much closer to the classical doctrine. At Viyahapannatti II.10a (147b) we read that the guna (essential property) of the atthikaya (fundamental entity) jiva makes possible uvaoga ('the spiritual function').33 And at II.10c (149a) it is asserted that the 'characteristic (lakkhana) of soul is the spiritual function (uvaoga)'. The soul by its own nature (aya-bhavenam) possesses will (viriya) 'which enables it to apply this spiritual function in the infinite number of possibilities (pajjava) of cognition - viz. in the domains of the five knowledges, the three nonknowledges and the three visions (damsana) - thus revealing the true nature of soul (jiva-bhava).34 At Viyahapannatti XVIII.10e (760a) the brahman Somila asks Mahavira whether he is 'one or two ... imperishable (akkhaya), immutable (avvaya) and stationary (avatthiya) or has he different forms in past, present and future (anega-bhuya-bhava-bhaviya)?' Mahavira replies that: He is all of these, since from the point of view of [the] essence [of his soul, Abhay.]35 (davv'atthayae) he is one, from the point of view of knowledge and vision (nana-damsan'atthayae) he is two; as to paesas (space-points] he is imperishable, immutable and stationary, but as to uvaoga he has different forms in past, present 32 See Schubring 1962, para.82; and below. 33 Deleu's 1970 trans. References are to his critical analysis. 34 Deleu II.10c. Cf. XII.4.4a (608a): 'The characteristic of the fundamental entity (atthi-kaya) soul (jiva) is the spiritual function (uvaoga-lakkh ...) which reveals itself in the different knowledges etc., ref to II. 10c.' For a description of these five knowledges, etc., see discussion of Panc. 41, p. 101, below. 35 I.e. according to Abhayadeva's Vitti on Viy.

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100 Harmless Souls and future. 36 Here it is interesting to note that the form of uvaoga, as 'spiritual function', is something that changes; moreover, it is essentially something that the soul changes itself.37 Viyahapannatti also uses the terms anagarovautta and sagarovautta to designate two types of uvaoga. Deleu, following Schubring's translation of sagara- and anagarauvaoga,38 renders these as 'faculty of abstract or indistinct imagination' and 'faculty of concrete or distinct imagination', respectively.39 At Viyahapannatti XXV.6.17 (899b) all classes of niyantha (monks) are said to have 'the formally distinct or the formally indistinct imagination (are sagarovautta or anagarovautta)'.40 Uvautta is the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit upayukta, meaning 'employed' or 'applicable to'; similarly, upayoga, as we have seen, can have the meaning of 'application', 'manifestation', or 'employment' (of consciousness), and these are the translations I shall prefer.41 Deleu's use of 'imagination' (see above) to translate the term seems eccentric. But at Viyahapannatti V.4 (221b) he renders uvautta as 'attentive'; and at XVIII.8.3 (755a) he gives sagara as 'formally distinct' and anagara as 'formally indistinct'. The Prakrit term agara corresponds to the Sanskrit akara, 'form' or 36 Deleu 1970. 37 Note also that jnana and darsana share the same context as upayoga here, but they are not linked as explicitly as in the TS, for instance. See below. 38 See Schubring 1962, para. 82. 39 See, for instance, Viy. VI.3.5 (257b), and XIX.8 (770b). 40 Deleu 1970. If uvautta corresponds to uvaoga then this can hardly be true of monks alone, since uvaoga is the characteristic of all jivas; it is, however, possible to use upayoga in the more limited sense of 'understanding'- see p. 102, below. 41 Frauwallner (1953, pp. 258, 287) translates upayoga by Betatigung, 'work' or 'activity'; but perhaps 'activation' / 'actuation' - and so 'awareness' (P.S. Jaini 1980, p. 223) and 'active consciousness' (Tatia pp. 55-56) would be better.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 101 'figure'; thus, taking uvautta as 'attentive', sagarovautta would be 'attentive to something with form', and anagarovautta 'attentive to something without form' (i.e. determinate or indeterminate cognition / manifestation of consciousness), corresponding to the two kinds of upayoga, jnana and darsana ('knowing' and 'perceiving').42 P.S. Jaini, following the Sarvarthasiddhi, has summarised the classical upayoga doctrine concisely.43 He states that the jiva has three main qualities (guna): caitanya, sukha and virya (consciousness, bliss and energy). Of these, consciousness is central, the distinguishing characteristic of the soul. Through the operation of this quality the soul can be the knower (pramats), 'that which illuminates both objects and itself. Upayoga is 'application of consciousness' (which Jaini refers to as 'cognition').44 It is twofold, consisting of darsana (perception, first contact, or 'pure apprehension') and jnana (comprehension of the details of what has been perceived).45 If we are looking for the origins of the technical use of upayoga to mean 'application of consciousness', it is worth noting that at Pancastikaya 41*1(42) and 41*2(43), for instance, upayoga is used in a somewhat different and apparently less embracing sense as a component part of matijnana and srutajnana (the first two types of jnana in the list of 5[8]), with the meaning of 'understanding of 42 For these see discussion of TS. 2:9 below. 43 JPP p. 104. 44 Cf. P.S. Jaini 1980, p. 223, where Jaini translates upayoga as 'awareness'. The purest upayoga (i.e. kevalajnana) is connected with the siddha, and the impurest with the submicroscopic nigoda. Thus the degree to which one's upayoga is obscured by impurity exactly reflects one's place in the karmic hierarchy (ibid.). Also see Tatia, who translates upayoga as 'active consciousness' (pp. 55-6 and p. 55, n.5). 45 For controversies over whether these are two distinct gunas of the soul or simply aspects of the one, see Tatia, pp. 70-80. And for further details of the standard use of uvaoga / upayoga, see Schubring 1962, paras. 71 and 82. For Private & Personal. Use Only

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102 Harmless Souls things' (i.e. 'application of knowledge'). Tatia comments that upayoga here means 'active consciousness', as opposed to labdhi, 'dormant consciousness':46 'soul is called upayukta v upayogavan when it is actually engaged in knowing something. Mere capacity for knowledge without actual knowledge is labdhi'.47 Although not relevant to the present enquiry, further research on this particular distinction might well shed light on the beginnings of the technical use of upayoga. Turning to the Tattvartha Sutra, we find that upayoga is again defined as the laksana, the distinguishing characteristic of the jiva. So, in referring to the jiva, Tattvartha Sutra. 2.8 reads (in its entirety): Application of consciousness is the distinguishing characteristic (of the sou!).45 In the next verse (TS. 2.9),49 application of consciousness (upayoga) is said to be of two kinds (subdivided into eight and four kinds respectively). These two categories, according to the Bhasya and the Sarvarthasiddhi, are jnana (knowledge) and darsana (perception); that is to say, application of consciousness with and without 'form'. 50 Enlarging on this, the Sarvarthasiddhi remarks that: Apprehension of the mere object (the universal) is perception, and awareness of the particulars is knowledge. These occur in 46 Tatia p. 55. 47 Ibid. p. 56. 48 Upayogo laksanam [TS 2:8). 49 Schubring 1962, para. 82, traces this back to Pannavana 29. 50 upayogo dvividhah sakaro anakaras ca jnanopayogo darsanopayogascety arthah (Bhasya on 2:9). Cf. use in Viy. above. Note also the use of sakara and anakara at Pravacanasara 2:102 to denote, respectively, the roles of the ascetic and the layperson. The two usages are clearly connected, in that while jnana can be seen to be more characteristic of the ascetic, darsana is relatively predominant in the lay person.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 103 succession (darsana and then jnana) in ordinary mortals (nonomniscients), but simultaneously in those who have annihilated karmas. 51 This accounts, in part, for the kevalin's omniscience. It also makes it clear that upayoga, when unobstructed by karmas, is instantaneous knowledge and perception (i.e. pure consciousness), the characteristic nature of all jivas attained in kevalajnana. At Tattvartha Sutra. 2.8 we have seen that upayoga is a manifestation of what it is that differentiates the jiva from the non-jiva (ajiva) - its 'jivaness' or svatattva. In sutra 2.1, however, Umasvati has described the jiva's inherent nature (svatattva) in terms of bhavas of five kinds, arising from the four types or conditions of karma plus the jiva's natural or inherent bhava (parinamika bhava), independent of karmas. According to this sutra, the five kinds of bhavas ('dispositions' or 'states of the soul') are:52 1) aupasamika - arising from subsidence of karmas (of the deluding kind), 2) ksayika - arising from destruction of karmas (of the four ghatiya, or destructive kinds), 3) misra (ksavopasamika) - arising from the destruction- cum subsidence of karmas (of the destructive kind), 4) audayika - arising from the rise of karmas (the fruition of karmas), 5) parinamika - that which undergoes modification, i.e. the inherent nature / capacity of the jiva (independent of karmas). We have already seen that at Viyahapannatti II.10c the 51 Trans. by S.A. Jain p. 56. of: sakaram jnanam anakaram darsanam iti / tac chadmasthesu kramena vartate / niravaranesu yugapat. 52 Following the SS on TS 2:1, which reads: aupasamikaksayikau bhavau misras ca jivasya svatattvam audayikaparinamikau ca.

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104 Harmless Souls jiva-bhava or 'true nature of soul' is said to be revealed through upayoga, which in turn applies itself through the five jnanas, etc. What then is the connection between the five bhavas (i.e. bhava used in a technical sense) and upayoga? Perhaps the clearest line to take is that followed by P.S. Jaini in The Jaina Path of Purification,53 where he points out that in the standard Jaina doctrine of anekanta (manifold aspects) an existent (sat) is composed of three aspects: substance (dravya), quality (guna) and mode (paryaya) - a substance being a substratum (asraya) for manifold gunas which, while free from qualities of their own, continuously undergo modifications (parinama) while acquiring new modes (paryaya or bhava) and losing old ones.54 The point to note is that bhava can be used as a synonym for paryaya. Applying this to the present case, we can see that consciousness (cetana / caitanya) is a guna of the dravya jiva; upayoga is that consciousness manifested or applied in jnana and darsana; the particular forms of jnana (such as matijnana, kevalajnana, etc. (see below]) are thus paryayas or bhavas of the guna jnana (which is really an aspect of the guna cetana). So the various kinds of jnana , for example, are bhavas or 'modifications' of the jiva, reflecting the karmic condition of the jiva at that time - which itself was brought about by previous bhavas. For this reason, bhava is sometimes translated as 'thought-activity' or 'psychological disposition', but for a Western reader this could be misleading unless it is clearly understood that bhava, as a modification or particular form of upayoga, is no more attributable to manas (mind) than is upayoga itself. (Tattvartha Sutra 2.11 is specific that there are two kinds of jivas, those with minds and those without; whereas upayoga characterises all jivas.) 'Manifestation of consciousness' and 'thought activity' should therefore be 53 Op. cit. pp. 90-91. 54 See TS. 5:29, 30, 38.

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: Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 105 taken in the sense of having consciousness (cetana) as their base (asraya). And as Kundakunda explains in his most orthodox work, the Pancastikaya [38, 39), cetana is experienced by the three kinds of jivas in different ways: one kind of jiva (in fixed organisms and plants) simply experiences the fruits of karmas (kammanam phalam ekko), another kind (embodied beings, etc. - ekko kajjam) experiences 'conative activity' as well, and another (the kevalin who is free from all physical and organic conditions) has 'pure and perfect knowledge' (nanam adha ekko).55 In short, bhavas are modifications or particular forms of upayoga. Thus by comparing the list of jnanas given in the Tattvartha Sutra with the five bhavas (listed at Tattvartha Sutra 2.1) we can see the way in which the former are all essentially modes (bhavas) of the jnana component of upayoga. The eight kinds of knowledge (sometimes divided into five right and three wrong) are as follows: 1) matijnana - sensory 2) srutajnana - scriptural 3) avadhijnana - clairvoyance 4) manah paryayajnana - telepathy 5) kevalajnana - omniscience 6) matyajnana - wrong sensory 7) Srutyajnana - wrong scriptural 8) vibhangajnana - wrong clairvoyance. Corresponding to the other component of upayoga, four kinds of darsana are usually listed with the jnanas: 1) caksurdarsana - perception through the eyes 2) acaksurdarsana - perception through the senses other than the eyes 55 Following Chakravartinayanar (Kundakunda (2)].

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106 Harmless Souls 3) avadhidarsana - clairvoyant perception 4) kevaladarsana - omniscient perception. 56 This list sometimes occurs without either kevalajnana or kevaladarsana;57 that is because these two are not strictly speaking separate types of jnana and darsana (upayoga) but the substrata of all the others - pure jnana and darsana without the impediment of karmas. Similarly, parinamika bhava is not a bhava or modification of the jiva as such, but the natural state of the jiva when it is free from karmic modification (i.e. from bhavas ).58 To put this in terms of the classical karman doctrine, 59 bhavas are states produced in the jiva by karmas. Thus five bhavas are possible in the jiva 'which can manifest themselves simultaneously in a greater or smaller number'. 60 These basic five subdivide into a total of fifty-three possible states of the jiva, among which are the different kinds of upayoga (jnana and darsana) and thus the eight jnanas. The amount or fraction of upayoga - which, it should be remembered, is the necessary characteristic of a jiva and so cannot be totally absent - is different in different beings, depending upon the degree to which their inherent kevalajnana (or parinamikabhava) is obscured by material karman. In other words, the five (fifty-three) bhavas list all the 56 See TS 1 for a detailed discussion of the kinds of jnana; also see the SS on TS 2:9, and Panc. 41 which repeats the list exactly. .: 57 See, for instance, TS 2:5. 58 In terms of Kundakunda's doctrine (see below), true bhavas (14) must be modifications of either subha or asubha upayoga; parinamika is free from karmas and thus identical to kevala- and darsana-jnana, which comprise the state of suddha-upayoga. As explained on p.103, parinamika refers to the jiva's natural or inherent bhava, independent of karman. Or to put it the other way round, being the natural condition of the jiva, it is that state which is the substratum of, or has the potential to undergo, modification under the influence of karman; but for that very reason, it is in itself free from such modification. 59 Schematised by Glasenapp p. 40ff. 60 Glasenapp p. 40.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 107 possible states of the bound soul (i.e. its karmic states). Distributed among these states are the jnanas and darsanas which make up upayoga; that is to say, since the various jnanas and darsanas (apart from kevalajnana and kevaladarsana) are essentially bhavas, they are ultimately products of karmic bondage. Before leaving the subject of bhavas, it is interesting to note that Kundakunda at his most orthodox (in the Pancastikaya) equates, in terms of their function, bhava with kasaya, and that bhava here plays the role that is taken by upayoga in the Pravacanasara.61 So Pancastikaya 147 (Upadhye's ed.; 154, SBJ edition) reads: Whatever arisen state (bhava) the impassioned self creates, auspicious or inauspicious, that state becomes the bond through that various material karman. And the following verse [Pancastikaya 148 (155)] continues: Physical combination (of karmic matter with the jiva) is caused by activity (yoga). Activity is of mind, speech and body. Bondage is caused by bhava(s); bhava(s) consist(s) of pleasure and attachment, aversion and delusion. In other words, it is yoga which causes influx of material karman, and subha and asubha bhavas, consisting of passions, which are instrumental in that karman adhering to the jiva. This is simply the standard, two stage kasaya doctrine of the Tattvartha Sutra, with the two components sometimes referred to as dravyabandha and bhavabandha (the material and efficient causes of bondage). Thus, when upayoga is substituted for its equivalent, bhava, it is clear that the upayoga doctrine performs precisely the same function in Kundakunda's soteriology as the kasaya doctrine in Umasvati's. This remains true while upayoga is 61 For bhava in the Samayasara, see p. 267ff., below.

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108 Harmless Souls characterised merely as subha and asubha, i.e. while it refers exclusively to samsaric manifestations of consciousness. However, as will become clear, when the emphasis is switched from samsaric to nirvanic, from the impure to a pure state of consciousness, and the latter is viewed as a positive state (as opposed simply to the absence of samsaric states), Kundakunda's upayoga doctrine comes to provide a radically altered perspective on Jaina theory and practice - a possibility latent in the kasaya doctrine but not activated. It is possible in this way, and with hindsight, to trace the development of the upayoga doctrine (or at least the stages in which it is presented) in Kundakunda's works. For purposes of simplification, we can point to the passages just quoted as examples of an 'earlier' strand of the doctrine, 62 before a suddha / asuddha distinction is introduced. Nevertheless, the material for the 'later doctrine' is already in place. The eight jnanas and four darsanas (the component parts of upayoga) listed above (pp.105-6) can be divided, from a soteriological perspective, into more (6-8] (asubha) or less [1-4] (subha) 'negative' states (darsana [1-3] would be 'neutral'), counterbalanced by a 'positive' state (kevalajnana and kevaladarsana). As remarked above, the latter is essentially freedom from karmic impediments, so it is not, strictly speaking, a manifestation or application of consciousness at all, rather it is the essence of the jiva unbound. Only subha and asubha upayogas are upayogas as such, since only they are the product of bhavas, i.e. of karma-controlled states. The fact, already mentioned, that kevalajnana and kevaladarsana are sometimes missing from the list of types of upayoga63 probably reflects the realisation of this, as well as giving a strong indication that this doctrine was modified over a period of time and only 62 Cf. my comments below on Pravacanasara 2:63. 63 See, for example, TS 2:5. .

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 109 reached its 'final' form with Kundakunda.64 The consequences of seeing kevalajnana and kevaladarsana combined - the latter being subsumed in the former - as a form of (pure) consciousness, as Kundakunda does in the Pravacanasara, are extensive, as I shall make clear. Here I shall restrict myself to the comment that, if it is the quality of consciousness that is instrumental in bondage and freedom (and the role of yoga [activity] has, via the two tier system of the Tattvartha Sutra and its precursors, become largely irrelevant to the actual mechanism of bondage), then it is only a relatively small step to saying that material karman's association with the jiva (i.e. bondage) is 'unreal'. For if the true nature of the soul is pure consciousness, then how can this be touched in reality by karman, which is material? And as will be seen, Kundakunda comes to assert that it is only from the vyavahara-naya that the jiva is characterised by bhavas, or subha and asubha upayoga (i.e. bondage through karmic matter); from the niscaya view, which in the Samayasara, at least, he takes to be the 'real' view, the jiva has no connection with these. Soteriology thus becomes a matter of knowing and realising the true nature of the self, by means of jnana and meditation. Tapas, on the other hand, has.- at least in theory - been down-graded. 65 Emphasis is switched from an obsession with the minutiae of the karma theory, where potentially every action has soteriological repercussions and interaction with the material world is crucial, to ways of achieving soteriological autonomy and 64 Three stages are suggested: 1) upayoga is used in the strict sense of 'manifestation of consciousness', so the state of the kevalin is not included among the jnanas and darsanas, the component parts of upayoga, 2) kevalajnana and kevaladarsana are added to the list of upayogas, 3) kevalajnana = suddhopayoga = the self, consciousness in its 'original', pure state, which is not a manifestation or application at all. 65 For a general discussion of these strands in Indian religions, see Gombrich 1988, p. 44f.

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110 Harmless Souls by-passing the karmic world altogether through the realisation of its irrelevance, or even its unreality, in terms of the essential self. In the light of orthodox Jaina doctrine such a position - although perhaps logical given the premises on which the doctrine is founded - is, to say the least, startling, and will require considerable comment once the evidence has been considered. To return to the present argument, we have seen that upayoga is the term used to designate 'application of consciousness', and that this is considered the defining characteristic of the jiva. However, so far upayoga has not been - and is not in standard expositions of Jaina doctrine which follow the Tattvartha Sutra (including most secondary sources in Western languages) - directly designated as the instrument by which the soul causes itself to be bound. Given that Umasvati in the Tattvartha Sutra identifies kasayas (passions) as the efficient cause of bondage through karma, and that kasayas need some kind of initial consciousness to engender them, then it might be inferred from the doctrines of the Tattvartha Sutra that ultimately upayoga is 'responsible for bondage.66 This is still some way from saying that it is the quality of consciousness alone which is directly instrumental on every count in binding and freeing individual jivas. This in turn is equivalent to saying that the soul is totally responsible for and in control of its own bondage or freedom, given that upayoga is the characteristic of jivas. To say so is not to maintain that particular states of consciousness cannot be, and are not, accounted for in terms of greater or lesser degrees of karmic obstruction, but that the cause of that obstruction comes to be seen in terms of the new central 'metaphor', i.e. consciousness itself, rather than in terms of particular physical activities and their consequences. And when pure consciousness is identified with an 'original', 66 Umasvati himself does not link the two, although the connection is evident from, for example, the way in which bhava is used in the same context in the Pancastikaya (see above).

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 111. pure self, this inevitably comes to undermine a theory of bondage based upon material karma. In other words, when ignorance (ajnana / avidya) of the true nature of the self becomes the overriding factor in bondage, material karman itself starts to lose reality. ii) Upayoga according to the Pravacanasara Although what I shall call Kundakunda's 'upayoga doctrine' is used repeatedly in the Pravacanasara to explain the mechanics of bondage and liberation, there is no one group of gathas in which it is systematically explained or justified in philosophical or doctrinal terms. On the contrary, it is presented as though it were a commonly accepted doctrine in need of little direct explanation. In this it demonstrates its compatibility with the nature of the text in which it occurs, since the latter has more the appearance of a mosaic of 'traditional', or earlier material, arranged on a roughly thematic basis, rather than something composed as a unity. However, as far as I know, the upayoga doctrine does not appear in this form in any recorded source prior to Kundakunda. Indeed, commentators frequently remark upon the peculiarity, or uniqueness of Kundakunda in this respect. 67 For all hermeneutic purposes, therefore, he must be taken as the originator of this particular form of the upayoga doctrine. The purpose of this compilation, at least in Books 1 and 2, is to instruct advanced mendicants (sramanas) in the discipline which leads to self-knowledge and final liberation. Book 3, insofar as it is directed at all, seems to have a different audience in mind, namely, those just setting out on the sramanas' path and advanced lay people. As I shall show, taken in the context of the upayoga doctrine of the first two books, there is, in terms of soteriology, something concessionary, and even 67 See, for instance, Tatia, p. 74.

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112 Harmless Souls contradictory, about Book 3; and this presents valuable evidence about the ways and extent to which the 'worldly' concerns of the laity were accommodated in the pattern of a largely 'internalised' ascetic soteriology. Given the unsystematic nature of the Pravacanasara, it is useful at the outset to give a schematic, if somewhat simplified version of the doctrine I shall go on to examine in greater detail in context. According to Kundakunda, upayoga, composed of jnana and darsana, is the 'self of the self, the atman of the atman. It appears in two forms, as suddha cr pure upayoga, and as asuddha or impure upayoga. Asuddhopayoga is further divided into subha (auspicious) and asubha (inauspicious) upayoga. Suddhopayoga is the characteristic of liberated and liberating states of consciousness; asuddhopayoga is the characteristic of bound and binding states of consciousness. Suddhopayoga, the soteriological ideal, is the condition achieved or aspired to by the most advanced ascetics (i.e. the most practised in terms of inner discipline). Asuddhopayoga is the condition of the majority (i.e. of ascetics short of the ideal, and of the laity). There is, however, a gradation in the quality of bondage in this latter condition, so that ascetics and advanced lay people have, or should aspire to bring about through particular kinds of behaviour, upayoga that is more subha than asubha. (At least, according to some gathas they should aspire to do so; as we shall see, it depends upon which audience is being addressed.) Upayoga is thus both instrumental in and typical of certain states of consciousness which are directly linked to both soteriological status and social role. Most importantly, it is seen to be directly and solely instrumental in bondage, something which differentiates its appearance in Kundakunda's works significantly from its use elsewhere (outlined above). In schematic form the doctrine may be

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113 Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara presented as follows: Upayoga (The 'self of the atman = jnana and darsana) Liberated and liberating (i.e. pure) consciousness Bound and binding (i.e. impure) consciousness suddhopayoga asuddhopayoga subha asubha (The condition of the most advanced ascetics and the natural state of the self) (The condition of less advanced ascetics and laity) Bearing in mind Upadhye's warning that upayoga is 'a very mobile term, whose shade of meaning slightly changes according to the context',68 I shall deal first with the general features of upayoga as described in the Pravacanasara, and then, in the next chapter, with its specific implications for the mechanisms of bondage and liberation. At Pravacanasara 2.35, the substance jiva (davvam jivam) is described as cedanovajogamao, i.e. as consisting of the manifestation of consciousness;69 and according to Amstacandra's commentary on the Pravacanasara, the Tattvadipika, this is the distinguishing characteristic (visesa-laksana) of the jiva. The Commentary adds that upayoga is a 'modification', or 'transformation' (parinama) of the jiva, which has the form of a function or mode of being of the substance (dravya-vrtti-rupa). This is consistent with texts such as Tattvartha Sutra 68 Upadhye, Index, p. 36. 69 Upadhye takes it as a dvandva compound: the jiva is 'constituted of sentiency and manifestation of consciousness'.

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114 Harmless Souls 2.8 (see above), as is the remark that the guna (the quality - i.e. unique quality) of the atman is upayoga (gunovaoga tti appano).70 Pravacanasara 2.63 reads: The self's self is manifestation of consciousness; manifestation of consciousness is said to be knowledge and perception; the manifestation of consciousness of the self is either auspicious or inauspicious. Again we see Kundakunda repeating the orthodox doctrine of, for example, Tattvartha Sutra 2.9, that upayoga consists of jnana and darsana, and the reformulation of the doctrine that upayoga is the distinguishing characteristic of the self in the epigram that it is the 'self's self (atma upayogatma). A new element is then introduced when upayoga is defined as being either subha or asubha ('auspicious' or 'inauspicious'). However, no mention is made of suddhopayoga here. In the light of the full upayoga doctrine, where subha and asubha are both classified as asuddha, this requires some comment. Amrtacandra in his commentary on the gatha (2:63) ignores this omission of suddhopayoga and takes the standard line that upayoga is divided into two, pure and impure, 71 and that of these two, while the pure is free from attachment (niruparaga), the impure has it (soparaga). The latter is of two kinds, subha and asubha, corresponding to the twofold nature of attachment, which takes the form of virtue (visuddhi) or affliction (samklesa). In the context of the Pravacanasara as a whole, and of the next gatha in particular, this expansion is quite natural. However, taken in isolation, Pravacanasara 2.63 presents a clue as to the origins of 'Kundakunda's' upayoga doctrine. I would suggest that this gatha reflects, or is part of, an earlier 70 Pravac. 2:42. 71 upayogo dvedha visisyate suddhasuddhatvena - TD on 2:63..

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 115 strand of doctrine, one which arose out of or was developed to accommodate lay aspirations, and that the division of upayoga into subha and asubha was one of the tools of this development. In brief, beneath the karmic net which characterises life-in-the-world, such a doctrine makes for a limited or impermanent hierarchy of goals and rewards, measured by accumulated amounts of merit and demerit (punya and papa) which are associated with particular types of consciousness (subha and asubha) (an association which will be examined in more detail when I come to consider the precise mechanism of bondage). For the sramana, however, whose ideal goal is total liberation from the karmic net, and thus from rebirth, consciousness directed into the world is at best a potentially dangerous irrelevance. Subha and asubha punya and papa, are equally binding for the ascetic, whose aim is to stop all 'action' (the instrument of karman), even the action of consciousness insofar as it is manifested or directed. Such a reading is borne out by the fact that suddhopayoga, when it comes to be posited in the full doctrine as the consciousness of pure ascetics, is (as one would always expect from a pollution-free state) viewed in negative terms, i.e. the term designates the absence of asuddhopayoga. As Upadhye puts it, suddhopayoga 'is not a positive spiritual something, but only immunity from the remaining two upayogas', subha and asubha, and 'upayogas are manifested by the soul because of its being associated with karmic matter'.72 In other words, suddhopayoga characterises the soul as it is in itself, free of karmic accretion. This seems to be the state which is intimated but not named or given any technical designation at Pravacanasara 2.64: 72 Upadhye p. Ixxiii.

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116 Harmless Souls If the application of consciousness is auspicious the soul accumulates merit; or if inauspicious, demerit; when there is neither (subha nor asubha ) there is no accumulation. Despite Amotacandra's commentary and Upadhye's remarks to the contrary,73 upayoga as a technical term seems to apply here only to subha and asubha. Nothing is said about a condition totally free of karman; it is merely stated that in the absence of subha- and asubha-upayoga there is no (further) accumulation. Nevertheless, it is quite natural to infer from this a kind of neutral or non-applied state of consciousness. And one may guess that when Jaina scholastics came to consider this doctrine of subha- and asubha-upayoga logically, they were led to posit a further category - suddhopayoga - which was characteristic of developed sramanas. Technically, it would seem that such a pure state of consciousness is not upayoga at all; i.e. it is not a manifestation or application of consciousness but pure consciousness itself, the parinamika bhava (of Tattvartha Sutra 2.1) in which the jiva 'experiences' kevalajnana. Thus, theoretically, it should make no difference to the behaviour of ascetics, since there is nothing additional which they must do in order to achieve it; i.e. they must continue as always to avoid the accumulation of new karman and to burn off the residue of 'old' karman. However, the fact that the instruments of bondage for lay people (subha- and asubha-upayoga) are seen as internal - states of consciousness rather than physical actions - means that any logical development of the doctrine will be in terms of 'internal' states rather than external behaviour. And this tendency was no doubt aided by the fact that, by the time it was developed logically, bondage for ascetics was already conceived of as predominantly the result of internal attitudes or 'passions' (as in the kasaya doctrine, 73 Upadhye p. Ixxii.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 117 classically formulated in the Tattvartha Sutra). That the upayoga doctrine represents the culmination and logical end of a lengthy process of 'internalisation' regarding the mechanisms of bondage and liberation, I shall argue at greater length below. Here, I wish to point out that although, technically, suddhopayoga is the absence of something and not a thing or condition to be attained as such, and that theoretically its articulation should make no difference to the behaviour of sramanas, in practice it quickly begins to be conceived of in a positive way. And once it becomes something to be achieved, then ways other than simple avoidance of asuddhopayoga can be prescribed for achieving it. Moreover, its internal' or psychological nature, is bound to be reflected in the methods enjoined for its attainment. Thus in the Pravacanasara the development of knowledge (jnana) of the true nature of the self its essential purity), and its realisation through meditation, come to be seen as the quintessential soteriological activities of the sramana. The radical implications of this, both for the institution of the renouncer and for ascetic behaviour as previously prescribed, and the reasons why such implications were tempered or largely avoided in practice, will be discussed below as the appropriate passages from the Pravacanasara are examined in detail. A full statement of the upayoga doctrine first appears in the Pravacanasara at 1.9: When the jiva, whose nature is (subject to) modification, modifies (itself) through auspicious or inauspicious (states of consciousness), it becomes auspicious or inauspicious, then through the pure it becomes pure. According to this gatha, the jiva modifies itself (i.e. its soteriological state) through the development of three different states of consciousness, viz. auspicious (subha),

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118 Harmless Souls inauspicious (asubha), and pure (suddha), and it becomes these states to the degree that its consciousness is them. That is to say, according to this view the jiva is not essentially different from its modification (parinama). So, as the Tattvadipika (on Pravacanasara 1.9) remarks, when the atman (= jiva) modifies itself through the bhava of subha or asubha raga (passion or attachment), having modification (parinama) for its svabhava, it becomes subha or asubha, like a crystal modified by the colour of a red (raga) contiguous object. Similarly, when it modifies itself through a pure, passionless state, 74 it becomes suddha, like a crystal modified by a pure colour (in effect, an unmodified crystal). What then are the (soteriological) conditions or goals connected with these states or modifications of consciousness? At Pravacanasara 1.11 we read: When the self which has modified itself through dharma is joined to pure consciousness (sampayoga), it attains the bliss of liberation (nivvana), or if joined to auspicious (consciousness) it attains heavenly bliss. Two stages seem to be implied here. First, it is necessary to modify oneself through dharma. Dharma has been defined (at Pravacanasara 1.7) as 'conduct' (caritra), which could hardly be argued with from the orthodox Jaina point of view; however, in the same gatha, dharma is further defined as sama (sama), equanimity, and sama as the parinama of the atman in which it is free from the disturbance of moha (delusion).75 Dharma is thus not so much linked with caritra in the sense of physical activity in the world, as with a particular state of mind, sama (Sk. sama, 'tranquillity', 'absence of passion'), connected here 74 suddhenaragabhavena - TD on Pravac. 1:9. 75 mohakkhohavihino - Pravac. 1.7 (= Sk. mohaksobhavihinah). .

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 119 specifically with the absence of moha, and probably attained through some form of preliminary meditation or 'calming'.76 The second stage involves the development of suddha or subha states of consciousness, one resulting in final liberation (nirvana), the other in rebirth in a heavenly world. This at least is the sense if we take sampayoga as a synonym for uvaoga, as the context would suggest. This is what the commentary (Tattvadipika) does, in the process warning against the (heavenly) bondage attendant upon subhopayoga and enjoining suddhopayoga instead. The following gatha (1.12) lists the inevitable (de)gradations of the atman through the rise of the inauspicious manifestation of consciousness. This is contrasted (at 1.13) with the 'happiness' (suham / sukham) of those who have attained suddhopayoga, providing the first unambiguous reference in the text (as opposed to the commentary) to the technical term suddhopayoga. In the light of what follows, the description (at 1.14) of the sramana whose upayoga is suddha as one who has understood well the padarthas (i.e. the nine tattvas) and the sutras, who is endowed with self-control (samyama) and tapas, who is free from desire (vigataraga), and to whom sukha and duhkha are alike, seems more like the attempted elision of a received 'external' tradition with a more recently formulated 'internal' one than a description of the ideal embodiment of suddhopayoga as such. Gatha 1.15 emphasises the autonomy of the atman whose upayoga is pure: it becomes itself the self77 because it is free from all forms of destructive karman.78 Having reached this state, it is omniscient and known as selfexistent (sayambhu / svayambhu) (1.16). The point to note 76 For comments on Jaina meditation, see p. 185ff., below. 77 bhudo sayam evada - Pravac. 1.15 (= bhutah svayam evatma). 78 See JPP p. 115ff.

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120 Harmless Souls here is that this journey to omniscience, to total purity, is seen as the recovery or realisation of the 'real' or 'true' self, i.e. of its essentially unbound nature.79 Svayambhu (self-existent) is a resonant term in Indian religious thought, and it is probably not coincidental that the text here uses an expression with a decidedly monistic and Vedantic ring to it, one which is used in various contexts as an epithet for the highest principle.80 Returning to the condition of those who are still characterised by asuddhopayoga, we read at 1.46 that: There would be no samsara for any embodied jiva if the atman by itself, through its own nature, did not become auspicious or inauspicious. 81 In other words, bondage - life in samsara- is the direct result of particular states of consciousness which are selfgenerated. Thus the atman does not find itself bound, its condition in the world is not existentially 'given'; it has bound itself. As the commentary (Tattvadipika) puts it: 79 That it has this meaning, despite the standard Jaina doctrine that the self has been bound in matter from beginningless time (see JPP p. 107), will be made clear below. As the commentary (TD) on this gatha (1:16) remarks, from the niscaya point of view - i.e. the determined or higher, as opposed to the conventional (vyavahara) view (see p. 126, fn. 5, below) - there is no causal or instrumental relation between the self and anything else, viz. the ajiva category, including material karman (na niscayatah parena sahatmanah karakatvasambandho 'sti). : 80 See, for example, Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 2.6.3.: brahma svayambhu brahmane namah. I shall have much more to say about the condition of the sramana whose upayoga is suddha in the sections on the mechanisms of bondage and liberation. 81 It should not be thought that I am taking these gathas out of context. Gatha 1:46 provides a good example of the disjointed nature of parts of the Pravacanasara, for it is sandwiched between a gatha on the activities called ksayiki (due to the destruction of karmas) and one on the knowledge called ksayika (produced after the destruction of karmas).

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 121 If the atman itself is not transformed exclusively by its own nature, consisting of auspicious and inauspicious states, then it remains with its own pure state, without division, in every way and forever. 82 This is strikingly at odds with the standard Jaina doctrine, summarised by P.S. Jaini as follows: the soul's 'involvement with the material universe ... has had no beginning, and it is likely to continue almost indefinitely'; furthermore, the Jaina 'believes it is incorrect to imagine that the soul was once pure but later became defiled. It has always been impure, just as a seam of gold has "always" been imbedded in the rock where it is found'.83 Gatha 1.46 implies a different view - that the natural or 'original' condition of the soul is unbound. In other words, Kundakunda denies that it is an ontological given that the soul is entrapped in matter from beginningless time, without initial cause; instead, he states that the cause of bondage (being in the state of samsara) is the soul's developing by itself into subha and asubha states. And once an original cause for bondage is posited, it is possible to go beyond that and describe the state before bondage, and this becomes the original or natural condition of the soul, i.e. the state from which each individual jiva has started and to which it aspires to 'return' - in this case suddhopayoga. Furthermore, if from the individual's point 82 yadi khalv ekantena subhasubhabhavasvabhavena svayam atma na parinamate tada sarvadaiva sarvatha nirvighatena suddhasvabhavenaivavatisthate - TD. on Pravac. 1.46. As we shall see, in the Samayasara Kundakunda actually affirms this view: from the niscaya standpoint, the soul is, in every way and forever, in its own pure state. That naya is clearly not the one taken here - i.e. the soul does in some real sense transform itself - however, some important doctrinal modifications (noted below), make this gatha one signpost on the road to such a position. 83 JPP p. 107.

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122 Harmless Souls of view samsara is self-generated by the atman through its manifestations of consciousness, this not only implies that the atman is prior to samsara but also that it 'creates' samsara through its own states of consciousness (i.e. 'creates' it in the only significant sense - for itself). Taken in this way, samsara would thus be the creation of impure or 'false' states of consciousness. Given the essential purity of the soul, however, this false consciousness can only take one form, namely, delusion regarding the atman's true nature. This is indeed the case in the Pravacanasara, where moha comes to be seen as the chief agent in bondage, and is directly linked to asuddhopayoga (subhaand asubha-upayoga).84 This, as will be made clear, has radical implications for the prescribed methods of liberation, entailing release through inner transformation of consciousness and knowledge (gnosis). But before considering these, I shall now discuss the mechanism of bondage as portrayed in the Pravacanasara in greater detail.85 84 For a full discussion of this, see p. 124ff., below. 85 Whether it is possible logically to hold a view that the world - samsara - is a product of false consciousness, and that false consciousness is produced by various obscuring karmas which are themselves the material constituents of samsara, is not a problem directly confronted in these texts. However, the implication of Kundakunda's niscaya view is that false consciousness is entirely selfgenerated and thus really has nothing to do with karman at all. The vyavahara view, of course, is different; and that is enough, according to the orthodox Jaina philosophical position, to neutralise the difficulty. For a historian, however, the fact that contradiction is built into the system explains nothing; rather it is necessary to explain why such a system, with its deliberate imperviousness to argument, should have been erected in the first place. Kundakunda's 'logical' (niscaya) view, by demonstrating the position Jaina scholastics would have found themselves in without the safety-curtain of the various nayas, helps us to formulate such an explanation. For, as we shall see when we examine the Samayasara, he remained largely true to the logic of his own argument by employing the niscaya / vyavahara distinction in a

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 123 non-'contradictory', and thus, according to his critics within Jainism, one-sided and heretical way.

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The mechanism of bondage according to the Pravacanasara 5.1 The mechanism of bondage The principal passages dealing with the mechanism of bondage in the Pravacanasara are clustered in a group in Book 2 (c. gathas 2.77-2.97). The pivotal gatha here is Pravacanasara 2.81, where the question is asked, how is it possible for the non-material atman to be bound by material karman. The text in full reads: The embodied (murta, i.e. material objects), having qualities such as rupa, etc., is bound by mutual touching; the atman is quite different from [the opposite of] that, so how can material karman be bound to it? In many ways this is a crucial question for Jaina dogmatics, and no less so for Kundakunda. It was one which was probably quickly identified by opponents in rival darsanas as a weak point in the Jaina argument; and as we shall see, it may well have been Kundakunda's attempt to solve this specific problem, although perhaps more for 'internal' than 'external reasons, which first put him on the path that ends in the apparently heterodox views of the Samayasara. To understand the importance of the problem we must look at the way the argument is developed in the Pravacanasara in some detail. At 2.77 it is said that molecules (khamdha / skandha), 'capable of becoming karman', coming into 'contact' with, or 'attaining to' a transformation of the jiva, develop into the state of karman (kammabhava); but it is not by the jiva that those skandha are transformed. In other words, it is neither the jiva nor the skandha which is directly instrumental in the 'creation'

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 125 of karman (and thus bondage), but the meeting of the two, i.e. of the jiva's condition, or mode at the time, with the molecules (pudgala-skandhas). However, as the commentary (Tattvadipika) makes clear, it is the skandhas which have the potential to transform into the karman state (karmabhava), even without the jiva side of the equation. So the soul (purusa) is not the agent of the karman-state of material masses (pudgalapinda). Thus the creation of karmic bondage is defined here as the transformation of material molecules by 'contact with the modifications of a jiva, with 'contact' and transformation, and not the jiva, being the instrumental factors as such. Clearly, the particular modification of the jiva also plays a crucial role, one we shall consider later, although it is not emphasised here.2 It is this material, transformed into karman, which goes to make up the various bodies the jiva is bound into in its various births. However, as the commentary reminds us, the jiva, since it is not material, cannot be - and therefore should not be identified with - any of these bodies.4 The soul's characteristics are then enumerated: Know that the jiva, whose quality is consciousness (cetana), is without taste, without form ('colour'), without odour; it is unmanifest (i.e. cannot be touched), without sound, beyond the range of a distinguishing or characteristic mark, and without describable configuration. [Pravacanasara 2:80] This is clearly a description of the jiva in its unbound or pure state (i.e. in Kundakunda's terms it is the niscaya view I na pudgalapindanam karmatvakarta puruso 'sti - TD on Pravac. 2:77. 2 What is meant by 'contact' in these circumstances, and thus the reason for its being placed between inverted commas, will be clarified below. 3 Pravac. 2:78. 4 TD on 2:79.

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126 Harmless Souls of the jiva).5 Nevertheless, there is something odd about such a gatha in a Jaina context. Why, for instance, is the jiva said to have no definable structure or configuration, when standard Jaina doctrine is that it has the shape of its current or, if released, final body?6 I shall have more to say about this later, but it is unlikely that it is simply a coincidence that the characterisation of the pure jiva given above could be just as well a description of the Vedantic atman-brahman, even down to the fact that it has cetana as its quality (guna). In this respect it is interesting to compare Kundakunda's characterisation with that given in, for instance, Nemicandra's Dravya-samgraha, a tenth century Digambara work referring back to the Satkhandagama and 5 Matilal points out that Kundakunda's dual classification (vyavahara- and niscaya-naya) 'has no direct connection with the usual seven standpoints of the Jainas, but corresponds to the ... distinction of two levels of truth in Madhyamika Buddhism' or the same distinction made in Sankara's school of Advaita Vedanta. This view, which is peculiar to Kundakunda and those following him, describes the soul from the niscaya standpoint 'as independent, self-existent and uncontaminated by matter. This is the truth in the ultimate sense, a goal to be arrived at the final stage (sic.)'. But the vyavahara standpoint 'describes the soul as one that is involved in karma as well as in the birth and re-birth cycle (samsara)' (1981, p. 43). I shall discuss this distinction and the ways in which Kundakunda uses it at length when I deal with the Samayasara - see p. 239ff., below. Samsthana is the term used, for example, at TS. 8.11 to denote the figure of the body. There are, however, other instances of this kind of description; thus in a passage in the Ayaramga-sutta the liberated self is held to be indescribable: aruvi satta, apayassa payam natthi - 'its essence is without form; there is no mark for what is without mark' (quoted by P.S. Jaini, JPP p. 271, fn. 41., who translates, 'there is no condition of the unconditioned'). On the dimensions of the jiva, see JPP pp. 58ff., 102, 269. As P.S. Jaini remarks, it is only the Jainas who posit a soul that is at the same time 'nonmaterial and yet subject to contraction and expansion when in its mundane state and is therefore 'of the same dimension as its body (sva-deha-parimana)' [JPP p. 58). So this is part of the same problem as that raised at Pravac. 2:81.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 127 the Kasayaprabhrta, the only works designated canonical by the Digambaras. There, a kind of composite view of the soul is given which includes the characteristic of its being the size of its body; and when the niscaya view is raised it simply designates the soul as that which has cetana: It (the soul) is (1) jiva (that which lives); (2) possessed of upayoga ...; (3) amurta (immaterial); (4) karta (the doer of all actions); (5) sva-deha-parimana (of the size of its body, which it completely fills); (6) bhokta (enjoyer of the fruits of actions); (7) samsara-stha (located in the cycle of death and rebirth); (8) siddha (in its perfect condition a siddha); (9) urdhvagati (of an upward tendency). That which in the three times has four pranas, viz. senses, power, vitality, and respiration, is conventionally soul; but from the essential point of view that which has consciousness is soul.? The term 'niscaya' is used here merely to designate the focused or narrow view of the essential characteristic of the soul; and unlike the niscaya view given at Pravacanasara 2.80, it does not contradict the vyavahara, or conventional Jaina view. That the niscaya-naya of the Pravacanasara is apparently irreconcilable to the conventional naya does not, of course, disqualify either according to Jaina 'logic'; however, I shall have more to say about this when I discuss the possible reasons for the development of the naya doctrine and Kundakunda's unconventional, not to say 'heretical' reading of it, below. 7 jivo uvaogamao amutti katta sadehaparimano bhotta samsarattho siddho so vissasoddhagai || 2 || tikkale cadu pana imdiyabalamau anapano ya| vavahara so jivo nicchayanayado du cedana jassa || 3 || Nemicandra's Dravya-samgraha, quoted by J.L. Jaini 1940, p.83; his translation with alterations. I am unable to translate vissasa, but it is probably connected with (Sanskrit) visvanc, 'going in all directions'. That is to say, the soul, depending upon its karmic condition, is capable of going in any direction on the death of the body, although its inherent tendency is upward. It may be that vissasa is a corrupt reading.

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128 Harmless Souls Returning to the Pravacanasara, we come again to the crucial question (at 2.81), how can the immaterial soul be bound by material karman? The fact that this question is being asked at all is highly revealing of the shift in doctrinal emphasis, one which, as we shall see, entails or accompanies a shift in practice. For according to standard Jaina doctrine there is no need to make such a query, since it is an existential fact - a 'given' - that the jiva has been entrapped in matter from beginningless time. As we have noted above, and as P.S. Jaini points out, the Jaina envisions his soul's 'involvement with the material universe' as having had no beginning. Furthermore, he 'believes it incorrect to imagine that the soul was once pure but later became defiled. It has always been impure ... !8 Thus, the received doctrine points to a question which is more practical than theoretical, viz. how can what is impure be made pure? If, however, you try to account for the fact that the jiva is, or appears to be bound, first you must assume some primal or 'original' state in which it is not bound, and then attempt to show what is demanded by this particular question (Pravacanasara 2.81), namely, how is it that the pure can become, or appear to be, impure? This is easy enough to answer when the two have the same ontological basis (a white sheet can be covered in mud), but when they have no such common ground, one being material and the other not, then a logically satisfactory answer such as might silence an opponent is going to be much harder to formulate. As the Tattvadipika (on 2.81) puts it: with embodied, material substances (murtayor ... pudgalayor) which have rupa, etc., mutual bondage due to particular touch (i.e. to the state of being smooth or rough / sticky or dry (snigdha or ruksa]) is recognised;9 but how can the atman, being incorporeal (amurta), and so without 8 JPP p. 107. 9 snigdha-ruksatva-sparsavisesad-anyonyabandho 'vadharyate - TD on 2:81.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 129 particular contact or touch, stickiness or dryness, be connected with material karman (karmapudgala) which has those qualities? To see how Kundakunda (and Amrtacandra) attempt to answer this question, we must look in detail at the gathas following Pravacanasara 2.81.10 At 2.82, we are told that although the jiva is without rupa, etc. (as enumerated at 2.81), itself, nevertheless, it sees and knows (pecchadi janadi) substances (dravya) which have rupa, etc., and that the mechanism of bondage is analagous to this. Thus the jiva, which consists of upayoga, having attained to various objects (of the senses), is infatuated, attached or averse, and so it is combined with them.11 The Tattvadipika (on 2.83) explains that the atman, composed of upayoga, meeting with various distinct forms / objects, betakes itself (samupaiti; sam-upa- vi) to moha, raga, or dvesa. And because the innate nature of the atman (atmasvabhava) is 'coloured' (uparakta) by moha, etc., which are conditioned or modified by the 'other' (parapratyaya) (i.e. the ajiva, the 'various objects'), like a crystal gem whose nature is coloured by the objects close to it, so the atman becomes itself 'bondage' (bandha) because it is paired with their natures (tadbhavadvitiyatvat). The gist of this seems to be that passions are generated in the atman by proximity to objects, that such passions are modifications of the upayoga which characterises the atman, and that this is what constitutes bondage. In other words, the atman binds itself through its own upayoga. On the one hand, this gatha and its commentary seem to be harking back to earlier ideas about the soul being 10 Since there is a good deal of repetition in these verses, in what follows I shall rely more on summary than direct quotation; the relevant gathas are Pravac. 2:81-2:97. 11 Pravac. 2:83. There is some ambiguity here over whether tehim refers to the sense-objects or to the passional states; Upadhye translates it as referring to the latter, although it amounts to the same thing.

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130 Harmless Souls 'coloured' (the lesya doctrine) which strongly suggest that the soul was once viewed in material terms, while on the other hand, the very idea of bondage seems to have been lifted out of the sphere of material karman altogether: the soul now binds itself through modification of its manifestation of consciousness. 12 Such modifications are said to be brought about by contact with or proximity to material objects; yet the mechanism of this is not explained; at the level of contact the problematical gap between the material and the immaterial remains. However, it looks very much as though bondage has in effect been dematerialised. For if it is the particular manifestation of the immaterial soul's own consciousness which is instrumental in bondage, what place is there for the original karman theory?13 The only answer is that it is the particular upayoga which 'causes' the karmic particles to adhere to the jiva (i.e. upayoga has the same role as kasaya does in the classical theory), but this only returns us to the original problem: how can what is immaterial - a state of consciousness characterising an immaterial soul - be instrumental in its own bondage by matter? A close reading of Kundakunda and Amrtacandra suggests that they were aware of these problems. In particular, the epistemological divide between the vyavahara and the niscaya views, with Kundakunda's peculiar interpretation of this division (which becomes so evident in the Samayasara), provide them with a possible route out of this impasse. But as we shall see later, this way offers such a threat to the whole tradition of Jaina doctrine and practice that, with the exception of the Samayasara, it cannot be 12 On lesya see, for instance, Utt. XXXIV and Jacobi's footnote on Utt. XXXIV.1 (1895, p. 196) which quotes the same metaphor of the crystal (sphatika) from the Avacuri with regard to the lesya's influence on the soul. See also Schubring (1962) para. 97-98. 13 Although, as we shall see below, Kundakunda and Amrtacandra are reluctant to admit this: according to the niscaya view, jiva is the instrumental cause of material karman, and the material cause of its own modifications.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara openly entered into or allowed to go beyond implication. Pravacanasara 2.84 confirms that it is by the (internal) state or attitude (bhava) with which the jiva sees and knows objects that it is stained (rajjadi), and it is this state which is instrumental in bondage. According to the commentary (Tattvadipika), this bhavabandha corresponds to, or represents, snigdha and ruksa, i.e. it takes the place of the material instruments of bondage. Thus dravyabandha is controlled or modified by bhavabandha.14 To put it simply, bhava is what counts in bondage, dravya cannot be bound without it. 15 131 At Pravacanasara 2.85 it is reiterated that whereas bondage between material atoms takes place through touching (sparsa), bondage of the jiva takes place through passion (raga, literally, the act of colouring); moreover, pudgala and jiva are said to be bound together by 'mutual interpenetration' (annonnassavagaho). As the next gatha (2.86) makes clear, this last part refers to the standard Jaina doctrine that pudgala and jiva / atman do not touch in bondage but occupy the same space: The self has space-points; material bodies enter into those spacepoints. They remain there as fit; they go [or] they are bound. This takes us to the heart of the problem, succinctly diagnosed by P.S. Jaini when he explains that: Jainas view the soul's involvement with karma as merely an "association" (ekaksetravagaha, literally, occupying the same locus); there is said to be no actual contact between them, since this would imply a soul which was, like karma, material by nature. Just how a non-material thing can in any way interact with a material one is not well clarified. The texts simply suggest that we can infer such an association from our own "experience" of 14 atha punas tenaiva paudgalikam karma badhyata eva, ity esa bhavabandhapratyayo dravyabandhah - TD on Pravac. 2:84. 15 Cf. TD introducing 2:87, below.

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132 Harmless Souls bondage, just as we infer the association of an immaterial consciousness and a material object from the experience of perception. He then refers to the passage from the Pravacanasara and the Tattvadipika (2.82) which we have noticed above. 16 The attempts of the Tattvadipika to explain the fact of bondage, given these conditions, merely circle the conundrum without engaging it (and it is difficult to imagine what solution could be offered to a problem expressed in such terms). Thus the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.86 'explains' that the atman has innumerable space-points (pradesa), equal to those of the inhabited universe (lokakasa);17 within those pradesas the soul vibrates, depending on the 'atom groups' (vargana) of body, speech and mind. Karmic material, having a similar vibration (parispanda), enters the pradesas and remains there. Then, if the soul is in a state (bhava) of moha, raga and dvesa, it is also bound. (In addition to the problem of how a bhava brings about material bondage, here there is also the question of how material atoms can 'cause the immaterial soul to vibrate.) The Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.85 claims that the modifications (paryayas) of raga, moha and dvesa are limiting adjuncts (upadhikas) in relation to the jiva, and that their oneness with the jiva constitutes bondage. Moreover, the bondage (interpenetration of jiva and karmapudgala is merely the occasion (nimitta) of their mutual modifications, i.e. they modify themselves, not each other. 18 Quite how this process is set off is again not explained. The commentary (Tattvadipika) on Pravacanasara 2.82 related this directly to the upayoga doctrine, explaining 16 JPP pp. 113-114. 17 On this, see JPP p. 102. 18 jivakarmapudgalayoh parasparaparinamanimittamatratvena visistatarah parasparam-avagahah sa tadubhayabandhah - TD on Pravac. 2:85.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 133 that, although the self, because it lacks touch due to its absence of rupa, has no union with karmapudgala, the vyavahara view of bondage by karmapudgala is 'proved' (sadhaka) by the union with states of raga, dvesa, etc., 'based upon a manifestation of consciousness conditioned by karmapudgala existing in the state of being immmersed in the same space [as that occupied by the self]'.19 In other words, karmapudgala, occupying the same pradesas as the jiva, brings about (subha or asubha) upayoga (raga, dvesa and moha), which is instrumental in bondage. Thus, according to the vyavahara view, it is still material karman, or dravyabandha, which 'causes' bhavabandha (particular manifestations of consciousness); so it is karmapudgala which is ultimately responsible for bondage. The niscaya view here, on the other hand, is that it is bhavabandha (upayoga, etc.) which is the cause of dravyabandha and thus the initiating cause of bondage. That is to say, it is the self-transformation of the jiva into states of upayoga characterised by raga, etc., which 'sets off the transformation of karmapudgala and brings about bondage. (I shall have more to say about this below.) This niscaya view is given in the Tattvadipika at 2.86, and again in the introduction by Amrtacandra to the next gatha (2.87).20 The actual text (Pravacanasara 2.87) is less technical but quite clear: The impassioned self binds karman, the self free from passion is freed from karman: this is the summary statement of the bondage of souls know this in reality. The Tattvadipika comments that the jiva free from raga 19 atmano nirupatvena sparsasunyatvan na karmapudgalaih sahasti sambandah, ekavagahabhavavasthitakarmapudgala karmapudgala nimittopayogadhirudharagadvesadibhavasambandhah bandhavyavaharasadhakas tv asty eva - TD on Pravac. 2:82. 20 dravyabandhasya bhavabandho hetuh - TD on 2.86. atha dravyabandhahetutvena ragaparinamamatrasya bhavabandhasya niscayabandhatvam sadhayati - TD intro. to 2.87.

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134 Harmless Souls not only fails to bind fresh (abhinava) karman, but it also rids itself of old karman, and so liberates itself (i.e. absence of raga functions as both samvara and nirjara). It is clearly, therefore, modification into attachment (ragapari nama) which is the 'real' bondage (that is to say, according to this view, it is the prime or ultimate cause of bondage). What precisely is being claimed here, and what are we supposed to understand by the use of vyavahara and niscaya in this context? In an attempt to clarify this, I shall construct a theoretical model to test against the text. And it is worth remembering that, freed from the commentary, this section of the Pravacanasara has all the appearance in its present form of being a compilation of gathas on bondage, and so may represent different layers of doctrine. First, it should be noted that Pravacanasara 2.97, which draws the line under this section on bondage, says that this description of the bondage of the jiva has been preached by Arahants for yatis (ascetics) from the niscaya point of view, whereas another point of view, the vyavahara one, is preached for others (i.e. the laity). In other words, this is a teaching aimed specifically at sramanas. The vyavahara view, which is not preached here, is, as we have seen, outlined in the commentary (Tattvadipika) on 2.82. It amounts to this: dravyabandha (karmapudgala) is the cause of bondage, for it is karmapudgala, through occupying the same pradesas as the jiva, which brings about the modification of consciousness (upayoga) into raga, dvesa and moha (subha and asubha),21 which in turn is the cause of further bondage (i.e. it 'sets off the binding of further karman). The niscaya view is that it is bhavabandha (subha- and asubha-upayoga) which is the cause of bondage, since, although karmapudgala occupies the same pradesas as the jiva, there is no contact (sparsa) between the two. Rather, their contiguity 'sets off' in the jiva self-transformations into 21 See Pravac 2*88.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 135 states of upayoga, characterised by raga, dvesa and moha, and these alone cause karman to bind the jiva.22 (What is meant by 'karman' in this case will be discussed below.) The content of these two views can be combined or reconciled in a circular model, in function not unlike the paticca-samuppada of the Buddhists. That is to say, karman causes transformation of consciousness, causing (new) karman to be bound, causing (further) transformation of consciousness, causing (new) karman to be bound, etc. The vyavahara and the niscaya views both turn this circle into a chain. The difference between them is that, from the vyavahara perspective, karmapudgala is the initiate cause of bondage (although strictly speaking dravyakarman is beginningless, corresponding to the standard Jaina view of the predicament of the jiva in samsara, that it has always been bound), while, from the niscaya perspective, it is upayoga which is the initiate cause.23 The vyavahara view is spelt out at Pravacanasara 2.29: The soul, tainted by karman, attains to a modification which is connected with karman; thus karman adheres; therefore karman is a modification (of the soul).24 The Tattvadipika on this gatha explains that the modification (parinama) of the atman is the cause of material karman adhering (dravyakarmaslesahetuh), and the cause of this parinama is itself dravyakarman. This is not, however, the 'fault' (dosa) of 'mutual dependence' (itaretarasraya) because the atman, which is bound by beginningless dravyakarman, employs as its cause the prior dravyakarman.25 And because new and old material 22 See Pravac. 2:87. 23 The precise meaning of karman in the niscaya chain will be discussed below. 24 Upadhye adds, 'developed by passions etc.'. 25 anadiprasiddhadravyakarmabhisambaddhasyatmanah praktanadravyakarmanas tatra hetutvenopadanat - TD on

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136 Harmless Souls karman are effect and cause, then the modification of the self is dravyakarman, and the atman, because it is the agent of its own modification, is figuratively (also) the agent of dravyakarman.26 Here the emphasis clearly falls on material karman as the 'real' or 'first' cause of bondage, i.e. the cause which one must concentrate on removing to achieve liberation.27 The standard explanation of these two views is given in the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.97, where it is claimed that both are correct, since the dravya jiva is thought of as both pure and impure.28 For according to the standard nayas doctrine,29 these are two ways of expressing the same thing - from the point of view of substance (dravyarthika) and from the point of view of modification or mode (paryayarthika). So from the former the jiva is pure, from the latter it is impure. Here, according to the Tattvadipika on 2.97, the purity of the jiva is emphasised because it is the most effective' or 'conclusive' (sadhakatama). In other words, as a pedagogic principle, either the purity or impurity of the jiva is stressed, depending upon which audience is being addressed. To use a Buddhist term again, this might be seen as a 'skilful means' to engender the type of behaviour most required at a particular rung on the soteriological ladder. However, from a logical point of view (i.e. the point of view required in debate) this brings us no closer to answering the question raised at Pravacanasara 2.81, namely, how can the immaterial soul be bound by, or bind, material karman? Nor does it answer the variant on that question, raised here Pravac. 2:29. 26 tathatma catmaparinamakartstvad dravyakarmakartapy upacarat - ibid. 27 Cf. the niscaya view at Pravac. 2:30, where the jiva is said not to be the agent of material karman; rather its action in transforming itself is viewed as karman, therefore it binds itself. 28 ubhav apy etau stah suddhasuddhatvenobhayatha dravyasya pratiyamanatvat - TD on Pravac. 2:97. 29 See, for instance, J.L. Jaini 1940, p. 116.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 137 by the niscaya view: how can what is essentially pure transform itself into something impure? To say that at the same time it is and is not bound by material karman, depending on one's point of view, is to side-step the question. To be clear about this, the naya view is not the tautological one that, from the standpoint of the liberated jiva, there is no bondage by material karman, while, from that of the unliberated soul, there is. Rather, it is saying that at one and the same time the jiva is bound and not bound by karmapudgala, depending on one's point of view. This is in many ways a risky concession; to say that there is a viewpoint from which the jiva is unaffected by material karman, here and now in samsara, even if the purpose of such a statement is primarily prescriptive and is not supposed to be a complete view, is to open a vista upon a potentially very different soteriological route. It is this path, as we shall see, that Kundakunda takes in the Samayasara through his use of a vyavahara / niscaya distinction which has more in common with Madhyamika Buddhism and even more with Advaita Vedanta than with the Jaina philosophy of Anekantavada. Here, we can come closer to understanding the origins of that departure by examining further the implicit tendency of this section of the Pravacanasara on the mechanism of bondage. As we have seen, the niscaya-naya is one attempt to break out of the logical impasse created by the material bondage of a non-material soul. It suggests that, at some level, the soul binds itself, which, if it is non-material, would seem to be the only intelligible explanation for the fact of bondage. (Although this, of course, raises other theoretical problems.) However, Jainism as a religion, as opposed to a philosophy, needs at the same time to keep the connection with material karman, which is the basis of all its ethical and ascetic practices. This connection is provided by the vyavahara-naya. As an ungenerous opponent might remark, the naya doctrine seems like a Jaina attempt both to have their material karman and to

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138 Harmless Souls destroy it. It might be objected here that karman, although not an initiating cause, is still an essential component in the mechanism or chain of bondage according to the niscaya view. To see whether this is really the case, we must make a closer examination of the relevant gathas in the Pravacanasara. As we know, the niscaya view is that when the soul is attached or impassioned (ratta) it binds karman, and that when it is free from raga it is free from karmas (Pravacanasara 2.87). Expanding on this, the next gatha (2.88) states that bondage comes from modification, which consists of attachment (raga), aversion (dosa), and infatuation or delusion (moha).30 Delusion and aversion are inauspicious, attachment is either auspicious or inauspicious (depending upon whether it takes the form of purification (visuddhi) or defilement (samklesa) [Tattvadipika]). Pravacanasara 2.89 continues: It is said among ignorant people (annesu) that the subha modification is merit (punya), the asubha is demerit (papa). The modification that does not result in anything else is, according to the Jain religion, the cause of the destruction of duhkha. In other words, while asuddhopayoga is the cause of punya and papa, the cultivation of suddhopayoga leads to liberation.31 Next (at 2.90), it is affirmed that the jiva is essentially different from its embodiments in the six classes of living beings, whether immobile (sthavara) or mobile (trasa). For as the Tattvadipika puts it, among these six classes of embodied jivas, there are other substances (viz. pudgala, etc.), whereas the atman is its own substance.32 30 Cf. Pravac. 1.84. 31 Compare this with 2:64 (quoted above), which is probably the gatha which 2:89 refers back to, where it is clearly stated that it is upayoga which accumulates karmic residue (merit and demerit). 32 atra sadjivanikayatmanah paradravyam eka evatma sva

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 139 We now come to a crucial gatha [2.91]: Who does not know thus the paramatman, encountered in their own natures, conceives through delusion the idea 'I am (this), this is mine'. This gatha has a number of ambiguities; for instance, paramappanam apparently refers to the Paramatman - a neo-Vedantic term possibly used by Kundakunda at 2.102 (see below), and frequently employed in the Tattvadipika, especially on Book 1 - rather than to the ajiva and the jiva (which is the way Upadhye takes it). However, the general meaning is clear: whoever does not know the essential nature of the atman - its difference from its embodiments - comes to have the delusive idea that what is in reality not himself - the ajiva or para - is himself; he confuses two totally separate categories. This cognitive or epistemological confusion about the true nature of the self is, as we have seen (2.88), a self-transformation of the jiva (asubhopayoga), said to have been 'set off by contiguity with material karman, although the mechanism of the latter cannot be explained (and, as I shall suggest, is not really needed according to the logic of the internalised system). In short, delusion (moha) is at the beginning of the causal chain of bondage; for if the soul is not really connected with ajiva (including karman) then only moha can 'persuade it to think that it is. However, moha itself, in the standard explanation, is a result of material karman. If this is how Kundakunda views moha - i.e. if material karman is still playing an instrumental or catalytic role in bondage because of the inexplicable reaction of the jiva to its contiguity - then one would expect freedom from moha, etc., and thus from bondage, to result from the destruction or obstruction of material karman. However, according to the Pravacanasara, it is meditation on the fact of the dravyam - TD on 2:90. Note the typically Vedantic distinction here between jiva, embodied soul, and atman, pure or essential soul.

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140 Harmless Souls complete separateness of the pure self, and thus the realisation of that fact, which brings about freedom from moha, and liberation; nothing is said about material karman, all is internal. To illustrate this point, it is necessary to trespass a little on themes I shall consider in their full context and at greater length in a later section, 'The mechanism of liberation'. There is a clear connection between the description of the jiva subject to moha at Pravacanasara 2.91 and gathas 2.98 and 2.99. Pravacanasara 2.98 reads: He who does not abandon the idea of 'mine' with regard to body and possessions - (thinking) 'I am (this), this is mine' - gives up the state of being a sramana and becomes one who has resorted to the wrong road. And 2.99 provides the antithesis to this, i.e. it describes the attitude of the sramana: He who meditates in concentration, thinking 'I am not others' and they are not mine; I am one (with) knowledge', comes to be a meditator on the (pure) self. At Pravacanasara 2.100, the self, which in meditation 'I' know to be myself, is described as being constituted of jnana and darsana, an object beyond the senses, eternal (dhuva), unmoving (acala), without support (i.e. independent) (analamba), and pure (suddha). Bodies, possessions, happiness, suffering, enemies and friends are not the 'eternal associates of the soul' (jivassa na samti dhuva);3 ;33 the self whose self is upayoga is eternal (dhuvovaogappago appa), i.e. the pure self (2.101). Knowing this (its true identity), the pure self meditates on the highest self (the paramatman) / the self and the other (the non-self),3 ,34 with formed or formless thought, and so 33 Upadhye's trans., p. 23. 34 TD translates as paramatman, the Prakrit text prints param

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 141 destroys the evil (literally, 'very difficult') knot of moha (khavedi so mohaduggamthim) [2.102]. And he who has overcome this knot of delusion, having destroyed raga and dvesa (which, as the Tattvadipika points out, have moha as their root), being indifferent to pleasure and suffering, attains to undecaying happiness (sokkham akkhayam), i.e. liberation (2.103). This whole passage is, of course, redolent of Vedanta. Here, I simply want to point out that liberation is seen to be attained not by the destruction of that karman which (very tenuously) has been said to bring about moha, but by the destruction of moha itself through meditation on the essential purity and complete separateness of the soul. In other words, it is lack of knowledge of the true nature of the self which really constitutes moha; consequently, it is the knowledge (gnosis) and realisation of the self's true nature which banishes moha (asuddhopayoga) and, by revealing and realising the inherent purity of the soul, accomplishes liberation. The role of material karman in this mechanism of bondage and liberation has thus for all significant purposes been forgotten. And it can be forgotten because the logic of the system no longer requires it. I refer to 'material' karman because its function has actually been taken over by immaterial asuddhopayoga / moha, caused, in the niscaya view, by the jiva's self-transformation. As the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.91 puts it: Therefore the instrumental cause of the soul's connection with other substance is merely the absence of an accurate distinction between what is self and what is other.35 In other words, given that the cause of the jiva's connection with other substance is the delusion that the soul appagam, two separate words, but how this is translated makes no difference to the present argument. 35 ato jivasya paradravyapravsttinimittam svaparaparicchedabhavamatram eva - TD on Pravac. 2:91.

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142 Harmless Souls is involved with the non-soul (including material karman), then the implication is that, since in reality the jiva has no connection with anything material, it cannot in reality be bound by karman. To believe otherwise amounts to moha, and it is this which is the 'fact' of the soul's bondage. Consequently, the belief that material karman can bind the non-material soul takes over karmapudgala's binding (i.e. its only) function, and Kundakunda has, in effect, internalised or dematerialised karman; bondage is now a matter of delusion, a false attitude manifested in a feeling of possessiveness with regard to the material (everything that is ajiva).36 The emphasis on moha, defined as the delusion that the self and the 'other' have any connection with or influence on each other, renders any 'two-cause' system of bondage - whatever the material and instrumental causes - effectively redundant. For how can something which does not and cannot really have any connection with what it is supposed in part to act upon be cited as a cause, material or otherwise? Furthermore, since it is the self's contact with paradravya, including material karman, that is a delusion, then it is paradravya / material karman that becomes, from the soteriological perspective, an irrelevance: in the characterisation of the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.101, 'unreal' (asat).37 In short, the stress on moha points to a solution to the problem of bondage beyond that attempted through the standard use of the vyavahara / niscaya distinction. (The way in which moha arises, whether it is self-generated and how, or whether it is, like the Vedantic avidya, inexplicable, is not dealt with in this text; and for practical purposes it is probably considered 36 In this context, we may recall gatha 1.46 (quoted p. 121, above): 'There would be no samsara for any embodied jiva if the atman itself, through its own nature, did not become auspicious or inauspicious.' Again this puts the 'blame' for bondage squarely on the atman itself; the process is self-contained and internal. 37 For comments on this, see below.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 143 irrelevant.) In this way, Kundakunda has silently rid himself of an embarrassment, since, to make logical sense of bondage when karman and the jiva belong to two ontologically different categories (the material and the immaterial), he had two options: either to make the jiva material (and so revert to what may have been the very origins of Jaina doctrine) or to make karman immaterial. That he has, in effect, chosen the latter is borne out by evidence from both the Pravacanasara itself and the Tattvadipika. Thus the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2.97,38 when it gives the niscaya view, actually refers to karman as though it were non-material: 'karman of/ for the atman is modification into attachment'; 'it is duality of merit and demerit'. 39 In other words, karman - what binds - is, from this perspective, not something material (pudgala), but the modification of the immaterial self into states of consciousness (subha- and asubha-upayoga) such as raga , which are meritorious or demeritorious. It is because the atman is the agent (karta), as it is also the appropriator (upadata) and relinquisher (hata), of modification into attachment, etc., that the latter is seen as its karman.40 This is stated explicitly by Kundakunda at Pravacanasara 2.30, where it is said that: The self itself is modification, and such modification is held to be action which consists of jiva; action is known as karman, therefore the self is not the agent (of material karman). The Tattvadipika explains that, from the higher view, the atman is the agent of that bhava-karman which is in essence the modification of the self, but it is not the agent of dravya-karman which is in essence a modification of 38 Cf. Pravac. 2:29-30 and TD. 39 ragaparinama evatmanah karma, sa eva punyapapadvaitam - TD on Pravac. 2:97. 40 ragadiparinamasyaivatma karta TD on Pravac. 2:97.

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144 Harmless Souls matter.41 Similarly, at Pravacanasara 2.92, it is affirmed that while the soul is the agent of its own nature it is not the agent of all those states composed of material substances. Thus, as the Tattvadipika points out, the karman of the soul (taken here in the sense of action done by the soul, but therefore also its karmic matter, what binds it) is its own modification (svaparinama). The soul does not bring about states of matter - it is not their agent - so they cannot be its karman. For the self, therefore, karman is not modification of matter.42 And Pravacanasara 2.93 continues with the statement that, although at all times it exists in the middle of matter, the jiva neither grasps, releases, nor brings about material karmas. These two gathas (2.92-93)43 therefore offer a flat contradiction to the view (outlined above) that the soul is the instrumental cause of karman, and vice versa. That is to say, it contradicts the doctrines contained in Kundakunda's own niscaya / vyavahara distinction. Dixit, who also notices this, identifies the 'thesis' put forward in these gathas as Kundakunda's 'transition-point in his journey away from the traditional stand-point and towards the stand-point of the Samayasara'.44 Given the apparently disparate nature of much of the Pravacanasara, this is probably too specific an attribution; nevertheless, the tendency is clear. Despite the views given at 2.92-93, the next three 41 tatas tasya paramarthad atma atmaparinamatmakasya bhavakarmana eva karta, na tu pudgalaparinamatmakasya dravyakarmanah - TD on Pravac. 2:30. The vyavahara view is that it is modification of matter which is karman for the atman (pudgalaparinamatmanah karma, TD on Pravac. 2:97), and that the atman is the agent, appropriator and relinquisher of the modification of matter (pudgalaparinamasyatma karta, TD on Pravac. 2:99; Cf. 2:29 and TD, quoted above). 42 evam atmanah pudgalaparinamo na karma - TD on Pravac. 2:92. 43 Cf. Pravac. 2:68-70. 44 Dixit 1971, p. 134.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 145 gathas (2.94-96) reiterate that sometimes and somehow (either because its space-points are stained by moha, raga and dvesa [2.96], or because its association with raga and dvesa brings about a self-modification into subha and asubha (-upayoga) [2.95]), it is clung to by karmic dust. As we have already seen, there is no satisfactory explanation of this conjunction, and the Tattvadipika on these passages comes no closer to providing one. For it states that the self, being its own agent, modifies itself, and the modifications of everything not self are only the occasioning causes of self-modification. How these modifications which are not self cause self-modification when the two have no contact is not explained. It is simply claimed that matter treats the soul's self-modification as an efficient cause to modify itself into karman,45 and that this karman then enters the self through the latter's (vibratory) activity. 46 (The perfunctory introduction of yoga here seems to be a sudden recourse to an earlier strand of doctrine.) Similarly, the soul treats matter as an efficient cause (nimitta) to transform itself into various states of consciousness.47 How this transformation takes place and how karman is actually bound remain unexplained features of this circular doctrine in which matter uses its proximity to the self-modifications of the soul to transform itself, and the soul uses its proximity to the self-modifications of matter to do likewise, If I have laboured these problems, it is simply to make the point that it is the very attempt to preserve the soul's immaterial autonomy, and yet at the same time explain the fact of its bondage, which opens the door to a radically different emphasis in the theory of bondage and liberation. For it is precisely this struggle which gives rise to a perspective from which karman can - at least in some lights 45 tasya svaparinamam nimittamatrikstya - TD on 2:94. 46 yogadvarena, TD on Pravac. 2:95. 47 See TD on 2:97, and JPP p. 117ff.

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146 Harmless Souls - be viewed as immaterial.48 By stressing the niscaya view and the role of moha in the key passages on bondage in the Pravacanasara, Kundakunda implicitly acknowledges the importance of a 'dematerialised' instrument of bondage for the development of his soteriology (a soteriology which, as we shall see, is taken to its logical conclusion in the Samayasara). In this context, 'karman' as employed at Pravacanasara 2.87 - 'Know this to be the niscaya description of the bondage of souls: the impassioned self binds karman, the self free from passion is free from karmas' - may therefore be taken to mean not material karman but the 'atman's karman', i.e. the jiva's own manifestation of consciousness, (asuddha-) upayoga.49 Again looking forward to the Samayasara, and taking the niscaya view in the strictest sense of there being no contact at all between the omniscient (i.e. liberated) soul and matter, we read at Pravacanasara 1.52 that: Although knowing those objects, the soul does not transform itself ('under their influence' - Upadhye), does not grasp them, nor is it born among them; thus it is recognised as being without bondage.50 This gatha describes the condition of the liberated or omniscient soul. However, as will become clear, in the Samayasara, Kundakunda comes to view this kind of statement as the exclusive truth about the soul. In other words, it is not and has never been really bound, but has 48 See above, comments on Pravac. and TD 2:92, 2:97. 49 It should be noted that this reading also takes us closer to the way in which the naya doctrine is frequently used in the Samayasara: there, the niscaya view is that the jiva has nothing whatsoever to do with paradravya, and both the elements - niscaya and vyavahara - of the doctrine as it was introduced in the Pravacanasara now fall into the vyavahara camp. 50 Cf. Pravac. 1.32: 'The omniscient lord neither grasps, nor releases, nor transforms the other; he sees everything and knows everything completely.'

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 147 only been thought to be so through the supposition of an, in reality, non-existent relationship between jiva and ajiva.51 The corollary of this view - that the jiva binds itself through false consciousness or moha - is that it can liberate itself by attaining true or pure consciousness via meditational techniques which lead to the realisation of that fact. Since this false consciousness takes the form of a delusion that the self is in some way connected to the material world, when in fact it is intrinsically and always pure, then it is only a short step to the conclusion that the world of matter, and especially material karman, is less 'real' than the and even totally unreal. By the same token, it is possible to conclude that the soul was never really bound but only thought to be so. And these are in fact very close to positions taken by Kundakunda in the Samayasara, although, as we have seen, there are also gathas in the Pravacanasara where they are strongly suggested, for instance, at 2.101. It is worth looking briefly at Amotacandra's commentary on this last passage (Pravacanasara 2.101) as an example of the direction Jaina theory can take once karman has been effectively dematerialised. (And it is probable that the commentator uses his knowledge of the Samayasara to provide himself with an interpretative framework here.) The text reads: Bodies, goods, pleasures and sufferings, enemies and friends are not eternal for the soul (jiva). Eternal is the self (atman) that consists of upayogu. 51 The ontological status of samsara vis a vis the kevalin's omniscience cannot be entered into here; nor can there be consideration of what it can mean to 'know' something without having any relationship with it. However, the gist seems to be that the kevalin is in some sense co-extensive with samsara - even the 'creator' of it - and so, in effect, the object of the kevalin's knowledge is itself alone, the self and what it knows being synonymous. See especially Book 1 of the Pravacanasara, 1:23-1:36 (discussed below).

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148 Harmless Souls The Tattvadipika on this begins as follows: For nothing is eternal for the self which is other than the self) and which is, since any such thing is not distinct from other substances and is indeed separated from its qualities as it undergoes the influence of other substances, the basis of impurity. [It cannot be eternal) because being unreal-and-caused (asaddhetumattvena) it must have a beginning and an end in time, and because it is not self-established (paratah siddhatvat). 52 The introduction of the term asat, the 'non-existent' or 'unreal', to describe everything that is other than the self (i.e. everything that is paradravya or ajiva, including material karman) is radical, and yet, given the fact that the instrument of bondage has been internalised and the self established as absolutely different from and untouched by the 'other', not unpredictable. In other words, for soteriological purposes (and perhaps ontologically too) samsara, made up of matter, including material karman, may be treated as irrelevant. (And we may also note here that karman and bondage by karman, being non-eternal, are, in contrast to orthodox Jaina doctrine, assumed to have a beginning.) Soteriological interest is now focused entirely upon the realisation of the eternally pure atman, which is the one way of destroying the bondage of moha. As the next gatha (Pravacanasara 2.102) puts it: He who, knowing this, meditates with purified self on the paramatman (or 'the self and the other'], with formed or formless 'thought', destroys the tight knot of delusion. 52 atmano hi paradravyavibhagena paradravyoparajyamanasvadharmavibhagena casuddhatvanibandhanam na kimcanapy anyad asaddhetumattvenadyantatvat paratah siddhatvac ca dhruvam asti - TD on Pravac. 2:101. I owe the translation to Alexis Sanderson's interpretation of this passage and the TD. on Pravac. 2:100.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 149 Since the effects of dematerialising karman and of seeing the soul as eternally pure are so far-reaching, it is little wonder that the Jainas struggled, by means of the naya doctrine, to preserve at some level the orthodox views that karman is material and that the soul has always been bound by it. For, liberated by this same naya distinction, Kundakunda is veering not just towards the heterodox, but towards the heretical; his doctrines entail not only a change in Jaina theory or 'philosophy', but, more importantly, they imply wide-ranging changes in Jaina practice, and so pose a threat to the whole social structure of Jainism as an independent Indian religion. 5.2 Moha Before examining Kundakunda's mechanism of liberation in detail, it is useful to say something more about the role of what, according to parts of the Pravacanasara, has become the effective instrument of bondage: namely, moha and its attendant 'passions'. The classical position, outlined at Tattvartha Sutra 8:9, is that there are 28 kinds of deluding (mohaniya) karmas. Without enumerating all the subtypes, the basic division here is between 'perception-deluding' (darsana-mohaniya) karmas and 'conduct-deluding' (caritra-mohaniya) karmas. That is to say, mohaniya karmas produce moha or avidya by deluding the jiva with regard to its belief and its conduct; or as P S. Jaini puts it, mohaniya-karman is karman that prevents the true perception of reality and the purity of the soul'. 53 In simplified diagrammatic form the division appears as follows:54 53 JPP p. 346 (Glossary); see also ibid. p. 131. 54 For a full enumeration, see SS on TS 8:9; Glasenapp pp. 8-11; JPP pp. 118-121.

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150 Harmless Souls mohaniya, karman darsana-mohaniya-karman caritra-mohaniya -karman engenders 3 degrees of engenders the various passions, mithyatva karman (kasaya), quasi-passions (nokasaya) and their subtypes, the main division being: raga dvesa maya lobha krodha mana Jaini identifies these 'producers of delusion' as being at the heart of bondage, generating defilement which is characterised by confusion and desire and so causing the soul to become 'confused and desirous' 55 Thus, at one level, darsana-mohaniya and mithyatva karman clearly operate with regard to Jaina religious belief in general, and are explained as such. However, the same terms also carry a more specific weight. Tatia summarises this when he writes that in Jainism, the term mithyatva (perversity) is generally used to denote the idea of avidya. The terms mithyadarsana or mithyadesti (wrong view), darsanamoha (delusion of vision), moha (delusion) etc. are also used in the same sense. He goes on to say that the function of darsanamoha is to delude the soul and misguide it; under such influence the jiva accepts, among other things, the ajiva as the jiva.56 (Such a use of mithyadarsana can be found, for instance, at Tattvartha Sutra 8:1, Bhasya and Sarvarthasiddhi.)57 55 JPP p. 117. 56 Tatia p. 144. 57 It should be remembered that Jaina philosophy uses the term darsana to denote both 'doctrine' or 'belief and 'undifferentiated

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 151 Thus, as P S. Jaini puts it, the mithyatva state, eigendered by darsana-mohaniya-karman, is manifested as a 'fundamental tendency to see things other than as they really are! 58 Caritra-mohaniya-karman generates the various passions (kasaya), and these two forms of mohaniyakarman combine to produce a 'condition of spiritual stupefaction' or defilement. 59 In this state the soul is open to the influence of other types of karman, affecting its remaining qualities and, indeed, generating its state of embodiment.60 Thus mohaniya-karman is of central importance to the classical theory of bondage; and although, as Jaini points out, it cannot be given first place in a beginningless cycle, it is impossible to eliminate other karmic influences 'as long as deluding factors remain'.61 However, although the importance of mohaniyakarman can hardly be denied in the classical theory, I should like to stress that it is the second term in the compound, 'karman', upon which the emphasis falls in terms of achieving liberation from such bondage. It is the fact that it is caused by deluding-(material)-karman that is of crucial significance, not the delusion itself, which is simply the particular form that karman takes. This becomes clearer if we look at the question of caritra cognition' or 'perception' - see Glasenapp pp. 6-8. 58 JPP p. 118. 59 Ibid. p. 119. 60 Ibid. pp. 120-121. 61 Ibid. In this respect, mohaniya-karman has exactly analogous status to that held by avijja ('ignorance and a synonym for moha) in the Buddhist formula of Dependent Origination (paticca-samuppada): aviija stands first in the latter because it is the 'primary root of all evil and suffering in the world' [Buddhist Dictionary p. 31), and whereas it cannot be viewed as the 'causeless cause of the world (Visuddhi Magga XVII, 36f., quoted in ibid.), it is, figuratively speaking, a root-cause. In particular, it is the root-cause of lobha / raga and dosa, 'consequently all unwholesome states of mind are inseparably bound up with it' (ibid. p. 32). Cf. the identical Jaina view given by the TD on Pravac. 2:103.

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152 Harmless Souls mohaniya-karman in slightly more detail, and thereby also remind ourselves of the essentials of Umasvati's kasaya doctrine. In the classical theory, passion (kasaya) is said to be generated by destructive karmas of the conduct-deluding (caritra-mohaniya) kind. Passion is two-fold, consisting of aversion (dvesa) and attachment (raga); 'the former is always divided into anger (krodha) and pride (mana) and the latter into deceitful manipulation (maya) and greed (lobha)'62 It is the passions which produce pramada ('carelessness') and thus himsa, i.e. the latter is the product of volitional activity motivated by passion.63 Thus kasaya, in effect, underlies all bondage: yoga attracts karmic matter to the jiva in the first place, deciding its type and quantity, while kasaya causes it to adhere, deciding its duration and intensity (Tattvartha Sutra 8:2-3). Passion is therefore necessary for bondage to take place. As we have seen, 64 parigraha (attachment to possessions) has the same nexus of associations as kasaya in general and raga / lobha in particular. And at Tattvartha Sutra 7:17 parigraha is defined as murccha ('infatuation' or 'delusion'), i.e. the delusion that something can be 'mine', as the Sarvarthasiddhi makes clear. Although, according to the Sarvarthasiddhi, infatuation or attachment (parigraha) 'is at the root of all evils' 65 - i e. it leads to himsa, etc. - passion, nevertheless, has the controlling hand, and remains instrumental. To quote the same source, 'so the passionless person posses ed of right faith, knowledge and conduct is free from delusion (moha). Hence there is no infatuation in his case'. 66 So even when the term 'moha' is used in the 62 JPP p. 119; see TS 6:5 (6), cf. 8:1. 63 See above, pp. 54-55. 64 See above, p. 31ff. 65 tanmulah sarve dosah - SS on TS 7:17. 66 tato jnanadarsanacaritravato 'pramattasya mohabhavan na murccha 'stiti nisparigrahatvam siddham - ibid., trans. by S.A. Jain p. 199.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 153 Sarvarthasiddhi, it designates something more affective than cognitive in character, contrasting with its employment in Kundakunda as something essentially cognitive. The consequence of viewing kasaya as the instrumental cause in bondage is that the mechanism of liberation in the Tattvartha Sutra is directed towards the individual ridding himself of such passions, and thus both stopping the influx of, as well as shedding, the karmas which are caused to be bound by passions. Tapas (austerity) 'effects both (stoppage and dissociation) and ... is the chief cause of stoppage of influx'. 67 Tapas is divided into 'external' and 'internal' austerities (see Tattvartha Sutra 9:19-20). Both categories are predominantly physical in character, although meditation (dhyana) is included as the last of the internal austerities. Such meditation, however, is defined at Tattvartha Sutra 9:27 as 'concentration of thought on one particular object'. 68 It is not designed to engender gnosis or realisation of the true nature of self - in contrast to what we find in Kundakunda, where it is effectively moha, and not kasaya as such, which is seen as the root cause of bondage (see above). * In the Tattvartha Sutra, therefore, the instrumental causes of bondage are basically twofold (or, as subdivided, fourfold): raga and dvesa (maya and lobha, krodha and mana). In the Pravacanasara, however, raga is used - perhaps in a more general sense - to denote 'passion' or 'attachment', and is usually part of a threefold division of the causes of bondage, completed by dvesa and moha. Raga and dvesa are self-evidently a pair, or two sides of the same emotion; the employment of one towards one 'thing' entails the employment of the other towards another thing'. 67 ubhayasadhanatva ... samvaram prati pradhanya - SS on TS 9:3, trans. S.A. Jain p. 242. 68 ekagracintanirodha - TS 9:27 trans. S.A. Jain, p. 266.

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154 Harmless Souls And as we have seen,69 when raga is associated specifically with parigraha, and dvesa with arambha, then the former leads to or causes the latter. In the Pravacanasara and Tattvadipika, moha, the newly introduced third element, is seen as being the root-cause of the other two. 70 Why does Kundakunda add moha to the standard twofold kasaya doctrine? There are probably two related reasons: his dematerialisation of the cause of bondage (karman) (outlined above), and the influence of the standard Buddhist triad of karmically unwholesome roots (mula), viz. greed (lobha = raga = tanha), hate (dosa), and delusion (moha). It hardly needs pointing out that in a system where the jiva 'really' has no connection with matter, and where karmic bondage is seen as being essentially cognitive in nature, delusion or its synonym, 'ignorance', is likely to be suggested as the root cause of that bondage. In other words, even without the Buddhist model, some such grouping of raga and dvesa with moha was likely to have suggested itself to Kundakunda, given his stress on the total separation of soul and matter and his movement towards an immaterial karman. Moha thus has a similar role in Kundakunda's teaching to avidya in Sankara's Advaita Vedanta and avijja / moha in the Pali Canon. In the Pravacanasara, therefore, we are presented with what appears to be a less complex formulation than that given in the Tattvartha Sutra: moha is added to raga and dvesa and the three together constitute or give rise to asuddhopayoga, and are thus responsible for bondage. However, Kundakunda's formula is clearly a refinement of the classical position in terms of his upayoga doctrine, and should not be supposed to predate it. His position appears to be less complex because the prolix categorisations of the 69 See above, Part I passim. 70 See above, pp. 141-142. As in the TS it is simply mohaniyakarman which is the generating cause of raga and dvesa.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 155 underlying material karman theory have been pushed into the background or 'forgotten'. In other words, there are few indicators that every time one sees 'moha' one should understand 'material mohaniya-karman'; on the contrary, moha as used by Kundakunda has clear non-material associations, and in this respect the fact that the Jaina's formulation reproduces the Buddhist triad of 'unwholesome roots' must be the result of sympathy rather than the attempt to 'colonise' a rival doctrine through re-definition. Some of the coincidences between the two formulations have been outlined above. But in summary I would suggest that Kundakunda's employment of 'moha / avidya' is closer to the Buddhist use of the term, with its cognitive and volitional associations, than it is to the material mohaniyakarman of standard Jaina doctrine, with its ramifications for ascetic practice (i.e. its requirement of extreme forms of tapas).71 The fact that Kundakunda uses mohaniya-karman as a category at least once in the Pravacanasara,72 but prefers to concentrate on the less obviously material moha, shows both his awareness of traditional doctrine and where he chooses to lay his emphasis. Faddegon, commenting on the use of duttho / dusta (glossed by the Tattvadipika as moha) at Pravacanasara 1:43, remarks that moha, raga, and dosa | dvesa together form mohaniya-karman, and contrasts this triple division with 'the more intricate classification of mohaniya-karman' in the classical position (see, for example Tattvartha Sutra 8:9).73 While not wishing to 71 It should be noted that in Jayasena's recension of the Pravacanasara there is an extra gathi at 3:26b where the four passions are referred to in a perfectly orthodox, i.e. classical, sense. This is an exceptional case, and it is perhaps significant that it occurs in Chapter 3, which appears to be only loosely related to the first two chapters and may well have been compiled for a different purpose. 72 At 1:15 and TD; cf. 1:19 and 1:43. 73 Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)] p. 27, fn. 1. The full text of Pravac. 1:43 reads: 'The great Jinas say that portions of karmas are necessarily operating (and giving their fruit); he, who is infatuated with,

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156 Harmless Souls deny that Kundakunda's idea of moha ultimately derives from and sometimes reverts to the classical position, I would point to its role in a new formulation, its association with the upayoga doctrine, and especially its connection with realisation (jnana) and not tapas, as indicators that the emphasis in the Pravacanasara is on an effectively dematerialised instrument of bondage. The complexity of the orthodox classification of (physical) mohaniya-karman has thus been largely by-passed simply because an understanding of it is essentially irrelevant to the proposed means of liberation (jnana through dhyana); whereas, for reasons outlined above, the orthodox classification points towards samvara and nirjara through tapas as the means to liberation. 5.3 Himsa in the Pravacanasara i) The role of himsa in the Pravacanasara With the stress on moha, its corollaries' (avidya and asuddhopayoga) and antidotes (jnana through meditation on the essential purity of the self, and suddhopayoga) the characteristic Jaina ptoccupation with the ethical imperative of ahimsa would appear, in the Pravacanasara, to have been moved to the periphery of soteriological concern. How then does Kundakunda view himsa, and what, according to him, is the relation of the latter to, for instance, moha? In Book 3 of the Pravacanasara we find a group of gathas dealing with himsa which, taken without the commentary, seem to have only a tenuous connection with the kind of doctrines expounded in the first two books. These verses certainly look more traditional and more orthodox; they are closer in feeling to the Tattvartha Sutra than to the Samayasara. Nevertheless, they merit more or shows attachment or aversion towards them, necessarily incurs bondage.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 157 detailed examination, for they provide some indicators of major changes in Jaina religious practice, and help to clarify the even greater changes implicit in Kundakunda's less orthodox doctrines. At Pravacanasara 3:16 himsa is defined (in Upadhye's translation) as follows: Careless activities of a monk when sleeping, sitting, standing and walking, are always known as continuous harm unto living beings. This would seem to be the most natural rendering, i.e. himsa is harm to living beings as a result of careless physical actions on the part of the monk. Prima facie, this is a purely orthodox doctrine such as might be found in the Dasaveyaliya Sutta. Amrtacandra, however, interprets it in the Tattvadipika in terms of Kundakunda's upayoga doctrine, an interpretation reflected in Faddegon's translation: 'Heedless action in lying, sitting, standing, going, etc., is considered to be at all times continual hurt (himsa) to the sramana-state!. Thus Amstacandra (and Faddegon) take the Prakrit samanassa to be equivalent to the Sanskrit sramanyasya, rather than sramanasya, i.e. they add the suffix -ya- to sramana and so turn it into an abstract meaning 'sramanastate'. 74 There seems to be no linguistic justification for this, but, as we shall see, it is resonant in terms of doctrinal change. (And although the original Prakrit gatha may not be by Kundakunda, the interpretation given in the commentary demonstrates the kind of practice his upayoga doctrine implies, and is thus highly relevant to the present enquiry.) The Tattvadipika is worth quoting in full here. Amrtacandra's introduction to the Prakrit gatha tells us that this is a definition of what constitutes cheda - 'infringement' or, more specifically, an offence against the monastic rules. The commentary proper states: 74 Cf. Pravac. 2:98 where samannam = sramanyam.

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158 Harmless Souls For negligence is impure manifestation of consciousness because of the destruction, the injuring, of that sramana-state whose form is pure manifestation of consciousness. And so (negligence) itself is himsa. Therefore, the sramana's careless activity with regard to sleeping, sitting, standing and walking, etc., which is inherently connected with impure manifestation of consciousness, is always himsa for him, a continuous force (lit. flowing continuously) at all times, which is another disadvantage consisting of infringement.75 Interpreting this, we may say that the monk 'hurts' himself - i.e. binds himself - through asuddhopayoga of which cheda is the external sign. For since the ideal sramana-state has the form of suddhopayoga, then asuddhopayoga is, in the first place, himsa to the sramana who aspires to that state, and, in the second, it necessarily entails (physical) cheda. That is to say, offence against the monastic rules presupposes asuddhopayoga. So the original or initiating cause of himsa, and thus of bondage, is internalised: the emphasis is on asuddhopayoga, not on external cheda as such. Moreover, himsa has been (re-) defined as an offence against the sramana-state, i.e. an offence against the monastic rules (= cheda), and thus as harm to the self because of the asuddhopayoga that is necessarily at the root of such neglect, rather than harm caused to other living beings as such. So it becomes apparent that it is now the role of the sramana which is all important; obedience to the prescribed actions not only leads automatically to the goal, but, more importantly, it does so only because - as that very obedience indicates (externally) - internal purity (suddhopayoga) has been maintained, for there can be no adherence to the monastic rules without such purity. Consequently, both monastic 75 asuddhopayogo hi chedah suddhopayogarupasya sramanyasya chedanat tasya himsanat sa eva ca himsaatah sramanasyasuddhopayogavinabhavini sayanasanasthanacankramanadisv aprayata ya carya sa khalu tasya sarvakalam eva samtanavahini chedanarthantarabhuta himsaiva || TD on Pravac. 3:16.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 159 behaviour and ahimsa may be said to have been ritualised in the sense that it is now the mechanical performance of the prescribed action itself that counts, or is indicative, not the ahimsic content of the action.76 What is significant is the harm caused to oneself through asuddhopayoga rather than any harm that might be caused to others, although this entails no particular change in practice since the monastic rules, adherence to which is now the expression of innerpurity, were originally formulated to prevent harm to others. (That is to say, while originally it was harm to others that caused harm (= bondage) to the self, it is now asuddhopayoga, a state of consciousness, whose external expression is cheda, offence against the monastic rules, that does so.) In other words, obedience to the rules leads automatically to the goal, but only in the sense that such obedience refers back to, or is a necessary consequence of, an internal state of suddhopayoga, which is what really counts for salvation. Thus total externalisation (the ritualisation of ahimsa) and total internalisation meet: one implies, or is a reflex of, the other. And although, theoretically, it is the internal (suddhopayoga), as the agent of the external (monastic practice), which is really instrumental in binding and liberating, in terms of the visible - of external practice - it is simple adherence to the letter of the law which is seen to bring about liberation. But, again, it is internalisation of himsa that allows it to do SO. As we have seen, it is the commentary and not Kundakunda's text (3:16) which engendered the above analysis. However, the following gatha is more directly relevant to at least part of that interpretation: Whether the being dies or lives, injury is certain for the man who is unrestrained; there is no bondage simply by injury (i.e. 'by mere 76 On my use of the term 'ritualisation' (the meaning is close to routinisation or formalisation), see above p. 86.

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160 Harmless Souls physical harm' - Upadhye) for the man who regulates himself according to the rules of conduct. This gatha has already been discussed above, 77 since it was quoted without attribution by Pujyapada (Devanandin) in the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 7:13. It is possible that Pujyapada was referring directly to this gatha from the Pravacanasara (as the Jaina Granthamala edition of the Sarvarthasiddhi claims), but it is more likely that both 'authors' quote from some earlier, unidentified, (possibly) canonical source. And in any case, as we have already noticed, this part of the Pravacanasara shows every sign of having been compiled from other sources rather than composed by Kundakunda himself.78 For the purposes of the present enquiry, the important thing is to examine the way this section is brought into line by the commentary with the doctrines propagated by Kundakunda in Books 1 and 2 of the Pravacanasara. In this context, therefore, gatha 3:17 means that as long as the sramana retains his internal purity, reflected externally in his adherence to the letter of the monastic rules, then he cannot do himsa or be subject to its effects (i.e. be bound), even if physical harm is caused. (Note the intentional ambiguity of himsa: it is injury done to others and therefore also to oneself.) In other words, outside the parameters set by the monastic code - which is the external reflection of internal purity - physical action and its consequences are irrelevant; it has no karmic and, therefore, no soteriological significance. Amrtacandra introduces this gatha (3:17) with the claim that in it Kundakunda teaches two kinds of cheda, antaranga (internal) and bahiranga (external). He defines them as follows: 'Impure upayoga is internal infringement, 77 See above, p. 53ff. 78 Upadhye (p. liiiff.) comments that this verse has 'a traditional appearance, and [it] might be traced to a tract of literature which was once the common property of Digambaras and Svetambaras'.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 161 the taking of another('s) life is external'.79 Whether it happens that another being's life is taken or not, the fact of 'careless conduct' (aprayatacara) proves asuddhopayoga (i.e. the external is a sign of the internal state), and so the existence of himsa for that impure consciousness is certain.80 (Read with 3:16 above, one may also understand from this that asuddhopayoga causes himsa to the self.) Conversely, 'careful conduct' (prayatacara) proves the nonexistence (asadbhavasya) of asuddhopayoga (internally); so himsa does not occur for that consciousness, as is shown by the fact that there is no bondage (for that pure consciousness) even as the result of taking another's life.81 Therefore, Amstacandra concludes, internal cheda is more powerful or important (baliyah) than external. Nevertheless, external infringement should be admitted simply because it provides a place (or "seat") for internal infringement'.82 In other words, external cheda is merely a sign of, or an emblem for, an internal state; the latter manifests itself in the former. This is repeated and amplified in the Tattvadipika on 3:18. The gatha reads: A Sramana of careless conduct is called a murderer of the six (classes of) embodied beings; if he carefully practises (his course of conduct) he is forever uncontaminated like the lotus on water.83 Again it is the performance to the letter of the monastic rules which is crucial here. To this ritualisation the Tattvadipika adds the internalisation which may also be 79 Trans. after Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)] of asuddhopayoga 'ntarangachedah parapranavyaparopo bahirangah. 80 suniscitahimsabhavaprasiddheh - TD on Pravac. 3:17. 81 parapranavyaparopasadbhave 'pi bandhaprasiddhya - ibid. 82 evam apy antarangachedayatanamatratvad bahirangachedo 'bhyupagamyetaiva - ibid. 83 Upadhye's trans. The six classes of living beings are the five sthavara and the one trasa, i.e. the 'immobile' and the 'mobile'.

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162 Harmless Souls latent in Kundakunda's gatha. Carefulness is something interior, an attitude; conversely, it is asuddhopayoga which is at the root of all external 'carelessness' and the initiating cause of bondage. That is to say, it is asuddhopayoga, the cause of the violence, which entails bondage; himsa in itself is karmically neutral. Amrtacandra works hard to stitch all this together: Since the existence of impure manifestation of consciousness, proved by careless behaviour, which does not occur without it, is hurtful since it is established that bondage is caused by the destruction of the lives of the six kinds of bodies; and since the absence of impure manifestation of consciousness proved by careful behaviour, which occurs when it is absent, is not hurtful; and because of the absence of even a small amount of bondage caused by the 'other' (viz. the ajiva), so that it is established that it is free from impurity, like a lotus lapped by water; therefore it is concluded that internal infringement, which has the form of impure manifestation of consciousness, should be prevented by all means by which external infringement, in the form of taking another life, which merely provides the occasion for that (internal infringement), is a fortiori prevented.84 Superimposed in this one gatha and its commentary there may be as many as three layers of doctrine: 1) an archaic himsa doctrine where any - even accidental - harm is binding, 2) a ritualised doctrine, where what counts is 84 Trans. after Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)] p. 164, of TD on Pravac. 3:18: ca tadvinabhavina yatas tadavinabhavina aprayatacaratvenaprasiddhyad asuddhopayogasadbhavah satkayapranavyaparopapratyayabandhaprasiddhya himsaka eva syat | yatas prayatacaratvena prasiddhyad aauddhopayogasadbhavah parapratyaya bandhalesasyapy abhavaj jaladurlalitam kamalam iva nirupalepatva prasiddher ahimsaka eva syat | tatastaistaih sarvaih prakarair asuddhopayogarupo 'ntarangacchedah pratisedhyo yairyais tadayatanamatrabhutah parapranavyaparoparupo bahirangacchedo durad eva pratisiddhah syat ||

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 163 that the sramana should perform his prescribed role to the letter, and 3) an internalised hinsa doctrine, linked to Kundakunda's upayoga theory, whereby the external is merely a reflex of the internal state, and it is the latter which carries the soteriological weight. In other words, the physical model of the killing of the six classes of embodied beings is retained, but the original doctrine is now interpreted in terms of 1) ritualised action, and 2) internalised doctrine. Perhaps that is why the gatha says vadhakaro tti mado, 'he is regarded as a murderer', i.e. this is just a way of talking about the person who is internally careless (which is what really counts), using the old imagery, the old physical connection of carelessness and jivas, in a new context. (Here, as elsewhere, ritualisation and internalisation complement each other.) To expand on this, originally the five samiti can only have been formulated as rules for the avoidance of himsa to the various kinds of jivas.85 The emphasis of the discipline is to avoid doing harm because such harm would automatically cause one to be bound by a new influx of karman. Yet here the discipline of samiti has been ritualised; it is adherence to the letter of monastic discipline that is crucial; if a monk follows the rules then, even if he does harm 'accidentally' - which would count as 'carelessness' in the original reading -, he is not bound by karman. Emphasis is switched from the results of actions to the actions themselves, and thus to the underlying attitude or volition accompanying them. This combination of ritualisation and internalisation disposes of the worry that even someone who is careful and observes the five samiti can be open to 'accident'. In other words, it removes the fortuitous from monastic life, for now it is attitude, externalised in particular ritualised actions, that really counts. Yet, once that shift of emphasis has been made, the doctrine that himsa to jivas (including nigoda) is what causes karmic bondage is undermined, for gathas such as 85 See Part I, above.

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164 Harmless Souls Pravacanasara 3:17 claim that 'unintentional' himsa - or himsa occurring after a certain degree of carefulness, encapsulated in the rules for ascetics, has been observed - does not bind. And if there is one case where himsa does not bind, then the logic of the system is cracked and has to be reassembled. For now it is something mechanical, a rule, that decides whether karman is bound or not, not actual himsa; at the same time, himsa is internalised and redefined to mean an attitude of carelessness, externalised in offences against the monastic rules. (To borrow a term from T.S. Eliot and the critical vocabulary of English studies, it might be said that offence against the rules is the 'objective correlative' of the subjective state or attitude.) Consequently, the karmic quality of an act is, in effect, decided, as in the Buddhist case, by the intention and attention - the internal state - which accompanies it, not by the act itself or what it results in. However, since that internal state is reflected or externalised so closely in the external rule, there is little visible alteration in behaviour. In this respect, the particular rationales that the Buddhists and the Jainas give for their differing external practices are each a mirror-image, or reversal, of the other. For the Buddhists, the purpose of rules of conduct (vinaya) is to help the monk to cultivate certain inner states which are instrumental in liberation. For the Jainas (as represented by Amotacandra), however, the inner state has precedence over and conditions the outer: perfect conduct is not so much a means to the end as a reflection of the already internallyachieved end. In other words, for the latter, the rationale for external practice is not so much soteriological as social - a public demonstration of inner purity. And in practice, this kind of public performance became important for Buddhism too. As Richard Gombrich points out, according to the view of ethics found in the Vinaya and commentarial literature (which was, of course, formulated with the Sangha in mind), sila (morality) is 'the monk's successful role performance. It makes clear to society he is being a good and proper

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 165 monk'.86 This external decorum was the response to 'an overwhelming demand for empirical evidence of a monk's internal state'.87 Thus the monk's moral habit, which is primarily an internal state, becomes 'instantly recognizable by a pattern of behaviour'.88 Such an explanation for the function of external practice is, of course, highly theoretical, since to achieve the optimum inner purity it is necessary to become an ascetic, and the only way to become an ascetic is to adopt the ascetic's vows. It is clear, therefore, that in practice the external must precede the internal. (The rationale works both ways: since the ascetic cannot follow his course of discipline without the necessary inner purity, the very fact that he is following it demonstrates to himself and others that he does have the requisite inner resources.) Nevertheless, the need for this type of theoretical justification of ascetic discipline demonstrates the extent to which the level of internalisation reached by Kundakunda and consolidated by his commentators offers a serious threat to standard Jaina practice. In other words, although the rationale for continuing ascetic practice may be weak, it is recognised that there does have to be some kind of rationale, otherwise the very complex of behaviour which provides the Jainas with their social and religious identity is made redundant. Thus, from this perspective, the real tasks of the post-canonical writers and scholastics are seen to be, on the one hand, the acknowledgement of the practical limits of 'carefulness' and, on the other, the need to rein in the logic of internalisation before it bolts and leaves behind any necessity for external practice, thus discarding the social identity such practice carries with it. As we have seen, a central element in this struggle to reinterpret ancient ascetic practices in doctrinal terms which are compatible with new social circumstances is the redefinition of what 86 Gombrich 1984, p. 100. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

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166 Harmless Souls counts as himsa, in the sense of 'bondage-causing himsa'. For the whole of ascetic discipline is built on the theory that there are ubiquitous jivas, that harm done to them constitutes himsa, and that himsa binds karman. In this context, the only way of setting practical limits to what counts as himsa (i.e. to 'carelessness') - that is, the only way to alleviate the formidable difficulties of ascetic practice and thereby give hope of liberation (or at least a better rebirth) to those who are not advanced ascetics - is to internalise it. Only after such a process is it possible to 'return', as it were, to the external world with a modified (i.e. ritualised) form of ascetic practice - limited to literal adherence to the monastic code - which can be defended doctrinally. This combination of mental discipline and adherence to the letter of particular physical vrata (whether monastic or lay) may be considered, at least in one respect, less taxing than the ancient, blanket adherence to physical ahimsa, and also, perhaps, easier to practise from within, or on the fringes of, society. For, when external behaviour becomes formalised, chance is removed from Jaina soteriology. The external world becomes less threatening, and life less contingent for the ascetic, who is now in more or less total control of his progress to liberation. This movement towards absolute personal control was probably inevitable, given that the world portrayed in the earliest canonical texts was a risk-saturated environment, even for the ascetic. The early 'canonical' sramana is under constant threat from other people and from the physical world: they threaten him not just to the extent that he threatens them, but he is also constantly at risk from the fortuitous and the accidental.89 (That is to say, he is under constant threat of being forced into, or finding himself by circumstances beyond his control, in a position where ahimsa is inevitable; and so he is under continual threat of further bondage.) Such 'accidents' could, of course, be rationalised in 89 See, for instance, the Ayaramga and Das.aveyaliya Suttas.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 167 terms of karma theory, as the karmic fruits of some previous action. That kind of explanation, however, does not solve the problem of control. The ascetic develops selfdiscipline precisely in order to have absolute control over his karmic destiny; and absolute control is only possible in isolation from the contingent, material world. Consequently, the earliest Jaina discipline demanded almost superhuman control and concentration, a fact which must have severely limited the number of recruits. To survive, even as a sramana movement, it must sooner or later have been necessary, among other things, for Jainism to hold out the prospect of a sure path towards release, free from chance and accident, the equivalent of the Buddhist bhikkhu's being 'an island to himself.9 90 Kundakunda is at the logical end of this movement towards ever-increasing autonomy. In contrast to the position of the early 'canonical' sramana, the greatest threat to Kundakunda's ascetic comes from within himself. Essentially, this threat amounts to ignorance of his own nature. Once that ignorance is dispelled, then the rest (i.e. proper external action) falls into place. If you have realised your true nature, then karmic bondage is impossible: whatever you do is himsa-free because it is the purified, knowing self that is doing it. No accident is possible where everything is jnana - defined by Kundakunda as 'self' (Pravacanasara 2:67, etc.). To put it another way, there is no longer any real interaction between the ascetic and the world of matter, since the latter can have no real effect on the former as long as his attitude is correct. The contingency which characterises ordinary life is blocked out, and the ascetic remains safe inside his own consciousness, his own upayoga. Upayoga is the fail-safe mechanism which ensures that the ascetic's salvation is in his own hands, and through it he becomes autonomous. This divorce of the sramana from the world of matter 90 See Digha-Nikaya II (Mahaparinibbana-Sutta), quoted by Rahula p. 60.

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168 Harmless Souls goes in tandem with a doctrine such as Kundakunda's (in the Samayasara and parts of the Pravacanasara), which points towards the unreality of all except the pure soul. The sramana's internal state has thus become its own universe, hermetic, and for all practical purposes, idealist. He no longer struggles with the world of matter, but with himself, alone. At least, from the point of view of personal soteriology, this is probably the position in which Kundakunda and his followers would like to find themselves. However, since purity of attitude is impossible to demonstrate except through purity of action, in a social situation ascetic behaviour is the only indication of a holy life: monks and nuns remain exemplars in their behaviour. Such behaviour, therefore, is a means of mutually maintained social regulation: the ascetics do what the laity expect them to do, while in return, the laity remain faithful and support them while maintaining their own lower-grade but related practice. ii) Himsa, moha, and upadhi In Jayasena's recension of the Prayacanasara, gatha 3:17 is followed by two extra gathas not contained in Amrtacandra's version (3:17b and 3:17c). The fact that these two (as well as 3:17) are quoted (with minor linguistic differences) in the same part of the Sarvarthasiddhi (on Tattvartha Sutra 7:13) lends weight to Upadhye's suggestion that we are dealing here with verses that form a group in some other source. .91 The gathas read: When the foot of an ascetic who observes the irya-samiti (i.e. who is careful in his walking according to the rule) has been raised for going out, should a minute creature (kulimgam),92 coming in contact with that, be hurt or killed, it is taught in the scripture that he is not liable even for the slightest bondage as a consequence of that; (the case is similar to the statement:) it is infatuation alone 91 See note 78, above. 92 Kulimgam is glossed by Jayasena as suksma-jantuh.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 169 that is called possession on the authority of the spiritual lore. [Pravacanasara 3:17b & 3:17c]93 In terms of doctrine these gathas are probably closer to the Tattvartha Sutra, and its concern with kasaya, than to Kundakunda's upayoga doctrine; i.e. prima facie, internalisation of himsa takes a different theoretical channel here. However, the redefinition of himsa by the collation of the elements of the first and the fifth mahavratas (ahimsa and aparigraha),94 and the further equation of parigraha and murccha, brings us back to moha as the agent of bondage. Thus it is infatuation (murccha / moha), stemming from a mistake about the jiva's relationship to matter, which causes adherence to physical objects (parigraha), and so physical or 'external' himsa. "Internal' himsa, harm to oneself, is the mental state of 'infatuation', external harm merely the indicator of that internal state, and 93 Cf. Upadhye's trans. On iriyasamida, Sk. iriyasamiti, see TS 9:5 and SS; J.L. Jaini 1940, p.134; Schubring 1962, para. 173. Faddegon [Kundakunda (3), p. 201) gives the second half-verse of 3:17c a very different translation, viz. '... just as acceptance of swooning also is regarded according (as it is due) to (concentration) on the self. That is to say, swooning, and thus causing himsa by falling, has no binding effect when it is the result of meditation practice. However, although it is possible for mucchapariggaho (Sanskrit: murcchaparigraha) to mean 'acceptance of swooning', in this context the interpretation seems strained. Given the close association of murccha and parigraha in Jaina theory (see TS 7:17 and SS, where they are defined as equivalent), Upadhye's reading appears to be the correct one here. Moreover, the stress in these gathas is clearly upon what Upadhye calls the 'mental condition', referring to which, his translation contains a footnote that is worth quoting in full: 'Himsa is not merely prana-vyaparopana, but pramatta-yogat prana-vyaparopanam (TS. VII, 13). It is passions, negligent and careless channels of activities etc., that matter most; it is the mental condition, rather than the visible act, that is of utmost importance. For instance, parigraha does not so much consist in having physical contact with external objects as being infatuated with them' (Upadhye fn. 1, p. 26 on 3:17*1-2). 94 See above.

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170 Harmless Souls it is the latter which is really instrumental in terms of binding and liberating the jiva. This is part of the same pattern of theory as Pravacanasara 2:24, which remarks that 'there is no action without fruit, although the highest dharma is without fruit'.95 The Tattvadipika reads this in terms of 'mental' action, the action of one who thinks (cetana), and such action is defined as a modification (parinama) of consciousness (caitanya). However, this modification is only (karmically) fruitful (i.e. binding) for the atman connected with 'delusion' (mohasamvalita; sval(I) + sam). When the connection of the soul with moha disappears, the action is without fruit, so there is no further rebirth. And it is this fruitless (i.e. moha-less) mental action which Amrtacandra defines as the parama-dharma, 'the highest dharma'. This may be compared with Pravacanasara 2:58, where it is the idea of 'mine' (mamattam) with regard to external objects, especially the body, which is the cause of rebirth. (According to the Tattvadipika, this idea is the 'interior cause' of rebirth, a manifestation of attachment [uparaktatva].) Taking these two together, it is clear that it is the 'delusion of possession' - the idea that the jiva can have a real connection with anything ajiva - that is the real cause of rebirth. In other words, himsa, the binding instrument, has effectively been internalised to moha, which, in turn, is a manifestation of, or equivalent to, 'false consciousness' or asuddhopayoga. Pravacanasara 3:19 and commentary assemble a further set of equivalences around the concept of himsa which point to asuddhopayoga as the significant cause of bondage. Gatha 3:19 reads: There is or there is not bondage, when a being dies in the course of physical activities; bondage is certain from attachment to 95 kiriya hi natthi aphala dhammo jadi nipphalo paramo - Pravac. 2:24.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 171 possessions, therefore ascetics should give up everything. 96 Upadhye renders uvadhi (Sk. upadhi) as 'attachment to paraphernalia', although he has already used 'paraphernalia' (i.e. physical possessions) to translate the term pariggaho / parigraha at Pravacanasara 3:15. At 3:19 he follows Jayasena, who, in the Tatparya-vrtti, paraphrases upadhi by parigraha.97 Faddegon, in a footnote on 3:15, remarks that: Tyaga is renunciation of all wordly concerns (parigraha), i.e. of possessions; vyutsarga is abandonment of all that may become seductive (upadhi), specially that which is required for the welfare of the body. Thus tyaga and vyutsarga, parigraha and upadhi are nearly identical.98 However, in common with a number of other technical terms, such as cheda, himsa, etc., upadhi can be shown to have two facets or areas of reference, one facing or referring to the external, physical world, and the other referring to an internal state or attitude. The earlier, technical sense (which is probably the one used at Pravacanasara 3:15)99 is found, for instance, at Uttarajjhayana 29:34, where 'the renunciation of articles of use' (upadhi-pratyakhyana) is prescribed. 100 The later internalisation of upadhi is evident in gathas such as Pravacanasara 3:19 (particularly when taken in conjunction with the next gatha, 3:20), a phenomenon spelt 96 Based on Upadhye's translation. 97 As Faddegon (Kundakunda (3)] points out, p. 164, fn. 2. TV on Pravac. 3:19 reads: atha bahirangajivaghate bandho bhavati na bhavati va parigrahe sati niyamena bhavititi pratipadyati. 98 lbid. p. 162, fn. 2. 99 Cf. Pravac. 3:23, where it has the same meaning. 100 Jacobi translates: 'By renouncing articles of use (except such as are obligatory - the broom etc.) he obtains successful study; without articles of use he becomes exempt from desires, and does not suffer misery' (1895, p. 167).

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172 Harmless Souls out in detail in the Tattvadipika, where the connection of upadhi and asuddhopayoga is made explicit. In his introduction to Pravacanasara 3:19 Amrtacandra states that, 'Now he (i.e. Kundakunda) teaches that similarly attachment to possessions (upadhi), since it is. unequivocally an internal infringement, should be prevented.'101 He goes on to explain in the commentary proper that, Whereas in the taking of another being's life through a bodily action the degree of infringement is held to be indeterminate (chedatvam-anaikantika), - because its character as bondage is variable according to the presence or absence of impure manifestation of consciousness (asuddhopayogasadbhavasadbhava), with attachment to possessions (upadhi) the case is different. Its degree of infringement is unequivocal, because its character as bondage is unequivocal owing to the unequivocal presence of impure manifestation of consciousness, which is proved by its non-occurrence without that same (tasya sarvartha tadvinabhavitvaprasiddhyad aikantikasuddhopayogasadbhavasyaikantikabandhatvena chedatvam aikantikam eva). 102 - In other words, whereas the taking of life is not necessarily binding because it is not necessarily connected to asuddhopayoga, upadhi is always binding because it is necessarily accompanied by asuddhopayoga. The Tattvadipika goes on to say arhats and paramah sramanah (supreme sramanas) have entirely rejected upadhi, and so it should be rejected by others too because, like 'internal negligence', it does not occur without asuddhopayoga.103 In the Tattvadipika on the following gatha (3:20), 101 Trans. after Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)] p. 164 of: athaikantikantarangacchedatvad upadhis tadvat pratisedhya ity upadisati. Faddegon renders upadhi as 'appropriation'. 102 TD on Pravac. 3:19, trans. after Faddegon. 103 ata eva caparair apy antarangacchedavat tadanantariyakatvat prag eva sarva evopadhih pratisedhyah - ibid.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 173 Amrtacandra claims that Kundakunda teaches that the purpose of rejecting upadhi is in fact to reject internal cheda. Moreover, since internal cheda is no different from asuddhopayoga, then upadhi is another name for asuddhopayoga; so it is really the latter, an impure state of consciousness, which is the instrument of bondage. 104 The gatha (3:20) commented on here reads: If there is no renunciation (absolutely) free from (any) expectation, the monk cannot have the purification of mind; how can he effect the destruction of karma, when he is impure in mind?105 In other words, purity of mind and renunciation of worldly-objects through an attitude of indifference are one and the same thing. For, if niravekkho / nirapeksa is taken to be the form of cago / tyaga, then the emphasis falls, not upon physical renunciation, but upon an attitude of indifference, an attitude which is the same thing as purity of mind. For the monk who does not have this purity of mind, how, it is asked in the next gatha (3:21), can he be free from muccha / murccha, arambha / arambha, and asamjama / asamyama (delusion, physical harm from worldly activities, and lack of control), and how, being attached to paradravya ('other substance'), i.e. the external world, the ajiva, can he ever realise (lit. gain) himself?106 And, consequently, in the Tattvadipika, upadhi is named as 104 tato 'suddhopayogasyantarangachedasya pratisedham prayojanam apeksyopadher vidhiyamanah pratisedho 'ntarangachedapratisedha eva syat - TD on Pravac. 3:20. 105 Upadhye's trans.; niravekkha / nirapeksa = 'indifferent to worldly objects'; asaya / asaya = 'heart', 'mind', 'resting-place'. The construction is odd here. The sense seems to require niruvekkhe cage, locative absolute. Faddegon's rendering of Prakrit asaya as Sanskrit asrava, rather than asaya (p.165], makes no real sense: asrava is by definition impure or, at best, neutral, whereas, in the co perfectly intelligible. 106 tadha paradavvammi rado kadham appanam pasadhayadi - Pravac. 3:21.

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174 Harmless Souls the root cause of all these (murccha, etc., and the attachment to paradravya which obstructs attainment of the suddhatman). 107 From the above we can see that a number of technical terms have been strung, as it were, into a necklace of equivalences, with the process of internalisation as the string which holds them together. Thus upadhi is equated with parigraha, murccha / moha, arambha / himsa, and antarangaccheda (= internal hinsa), and all these with asuddhopayoga. Physical himsa in itself is neutral in terms of bondage, but the underlying attitude is decisive: if renunciation is incomplete, if there is attachment, then consciousness is impure, and vice-versa. In other words, parigraha, in the form of upadhi, is himsa internalised, i.e. it is asuddhopayoga. Because upadhi is characterised by the Tattvadipika as an unequivocally internal infringement, 108 an instructive comparison can be made with the use of the same term in the Tattvartha Sutra and the Sarvarthasiddhi . There, at Tattvartha Sutra 9:26, upadhi is characterised as being of two kinds, external and internal (bahyabhyantaropadhyoh). The Sarvarthasiddhi comments that vyutsarga means tyaga, and that it is twofold, the giving up of external objects of attachment and the giving up of internal attachments. 109 External attachments are characterised as house, wealth, cereals, etc. (vastu-dhana-dhanyadi), which are not appropriated (anupattam, root da). Internal attachments are the passions, which are natural to, or 'the dispositions of 110 the self.111 107 For the minimal exceptions to the rejection of upadhi in the technical sense of 'physical possessions' - 'possessions' which are karmically neutral because the attitude or manifestation of consciousness accompanying them is pure - see Pravac, and TD 3:223:26. 108 Introduction to Pravac. 3:19, see above. 109 bahyopadhityago 'bhyantaropadhityagas ca - SS on TS 9:26. 110 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 266. 111 krodhadir atmabhavo 'bhyantaropadhih - SS on TS 9:26. The

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 175 Here, the term upadhi has the external sense of being connected with possessions, similar to the meaning employed at, for instance, Pravacanasara, 3:15. It also has the internal sense of attachment to the body and being under the control of the passions. As the Sarvarthasiddhi explains, renouncing attachment for the body has a technical sense here, of limited or unlimited periods of vyutsarga, which is not significant for the present discussion. The renunciation of passions, however, is clearly linked to Umasvati's kasaya doctrine. Comparing this with the other uses of upadhi discussed above, it is clear that, from its original meaning of physical articles of use, 112 the sense has been, to a greater or lesser degree, internalised and the meaning extended by both Umasvati and Kundakunda, but in different ways in accordance with their own explanations of the mechanism of bondage. Thus, in Umasvati's case, the internalisation is partial, and tied to the kasaya doctrine, kasaya being instrumental in bondage. In Kundakunda (and Amrtacandra's) case, upadhi has been fully internalised - it is 'unequivocally an internal infringement' 113 - through being tied to the upayoga doctrine, in which asuddhopayoga, a state of consciousness, is instrumental in bondage, 114 Bhasya states that, 'external upadhi has 12 forms, internal upadhi is to do with (attachment for) the body and for passions' (abhyantarah sarirasya kasayanam ca). 112 See Utt. 29:34, quoted p. 171, above. 113 TD on 3:19, intro. 114 At Pravac. 3:73, there is an obscure reference to 'external and internal(?) upadhi' (uvahim bahitthamajjhattham). Upadhye takes ajjhattha as adhyatma; Faddegon, following the TD, divides differently - madhyastha.. However, this gatha belongs to the last five of the Pravacanasara, which are a self-contained group and may be a further addition to the text. In any case, the TD is unambiguous in describing upadhi as 'unequivocally an internal infringement'.

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* 176 Harmless Souls iii) Himsa and 'compassion' Kundakunda's internalisation and assimilation of himsa and its equivalents to asuddhopayoga has consequences for the whole nexus of Jaina doctrine, consequences which are illustrated throughout this part of my work. Here, by way of concluding this section, I shall point to one specific doctrinal implication, interesting both in itself and because it illustrates the distance Kundakunda has travelled from some of the positions advocated in the earliest extant texts. As we have seen (at 3:20, above), it is purity of mind, characterised by an attitude of indifference towards all possessions, that distinguishes the true monk. The action of such a sramana is free from delusion (moha) and so does not incur bondage (see Pravacanasara 2:24-30); moreover, such action coincides exactly with the monastic rules. Mental disturbance both engenders and is engendered by himsa / parigraha, but it is the mental component, the underlying attitude, which is karmically significant, not the harming act itself. This is illustrated by Pravacanasara 3:20c (an obviously anti-Svetambara gatha, only present in Jayasena's recension), which reads: If he accepts a piece of clothing, gourd-bowl and anything else, necessarily there is involved harm unto living beings, and there is disturbance in his mind. 115 This gatha can be interpreted in two ways, both of which, in the context, are probably intended: first, it is implied that the taking of life causes a disturbance in the mind of the sramana, and that it is that disturbance which is to be avoided rather than the taking of life per se, which is karmically neutral (see above). Second, and conversely, the very act of violence reflects an already existing mental 115 Upadhye's trans. Vikkheva (see text) = Sk. viksepa, 'distraction', 'inattention'. See JPP pp. 38-41 on the major differences between Digambaras and Svetambaras in matters of clothing, almsbowls, etc.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 177 disturbance which is the root cause of the physical act. Either way, it is the internal attitude which is significant: the purity (calmness) or impurity (disturbance) of mind. In other words, the basic strategy for (correct) conduct, as prescribed in early Jaina doctrine, has been retained but internalised: physical inactivity, the antidote to external himsa, has been internalised to mental 'inactivity', i.e. to the attainment and maintenance of an inactive, and therefore pure, consciousness. Not even compassion must disturb this uncompromising stasis. On the contrary, since feeling clouds consciousness, compassion falls into the camp of asuddhopayoga. One does not refrain from himsa because it is compassionate to do so, one refrains because the practice of himsa indicates internal impurity, i.e. impure upayoga which binds. Thus ahimsa achieved as the result * of a feeling of compassion is, by definition, not fully ahinsa and cannot be fully liberating, although, in samsaric terms, it is relatively virtuous. Kundakunda's position on compassion is made clear at Pravacanasara 2:65, where he describes it as one of the constituents or prerequisites of subhopayoga (which, we should remember, is ultimately a form of asuddhopayoga): He, who recognises the great Jinas, attends on Siddhas as well as saints and is compassionate towards living beings, has an auspicious resultant of consciousness. 116 Here the term used for 'compassion' is anukampa.117 This occasionally occurs in the early Svetambara canon, for instance, at Ayaramga 2.15.4, where Indra is described as 'the compassionate god' (anukampantenam devenam).118 At Ayaramga 2.2.1.8, the compassion (kaluna = karuna) of householders towards ill monks or nuns is described as 116 Upadhye's translation. 117 Compassion' / 'mercy' / 'pity' - Ardha-magadhi kosa; cf. below, where the same term is used in the TS. 118 See Pischel, para. 397.

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178 Harmless Souls resulting in himsic activities, such as attention to their bodies, washing, the lighting of fires, etc. This idea, that compassion is essentially a lay virtue, something to be excluded from the world-view of the sramanas, persists in later Jaina theory. However, in the earliest parts of the canon there also occurs a different attitude towards the affective in general and compassion in particular. At Ayaramga 1.5.5.4 (Suttagame 320), for instance, we are presented with a version of the 'Golden Rule' in which the sramana is urged to practise ahimsa out of empathy (and thus compassion) for the suffering of others: As it would be to you, so it is with him whom you intend to kill. As it would be to you, so it is with him whom you intend to tyrannise over. As it would be to you, so it is with him whom you intend to torment. In the same way (it is with him) whom you intend to punish, and to drive away. The upright man who lives up to these sentiments, does therefore neither kill nor cause others to kill (living beings) ...119 Similarly, at Ayaramga 1.4.2.6 (Suttagame 242) the suffering of others is proved by inference from personal suffering: First the persuasion of everyone should be ascertained, and then we will ask them severally: Is pain pleasant to you, or unpleasant? If they give the right answer, reply: For all sorts of living beings pain is unpleasant, disagreeable and greatly feared. Thus I say. 120 119 Based on Jacobi's trans., 1884, p. 50 of: tumam si nama sa cceva jam hamtavvam ti mannasi; tumam si nama sa cceva jam ajjaveyavvam ti mannasi; tumam si nama sa cceva jam paritaveyavvam ti mannasi; evam (tam ceva) jam parighittavvam ti mannasi; (evam tam ceva) jam uddaveyavvam ti mannasi; amju c' eyapadibuddhajivi tamha na hamta na vighayae - Suttagame 320. 120 Based on Jacobi's trans., 1884, p. 39, of: puvvam nikayasamayam patteyam patteyam pucchissamo: ham bho pavadiya kim bhe sayam dukkham, udahu asayam? samiya padivanne yavi evam buya: savvesim pananam savvesim bhuyanam savvesim

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 179 In other words, appeal is made to one's own experience, extended to others through feelings of empathy and compassion, as a reason for practising ahimsa. Here, we are probably close to the original rationale for the Jaina emphasis on ahimsa, whereas, in the later formulations, once behaviour has been formalised in a particular set of doctrinal rules, the dominating reason for ahimsa is that such practice is the only way to avoid karmic bondage; or, as in Kundakunda's reformulated doctrine, it is the reflex of an already-achieved state of internal purity which is, by definition, non-binding. This later view is evident in the Pravacanasara at, for instance, 1:85, which, in Upadhye's translation, reads: False perception of things, absence of kindness towards subhuman and human beings and indulging with objects of pleasure - these are the characteristics of delusion or infatuation. However, in the light of Pravacanasara 2:65 (above), I prefer to follow Faddegon here and take karunabhavo as meaning 'the feeling of compassion towards animals and men' (i.e. karuna-bhava, rather than karuna-abhava).121 This, indeed, is the interpretation that Amrtacandra gives in the Tattvadipika. There, it is said that a component part of the 3 'stages' of moha is 'a feeling of compassion towards animals and men, who are simply worthy of respect'. 122 In other words, the Tattvadipika attempts to fit karunabhavo into the triad, or three stages (tribhumika), of moha (in the widest sense):123 viz. 1) false perception and karuna jivanam savvesim sattanam asayam aparinivvanam mahabbhayam dukkham ti bemi - Suttagame 242; cf. Ay. 1,6,5,4; 1,7,1,5; 1,7,3,2; Suy. 1,7,2. 121 Faddegon [Kundakunda (3)] p. 53. 122 tiryagmanusyesu preksarhesvapi karunyabuddhya - TD on Pravac. 1:85. 123 See Pravac. 1:83-84 and TD.

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180 Harmless Souls correspond to moha (in the limited sense), 2) and 3) inclination towards / indulging with objects corresponds to raga and dvesa. This does seem a little strained as it stands, for why should karuna be selected as one of two typical examples of moha? It may, therefore, be the case that in 1:85 we have a different 'definition of moha, congruent with, but unrelated to, the tribhumika division, which may have been unknown to the author of this gatha in its developed technical sense. There is also the possibility here that Amrtacandra, or both Amrtacandra and Kundakunda, are consciously using the fact that karuna plays such an important role in Mahayana Buddhism. That is to say, by including it within the circle of moha, raga, and dvesa, they are denying the idea that ultimately there can be such a thing as 'detached compassion', compatible with wisdom and liberation; in the final analysis, karuna is asuddha. Such an interpretation may be supported by the apparent Jaina preference for anukampa, rather than karuna, as the term for 'compassion'. In other words, it is possible that, at least when first employed by the Jains, karuna was chosen when some special shade of meaning was required. 124 To take the contrast a little further, Rahula remarks that, according to Buddhist ethics, 'for a man to be perfect there are two qualities that he should develop equally: compassion (karuna) on the one side, and wisdom (panna) on the other'. 125 Compassion represents 'the qualities of the heart', such as love, charity, kindness and tolerance, while wisdom represents 'the qualities of the mind'. Thus, in the ideal Buddhist way of life, wisdom and compassion - the cognitive and the affective - 'are inseparably linked 124 It should, however, be noted that the Pali Canon also uses anukampa in the sense of 'compassion'. For instance, it is said that the Buddha gave his teaching 'for the good of the many, for the happiness of the many, out of compassion for the world' (bahujanahitaya bahujanasukhaya lokanukampaya, quoted by Rahula p. 46). 125 Rahula p. 46.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 181 together', 126 for true wisdom is endowed with thoughts of selfless detachment, love and non-violence'. 127 The Jains, by way of contrast, aim for a state in which the affective can be discarded altogether; for ultimately liberation is only to be attained from a condition founded in indifference to everything not self. This is made explicit at Pravacanasara 2:67, which reads: Free from inauspicious manifestation of consciousness, not joined to auspicious (manifestation of consciousness) towards other substance, let me be indifferent; I meditate on the self whose essence ('self) is knowledge. Since, as we have already noted at 2:65 (above), compassion (anukampa) directed towards other beings is a manifestation of subhopayoga, then it is clear that compassion can have no part in this meditation practice, the aim of which is to destroy all connection with paradravya, a connection which in itself constitutes bondage. 128 In other words, as one approaches the top of the ladder to salvation, one develops, on the one hand, an attitude of indifference, a kind of psychological stasis with regard to everything not self, and on the other, an intense concentration on, or realisation of, the inner 'knowledge' which constitutes the atman alone. This isolation of the self from other selves, and from the world in general, mirrors, and eventually becomes, the isolation of the jiva that has attained kevala-jnana at the apex of the universe. Before leaving the subject of compassion, we should note that Kundakunda's categorisation of it as falling under 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. p. 49. Rahula is, perhaps, sandpapering the joints here: such pairings are not unproblematical even for the Buddhists. For the tension between 'love' and 'self-restraint', see Gombrich 1971, pp. 320 128 esa me paradravyasamyogakaranavinasabhyasah, 'This is my practice of the destruction of the causes of conjunction with other substance.' - TD on Pravac. 2:67. Jain. Education International

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182 Harmless Souls subha- but asuddhopayoga has its analogue in Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra, where it is placed among the sata, i.e. pleasure-causing, category of the vedaniya (feelingproducing) karmas. Tattvartha Sutra 6:12 reads: Compassion towards living beings (in general) and the devout (in particular), charity, asceticism with attachment etc., concentration, equanimity, purity (= freedom from greed] - these lead to the influx of karmas that cause pleasant feeling. 129 The Sarvarthasiddhi comments: 'Compassion is the thinking in sympathy of one whose mind is moistened by favour for the suffering of others as it were one's own'.130 As has been noted above, the vedaniya-karmas are a subtype of aghatiya karmas, whose function is to generate embodiment. Thus, although compassion may be viewed positively in terms of worldly experience and as leading to worldly happiness, ultimately it too must be abandoned in the quest for liberation, since it is responsible for the adhesion of some kind of karman and so contributes to bondage, albeit in a tenuous way (i.e. at a relatively high rung of the soteriological ladder). 131 The ritualisation of (external) ahimsa, in so far as it becomes a matter of following the rules to the letter with an attitude of non-attachment, can only further weaken the force of compassion as an agent in bringing about non 129 Trans. after S.A. Jain p. 178 of: bhutavratyanukampadanasaragasamyamadi yogah ksantih saucam iti sadvedyasya - TS 6:12. 130 anugrahardrikrtacetasah parapidam atmastham iva kurvato 'nukampanam anukampa - SS on TS 6:12. 131 But compare this with TS 7:11 and $S, where it is said of compassion (karunya) - i.e. 'the disposition to render assistance to the afflicted' (dinanugrahabhavah) (S.A. Jain's trans. of SS p. 195] - that it characterises the conduct of those who are able to practise non-violence and other vows to perfection' (evam bhavayatah purnanyahimsadini vratani bhavanti - SS). Cf. Pano. 144 (SBJ ed.) on active compassion. Once more, there are clearly two layers of doctrine here.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 183 violence and liberation. Feeling with regard to other beings is at best irrelevant in these circumstances. At worst, it agitates and clouds consciousness; thus, once himsa has been internalised as the harm one does to oneself through asuddhopayoga, i.e. through affective activity of consciousness, compassion, although undoubtedly a lay virtue, becomes just one more means of tying the ascetic to samsara. That is to say, compassion is consciousness directed towards the external world, towards paradravya. Against this there is the antidote of mental stasis or indifference, the purely cognitive, but, especially in Kundakunda, there is also consciousness directed 'inwards', at the atman: i.e. the means becomes not just non-action (mental and physical) but insight into and realisation of the nature of the atman itself, of its essential isolation from everything else. And it is to this, Kundakunda's mechanism of liberation, that attention must now be turned. 132 132 The fact that logically liberation requires the cessation of all activity and, in the case of extreme internalisation, an undisturbed, pure consciousness, has not always been tempered in Jaina practice by what P.S. Jaini calls 'a real and active concern with the prevention and alleviation of suffering' [JPP p. 313]; nor has the spirit of anekantavada always informed and restrained behaviour based on such doctrines. Jaini cites the case of an 18th C. Sthanakavasi monk [the Sthanakavasis are themselves an offshoot of the Svetambaras], Bhikhanji, who established a sect, the Terapantha, 'based on the doctrine of total nonassistance to any living being (except mendicants)' [JPP p. 313]. The theoretical basis for this is that, by aiding or 'saving' other creatures, you become responsible for their future violence; moreover, "helpful" behavior almost always involved some interest in the result, hence brought an increase in karmic attachments' [JPP p. 314 fn. 63]. This proved unacceptable to the Jaina community at large, and ensured the isolation of the small group of Terapantha mendicants. However, as Jaini puts it, Bhikhanji exploited 'the doctrinal split inherent in any community that preaches the ideals of total renunciation and moksa, on the one hand, and the value of compassionate and charitable behavior (leading to heaven) on the other' [ibid.]. In some ways, the position Kundakunda advocates for those who aspire to liberation foreshadows Bhikhanji's: compassion too, whether actuated in behaviour, or as an attitude of mind, keeps one in bondage and prevents spiritual progress

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184 Harmless Souls beyond a certain level of attainment. The reaction to the Terapantha also highlights the readily perceived threat posed to Jaina social identity by such 'isolationism'. In Bhikhanji's case, it is the ethical norm of the lay community which is threatened; in Kundakunda's, internalisation also jeopardises ascetic practice, and thereby the entire structure of Jaina religious and social identity.

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The mechanism of liberation according to the Pravacanasara 6.1 Caritra It is a commonplace of Jaina doctrine that liberation (moksa) cannot be achieved through samyag-jnana - 'right knowledge' (and samyag-darsana, 'right faith') - alone: samyak-caritra - 'right conduct', the third 'jewel' of the triad, is also required. As the very first sutra of the Tattvartha Sutra puts it: samyagdarsanajnanacaritrani moksamargah: 'Right faith, right knowledge, and right conduct are the path to liberation'. (Or to invert the formulation, the condition of bondage is threefold, consisting of mithya-(wrong)-darsana, mithya-jnana, and mithya-caritra.)These three together constitute a single path to liberation.2 Right conduct, moreover, is defined (by the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutral.1) as 'the cessation of activity leading to the taking in of karmas'.3 Consequently, as Tatia explains, the attainment of perfect knowledge does not result in immediate liberation, since the latter requires perfect conduct too, and that is only attained when all activity (yoga) ceases (i.e. in the last moment before death).4 Prima facie, this would seem to act as a check on any tendency, such as Kundakunda's emphasis on jnana, to undermine the rationale of physical, external discipline through the internalisation of practice. However, this only See Tatia p. 151. 2 See SS on TS 1.1: marga iti caikavacananirdesah samastasya margabhavajnapanarthah - 'The singular "path" is used in order to indicate that all the three together constitute the path to liberation'. 3 S.A. Jain's trans., p. 3, of karmadananimittakriyoparamah. 4 Tatia p. 153.

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186 Harmless Souls holds good as long as caritra itself is seen predominantly in terms of restraint from external, physical action; Kundakunda, however, makes it clear at the beginning of the Pravacanasara that for him caritra too is essentially something internal, a matter of attitude. In this work, as will become evident, caritra is intimately linked to the attainment of jnana through dhyana, rather than to the practice of external tapas. Thus, for Kundakunda, samyakcaritra becomes merely an augmentation to, or instrument of, samyag-jnana, whereas the classical view is that it is samyag-jnana which results in samyak-caritra, and that it is the latter which is soteriologically crucial.5 Evidence of this internalisation is provided at the beginning of the Pravacanasara. There, in gatha 1:6, it is stated that the jiva attains nirvana by conduct (caritra) which has as its most important component perception and knowledge (darsana and jnana).6 Such conduct, as the Tattvadipika explains, is that which is free from attachment (vitaraga). However, in the next gatha, caritra is given a more precise definition: Conduct is indeed dharma; dharma is defined as equanimity [sama]; for equanimity is a modification of the self which is free from delusion and disturbance (or 'the disturbance of delusion'). [Pravacanasara 1:7] That is to say, ideal conduct is an attitude of calmness (sama), an absence of passion, not a particular course of external, physical conduct. It is something that occurs internally, transforming the essential self (cf.1:8); i.e. caritra is internalised to a bhava or mental state (see 1:9). Pravacanasara 1:11 goes on to say that if the self which 5 See the SS on TS 1.1: 'knowledge is mentioned before conduct, for conduct issues from knowledge' - trans. by S.A. Jain p. 4, of: caritrat purvam jnanam prayuktam, tatpurvakatvac caritrasya. 6 jivassa carittado damsana sampajjadi nivvanam nanappahanado - Pravac. 1:6.

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: Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 187 has transformed itself through dharma (i.e. through its internal attitude) is united with the pure manifestation of consciousness then it attains to the bliss of nirvana.? This definition of caritra as part of the ratnatraya may be compared with that given in the Pancastikaya at gatha 115, viz.: Right faith is belief in the way things are (i.e. in the tattvas). Right knowledge is the acquisition of correct knowledge about things (adhigama).8 Right conduct is an attitude of indifference towards things on the part of those who are on the path. In other words, when you know how things really are you realise that they have nothing to do with the self, and so you maintain a liberating attitude of indifference towards them. 9 This lack of interest in external conduct is indicative of Kundakunda's attitude throughout these works. Moreover, it is probable that this situation obtains not so much because he takes external practice for granted but because his own development of doctrine has led him to a position where the external is irrelevant. This will become clear when we try to find a place for his understanding of the roles of jnana and dhyana in the standard Jaina categorization of tapas (as imperfectly schematised in the Tattvartha Sutra). . 7 dhammena parinadappa appa jadi suddhasampayogajudo pavadi nivvanasuham ... Pravac. 1:11. 8 On adhigama, see TS 1:3 and SS. 9 Here 'knowledge' may be being used in the vyavahara or conventional sense, as opposed to the niscaya view of jnana which refers to realisation of the self ('self-knowledge'); nevertheless, it is clear that knowledge and conduct are interdependent and inform each other at both levels. The crucial consideration, however, is how caritra is defined

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188 Harmless Souls 6.2 Samayika Before we deal with tapas and dhyana directly, however, it is worth considering some of the associations which cluster around the word sama / sama, 'equanimity', and its synonyms in Jaina doctrine. This will provide some indication of how Kundakunda has arrived at his conception of ideal conduct as primarily an attitude of mind rather than specific, physical conduct.10 Throughout Jaina literature there occurs the term samayika, often translated as 'attaining equanimity'.11 It is, however, possible to trace a substantial shift in emphasis and meaning between the samayika of the early canon and samayika as it appears in later works (in, for example, Kundakunda's Niyamasara). An outline of this change will help us to a better understanding of the range and type of mental conduct that Kundakunda recommends in the Pravacanasara. P.S. Jaini writes that samayika is 'first used in canonical texts with reference to a restraint (samyama) undertaken by Mahavira when he renounced the world'. This involved 'nothing less than the lifetime abandonment of all evil acts'. 12 This usage is evident in the following passage from the Ayaramga Sutta: After the Venerable Ascetic Mahavira had plucked out his hair in five handfuls ..., he paid obeisance to all liberated spirits, and vowing to do no sinful act, he adopted the holy conduct. 13 10 See Pravac. 1:7, above. 11 See, for instance, JPP (glossary) p. 350. 12 JPP p. 221. 13 tao nam samane bhagavam Mahavire ... pamcamutthiyam loyam karetta siddhanam namokkaram karei, karetta savvam me akaranijjam pavakammam ti katlu samayiam carittam paoivajjai. Quoted in JPP p. 17, fn. 40 - II.15.23 in Jacobi's trans.; cf. Utt. 28.32. Jacobi's trans., 1884, p. 199 is the one used here. Jacobi's translation of samayiam / samayikam in this passage as holy' is criticised by Jaini as ignoring the technical meaning of

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara The important point to note here is that samayika is essentially to do with physical conduct (caritra) and so with physical restraint. Moreover, this giving up of all harmful acts is, in effect, a compression of the mahavrata, the five great vows of the ascetic: viz. to desist from himsa, anrta, steya, abrahma, and parigraha (injury, lying, taking what is not given, unchastity, and attachment to things). This connection is pointed out by Pujyapada in his commentary on Tattvartha Sutra 7:1 (which enumerates the mahavrata) where he states that, 'From the point of view of samayika, which consists of the cessation from everything blameable (i.e. harmful) the vow is one'. 14 As I have already explained, the earliest understanding of the mahavrata was overwhelmingly in terms of physical restraint; the samayika-caritra of the Ayaramga must, therefore, be similarly external in its range and focus. However, this very wedding of samayika and mahavrata alerts us to the probability that, with the increasing internalisation of the vrata especially of ahimsa and aparigraha (they become at least as significant as attitudes or mental events as they are as physical restraints) -, samayika too will be internalised. This does turn out to be the case; the difficulty lies in deciding when - i.e. in what social and religious circumstances - it occurred. - 189 The term samayika is also used for what is undoubtedly a very ancient lay practice,15 namely, the assumption of temporary ascetic status, for periods of up to one muhurta (48 minutes).16 The purpose of this ritual is, as P.S. Jaini remarks, to lead the layman 'voluntarily and irrevocably samayika-caritra and so also its wider implications [JPP p. 17, fn. 40]. 14 Trans. of: sarvasavadyanivrttilaksanasamayikapreksya ekam SS on TS 7:1. vratam, 15 One mentioned derisively in the Buddhist Anguttaranikaya 1.206, quoted in JPP p. 223, fn. 42. 16 See JPP p. 223.

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190 Harmless Souls into the vows and life of an ascetic'.17 As the Avasyakaniryukti (c.90 C.E.?)18 remarks, during the time of samayika, 'a layman becomes like an ascetic and for that reason it should be performed often'. 19 The extent to which this practice in its earliest form was fully meditational (i.e. aiming at self-realisation or gnosis through concentration), as opposed to simply a physical restraint, is not clear. P.S. Jaini does not address the problem, giving a largely synchronic analysis of samayika based upon Williams' excellent study of the medieval sravakacara material.20 It is reasonable to suppose that lay discipline in this respect would be meditational only to the extent that the corresponding ascetic discipline was also yogic. Yet there is also the possibility that samayika, as the mental rehearsal or internalisation of ascetic practice, came to be instrumental in engendering a corresponding internalisation in the very ascetic behaviour it was attempting to concentrate. This process, if genuine, would have been facilitated by the fact that it was the same people who may have been practising in this way, as laity, who would eventually have become sramanas. Neverthelss, it remains to be shown that the earliest practice of lay samayika was anything more yogic than kayotsarga, thought-free physical immobility.21 Samayika-caritra was not, of course, confined to lay practice. For Mahavira, as we have seen, it was the one all 17 Ibid. p. 226. 18 See Schubring 1962, para. 55. 19 R. Williams' paraphrase of: samaiyammi u kae samano iva savao havai jamha / eena karanenam bahuso samaiyam kujja - quoted 1963, p. 133. 20 JPP pp. 221-227; cf. R. Williams 1963, pp. 131-139. 21 Eventually, samayika comes to include puja, 'meditation by worship' and, indeed, is used as a blanket term for all types of spiritual activity. Moreover, according to the later classification of lay spiritual progress, it is the third pratima (out of eleven), and the first of the four lay siksavrata. For the relation of these vrata to each other and to mendicant practice, see JPP p. 182; see also ibid. p. 186-187, p. 190.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 191 one embracing ascetic vow; however, the term also appears in canonical texts, not as a comprehensive vow, but simply as albeit the first - among six avasyaka or 'essential duties' of the mendicant, to be performed daily.22 Here, samayika means something like a state of 'mental equanimity' or 'equilibrium' which leads to the end of all sinful activity.23 In other words, it is an internal state, or 'meditation', initially designed to bring about the cessation of harmful conduct. Schubring sees it as a 'state of inward balance', allied to or manifesting itself in 'an act of devotion to be repeated several times a day'.24 He characterises the avasya as 'formulae' which have to be known, and samaiya as 'a short vow to be brought to one's mind repeatedly during the day promising to shun for life all that is blamable in thoughts, words and deeds ... as well as in all one has personally caused and approved of (i.e. it corresponds to the 'three restraints' or gupti).25 However, Schubring seems to be reading the term in the light of a particularly mechanised and ritualised context. For, as P.S. Jaini makes clear, these formulae are only the start of the practice which leads on to deeper meditation.26 Samayika, therefore, clearly has a more general and primary sense of developing a practice of equanimity towards everything exterior to one's self, with the understanding that the corollary of such an attitude is necessarily good physical conduct. That is to say, the physical restraint connected with Mahavira's one great vow has been partially - 22 Indeed, before taking the full mendicant vows, the novice Svetambara monk is said to live in the samaiya state or branch of the monastic order (-kappa-tthii) - see Schubring 1962, paras. 136, 138, 151. For details of the avasyaka, see Schubring 1962, para. 151; R. Williams 1963, pp.184-5; JPP pp. 189-191. 23 See Utt. 28.32, 29 (intro.), and 29:8. Jaini says that the minimum amount of samayika required of a monk is three periods a day - JPP p. 182. 24 25 Schubring 1962, p. 299; see paras. 151, 170. Ibid. p. 269. On gupti, see section 1 above. JPP p. 222ff. 26

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192 Harmless Souls internalised, in recognition of the fact that external action is engendered and sustained by internal attitude. (The inversion of this, of course, is that if one's attitude is pure then, ipso facto, one's external behaviour will be so; the focus of personal practice has thus shifted to the former, since it is the internal attitude which is really instrumental in binding and liberating the soul.) Pujyapada seems to take this further in the Sarvarthasiddhi. Starting with the canonical understanding that samayika is a single great vow, he equates this with the subject becoming one, or concentrated: To become one is samaya. Samayika is just the same as samaya, or it can be analysed as having samaya as its purpose.2 27 It is thus made clear that external restraint is the means to a unified internal state, a becoming 'one'. Moreover, it is this inner concentration which is the immediate cause of liberation. This is spelt out elsewhere in the Sarvarthasiddhi. At Tattvartha Sutra 9:2, the causes of samvara for ascetics are listed; these are gupti, samiti, dharma, anupreksa, parisahajaya, and caritra (control, carefulness, virtue / duty, contemplation, victory over the afflictions, and conduct). According to Pujyapada, conduct (caritra) is mentioned last to indicate that it is the direct cause of liberation.28 And foremost, and of most importance, among these five kinds of liberation-causing conduct is samayika.29 So far we have seen that samayika has been characterised chiefly as the development of an attitude of 27 ekatvena ayanam gamanam samayah, samaya eva samayikam, samayah prayojanam asyeti va vigrhya samayikam - SS on TS 7:21. 28 caritram ante grhyate moksaprapteh saksat karanam - SS on TS 9:18. 29 See ibid.: samayikadinam anupurvyavacanam uttarottaragunaprakarsakhyapanartham kriyate; cf. Pravac. 1:7 and Panc. 115, quoted above, pp. 186-187.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 193 restraint or indifference towards the world - an attitude which in turn entails physical restraint. This reading looks, as it were, over its shoulder at that bodily control which is the ultimate factor in liberation. However, the kind of concentration of and on the self, described by Pujyapada, looks forward to the self-realisation or jnana of Kundakunda.30 When we turn to Kundakunda himself, we find that the only sustained use of the term samayika, as such, is in the Niyamasara (although, as we have already seen, in the Pravacanasara there is the crucial equation of sama with caritra and dharma). There, in the section on pratyakhyana (renunciation), we find the following verses: Whatever wrong conduct is in me, I give it all up together with threefold activity and practise threefold equanimity (samayika) which is everything and formless, [Niyamasara 103131 and I am impartial (samya) towards all living creatures and I have no animosity towards any of them. Having given up all desires, deep meditation (samadhi) is attained.[Niyamasara 104]32 30 It is possible, of course, that Pujyapada had read Kundakunda; certainly, he must have been aware of some of the latter's source material. 31 Niy. 103 trans. by Uggar Sain (Kundakunda (1)], with alterations. The surrounding verses are slokas, but 103 is metrically defective. 32 Niy. 104. It is worth noting that commentators generally take verses 77-139 of the Niyamasara to be Kundakunda's version of the six avasyaka. As Bhargava (pp. 166-167) points out, this particular list of avasyaka is slightly different from all other versions, before and after Kundakunda. If it is really supposed to be a list of avasyaka then it is a radically internalised one, in which pratikramana (confession), prayascitta (repentance), etc. are all done by the self to the self through inner discipline, and have no external indicators or emblems; that is to say, they are de-ritualised.

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194 Harmless Souls First, it should be noted that samayika is equated with inactivity: it is again connected with the threefold restraint (gupti) of mind, speech and body. Yet this is viewed not so much as a renunciatory practice as the attainment of 'everything'. It may be asked, what can be meant by a 'threefold equanimity' that is everything and formless? Uggar Sain's modern commentary33 splits the practice of samayika into three tiers (lowest, middle, and highest); however, it seems clear that the threefold samayika is simply the restraint of body, speech, and mind, in negation of their threefold activity, and that this practice is viewed as essentially one, a total equanimity rooted in realisation of the self's true relationship (i.e. lack of relationship) with everything else. Second, equanimity, the condition of impartiality towards everything, is closely connected with the meditational state of samadhi, the former apparently being a prerequisite or preliminary form of the latter. A section of the Niyamasara, called 'parama-samadhi' (122-133), deals with this relationship in more detail. Here, in gatha 123, parama-samadhi is seen as the result of meditation on the the self through dharma-dhyana and sukla-dhyana.34 When this is compared with gatha 133, it can be seen that meditation on the self (through dharmaand sukla-dhyana) is the practice of samayika.35 Gatha 133 reads: In the teaching of the omniscient, he who continuously practises dharma-dhyana and sukla-dhyana, for him there is lasting equanimity (samayika). Taking these two gathas together, it becomes clear that 33 Based on Padmaprabha's commentary of c. mid twelfth century C.E., on which see Upadhye p. xl, fn. 1. 34 dhammajjhanena sukkajhanena | jo jhayai appanam paramasamahi have tassa - Niy. 123. 35 On dharma- and sukla-dhyana, see below.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 195 samayika leads to parama-samadhi. Indeed, that they are perceived as virtually synonymous may be inferred from the fact that, barring the first two gathas (122 and 123) and the last (133), the whole of this 'parama-samadhi' section is devoted to characterising samayika. In selective summary, all external tapas and study is useless to one devoid of equanimity (124); but an all-embracing attitude of nonattachment, of sama (126), towards all things brings one close to the atman (127) and constitutes samayika. In other words, it is not so much a condition resulting from realisation of the self (of its true nature), but a means to engendering that realisation. And it is through such realisation, brought about by meditation on the true nature of the self (= samayika [123]), that parama-samadhi results. Pure self-awareness or self-knowledge is inextricable from samayika, and it is for this, as we shall see, that Kundakunda's ideal ascetic is striving. It is clearly with definitions such as these in mind that P.S. Jaini refers to samayika as meaning both 'attaining equanimity' and 'fusion with the true self, or as 'becoming fixed in jnana-cetana, pure self-awareness'.36 This, as Jaini further remarks, amounts to a 'progressive detachment of one's consciousness from all external objects';37 yet, rather than being mindless, such an attitude - as we shall see - leads, according to Kundakunda, to nothing less than omniscience. Briefly, we have considered the shift in meaning of 'samayika' - from being a synonym for the total physical restraint of the mahavrata, via internalised restraint, to an attitude of mind, or development of consciousness through meditation, which leads to pure self-awareness. By doing so, we have charted a line of development through which the ascetic (especially, but not exclusively) has acquired a greater and greater autonomy of means vis a vis his personal liberation. 36 JPP p. 221. 37 Ibid.

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196 Harmless Souls With this rapid sketch of one strand of doctrinal development in mind, we must now return to a more detailed analysis of Kundakunda's internalised mechanism of liberation. 6.3 Tapas and dhyana The ninth adhyaya of the Tattvartha Sutra deals with samvara and nirjara, the obstruction of the influx of karmic material and the destruction of that already bound. Samvara is effected by gupti (restraint), samiti (carefulness), dharma, anupreksa (reflection), parisahajaya (victory over the twenty-two afflictions) and caritra (conduct of five kinds) (Tattvartha Sutra 9:2).38 Nirjara is effected by tapas (austerities / penance) (Tattvartha Sutra 9:3). The Sarvarthasiddhi adds that tapas causes both samvara and nirjara; indeed, it is the chief cause of samvara.39 This, says Pujyapada, is why tapas is mentioned separately here, although it is also included as a sub-category of dharma (at Tattvartha Sutra 9:6). From this it is clear that tapas is by far the most important element in the process of achieving permanent liberation from the bondage of karman. (There are, of course, degrees of tapas, and so also of samvara and nirjara, but not of final liberation.) Umasvati divides tapas into two categories, bahya (external) and uttara ('higher', i.e. the internal) (Tattvartha Sutra 9:19-20). External tapas need not detain us here, other than to remark that it consists of: 1) anasana - fasting 2) avamaudarya - reduction in food intake 3) vrtti-parisamkhyana - restrictions on the begging of food 4) rasa-parityaga - rejection of stimulating or delicious food 5) vivikta-sayyasana - sitting / sleeping in a lonely place 38 On caritra, see TS 9:18; cf. p. 185ff. above. 39 samvaram prati pradhanya pratipadanartham - SS on TS 9:3.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 197 6) kaya-klesa - mortification of the body. [Tattvartha Sutra 9:19] According to the Sarvarthasiddhi, these are called external 'because they are dependent on external things and these are seen by others'.40 Internal tapas consists of: 1) prayascitta - repentance of transgressions due to negligence (nine kinds, see Tattvartha Sutra 9:22) 2) vinaya - reverence, especially to elders (four kinds, see Tattvartha Sutra 9:23) 3) vaiyavsttya - respectful service to other monks, especially when they are ill (ten kinds, see Tattvartha Sutra 9:24) 4) svadhyaya - study of the scriptures (five kinds, see Tattvartha Sutra 9:25) 5) vyutsarga - renunciation of external and internal attachments (upadhi - see Tattvartha Sutra 9:26) 6) dhyana - meditation (four kinds, see Tattvartha Sutra 9:28) [Tattvartha Sutra 9:20] These are called 'internal' (abhyantara) because of the restraint or limitation of the mind in these cases.41 In practice, commentators agree that dhyana is the most significant of these internal austerities and the most important feature in the pattern of Jaina ethics.42 Dhyana is first defined (in the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 9:20) as the abandoning of mental confusion (literally, the giving up of the distractions of/ to the mind - cittaviksepatyago dhyanam).43 A more technical description follows (at Tattvartha Sutra 9:27), where meditation is said to be the concentration of thought on one point or object, lasting up to a maximum of one muhurta 40 S.A. Jain's trans. of: bahyadravyapeksatvat parapratyaksatvac ca. 41 manoniyamamanarthatvat - SS on TS 9:20. 42 See, for example, JPP p. 251, and Bhargava p. 193. 43 On citta-viksepa, cf. YS, 1:30, 1:31. -

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198 Harmless Souls The (forty-eight minutes) for the most robust.44 Sarvarthasiddhi connects such meditation with jnana by defining dhyana as 'knowledge which shines without quivering like the steady flame of a candle'.45 This dhyana, according to Umasvati, is of four types: 1) arta 2) raudra 3) dharmya virtuous concentration 4) sukla pure concentration. concentration on something painful concentration on something cruel [Tattvartha Sutra 9:28] The first two types (arta and raudra) are aprasasta (not recommended) because they are the cause of the influx of inauspicious karmas.46 Conversely, the second two (dharmya and sukla) are prasasta (recommended) because they have the power to destroy karman.47 Moreover, dharmya- and sukla-dhyana are the causes of moksa (Tattvartha Sutra 9:29). Arta- and raudra-dhyana are each divided into four types [see Tattvartha Sutra 9:30-35], characteristic, in the case of arta, of laymen and non-vigilant ascetics (Tattvartha Sutra 9:34), and in the case of raudra, of laymen who have and have not taken the partial vows (Tattvartha Sutra 9:35). An 'ascetic' who is subject to this spontaneous type of dhyana would, ipso facto, no longer be an ascetic. 48 Similarly, the liberating kinds of meditation, dharmya and sukla, are each subdivided into four types (Tattvartha Sutra 9:36-44). Dharmya-dhyana is divided into: 44 uttamasamhananasyaikagracintanirodho dhyanam antarmuhurtat. Cf. Patanjali's YS 1:2: yogas citta-vrtti-nirodhah, 'yoga is the control of the activities of the mind-field'. 45 S.A. Jain's trans. of: jnanam evaparispandagnisikhavad avabhasamanam - SS on TS 9:27. 46 apunyasravakaranatvat - - SS on TS 9:28. 47 karmanirdahanasamarthyat - ibid. 48 See SS on TS 9:35.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 199 1) ajna vicaya - the investigation of, or meditation on, the teachings of the Fina - especially on what can be known only through those teachings 2) apaya-vicaya - meditation on the loss of the true path by others, and the means to their liberation 3) vipaka-vicaya - meditation on the effects of karman on jivas, and the way to liberation from karman 4) samsthana-vicaya - meditation on the structure of the universe and the way in which jivas are brought to their particular position.49 The Sarvarthasiddhi explains that this kind of meditation is attainable by, or characteristic of, laymen of the fourth and fifth gunasthanas, and ascetics of the sixth and seventh gunasthanas.50 Sukla-dhyana is also divided into four: 1) prthaktva-savitarka-savicara 2) ekatva-savitarka-avicara These two 'involve discursive concentration upon the nature of the tattvas (existents)'. Each focuses on a single existent, but, in the first, the meditator's attention 'shifts from one of the existent's countless modes to another', whereas, in the second, his attention is applied to a single mode of the existent.51 They occur between the eighth and twelfth gunasthanas, and the attainment of the twelfth gunasthana is only possible through their negation of the passions. 52 49 TS 9:36 and SS - see also JPP pp. 252-253; and Bhargava pp. 199-200. 50 See JPP p. 253. 51 JPP p. 257, based on the SS on TS 9:39-44. 52 The terminology here is very close to that applied to the first two Buddhist jhana; in the Buddhist case, however, reasoning / conceptual thought (vitarka) usually disappears along with discursive thought (vicara) in the second jhana (see Lamotte, pp. 42-43). See also 'Jhana' in Buddhist Dictionary, and e.g. Majjhima-Nikaya 1.276. Also

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200 Harmless Souls 3) suksmakriya-anivartin - the 'meditation' of subtle activity, in which 'all gross and subtle activities of mind and speech, as well as the gross activities of the body, are absolutely stopped'. 53 4) vyuparatakriya-anivartin - absolute non-motion, in which even the subtle physical activities - breathing, heartbeat, etc.- are stopped. These two - designated anivartin, 'that from which there is no falling back'54 - occur in the final two gunasthanas, immediately preceding physical death and final liberation. The discussion of sukla-dhyana, in particular, is very limited in the Tattvartha Sutra and Sarvarthasiddhi. A number of problems attend the relevant passages, not least the assertion, at Tattvartha Sutra 9:37, that the first two types of sukla-dhyana can be attained only by those who know the purvas (i.e. the original Jaina canon which, at the time of the Tattvartha Sutra's composition, was already considered to be 'lost'). These difficulties have been considered by a number of scholars and I shall not enter into a further discussion of them here.55 Enough, however, has been presented of this standard schema of tapas and dhyana, and its relation to the jiva's progress towards liberation, to be able to ask where, if at all, Kundakunda's soteriology of liberation through jnana and liberation fits into this pattern. In order to answer this, we must now look at Kundakunda's gathas on liberation in greater detail. cf. Yoga Sutras 1:42-44 on savitarka, nirvitarka, savicara, and nirvicara. 33 JPP p. 269. 54 Ibid. p. 270. 55 On sukla-dhyana see Bronkhorst p. 179; Schubring 1962, p. 315 fn. 3, p. 316. On the contradiction between the TS and Bhasya concerning sukla-dhyana, see Zydenbos pp. 34-35. On the later systematisation of dhyana, especially by Haribhadra, see Tatia pp. 283291.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 201 6.4 Meditation in the Pravacanasara i) Dhyana The first direct reference to 'meditation' (hana / dhyana) in the Pravacanasara occurs at gatha 2:59: He, who having conquered the senses etc., meditates on the pure manifestation of consciousness (which is) the self, will not be affected by karmas. How then can the life-essentials (prana) follow him?.56 The prana - the 'life-essentials' or 'animating principles' - do not, as Upadhye explains, 'form the nature of the soulstuff, but they are the indications or the signs of the presence of the soul in an embodied condition'.57 That is to say, they are the only available means by which a jiva may be detected in samsara; or as the Tattvadipika on Pravacanasara 2:53 puts it, they are the reason for the vyavahara condition of the jiva, as opposed to its condition as it is in itself, its niscaya condition. The prana are fourfold - of the senses (imdiya), of the channels of activities (bala) [viz. body, speech and mind), of duration of life (au / ayu), and of respiration (anappana / anaprana) (Pravacanasara 2:54). The jiva 'lives' in samsara (in the past, present and future) by virtue of these prana, which themselves originate from material substances (poggala-davva / pudgala-dravya) (2:55). As the Tattvadipika on 2:55 is at pains to point out, the prana, because of their material basis, cannot reach the innate nature of the soul.58 Inevitably, given their materiality, the prana are seen as being both the effects and the causes of 56 Translation after Upadhye. 57 Upadhye p. 19, fn. 1 on 2:54 (trans.). 58 tan na jivasya svabhavatvam avapnoti pudgaladravyanirvrttatvat - TD on Pravac. 2:55.

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202 Harmless Souls material karman.59 The karma-tainted jiva supports prana again and again (i.e. it is reborn) - prana which, by their very nature as active principles, involve the jiva in further himsa,60 until it gives up the attitude of possession, of 'mine', towards external objects, especially the body.61 This, according to the Tattvadipika on 2:58, breaks the sequence and, having conquered the senses through this renunciation of possession, the person meditating on the pure self achieves samvara. 62 In other words, there is no rebirth, for the pure soul cannot, by definition, be embodied by material prana (themselves the effect and further cause of karman); for while the conjunction with material prana is the cause of the soul's vyavahara state,63 from the niscaya view the soul is quite separate from material prana. As the Tattvadipika puts it, the cessation of this series of material karman accrues to him who has conquered all strange substances such as the senses, like a crystal gem withdrawn from the influence (anuvrtti) of any support, and who abides in the perfect (kevala) and motionless self, completely pure and consisting merely of manifestation of consciousness.64 * So rather than physical tapas, it is meditation on the true nature of the self- that it is pure consciousness - which is instrumental in bringing the cycle of material prana and 59 For a full description of the mechanism of this, see Pravac. and TD 2:56-57. 60 See TD on 2:57. 61 See Pravac. 2:58. 62 See Pravac. 2:59, quoted above. 63 vyavaharajivatvahetavah - TD on Pravac. 2:59. 64 Faddegon's trans. [Kundakunda (3)] p.123, slightly altered, of TD on 2:59: sa (tu) samastendriyadi paradravyanuvijayino bhutva samastopasrayanuvrttivyavrttasya sphatikamaner ivatyantavisuddham upayogamatram atmanam suniscalam kevalam adhivasatah syat Note once again the way in which the jewel simile is employed: the material world colours the jiva by reflection, there is no real contact.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 203 karma to an end. The classical idea of liberation achieved through the stoppage and shedding of material karman through tapas fades before Kundakunda's idea of release through realisation of the pure self - the atman whose svabhava cannot, by definition, be tainted by karman - through meditation. This is made even clearer at Pravacanasara 2:67, which reads: Free from inauspicious manifestation of consciousness, not joined to auspicious (manifestation of consciousness) towards other substance, let me be indifferent (i.e. neutral); I meditate on the self whose self is knowledge.65 Introducing this gatha, Amrtacandra characterises it as a teaching of the destruction of the causes of conjunction with other substance'. 66 By becoming indifferent to paradravya, one is released from asuddhopayoga and becomes intent upon the self alone - a state synonymous with suddhopayoga.67 The next gatha (2:68) takes the form of a performative or prescriptive statement, prefaced by the nominative singular of the first person pronoun, with regard to paradravya. In other words, it gives what seems to be a paradigm of meditational practice: I am neither body, nor mind, nor speech, nor the cause of these, (I am) neither the agent, nor the instigator, nor the approver of doers / actors. This adds up to a radical reinterpretation of the gupti doctrine of classical Jain thought.68 Freedom from 65 Cf. pp. 181ff., above, on Pravac. 2:67, etc. 66 Faddegon's trans., p. 127, of: paradravyasamyogakaranavinasam; cf. TD on 2:65. 67 Paraphrase of the TD on Pravac. 2:67. 68 See above; TS 9:4; JPP p. 247.

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204 Harmless Souls bondage is no longer a matter of restraining or progressively curbing the activities (yoga) of body, mind and speech with regard to what is done, caused, or approved by oneself; now it is a matter of realising that body, mind and speech are entirely alien substances (paradravya) which, in reality, have no connection with the self whatsoever. A strict dualism applies in which the very instruments and organs of yoga (activity) are denied any connection with the essential self; therefore, what body, mind and speech do or do not do is actually irrelevant to liberation. What counts now is knowledge or realisation of the true nature of the atman through meditation, the prerequisite of which is an attitude of indifference (madhyastha) to everything not that pure self. (The possible implications of this for Jaina orthopraxy hardly need pointing out.) Thus this gatha (2:68) may be taken as an apophatic statement about the true nature of the self - a statement which acts, mediately and meditatively, as a means of realising that nature. The Tattvadipika stresses at length that body, voice and mind - characterised as acetana-dravya ('unintelligent / unconscious substance', consisting of poggala-davva / pudgala-dravya)69 - act independently of the self; they are autonomous; indeed, the body, taken in its widest sense, is an automaton. For example: I am not the unconscious substance which is the cause of body, voice and mind; indeed, these are cause even without me as cause and I am not the unconscious substance which is the independent cause of body, voice and mind; indeed, these are being done even without me as agent, etc.70 69 See Pravac. 2:69-70. 70 na ca me sariravanmanahkaranacetanadravyatvam asti, tani khalu mam karanam antarenapi karanam bhavanti ... na ca me

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 205 All this amounts to saying that the essential cause of bondage is the mistaken belief that the jiva has some connection with what is ajiva. Such a belief constitutes asuddhopayoga, which is destroyed by the realisation of the jiva's true identity (and thus of the 'mistake') through meditation on its true nature. This seems perilously close to saying that bondage is not simply maintained by delusive behaviour - the product, among other things, of mohaniyakarman - but that it is a delusion. If the jiva, by definition, cannot act or cause action, if it cannot really have any connection with matter, how can it ever have been bound? Unsurprisingly, the Pravacanasara does not pursue this here, but starts a technical discussion of the nature of atoms (2:70ff.). 71 ii) Dhyana and jnana Pravacanasara 2:98-2:108 provides a cluster of gathas on meditation, the nature of the self and knowledge. I have commented on the significance of some of these for Kundakunda's doctrine of liberation already;72 here I shall consider their relation to dhyana and jnana. Pravacanasara 2:98 states that to identify the self with body and wealth (i.e. with paradravya, the not-self) is to resort to the wrong road (ummaggam / unmargam). According to the Tattvadipika, such identification brings about a transformation into the impure self; it is this which is the 'wrong road'.73 Thus, 'from the point of view of the svatantrasariravanmanah-karanacetanadravyatvam asti, tani khalu mam kartaram antarenapi kriyamanani - TD on Pravac. 2:68. can mean to characterise manas as 'unconscious' or the product of 'unconscious substance' is not made clear. But the physical manas of Samkhya, a product of unconscious praksti, and totally separate from the purusa, may provide a model here. 71 Samkhya, of course, has precisely the same problem, one which is inherited by Vedanta. 72 See above, pp. 140-143, 147-149. 73 asuddhatmaparinatirupam unmargam - TD on 2:98.

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206 Harmless Souls impure only the impure self is attained'.74 Moreover, commenting on the previous gatha [2:97], Amstacandra has already associated this emphasis on the impure with the vyavahara view of the self, i.e. with the point of view that the self is and can be contaminated by paradravya.75 So for Amstacandra, at least, when it comes to the question of liberation, the vyavahara view is not simply a theoretical construct - a partial view, or the truth at one particular level - it is actually instrumental in further bondage: to believe that the soul can be connected with and thus contaminated by paradravya is to bring about that very contamination. 76 And the self which does not cease to identify with other substances is characterised as one 'whose delusion is produced by the vyavahara-naya'.77 'From the point of view of the pure', however, 'only the pure self is attained'.78 The person who meditates on the niscaya view - that there is no connection between the pure self and paradravya - actually becomes that pure self, i.e. he is liberated. So, according to this, it is a mental act - meditation - including or allied to another mental act - a particular kind of knowledge about the (non-)relation of the pure self to matter - which is instrumental in liberating the jiva. External means and the various kinds of material karman are disregarded. This technique is exemplified by Pravacanasara 2:99; He who meditates in concentration, thinking 'I am not others' and they are not mine; I am one (with) knowledge', comes to be a meditator on the (pure) self. 74 asuddhanayad asuddhatmalabha eva - TD, intro. to 2:98. 75 See TD on 2:97: asuddhadyotako vyavaharanayah - the conventional view which explains the impure'. 76 Although, at the theoretical level, the TD on 2:97 holds to the idea that both views are 'correct': ubhav apy etau stah. suddhasuddhatvenobhayatha dravyasya pratiyamanatvat. 77 vyavaharanayopajanitamohah - TD on 2:98. 78 suddhanayad eva suddhatmalabhah - TD on Pravac. 2:99.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 207 The Tattvadipika comments that the person doing this, who lets go the non-self and, taking on the self as self, turns away from other substance and confines his thought to the single point, the self, such a one assuredly, confining his thought one-pointedly, will in that moment of confining his thought one-pointedly be pure self.79 Here, Amrtacandra is probably writing under the influence of the synthesis of yoga traditions made by Patanjali in the Yoga Sutras and by Vyasa in his Yogabhasya. Both these works predate Amotacandra by at least several centuries. If Kundakunda himself knew the Yoga Sutras it is not evident in his work, but since he is clearly drawing on the same ancient tradition of meditational and yogic techniques which are systematised by Patanjali, the chronology is not important. (It is interesting to note that Amotacandra echoes not only the yogas cittavrttinirodhah of Yoga Sutras 1:2 but with his stress on ekagra, 'one-pointed thought' or 'concentration', recalls the technical use of this term in Vyasa as the means by which pure samadhi is attained.) 80 On samadhi, the object of yoga, Mircea Eliade writes that, in the first place, it is 'the state in which thought grasps the object directly. Thus there is a real coincidence between knowledge of the object and the object o: knowledge'::81 According to Patanjali and his commentators, samadhi has a number of stages; by successively accomplishing these, the 'faculty of absolute knowledge' (rtambharaprajna) is attained, and this 79 Faddegon's trans. (p.145) of: anatmanam utsrjyatmanam evatmatvenopadaya paradravyavyavrttattvad atmany evaikasminn agre cintam nirunaddhi sa khalv ekagracintanirodhakas tasminn ekagracintanirodhasamaye suddhatma syat - TD on 2:99. 80 See Bhasya on YS 1:1, etc. 81 Eliade p. 522.

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208 Harmless Souls is in itself an opening toward samadhi 'without seed', pure samadhi, for absolute knowledge discovers the state of ontological plenitude in which being and knowing are no longer separated ... Fixed in samadhi, consciousness (citta) can now have direct revelation of the self (purusa).82 This is similar enough to Kundakunda's concentration on the pure self as knowledge - without, of course, sharing the same technical context or metaphysics - to alert us to the kind of meditational technique the Digambara writer is recommending. The general method has been discussed above (under 'samayika); as a technique, it might also be compared with the preliminary form of Theravada Buddhist meditation - samatha or samadhi, the development of onepointedness of mind.83 But such comparisons merely, demonstrate the pan-Indian character of this method; the real interest lies in the way in which Kundakunda applies it and the implications that this has for ascetic practice. And here, the fact that it bears little resemblance to (or at best subsumes) the classical Jaina modes of dhyana as outlined in the Tattvartha Sutra (see above), with their emphasis on the cessation of all activity, is significant. For Kundakunda has developed a path to liberation which, at least in its later stages, is almost totally hermetic or self-referential. The goal is achieved through the individual's inner concentration on his pure self; this brings about knowledge or realisation of that self which, since the pure self has absolutely no connection with other substances (karman, etc.), is synonymous with liberation. The old, semimaterialist model of a soul which is weighted down by material karman shedding that karman through physical austerities and, in its liberation, ascending to the topmost part of the universe, has been (at least temporarily) superseded. This becomes clear if we consider the ways in which 82 Ibid. 83 See, for instance, Rahula p.68.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 209 meditation is characterised in the Pravacanasara. Gatha 2:104 reads: He, who has destroyed the impurity of delusion, who has no interest in the objects of the senses, and who, having restrained his mind, is fixed in his own nature, is a meditator on the self. In other words, meditation on the (pure) self is nothing less than realisation of that self; the successful meditator becomes the pure self which is his own nature (svabhava). As the Tattvadipika on 2:104 puts it: 'Thus meditation, which takes the form of absorption in one's own nature, is the self, because it is nothing other than the self.84 That is to say, the atman has and can have no dravya for its substratum (adhikarana) other than its own nature; its own nature (as defined by the Tattvadipika) is 'infinite, innate intelligence' (anantasahajacaitanya), and it is the fixing of oneself in this svabhava which constitutes meditation.85 Kundakunda himself has already defined the self's svabhava in some detail as being constituted of jnana and darsana, an object beyond the senses, eternal (dhuva), unmoving (acala), without support - so independent (analamba), and pure (suddha).86 This is the eternal self, whose 'self is upayoga (2:101), meditation upon which destroys moha,87 and leads to 'imperishable happiness'.88 Kundakunda then asks the question (Pravacanasara 2:105), what does the person who has realised his pure self, who has attained kevalajnana, meditate upon (given that he 84 atah svabhavavasthanarupatvena dhyanam atmano 'nanyatvat dhyanam atmaiveti - TD on 2:104. 85 See TD on 2:104. 86 At Pravac. 2:100-101. 87 See above, pp. 140-143, 147-149. 88 sokkham akkhayam / saukhyam aksayam - 2:103. Note that the TD on 2:102 defines dhyana as ekagrasamcetana, 'one-pointed awareness'.

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210 Harmless Souls is omniscient and, as the Tattvadipika puts it, does not feel any desire, curiosity or doubt)?89 The answer is that he meditates on 'supreme happiness' (param sokkham 2:106) which, according to the Tattvadipika (on 2:106), is as much as to say that the self 'continues as simply a one-pointed awareness in a state of calm'.90 This is the attainment of 'perfection, whose svabhava is innate knowledge and bliss'.91 In other words, meditation is not only the instrument of liberation but it also characterises the state of the liberated: path and goal constitute a single practice. iii) Jnana It has been shown that knowledge about the true nature of the self, combined with meditation on that nature, constitutes Kundakunda's path to liberation. However, given the omniscience of the arhat, knowledge occupies an even more central place in Kundakunda's soteriology than the above might at first suggest. For he equates knowledge with the knower (i.e. the self); they are co-extensive and omnipresent. This formula, and the relation of knowledge to the objects of knowledge, must now be considered in greater detail. Sruta Skandha 2 of the Pravacanasara (jneyatattvaadhikara) ends with the following gatha: Therefore, having thus realised that the self is innately disposed to be a knower, stationed in unpossessiveness, I turn away from the idea of 'mine'. [Pravacanasara 2:108] The Tattvadipika comments: 89 abhilasitam jijnasitam samdigdham - TD on Pravac. 2:105. 90 anakulatvasamgataikagrasamcetanamatrenavatisthate - op. cit. 91 sahajajnananandasvabhavasya siddhatvasya - ibid. For the equation of 'happiness' with knowledge, omniscience and liberation, see Pravac. 1:59 and Upadhye's footnote on p. 8 of his translation of 1:59.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 211 This I, qualified for liberation by means of adhering to the idea of 'not mine' and abandoning the idea of 'mine', preceded by full aquaintance with the truth that the self is inherently a knower, devotes itself to the pure self in all its undertakings because there is no gap between them. That is to say, I am indeed inherently a knower, and as I am one whose knowledge is absolute (i.e. as I am omniscient) I have a relationship - which takes the form of that between a knower and the naturally knowable - with everything, and no other relationship, such as that between possessor and possession. I am, therefore, unpossessive towards all things and attached to nothing. 92 What does it mean to say that the atman is naturally or inherently a knower (or as the Samayasara puts it of the emotions and the operation of karman: 'they are not my own nature; I am exclusively [uniquely) a knower by nature')?93 In the first instance, this is a perception which relies upon the teaching that the liberated soul does not simply attain a condition of isolated bliss at the apex of the universe, it is also characterised by omniscience (kevalajnana). (Although, for the sake of precision, one should distinguish between those liberated souls who have already discarded their bodies (siddhas) and those arhats who have attained omniscience but for the time being remain embodied.) P.S. Jaini renders the term 'kevalajnana' as 'knowledge isolated from karmic 92 aham esa moksadhikari jnayakasvabhavatmatattvaparijnanapurassaramamatvanirmamatvahanopadanavidhanena krtvantarasyabhavat sarvarambhena suddhatmani pravartate tathahi - aham hi tavat jnayaka eva svabhavena, kevalajnayakasya ca sato mama visvenapi sahajneyajnayakalaksana eva sambandhah na punar anye svasvamilaksanadayah sambandhah|| tato mama na kvacanapi mamatvam sarvatra nirmamatvam eva | TD on Pravac. 2:108. 93 na du te majjha sahava janagabhavo du aham ikko - Sam. 198 [= 213); cf. ibid. 207.

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212 Harmless Souls interference'. He goes on to say that such knowledge is compared to a mirror in which every one of the innumerable existents (dravya), in all its qualities (gunas) and modes (paryayas), is simultaneously reflected. These 'knowables' are cognised without any volition whatsoever on the part of the arhat. Furthermore, no activity of senses or mind is involved; there is only direct perception by the soul.94 Omniscience is thus the natural state of the soul, in the sense that, when all karmic obstruction is removed, that kind of knowledge automatically obtains. To put it another way, omniscience is not something to be striven for or attained, in the sense of being some quality which is added to or gained by the agent or knower, rather it is something to be realised or revealed (through the shedding of karman) as the original nature of the self. Moreover, since the jiva has, in reality, no physical relation with anything ajiva - their relation is that of the knower and the knowable -, it is apparent that in its fundamental nature the soul has never been anything but omniscient. And to achieve that omniscience it is only necessary to realise it, through meditation on the true nature of the self and its relationship with the world of matter. Again this seems tantamount to saying that karmic bondage - the adherence of matter to the jiva is fundamentally unreal, a mistake or delusion. For while on one level the realisation of the original nature of the self shines through when obstructive karman is removed, on another it is that very realisation which is instrumental in removing obstructive karman, through the perception that in reality karman cannot obstruct the pure self. Referring to Kundakunda's Niyamasara (159 = 158 SBJ ed.), P.S. Jaini remarks that the defining mark of the omniscient being is 'complete self-knowledge ...; any other 94 JPP p. 266.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 213 description is simply a worldly or "conventional" one'. 95 That is to say, 'From the vyavahara point of view the omniscient lord sees and knows everything, from the niscaya point of view the omniscient sees and knows the self.96 But, according to the Pravacanasara, this exclusive knowledge of the self is not a limitation on or contraction of knowledge; on the contrary, knowledge of the self includes knowledge of everything else. As gatha 1:23 puts it: The soul is co-extensive with knowledge; knowledge is said to be co-extensive with the objects of knowledge; the object of knowledge comprises the physical and non-physical universe; therefore knowledge is omnipresent. 97 It follows from this that the soul too is omnipresent. Although this is admitted as a temporary possibility in certain circumstances by orthodox doctrine, it is not seen as a characteristic of the liberated soul.98 Kundakunda, however, confirms at Pravacanasara 1:26 that this is how he understands the nature of the kevalin: The great Jina is everywhere and all the objects in the world are within him; the Jina consists of knowledge, and those referents of words (i.e. objects) are declared his because they are the objects of knowledge. As the Tattvadipika on 1:26 states, this means simply that the Jina knows all the objects in the world completely (i.e. he knows the meaning of all words and so he knows 95 Ibid. p. 267. 96 Niyamasara 159. Cf. Niyamasara 166: appasaruvam pecchadi loyaloyam na kevali bhagavam ... - '[From the niscaya point of view] the omniscient lord sees the real nature of the self, not the universe and non-universe.... 97 Upadhye's translation, p. 4. 98 See JPP pp. 102-3, and especially p. 269.

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214 Harmless Souls their referents). In reality, he has no physical or metaphysical contact with them, or they with him.99 That is to say, there is no activity on the part of the liberated self, or - as the Tattvadipika points out - it never leaves its svatattva. 100 This inactivity of the self includes 'knowing'; indeed, there is no 'knowing' as such (in the sense of process) for the pure self; for, since the knower (i.e. the self) has knowledge as its own nature, 101 it does not have to do anything in order to know apart from realise its true nature. This relationship is confirmed by gatha 1:27: The doctrine is proclaimed that knowledge is the self; without the self there is no knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is the self; but the self is knowledge or anything else. 102 (The Tattvadipika explains that the self, 'being the seat of innumerable properties', 103 may be knowledge owing to the dharma of knowledge, or owing to some other dharma it may be something else. 104 In other words, the self and knowledge are co-extensive, but the latter does not define the former, which is actually and potentially much greater.) The non-knowingness of this atman (= jnana) is further 99 Sarve 'rthas tadgata ity upacaryante, na ca tesam paramarthato 'nyonyagamanam asti, sarvadravyanam svarupanisthatvat - .... objects are said metaphorically to belong to him ... but in the real sense of the word there is no mutual going towards each other, since all substances abide in their own characteristic-nature' - Faddegon's trans., p. 16. 100 Ibid. Indeed, at one level, ontological description as such is probably irrelevant to Kundakunda's purpose here which, like that of much, if not all, 'mystical' teaching, is to engender in the audience a particular attitude or transformation of consciousness. In other words, the teaching is itself directly instrumental in self-realisation: conventional or partial knowledge helps to liberate absolute knowledge. 101 nani nanasahavo / jnani jnanasvabhavah - Pravac. 1:28. 102 Translation after Upadhye p. 4. 103 Faddegon's trans., p. 16, of anantadharmadhisthanatvat - TD on 1:27. 104 jnanam anyadharmadvarenanyad api syat - ibid.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 215 stressed by Kundakunda: He who knows is knowledge; the self does not become a knower through knowledge; knowledge develops of itself, and all objects are found in knowledge. 105 As Faddegon puts it in his translation of this gatha, 'the self does not by the help of its knowledge become somethingthat-is-knowing (jnayaka)';106 knowledge is thus the natural or revealed state of the karmically unobstructed atman. The Tattvadipika explains that this equation obtains because 'the self is an actor of the greatest supremacy and power in whom agency and instrumentality are united'. 107 In other words, the pure self does not do anything; despite the confusion of terminology it is not an 'actor' in the ordinary sense of that word, it simply is.108 Moreover, all the objects of knowledge, since they are said to be found or 'stand' (tthiya/sthita) in knowledge, are thus also found in the self which has been equated with knowledge. 109 It is in this context that passages such as those quoted from the Niyamasara (159; 166 see above) should be understood. The pure self or kevalin knows everything without coming into possessive relation with anything notself.110 Knowledge is essentially a matter of indifference or non-attachment, not of possession. That is to say, it is not the result of a process ('knowing') but a permanent state which is revealed and realised through meditation on the true nature of the self. Such meditation focuses on the status of the relationship between jiva and ajiva, the knower and the known; the full realisation of that 105 Translation after Upadhye p. 5. 106 Faddegon's trans., p. 21. aprthagbhutakartrkaranatvasaktiparamaisvaryayogitvad 107 atmanah - TD on 1:35. * 108 Cf. Niyamasara 172. 109 Pravac. 1:23, 1:26-7, 1:36: tamha nanam jivo. 110 See 2:108 and TD, above.

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216 Harmless Souls relationship is liberation and omniscience. For Kundakunda, an understanding of this is clearly the crucial component in his mechanism of liberation. He reiterates the relationship in a number of similar formulations. For instance, The omniscient lord neither grasps nor releases nor transforms the other; he sees all around and knows everything completely, 111 and The knower, who is beyond sense-perception, necessarily knows and sees the whole world neither entering into nor entered into by objects of knowledge, just as the eye sees the objects of sight. 112 The Samayasara uses a different image to illustrate the relation of the knower (i.e. the self) and the object known (from the niscaya view), but with the same meaning: Just as chalk does not become the other (i.e. the surface it is applied to) but remains chalk qua chalk, so the knower does not become the other i.e. the object known) but remains the knower qua knower. [Samayasara 356 (= 385 J.L. Jaini's ed.)]113 And again, in a familiar image of the contactless, noncontaminating relation of self and not-self, the Pravacanasara states that 'knowledge operates on objects just as a sapphire, resting on milk, pervades the whole of it with its lustre'. 114 111 Translation after Upadhye, p. 4, of Pravac. 1:32. 112 Upadhye's trans., p. 4, of Pravac. 1:29. Upadhye takes na pavittho navittho as Sk. na pravistah na avistah, as against the commentators who take na avistah (na apravistah) - see fn. 2, p. 4. 113 Cf. Pravac. 1:28 and 1:29, above, where the objects of knowledge are compared to the objects of sight: they are within range of the knower / seer, but, crucially, there is no 'mutual inherence' (Upadhye's trans., p. 4, of nevannonnesu). 114 Upadhye's trans., p. 4, slightly altered, of Pravac. 1:30.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 217 To summarise, one becomes such a knower by rehearsing in meditation this attitude of detachment - which springs from knowledge of the true relation between self and other towards everything not-self (ajiva / para). The understanding that the self is a knower rather than a possessor leads to the abandonment of a possessive relationship with anything not-self - indeed, from the niscaya point of view, such a relationship is an impossibility, i.e. a delusion, anyway. For, in reality, there is nothing the pure self can do except be itself. In other words, kevalajnana points to the isolation and inactivity of the self; the atman is co-extensive with and yet not of the world; it is rather than does. To such an entity, karman and the fruit of karman are, in the final analysis, irrelevant; they do not bind what, in reality, cannot be bound. Selfknowledge is the sole key to liberation. 6.5 The rationale for external, ascetic practice, according to the Pravacanasara In the light of this stress on self-knowledge, or selfrealisation, and meditation, the question arises of what rationale can be offered for continuing with external practices, i.e. with the identity-defining practices of the Jaina ascetic. Perhaps because his works were composed primarily for those who were already habitually ascetic in their practice, Kundakunda does not address this problem directly. However, in the Pravacanas ara and its commentaries there are a small number of significant references which indicate a recognition albeit a philosophically unsatisfying one - that some kind of answer is required. In gathas 3:5-6, Kundakunda lists some characteristics or 'emblems' (linga) of the Jaina ascetic. First, he states that: The mark (of a Jaina ascetic) consists in possessing the form in which one is born, in pulling out hair and beard, in being pure, in

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218 Harmless Souls not harming beings, etc., and in not attending to the body. 115 Then he adds: The Jaina mark, which is the cause of the stoppage of rebirths, consists in being free from action based on delusion, in being endowed with purity of manifestation of consciousness and purity of activity, and in being independent of the other (everything not self).116 Considering 3:5 first, the expression 'possessing the form in which one is born' (jadhajadaruvajadam) occurs in a slightly different formulation in the previous gatha (3:4), as jadhajadaruvadharo, 'wearing a form similar to that in which he is born'.117 Upadhye explains that this means that the person wishing to be an ascetic (the subject of these gathas) 'should give up everything including clothes and remain naked; this is the excellent type of Jaina asceticism'.118 In other words, this is equivalent to the English colloquial expression 'wearing one's birthday suit', meaning going completely naked (which, of course, is the most obvious characteristic of the Digambara ascetic). The other components of 3:5 are self-explanatory, except for suddha. The Tattvadipika describes this 'purity' in material terms, as being due to the negation of 'possessing anything'.119 As we have seen, in the Sarvarthasiddhi (on Tattvartha Sutra 9:6) 'purity' (sauca) is glossed as 'freedom from greed' (parigraha I lobha), the defining characteristic of the householder's way of life; 120 it initiates himsa and causes bondage. In short, purity both 115 Trans. after Upadhye p. 25; see ibid. p. 25 fn. 2, on pratikarma, which he takes as a-pari-karma, a reading followed in this translation. 116 Translation after Upadhye p. 25. 117 Upadhye's translation. 118 Upadhye p. 25 fn. 1. 119 Translation by Faddegon p. 157, of sakimcanatva. 120 See above, p. 76ff..

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 219 results from and exemplifies non-possession (aparigraha ). Suddha appears again in the next gatha (3:6), but this time it is connected with upayoga ('manifestation of consciousness') and yoga ('activity'). In the Tattvadipika these two are linked as cause and effect: the possession of asuddha-upayoga, doloured by subha- and asubhaupayoga, engenders asuddha-yoga (of body speech and mind); conversely, the negation of asuddha-upayoga leads to purity of upayoga and so of yoga. In other 'words, it is the internal condition which informs external behaviour.. The Tattvadipika claims that these two gathas (3:5 and 3:6) describe a pair of linga, 'external' and 'internal', which together characterise the ascetic. 121 There are, however, a number of indications that, rather than a systematic definition of what constitutes sramana-status, we have here a conflation of two different classificatory systems, representing two different historical moments in the development of Jaina doctrine. That is to say, there is a certain amount of overlap between the content of the two gathas which points to a separate origin for each. For instance, although in general the two uses of 'purity' discussed above divide into 'external' and 'internal', we may note that non-possession of material goods springs in the first place from an attitude - freedom from greed, and that, on the other side, two of the aspects of yoga, activity of body and activity of speech, are material in nature and external in operation. Moreover, muccha-arambhavimukkam / murccha-arambha-vimuktam (3:6), which I have translated as 'freedom from action based on delusion' (i.e. from action based on delusion about the real nature of the self, and thus about its relation to the non-self), is virtually equivalent to the 'purity' (suddha) listed as an 'external' aspect of the ascetic at 3:5. For as I have noted above, 122 arambha is closely associated with parigraha in Jaina thought, and denotes a violent action initiated by 121 bahirangantarangalingadvaitam - TD intro. to Pravac. 3:5. 122 See pp. 5, 31, etc., above.

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220 Harmless Souls greed and possessiveness. Amrtacandra's reading of murccha-arambha-vimuktam, as negation of the development of the karmic consequences of the attitude of possession123 emphasises only one half of the classical theory of the equivalence of parigraha and murccha as defined at Tattvartha Sutra 7:17 and Sarvarthasiddhi,124 where murccha is both the activity of preserving or acquiring possessions and an attitude of possessiveness towards them. It is clear from these instances that neither division of the characteristics of the ascetic given at Pravacanasara 3:5 and 3:6 falls exclusively into the 'external' and 'internal' categories which the Tattvadipika attempts to impose. 125 I suggest that, historically, 3:5 represents an earlier understanding of the linga of an ascetic, while, given that upayoga appears to have originated with him, 3:6 is Kundakunda's revision or further internalisation of that earlier definition. It should also be noted that the next gatha (3:7) begins with the words 'having taken this characteristic' (adaya tampi limgam), singular, apparently referring (pace Amstacandra) to only one set of characteristics. Again, this suggests that 3:6 represents an interpolation by Kundakunda into a traditional description of the way in which one becomes a sramana. Moreover, Kundakunda leaves us in little doubt as to which set of characteristics he considers the more important, since he says of the highly if not totally internalised group which make up the Jaina-linga at 3:6 that they are 'the cause of the stoppage of rebirths' (apunabbhavakaranam). Kundakunda's view on the relation of internal purity and external practice is, as we have seen, that the physical practice is only of value insofar as it is informed by and proceeds out of the correct internal attitude. To put it 123 mamatvakarmaprakramaparinama - TD on Pravac 3:6. 124 See above, pp. 73ff. 125 This, of course, is not unexpected, given that Book 3 of the Pravacanasara, in particular, appears to be of a compilatory nature.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 221 crudely, although without significant distortion, if one takes care of the upayoga the yoga will take care of itself. This returns us to the question of why it should be thought necessary to continue with external practice at all, since the latter is only the reflection of an already-achieved internal state, and it is the internal state which is significant for one's personal liberation. Yet this very phenomenon - that the external reflects the internal - points towards an answer. Pravacanasara 3:5-6 deals with the linga, the characteristic mark, of the ascetic. In logic, a linga is 'the invariable mark which proves the existence of anything in an object';126 i.e. given this characteristic or characteristics, there can be no doubt about the nature of the thing examined. In this case we have to do with the linga which prove that somebody is a true ascetic and so on the route to liberation. The constituents of the external linga - nakedness, the pulling out of hair and beard, nonpossession, ahimsa, neglect of the body - are, once defined, clear enough and physically evident to anyone who knows what they are looking for. The constituents of the internal linga, however, are - from the very fact that they are internal, relying as they do on pure upayoga and attitude - not evident to observers; i.e. although they may provide an ideal towards which the individual strives, they are insusceptible to outside verification in themselves. And if they are not observable characteristics then, it may be asked, in what sense can they be linga? The internal are, however, not totally unobservable, for, since external practice is said to reflect an already-achieved internal state, the external linga of ascetic behaviour imply the inevitable although invisible presence of the pre-defined internal linga. In other words, there is really only one linga (or set of linga) in the strict sense of the term, the external. From the presence or absence of that mark any observer can infer the presence or absence of internal states. And since it has been laid down that what really counts in terms 126 Monier-Williams, Sanskrit Dictionary.

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222 Harmless Souls of liberation is precisely the internal state, then it becomes clear that, in this teaching, the function of external practice is to provide a linga - i.e. evidence or proof of the soteriologically crucial internal condition. 127 That is to say, it is a public demonstration or assurance, chiefly to others but perhaps also to oneself, that one is on the correct road - a visible emblem and reinforcement of Jaina identity. Nevertheless, from the advanced ascetic's point of view, Kundakunda's stress on the internal makes external conduct This is karmically (i.e. soteriologically) irrelevant. graphically illustrated by Pravacanasara 3:27, which reads: He whose self is non-desiring, that is asceticism that is what ascetics seek. Other food, obtained as alms, is not desired (not food); so those ascetics are not takers of food. 128 M 1 It seems that there is a pun here on esana which can mean either 'desire' or 'alms begged in the correct manner'. The self without desire is foodless, therefore 'other' (i.e. material, actual) food is not food, in the sense that it is not desired (by the desireless self who is the ideal ascetic). In other words, for the true ascetic, external conduct - physical tapas becomes irrelevant: if he is internally pure then what he does physically can have no karmic effects for him. The Tattvadipika bears this out: Since in essence he is abstinent from food (anasana) and since the alms are devoid of the [fault of desire (esana- dosa)] fault against the esana-samiti, the self-controlled in food is visibly actually foodless. Thus: - if a man is at all times conscious only of the self, which is exempt from the taking of material sustenance, his any 127 See above, pp. 160-163, for further comments on the external being an emblem of the internal, ref. TD on Pravac. 3:17. 128 Pravac. 3:27. Cf. Samayasara 405ff. Cf. also Pali anesana: 'improper alms begging' ('a wrong going for food' - CPD); e.g. DN III 224.25 - anesanam appatirupam apajjati. The pun that is reflected in my translation is explained in the following paragraph. .

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 223 innate nature is in itself foodless, inasmuch as it is void of all longing for food. This, namely, is his abstinence from food, his asceticism; for the internal is of more importance (than the external). 129 Anasana is given at Tattvartha Sutra 9:19 as the first of the 'external austerities' (bahyam tapah).130 Clearly, therefore, Kundakunda and Amotacandra are here emptying external tapas of any independent soteriological value; for if the esana-samiti is not infringed, the attitude of nondesire makes even feeding not count as feeding. This is extreme, but, given the way in which Kundakunda ascribes new values to the vocabulary of begging and fasting, we may surmise that he is here consciously reacting against excessive formalisation, the mechanistic pursuit of physical austerity. That is to say, by giving the 'true' definitions of foodlessness and alms, he provides a corrective to the mindless repetition of a practice whose underlying significance has been forgotten. From the standpoint of personal liberation this may be very necessary, but if taken as a general, social principle it clearly undermines, probably fatally, the rationale for external, ascetic practice. From the point of view of the Jaina community as a whole, it is therefore essential that some reason should be given for continuing with external tapas. Such a reason has been outlined above; it may seem philosophically weak but it is socially indispensable. The importance of public display in any religion should not be underestimated; indeed, it is what most obviously characterises a 'religion' as opposed to a private soteriology. Thus, in abstract terms, there is probably a pendulum-like 129 Faddegon's trans., p. 169, slightly emended, of: svayam anasanasvabhavatvad esanadosasunyabhaiksyatvac ca yuktaharah saksad anahara eva syat / tathahi - yasya sakalakalam eva sakalapudgalaharanasunyam atmanam avabudhyamanasya sakalasanavrsnasunyatvat svayam anasana eva svabhava / tad eva tasyanasanam nama tapo 'ntarangasya baliyastvat iti ... 130 See above, pp. 196ff., and JPP pp. 250-251, on these.

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224 Harmless Souls movement or continuous balancing act in Jainism between excessive formalisation, with its threat to the personal or soteriological, and excessive internalisation, with its threat to the social or corporate identity. Given the compilatory nature of early Jaina texts (including the Pravacanasara), the two extremes may frequently be reached in the same text. It fell to the scholastic commentators to attempt to compensate for and correct this polarisation. The doctrine of the two naya, if not conclusive, is at least a holding operation in this struggle. In terms of the present analysis, the vyavahara-naya would thus embody the social view while the niscaya-naya would represent the personal or soteriological perspective. 6.6 Socio-religious roles in the Pravacanasara It remains to comment briefly on the Jaina socio-religious hierarchy implicit in the Pravacanasara, and on Kundakunda's attitude to the laity. (The purpose of this section is simply to make explicit what may be readily inferred from the material already treated.) The individual's place in the religious hierarchy, and thus his social role, is decided for Kundakunda by his state of consciousness. It is always a particular upayoga (manifestation of consciousness) which underlies and informs any external 'emblem' of religious status; and, in theory, it is to the underlying internal state that any question about an individual's status should be referred. In practice, the problem of gauging 'inner-states' leads, of course, to reliance upon external indicators. Nevertheless, Kundakunda is unequivocal about the meaninglessness of external practice unless it derives from and is informed by internal purity. 131 The equations are as follows: suddha-upayoga is the 131 See above, passim.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 225 internal state of the ideal sramana, and leads to liberation;132 asuddha-upayoga covers the full range of inner states short of suddha-upayoga, and leads to a relatively better or worse rebirth. Thus, in terms of socioreligious roles, the latter state characterises virtually the whole community. As we have seen, however, asuddhaupayoga is divided into subha- and asubha-upayoga. subha is clearly better than asubha, but how positively or negatively the former is viewed depends entirely upon what audience is being addressed. Thus, in Book 1 of the Pravacanasara, which is aimed predominantly at sramanas, anything less than the attainment of suddhaupayoga is considered unsatisfactory; in Book 3, however, which has a more general (perhaps one should say, less ideal and more realistic) audience in mind, the cultivation and attainment of subha-upayoga can, in itself, be a laudable activity and goal. Subha-upayoga is clearly the inner state most open to interpretation and ambiguity in terms of the spiritual value and thus the religious status attached to it. In Pravacanasara Book 1, subha's asuddha nature is stressed (1:69-1:79): it entails desire, contingency and impermanence, hankering after sense-pleasures, attachment to objects which are dependent and impermanent, and thus it results in misery (see 1:74-77). Even the gods are caught in this trap of contingency (1:71-74). And 'if men, hellbeings, subhuman beings, and gods suffer misery, born from the body, then of what use is (the distinction of) auspicious or inauspicious manifestation of consciousness for souls?'133 That is to say, if subha- and asubha-upayoga lead alike to rebirth and misery, what is the point of 132 See Pravac. 1:14; cf. 1:11, 2:103. 133 Translation of Pravac. 1:72.

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226 Harmless Souls distinguishing between them?134 The point is clearly to devalue subha-upayoga in the (potential[?]) sramana's mind, and to stress that liberation can only be achieved through suddha-upayoga. This is given full emphasis in gathas 1:77 and 1:78. Gatha 1:77 reads: He, who does not think that there is no difference between merit and demerit, wanders about in terrible, unbounded samsara, covered in delusion. In other words, punya and papa, associated with subha- and asubha-upayoga, are both characterised as totally samsaric. (Note the emphasis again on knowledge and delusion as the liberating and binding factors.) In contrast to this, the condition of the asuddhaupayogin (= the ideal sramana) is described in the next gatha [1:78]: He who, understanding the nature of things, does not experience attachment or aversion towards objects, his manifestation of consciousness being pure, destroys the suffering which arises from embodiment. To put this in the terms of the present argument, here Kundakunda is criticising the inner-condition of the laity, probably for a sramanic or potentially sramanic audience. That it is indeed the laity he associates with asuddhaupayoga is evident from Pravacanasara 1:69, where the atman which is characterised by subha-upayoga is described in terms of activities associated with lay vrata: The self which is attached to the worship of gods, ascetics and teachers, to giving, to good morals, and to fasting, etc., is a self 134 See TD on Pravac. 1:72.

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara with auspicious manifestation of consciousness.135 227 In this context (Book 1 of the Pravacanasara), therefore, lay-practice is viewed in a negative light. However, in Book 3 of the Pravacanasara, Kundakunda is apparently much more accommodating to subha-upayoga, and thus, by implication, to the laity (although again he addresses himself directly not so much to the latter as to the average sramana). For here it is recognised, realistically, that subha-upayoga, and thus a better rebirth, is also a legitimate goal - albeit a lower one - for ascetics. Gatha 3:45 reads: In (our) religion there are ascetics who have pure manifestation of consciousness and those who have auspicious manifestation of consciousness. Among them, those with pure manifestation of consciousness are not subject to the influx of karmic matter, while the rest are subject to influx. The behaviour associated with subha-upayoga is listed at Pravacanasara 3:46ff. This consists mostly of devotion and service to (more) advanced monks and to the ascetic community as a whole. Gatha 3:54 concludes: This conduct is commended for ascetics, but it is said to be the best (or 'the highest form of conduct') for householders; by it alone he (the householder) attains highest bliss. This is interesting because it seems to hint at the possibility of two routes to the goal of final liberation, associated with the two social and religious roles of ascetic 135 On correspondences between this and lay vrata, see Faddegon p. 45 fn. 1. But whether it fits into a specific technical pattern or not, the gatha clearly describes good lay behaviour.

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228 Harmless Souls and householder / layman. Perhaps the Hindu idea (most famously expressed in the Bhagavadgita), that the route to salvation is through the conscientious performance of one's svadharma, is at work here; more precisely, it may be a concession to expectations within the Jaina lay community which have been aroused by the realisation that, ultimately, their Hindu neighbours expected to be rewarded simply through pursuing their dharma as householders. This interpretation relies, of course, upon taking param sokkham to mean complete liberation and not some less final state. The Tattvadipika on 3:54 has no doubt: it explains that good conduct, which is the form of subhaupayoga, is secondary (gauna) for sramanas, but for the laity it is primary (mukhya), and even though there is still the existence of passion (raga), the pure self (suddhatman) can be experienced like the sun's heat experienced through the medium of crystal. Such conduct 'gradually brings about the highest happiness of nirvana'.136 In other words, for Amotacandra, there is apparently a quick (but difficult) and a gradual (but easier) route to liberation, although it is not clear how gradual the latter is - i.e. whether or not it stretches over many re-births. Whatever the answer, this gatha clearly reflects a different and more positive attitude to the laity than that evidenced in Book 1 of the Pravacanasara. This suggests that the material in Books 1 and 2, on the one hand, and that in Book 3, on the other, may have been collated under different social circumstances and with a different audience in mind (not to mention by a different hand).137. 136 Faddegon's trans., p. 190, of kramatah paramanirvanasaukhyakaranatvat. 137 Note 2:97 - cited above, p. 134, - where the teaching of the niscaya view (i.e., the view which deals with the real nature of t is directed exclusively at sramanas and yatis. See also Pravac. 2:102 and TD, and Faddegon's trans., p. 147, fn. 1. Jayasena's commentary

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Kundakunda: The Pravacanasara 229 All this points to the vulnerability of ascetic territory to invasion by the laity once practice has been largely internalised. The upayoga doctrine, with its corollary of internal cultivation, carries within itself the possibility that the condition of suddha-upayoga, and thus of liberation, may be reached by inner development alone. In other words, the attainment of the soteriological goal does not logically entail becoming a sramana. Indeed, at the end of the Pravacanasara, in gatha 3:74, there is what looks like a re-definition of 'sramana' in terms which would not necessarily exclude the laity. Gatha 3:74 reads: He, who is pure, is said to be a sramana; to the pure one belong faith and knowledge; the pure one attains liberation; he alone is a siddha: my salutation to him. 138 In other words - although perhaps no Jaina would want to put it as bluntly as this -, if you fulfil these criteria through inner-discipline, you are a 'sramana' regardless of your external, social status. (Tatparyavrtti) on this gatha gives a second interpretation of the Prakrit sagaro nagaro as sagaranagarah, 'while he is a householder or an ascetic', as an alternative to the first interpretation, viz. sakaranakarah, 'with formed or with formless (self-realisation)'. If Jayasena's suggestion were correct, this would mean that meditation on the pure self was considered liberating for both ascetics and laymen. This seems unlikely to be the meaning in the context, but the fact that such a reading could be considered indicates, if nothing else, the status and content of lay religious practice at the time the Tatparyavrtti was composed (second half of the 12th century C.E.? - see Upadhye p. civ). 138 Upadhye's trans., p. 34. The TD comments: 'sramana-hood, which is the manifest road to liberation and is characterised as mentalconcentration occupied with a simultaneity of perfect conviction, knowledge and conduct, belongs to the pure alone' - Faddegon's trans., p. 198 of : yattavat samyagdarsanajnanacaritrayaugapadyapravrttaikagryalaksanam saksan moksamargabhutam sramanyam tac ca suddhasyaiva.

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230 Harmless Souls However, as we have seen, even within the Pravacanasara itself there are indications of built-in checks to hold back any serious claim on the part of the laity to inner purity for themselves. Put simply, the only evidence of internal purity is external behaviour, and the latter is defined in sramanic terms. We may speculate that, without this check, a fully internalised and laicised Jaina religious practice, based on what is essentially a pan-Indian meditational technique, would have been likely to prove critical for the cohesion and identity of the Jaina community. Moreover, without the continuing necessity of strict physical (i.e. external) ahimsa at some level - for whatever reason - there would have been nothing to guarantee the most obvious 'emblem' of Jaina religion or, we may suppose, to retard the tendency towards ethical decay. I shall now turn to the Samayasara, which provides a test case as to whether Kundakunda can, or even wants to, sustain this tenuous link with external practice in what is his least orthodox work.

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PART IV KUNDAKUNDA: THE SAMAYASARA Kundakunda: definitions and truths 7.1 Samayasara i) Introduction Turning from the Pravacanasara to the Samayasara, we soon become aware of a number of significant differences in terms of content and scope between the two texs. Some of these differences are so great that it is difficult to think that the two works, or even particular parts of them, should be ascribed to the same author (or redactor). (This, of course, does not affect my argument, which is concerned with the practical and historical implications of certain trends in Jaina doctrine.) Three differences are particularly significant. First, there is the absence in the Samayasara of any upayoga doctrine. As we have seen, this was Kundakunda's (i.e. the author-redactor's) distinctive means of explaining the mechanism of bondage in the Pravacanasara. The term upayoga does occur in the Samayasara, but only in the restricted technical sense employed in, for instance, the Tattvartha Sutra. Jayasena, in his Tatparyavrtti commentary on the Samayasara, does occasionally employ the Pravacanasara-type upayoga doctrine for exegetical purposes (e.g. at Samayasara 210), whereas Amstacandra, in his Atmakhyati is apparently more attached to the immediate text. There is, however, an incompletely formulated bhava doctrine in the Samayasara which fulfils a function similar or identical to that of the upayoga doctrine. (This will be considered below.) The second significant difference is one of degree 1 See above, 4.2(ii): Upayoga according to the Pravacanasara.

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232 Harmless Souls rather than kind. The use to which the niscaya-vyavahara doctrine is put in the Samayasara is, in a number of gathas, far more explicitly radical than anywhere in the Pravacanasara, and the implications for ethical conduct are consequently more serious. In fact the niscaya view is applied in two different and incompatible ways in the Samayasara. The bifurcation of the niscaya doctrine is probably connected with the third significant difference between the two texts: the fact that the Samayasara is not only more obviously concerned with confronting and refuting other doctrinal positions, particularly Buddhist and Samkhya ideas, but is also more clearly influenced, both in its technical terminology and in its approach to particular problems, by non-Jaina doctrines. It also has a more persistent devotional strain than does the Pravacanasara; of particular note is the conjunction of the (lay) vocabulary of bhakti with ascetic concentration on the self (in 'selfdevotion') as a means to liberation. (This was, perhaps, an attempt to reduce, through assimilation, the attraction of the Hindu bhakti cults for Jains.) The relative eclecticism of the Samayasara thus indicates the probability that it was compiled from a number of sources, each of which had been subject to a variety of influences. It is not my purpose here to tease out all these threads (although this is an area in which more research could be fruitfully conducted); rather I intend to illustrate the ways in which the Samayasara represents a point of maximum tension between theoretical philosophy and the Jaina tradition of ascetic practice. I shall then consider how certain Jaina philosophical strategies - such as anekantavada (the doctrine of manifold aspects) and syadvada (the doctrine of qualified assertion) - are used alongside Kundakunda's doctrine of 'two truths' in an attempt to hold together these two strands, the theoretical and the practical. I shall begin with a general discussion of how the text

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 233 views itself, i.e. of how it defines the samaya of which it is the essence (sara). ii) Samaya Perhaps the most obvious translation of samaya would be 'rule' or 'way of life', and thus the Samayasara would be 'the essence of (our) way of life'.2 However, following Amstacandra and Jayasena, modern commentators take samaya to mean the realised or unified self. At first sight this seems puzzling. How have they arrived at this apparently idiosyncratic definition? Without prior knowledge of the way in which the term should be understood all the internal evidence is inconclusive. An external source, however, points us in the right direction. Vatsyayana's Nyayabhasya (dated by Frauwallner to the first half of the fifth century)3 defines samaya as follows: The direct meaning of this word (samaya) is this referent: this is the application of the rule which connects the designator and the designated. When it is applied the correct understanding of the meaning is derived from the word.4 2 The underlying meaning here is 'what is mutually agreed' - so samaya would be rules for behaviour rather than doctrinal laws. In Tantra it has the standard meaning of 'the way to behave'. Caillat (1987, p. 508) translates Samayasara as 'Essence of the Doctrine'. Friedhelm Hardy, in a personal communication, points out that, in southern India, 'religion' or 'true religion' developed as the most popular meaning of samaya. (See the Tamil Lexicon, Vol. 3, pp.12916 - 936, under 'camaya'.) I am not, however, persuaded that it should be translated in this way in all or most cases in the Samayasara, for the reasons given in the following pages. 3 Frauwallner 1973, Pt. 2, p. 8. asya sabdasya idam arthajatam abhidheyam ity abhidhanabhidheyaniyamaniyogah / tasminn upayukte sabdad arthasampratyayo bhavati - Nyayabhasya. 2.1.55. The Nyayakosa also gives nirdesa - 'description', 'specification' - as a synonym for samaya.

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234 Harmless Souls In other words, samaya means 'the correct or true definition'. Applying this to the Samayasara, it quickly becomes clear that there too samaya has the primary or underlying sense of 'true definition'. Thus gatha 2 of the Samayasara reads: Know that the term 'jiva' when it has reference to (right) conduct, faith and knowledge is stringently defined; know that when it has reference to material karma it is loosely defined i.e. it includes that which is essentially alien to it). S There is an analogous gatha in the Pancastikaya (162): The jiva is defined by / in its own nature (sahava / sva-bhava); when it has inessential (non-defining) qualities for its modes it is alienly (loosely) defined (parasamao / parasmaya) [i.e. it is being 'defined' by what is essentially other than itself]. If one applies the self's own definition one will escape from the bondage of karma. Returning to the Samayasara, gatha 3 reads: The definition which determines its (the jiva's) unity is universally fine (correct), so talk of bondage when there is only one thing is contradictory. If what is being referred to here is the astringent definition (sva-samaya) of the self then this gatha appears to contradict the previous one [2], where three things (caritra, darsana, and jnana) are mentioned. However, gatha 7 resolves the difficulty. There it is stated that: From the conventional point of view conduct, faith and knowledge are predicated of the knower; but there is neither knowledge, 5 Upadhye (p. xlv) gives sva-samaya as 'the realisation of the self as identical with Right faith, etc.' and para-samaya as identification of the self 'with material karmas'; but this is a gloss rather than a translation.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 235 conduct nor belief, just a pure knower. As we have seen, (sva)samaya is the self defined according to its own nature; that is to say, it is defined as one thing, pure knowledge, there being no difference in this context between knowledge and the knower. That is what constitutes the soul's svabhava or essence, as Samayasara 198 makes clear: Various types of rising and fruition of karmas have been described by the great Jina(s); but they are not my own-nature. I am one, a knower by nature.? That is to say, the unified self - the self which has realised its own nature - is the pure knower (i.e. the knower par excellence, the omniscient, liberated self). And for the pure, liberated knower there is no ratnatraya (samyag jnana, darsana and caritra) [gatha 7]. The heterogeneity of the Samayasara has already been commented upon; nevertheless, it is possible to chart the ways in which the meaning of the term samaya is extended within the text. As we have seen, the basic meaning of samaya is 'true / correct definition'. Thus the sva-samaya is the astringent definition of the self, i.e the soul defined or described from the perspective of its essence. This is also precisely the condition of the liberated self. From this basis, the term samaya then becomes short-hand for the principal thing it is defining in the Samayasara, namely, the essential or realised self. In other words, we move from the statement that 'The samaya (the true definition) of the jiva is the realised self to the understanding that 'Samaya is the realised self. Gatha 151 and its commentaries provide us 6 Cf. Samayasara 16 (18). 7 Cf. Samayasara 38 where the self is described as follows: 'I am one, indeed, pure, consisting of faith and knowledge (i.e. upayoga), always incorporeal. Nothing other is mine whatsoever, not even an atom.' See also Samayasara 31.

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236 Harmless Souls with a clear instance of this. The verse reads: The true meaning, indeed, the samaya, pure, sheer, the seer, the knower - the mendicants who are absorbed in this, their own nature, attain nirvana. These epithets obviously all refer to the pure self, so samaya here has become a synonym for the 'unified' or 'realised self'. (Amrtacandra glosses it in terms of 'entering into the knowledge which is produced from the state of oneness'. Jayasena says he is called samaya because 'he attains / transforms (himself) into pure qualities and modes'.): There is also a self-conscious yet ambiguous attempt within the text to define what is meant by 'samayasara' itself. Gatha 142 states: Karma is bound or not bound to the self - know these to be points of view. But whatever is said when these alternatives have been transcended, that is samayasara (the true definition of jiva). Is Samayasara therefore a teaching - a 'view' which transcends views? Or is it a condition of the self which reflects its true, transcendental relation to karma?9 The Atmakhyati is almost equally ambiguous, stating that he who goes beyond both views and their combination acquires or finds samayasara. And 'if that is the case, then who, indeed, would not activate the alternative-renouncing state of mind?'10 The fact that alternatives are being definitively discarded lends some weight to the idea that samayasara (essential definition) cannot be another view, 8 ekibhavapravsttajnanagamana - Atmakhyati JGM ed. on Samayasara 161 (= Chakra. 151). suddhagunaparyayan parinamati - Tatparyavrtti on ibid. 9 I shall deal with this question from a different perspective when I consider Kundakunda's use of the vyavahara-niscaya doctrine. See below, pp. 239ff. 10 yady evam tarhi ko hi nama paksasamnyasabhavanam na natayati - Atmakhyati on Samayasara 142 (152 JGM ed.).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 237 however transcendent; nevertheless, the paradox of a 'definition' that transcends all views cannot be totally discounted. The text continues: One connected to the true definition (samaya) knows what is said of the two views, but does no more; he takes neither of the alternative views at all, being without (such) alternative views. [Samayasara 123] But again samaya could be translated here either with the primary sense of 'true definition' or with the extended sense of the realised or unified self. (It should be noted, however, that this gatha is capable of providing an accurate description of the pure omniscient self that just knows.) This is also true of Samayasara 144, upon which the Atmakhyati comments: Whatever is the practice of the cessation of all views through the nonexperience of any point of view, that, indeed, is samayasara.11 Modern commentators, however, seem to be in no doubt about the principal meaning of 'samayasara'. Chakravarti writes: The term samayasara means the essential nature of the Self. This Absolute Ultimate Unity is transcendental in nature. Hence the various appellation based upon different points of view really have no relevancy in that state.12 J.L. Jaini concurs: 'Samayasara is the pure soul in its essence'. The soul is really above all impurities, and 'one 11 yah khalv akhilanayapaksaksunnataya visrantasamastavikalpavyaparah sa samayasarah - Atmakhyati on 144 (154). I shall have more to say about these passages and their relation to the rest of the Samayasara in my discussion of the 'two truths' doctrine. 12 Commentary on Samayasara 144, p. 101.

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238 Harmless Souls who meditates upon this again and again acquires selfabsorption, which is Samayasara'.13 Singh remarks that, in the Samayasara, Kundakunda 'gives instructions how to know the real self (Sva-samaya). This Sva-samaya (Samayasara 2) or the Ego-in- itself is the pure and ultimate reality'.14 This is the self which has realised its oneness, a description which 'very much resembles that of the Upanisadic and Advaitic Brahman or Atman'.15 In so far as these definitions reflect the principal teaching of the text they are indeed correct. For we have seen how the weight of meaning of the term samaya shifts from 'definition', via 'the correct definition of the self, to become synonymous with the self in its true nature, i.e. 'the realised or essential self. However, the crucial nuance in this conflation of epistemology and ontology is the one which makes knowledge of the true nature (definition) of the self instrumental in realising that pure self, i.e. instrumental in, or indeed tantamount to, liberation. (I shall have more to say about this below.) Referring to Upanisadic doctrine, Gombrich (quoting Malamoud) remarks that, 'The identification of one's atman and brahman is "at the same time the truth to be discovered and the end to be attained"".16 Rephrasing this formulation to fit Jaina circumstances, we may say that the realisation of the true nature of the self- as totally separate from and untouched by the other (karma, etc.) is at the same time the truth to be discovered and the end to be attained. Consequently, there are passages such as that at Pancastikaya 162 17 which state that the realisation of the correct definition of the self is actually the means to liberation. In other words, the definition or description of the soul from the perspective of liberation of the soul as it 13 Commentary on 151 (= 144 Chakravarti's ed.). 14 Singh p. 85. 15 Ibid. P. 89. 16 Gombrich 1988, p. 43. 17 Quoted above, p. 234. -

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 239 is in its self (svabhava) - is conflated with the idea that that state of the liberated self is actually achieved by realising, i.e. 'knowing', that it is the true or real state of the self. And it is in this way that the realisation or 'definition' of the self is seen to be both means and end, the way to liberation and the state achieved. So whether samaya is read as the true condition of the self or as a definition or 'view' beyond alternatives, it comes finally to imply self-realisation and thus liberation. This process in itself illustrates the growing stress on 'selfrealisation' in Jaina doctrine, even if some of the gathas collected under the heading of Samayasara were not originally so gnostic in tenor. It is the gnostic, however, which in the end comes to overlay and alter the meaning of the other layers. A change of context, with its new juxtapositions, inclines some older or more orthodox doctrines towards new meanings. Whether or not one attributes all these shades of meaning to an individual compiler ('Kundakunda') is strictly not relevant to my purpose, which is to explicate a particular doctrinal tendency and its implications for practice. 7.2 Vyavahara-niscaya: the two truths doctrine We have already seen how the doctrine of two truths was employed in the Pravacanasara. The use to which this vyavahara-niscaya doctrine is put in the Samayasara is more complex and requires some independent discussion before we examine the ways in which it is applied to the mechanism of bondage and liberation. First, I shall point out a number of apparent contradictions in the text. Gatha 8 reads: Just as a non-Aryan is not able to make another understand [anything] without his non-Aryan speech, so without the conventional truth instruction in the highest truth is not possible. That is to say, initial instruction has to be couched in

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240 Harmless Souls terms which are capable of being understood by those who are spiritually undeveloped. This is the standard reconciliation of the elements in a two truths doctrine: the lower is a means or ladder to the higher. As Frauwallner puts it: The common-place consideration (vyavahara-nayah) is necessary in order to make the doctrine intelligible to ordinary men. One can only come to an understanding with a foreigner when one uses his speech (Samayasaro (sic.) v.8]. But one must be clear about the fact that it has validity only in a certain sense. It should necessarily supplement the pure way of thought which alone brings full truth.18 This relation is typified in gatha 16 (19): (Right] belief, knowledge and conduct should always be practised by a sadhu (from the vyavahara point of view]; but know that these three are, in reality, the self. Amrtacandra comments that it is established that the sadhu, in talking to other people, must refer to belief, knowledge and conduct. Personally, however, he must cultivate the self with the sentiment that it is at the same time both the means and the end.19 In other words, the sadhu sees through the vyavahara view. Referring to one of the last gathas of the Samayasara, Amrtacandra also states that those who are 'deluded by beginninglessly produced vyavahara views ... do not see the highest truth, the holy Samayasara'.20 Similarly, the Samayasara states: 18 Frauwallner 1973, Vol. 2, p. 208. 19 yenaiva hi bhavenatma sadhyam sadhanam ca syat tenaivayam nityam upasya iti svayamakuya paresam vyavaharena sadhuna darsanajnanacaritrani nityam upasyaniti pratipadyate - Atmakhyati on Samayasara 16 (= 19 JGM). 20 te 'nadirudhavyavaharavimudhah ... paramarthasatyam bhagavantam samayasaram na pasyanti - Atmakh on Sam 413 (= 443).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 241 The knowers of reality say that other substance is 'mine' in conventional parlance, but they know that, from the niscaya point of view, not even an atom is 'mine' [324]. Just as when a man says that 'the village, country, town, kingdom are mine' when they are not [really] his, it is his self speaking out of delusion [325], so the knower who takes other substance to be his and makes it his own certainly becomes a wrong-believer [326]. are In other words, there is no simple progression from the vyavahara view to the niscaya view an understanding of the former does not automatically lead to an understanding of the latter; on the contrary, if Amrtacandra is to be believed, it actually prevents it.21 This seems to conflict directly with the idea that the vyavahara in itself is a means to perfecting the self. (And it should be remembered that the elements of standard Jaina metaphysics - the doctrines concerning the various tattvas, padarthas, etc. included under the vyavahara rubric.) Rather, the crucial step seems to be the recognition that there are two views, and that one of them entails delusion and wrong belief. That is to say, you have to realise that the vyavahara view is a lower view, that it is just a way of talking about the self for 'practical' or pedagogical purposes, before it can become a means to the higher view. Indeed, it is the recognition of that fact, rather than the doctrinal content of the lower view, which is the real means to achieving the higher, liberating view. It is not surprising, therefore, that the predominant attitude towards the vyavahara viewpoint in these texts ascribed to Kundakunda should be negative. Gathas such as Samayasara 8 (see p. 239, above) are rare. More typical is Samayasara 156: - Wise people do not operate in vyavahara, leaving aside the real object (niccayattham); the destruction of karma is ordained [only] for those ascetics whose refuge is the highest object [i.e. the pure 21 See Atmakhyati on 413, quoted above. -

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242 Harmless Souls self, the sole object of the niscaya view). Similarly, gatha 166 states that there is no influx of karma (asrava) or bondage for the right believer (samyagdrsti).22 And as we have seen, the 'right-believer is the person who, rejecting the wrong-belief of the vyavahara view, sees things from the niscaya point of view. Seemingly most radical of all, there is Samayasara 11 (=13]: vavaharo 'bhudattho bhudattho desido du suddanao | bhudattham assido khalu samaditthi havadi jivo! The vyavahara [view] does not deal with the really existent, but the pure view (suddha-naya) is taught as the really existent. The living being who depends upon the really existent is, indeed, a rightbeliever. Clearly, the significance of this statement depends to a large degree upon the meaning attributed to bhudattho (bhutartha), translated as 'really existent'. Amrtacandra offers no real definition.23 Jayasena, however, glosses vavaharo as vyavaharanayah, and abhudattho as abhutarthah asatyartho bhavati. Conversely, suddhanao is suddhanayah niscayanayah and bhudattho is bhutarthah satyarthah [Tatparya-vrtti. on Samayasara 114=13 JGM)]. Thus, while the vyavahara-naya has what is false as its object, the suddha / niscaya-naya has what is true. In this way, the focus is shifted from the ontological to the epistemological, from things to views about things. Since the niscaya-naya is the view of the unified self, eternally separate from non-self, and the vyavahara-naya is the conventional view, which sees the self as interactive 22 natthi du asavabamdho sammaditthissa (nasti tv asravobandhah samyagdrster) - Samayasara 166. 23 But see below, pp. 250-251 - Purusartha quote.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 243 with the non-self (everything that makes up samsara), then it is clear that, according to this Samayasara doctrine, the latter view is 'untrue' in the sense of not reflecting the the real nature of the lack of) relationship between 'self and 'other'. (Bhutartha is thus the 'really existent' in the sense of being the truth about the (non-) relationship between atman and paradravya.) This seems to be the way in which this gatha [11] should be taken. However, some modern commentators have read bhutartha in a strongly ontological sense - i.e. they believe it to denote that which actually exists. On this reading, abhutartha (viz. paradravya or samsara) is an illusion. Thus Bhatt writes that the contact of jiva and ajiva is a 'pure fiction' (upacara) and not reality; it brings forth 'illusory experiences constituting the worldly sphere'; consequently, the world is 'a creation of ignorance appearing real only as long as the soul remains ignorant about its true nature'.24 This is tendentious, not merely in the dubious translation of upacara (a term imported by Bhatt), which might be better rendered as 'metaphor' or 'figure of speech', for Bhatt has jumped from the unreality of a relationship between two categories to the unreality of one of the elements in that relationship (the ajiva). Moreover, he claims that the ajiva is actually a creation of ignorance - a statement clearly made under the influence of a particular interpretation of late Vedanta. It might be possible to argue that Kundakunda is swaying in that direction, but it can hardly be claimed that he calls the reality of the separate ajiva into doubt. Indeed, its reality or unreality is irrelevant to liberation; it is the realisation of its non-relation with the jiva which is crucial. That is to say, it is the relation itself which is the 'creation' of ignorance, not the thing. To make ajiva unreal would be to make bondage itself unreal, the result of an inexplicable delusion rather than the corollary of an understandable confusion of categories. (That the categories are in reality absolutely 24 Bhatt 1974, pp. 279-291.

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244 Harmless Souls separate is, of course, a matter of dogma and the premise upon which the argument is based, not part of it.)25 Dixit is closer to the significance of this gatha [Samayasara 11-13] when he writes of the Samayasara that: the whole of this text is a standing harangue against all talk of a relationship between a soul and a matter (sic.). Towards the very beginning (v.13) we are told that the practical standpoint is the standpoint of untruth while definitive standpoint is the standpoint of truth so that even to concede that from the practical standpoint a soul and matter do enter into mutual relationship amounts to saying that they in fact do nothing of the sort.26 The radical nature of this gatha [11=13] thus lies in the fact that it states explicitly that the niscaya view is true because it expresses the way things really are, and the vyavahara untrue because it is a false account of reality. The relativity of truth to viewpoint (syadvada), based on the manifold (anekanta) nature of reality, seems to have been rejected here in favour of an absolute view of truth. In other words, Kundakunda looks like an ekantavadin here, with a doctrine of 'two truths' which bears a close resemblance to that used in other ekanta systems. Gatha 272 [=296 JGM] of the Samayasara is equally explicit: Know that the vyavahara view is contradicted by the niscaya view. 25 Here it is useful to bear in mind Matilal's words on 'two truths' in Vedanta and Buddhism, that 'an object can be said to be not real in two very different senses'. It can be non-existent or it can be devoid of the 'own-nature or svabhava that it is supposed to possess or that it professes to possess'. Thus, samsara is 'not a mere appearance, still less an illusion - it is something that is not quite successful in embodying an own-nature, svabhava' (1986, p. 137). In the terms of the present discussion, it is the self viewed as related to non-self that is not real, because its essence is pure, inactive, isolated consciousness - it is a [self-] knower and nothing else - that is its svabhava. 26 Dixit 1971, p. 134.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 245 Munis absorbed in / adopting the niscaya view attain nirvana. The idea of a graduated progression from the vyavahara to the niscaya viewpoint does not arise here. Liberation is achieved only by rejection of the former and absorption in the latter (i.e. the self). Amotacandra commments: The niscaya view refers to the self, the vyavahara view refers to the other (the not-self]. The conventional view is prohibited by the niscaya view, which blocks for the one who desires liberation all intention which relates to anything other than the self as being a cause of bondage, and because for him intention is no different from being dependent on something other than the self. It is to be rejected because only those are liberated who resort to the niscaya view, which refers to the self, and because it is the abhavya - one who is definitively incapable of being liberated - who resorts to the vyavahara view which refers to the other.27 So even if the vyavahara viewpoint were to be considered a necessary first position, there is clearly no natural progression from there to the liberating niscaya view. Indeed, it is difficult to see the vyavahara view positively at all (i.e. as a ladder or raft to the higher view and liberation) when it is precisely the view held by those who can never achieve liberation, the abhavya souls.28 In other words, the vyavahara view is essentially a 'wrongview'. (But note that it is not the view itself which prevents the abhavya souls from ever being liberated. Rather that view is their characteristic view; they are incapable of 27 atmasrito niscayanayah parasrito vyavaharanayah | tatraivam niscayanayena parasritam samastam adhyavasanam bandhahetutvena mumuksoh pratisedhayata vyavaharanaya eva kila pratisiddhah, tasyapi parasritatvavisesat| pratisedhya evam cayam, atmasritaniscayanayasritanam eva mucyamanatvat, parasritavyavaharanayasyaikantenamucyamanenabhavyenasriyamanatvac ca - Atmakhyati on Samayasara 272 (= 296 JGM). 28 On abhavya see JPP p. 140, and P.S. Jaini 1977.

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246 Harmless Souls holding any other.) It should be abandoned as soon as possible.29 This feeling is expressed in more purely psychological terms at Samayasara 12 [=14]: The pure [viewpoint} which teaches about the pure (substance - i.e. the pure self] should be known by [those whose object it is to be] the seers of the supreme mental state; but the vyavahara teaching is for / employed by those who stand in / employ inferior mental states. Again the negative formulation indicates that the crucial liberating act is to abandon the vyavahara view. The suddhanaya, which should be adopted instead, is defined at Samayasara 14 [=16): He who sees the atman as neither bound nor touched [by karmic matter), not other than itself, fixed, without differences, and not combined (with anything not self], know that he is one who holds the pure point of view. On this reading, the difference between the two views is irreconcilable: one cancels out or denies the other. This is quite a different interpretation of the 'two views' or 'two truths' doctrine from that expressed at, for instance, Samayasara 345-348 (=JGM 357-360]: From the point of view of modifications the self is destroyed; from another point of view it is not. Because of this, there is not the one-sided view that the soul acts or that something else acts. From the point of view of modifications the self is destroyed; from another point of view it is not. Because of this, there is not the one-sided view that the soul experiences or that something else experiences. . It should be known that whoever holds the doctrine that the self that acts is the self that experiences (the fruits of that action] is a 29 What this entails in terms of conduct will be considered below.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 247 wrong-believer and not of the Arhat faith. But it should be known that whoever holds the doctrine that the self that acts is other than the self that experiences is a wrongbeliever and not of the Arhat faith. Here the two views relate to whether an object is viewed with regard to its modes (paryaya) or to its substance (dravya). To take either perspective as the exclusive truth about an object would be one-sided (ekanta) and the mark of a wrong-believer. According to this reading, the self is neither the same as nor different from the doer and experiencer. Right-belief, or 'right-view', entails knowing that both views are valid depending on the perspective taken. Unlike the distinction made above (Samayasara 14, etc.), this is clearly compatible with anekantavada doctrine; one view (i.e. the dravya perspective) is not higher, more 'real', or truer than the other (the paryaya perspective); they are complementary. However, the very fact that the dravya perspective deals with what is fundamental or essential, while the paryaya is a mode of that dravya, indicates at least the potential for a logical hierarchy of truth. It might be thought that the anekantavada-compatible version of the 'two truths' doctrine opens up the possibility of a 'third' view, one which reconciles or synthesises both statements. However, the strictures of the syadvada doctrine ensure that, rather than a true overview, such a synthesis could only take the form of a perception that the vyavahara and niscaya perspectives are merely views, and therefore neither is to be taken as exclusively true. Indeed, to ensure this is the function of the classical sapta-bhanginaya formulation as a whole.30 On the other hand, such passages as Samayasara 141ff. (=151ff. JGM)31 are not readily explicable in syadvada terms. Indeed, they seem more like an attempt to discard 30 See JPP pp. 94-97; and Dixit 1971 p. 24ff. for the possible historical development of this doctrine. 31 See pp. 236ff. above, and the following.

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248 Harmless Souls the anekantavada perspective entirely. section reads: The relevant From the vyavahara point of view it is said that karma comes into contact with and is bound to the jiva; but from the pure (suddha) point of view karma neither comes into contact with nor is bound to the jiva. [141] 'Karma is bound or not bound to the jiva' - know these to be [statements made from] different points of view. But it is said that he who goes beyond alternatives [attains) samayasara. [142] One connected to the true definition knows what is said of the two views, but does no more; he takes neither of the alternative views at all, being without (such) alternative views. [143] It is just a statement (vyapadesa) to say that he [the self] attains right perception and right knowledge; he who is said to be free from any alternative views / viewpoint, he has the essential definition (samayasara). [144132 The Atmakhyati on Samayasara 141 and 142 (= 151 and 152 JGM) explains: The vyavahara point of view is that karma comes into contact with and is bound to the jiva because of the non-existence of any great separateness between them, due to jiva and material karma being modes (paryaya) of a single bound state. The niscaya point of view is that karma does not come into contact with and bind the jiva because of the absolute separateness of jiva and material karma, due to their being fundamentally different substances (dravya). [141] The points of view are twofold: the one view is the conceptualization that karma is indeed bound to the jiva, the other is that karma is not bound to the jiva. Who thus goes beyond, who has altogether overcome conceptualization, having himself become viewless - one whose own-nature has destroyed partial knowledge 32 And so, through the movement from epistemology to ontology outlined above, the person free from alternative views realises, i.e. is, the self as correctly defined.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 249 - [for him) the essence of self is evident. Therefore, even he who, going beyond the one-sided view that karma is bound to the jiva, conceives that karma is not bound to the jiva does not go beyond views. And even he who, going beyond the one-sided view that karma is not bound to the jiva, conceives that karma is bound to the jiva does not go beyond views. And again, even he who, going beyond these two views, conceives that karma is both bound and not bound to the jiva does not go beyond views. Therefore, he who thus goes beyond the combined view, he alone indeed goes beyond choice. He who thus goes beyond all conceptualization, he indeed finds the essence of self. If that is the case, then who indeed would not activate the view-renouncing state of mind (bhava)?' [142]33 This is strikingly similar to Madhyamika Buddhism's denial of the ability of doctrines or views to characterize reality. For the Madhyamika, according to one modern commentator, 'the real as transcendent to thought can be realised only by the denial of the determinations which systems of philosophy ascribe to it'. 34 In other words, 33 jivapudgalakarmanor ekabandhaparyayatvena tadativyatirekabhavaj jive baddhasprstam karmeti vyavaharanayapaksah| jivapudgalakarmanor anekadravyatvenatyantavyatirekaj jive 'baddhasprstam karmeti niscayapaksah|(141) | yah kila jive baddham karmeti yas ca jive 'baddham karmeti vikalpah sa dvitayapi hi nayapaksah| ya evainam atikramati sa eva sakalavikalpatikrantah svayam nirvikalpaikavijnanaghanasvabhavo bhutva saksatsamayasarah sambhavati tatra yas tavaj jive baddhakarmeti vikalpayati sa jive 'baddham karmeti ekam paksam atikramann api na vikalpam atikramati yas tu jive 'baddham karmeti vikalpayati jive baddham karmetyekam paksam atikramann api na vikalpam atikramati yah punar jive baddham abaddham ca karmeti vikalpayati sa tu tam dvityam api paksam anatikraman na vikalpam atikramati tato ya eva samastanayapaksam atikramati sa eva samastam vikaipam atikramati ya eva samastam vikalpam atikramati sa eva samayasaram vindati | yady evam tarhi ko hi nama paksasamnyasabhavanam na natayati (142) | - Atmakhyati on Samayasara 141 and 142 (= 151 and 152 JGM) 34 Puligandla p. 289, fn. 100.

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250 Harmless Souls 'Rejection of all thought categories [concepts] and views [theories] is the rejection of the competence of reason to apprehend reality. The real [according to Madhyamika] is transcendent to thought'.35 'Samayasara' thus looks analogous to that state grasped by Nagarjuna's prajna and characterized by paramartha-satya, viz. the direct realisation of a higher, ineffable truth, beyond conceptual thought, which is synonymous with liberation. (It is, of course, only an analogy or, at most, a borrowed or shared technique applied to different material; Buddhist and Jain doctrines concerning the nature of 'self', 'not-self', what constitutes liberation, etc., are, it hardly needs to be said, quite different.) Amrtacandra highlights this resemblance in another work, the significantly entitled Purusartha-siddhy-upaya. There he writes: The niscaya mode (of statement) they describe as having a real referent; the vyavahara mode as without a real referent. All mundane souls are mostly opposed to knowledge of the reality of things.(5) The great saints (muni) teach the mode without a real referent to wake up the sleepy, (6a) (but) who so understands only the vyavahara mode, in him there is no teaching.(6b) As to a man who has not known a lion a toy is the only lion, so a man who knows not the real method takes the practical method itself for reality!(7) That disciple alone who understands both the real and the practical method, and takes a higher view equally distinct from both, obtains the full fruit of the teaching.(8)36 35 T.V. Murti, Central Philosophy of Buddhism, p. 208, quoted by Puligandla, ibid. fn. 101. 36 niscayam iha bhutartham vyavaharam varnayanty abhutartham | bhutarthabodhavimukhah prayah sarvo 'pi samsarah ||5|| abudhasya bodhanartham munisvara desayanty abhutartham | vyavaharam eva kevalam avaiti yas tasya desana nasti ||6|| manavaka eva simho yatha bhavaty anavagitasimhasya | vyavahara eva hi tatha niscayatam yaty aniscayajnasya ||7|| vyavaharaniscayau yah prabudhya tattvena bhavati

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 251 First there is the question of what it is the ignorant should understand (6a). Clearly, it is not merely the vyavahara point of view, since in the second half-verse (6b) that is said not to constitute a teaching at all. Rather, it must be the fact that the vyavahara mode is just a mode (i.e. that there is a higher view, the niscaya) which should be understood. Beyond this, however, both views must be discarded for a position which is neutral (madhyastha). In other words, the vyavahara-niscaya distinction is itself simply a means (upaya) to approach the highest goal, a means which must itself be discarded in order to attain final liberation. Such a view sits uneasily among the orthodox Jaina doctrines of syadvada and anekantavada. For one cannot arrive at such a prescription by adhering to the syadvada analysis.37 The vyavahara-niscaya doctrine, however (in those cases where the niscaya view is said to be the truth rather than merely a different perspective), claims that the view that the self is not really bound leads to selfrealisation, a state in which there is no duality of knower and known, and so, by definition, no distinction of viewpoints. The difference between the two views (one congruent with anekantavada, the other not) is pointed up by a verse in another work attributed to Kundakunda, the Niyamasara [159]: From the conventional point of view the omniscient Lord knows and perceives everything; from the absolute [viewpoint] the omniscient knows and perceives [only] the self.38 madhyasthah | prapnoti desanayah sa eva phalam vikalam sisyah ||8|| Purusartha-siddy-upaya, quoted and trans. (with my alterations) by J.L. Jaini 1940, pp. 107-108. 37 There is the idea in the fully developed syadvada doctrine that the self is avaktavya, but this simply means that 'in some respect (the ontological situation of) the self is inexpressible' - see JPP pp. 95-96. 38 Quoted by P.S. Jaini, JPP p. 267, fn. 33; my translation.

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252 Harmless Souls The anekantavada-compatible vyavahara view points to a state of liberation where the self still has some kind of relation with the not-self (there is a 'knower' and something 'known'), whereas the niscaya view envisages a liberated self, totally isolated from the not-self, whose omniscience is identical with self-knowledge. In other words, even when the Samayasara is apparently rejecting all views (as at 141-144), and so both anekanta and vyavahara-niscaya distinctions, it is clear that it is the niscaya view, taken as truth, which leads one to the point where views can be abandoned and liberation achieved, i.e. to self-realization. The niscaya view indeed characterizes - albeit from an inevitably intellectual rather than experiential perspective - the essence of self. Transcending all viewpoints (the intellectual), one goes on to experience the reality of that state. Here, in the Samayasara, in contrast with the Madhyamika where the abandonment of views is the chief instrument in the achievement of the goal, it is the espousal of the niscaya view which is clearly of prime importance.39 The idea that the latter should be abandoned too seems to have been added, probably under Madhyamika influence and perhaps because it was supposed (erroneously) that this was a way of shepherding the absolute, hierarchical distinction of two truths' back into the anekantavada fold.40 It may also be the case that what was intended merely as a 'description of 'samayasara' ('the realized self) in the text itself was extrapolated by the commentators into a technique for achieving that state. Furthermore, we can see the fundamental incompatibility between syadvada and the absolute 39 See, for instance, gathas 11-12, 156, 272, etc., quoted above. 40 The meaning attributed to 'samayasara' ('the essence of self) in Samayasara 141-144, and the fact that these verses conclude a discrete section of the work, point to the likelihood that they were indeed added after the bulk of the text had already been compiled.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 253 vyavahara-niscaya distinction. The former is essentially an intellectual strategy for evading confrontation with other schools over what appear to be internal contradictions in Jaina metaphysics, as well as for avoiding the logical resolution of such contradictions, with all that that would imply for ethical conduct.41 The latter, on the other hand, has, like Nagarjuna's Madhyamika teaching, a soteriological function. This is not to say that there may not be an awareness at one level of the text of the dangers to Jaina orthopraxy inherent in doctrines present in another layer; the distinction between the gathas which are compatible with anekantavada and those which take an ekanta view is frequently and perhaps deliberately blurred. However, once an absolute niscaya view has been introduced, its superiority from a logical point of view is unambiguous.42 Any attempt thereafter to overlay it with anekantavada must be considered unconvincing. The only real solution would be to exclude the absolute niscaya view from the text altogether. The fact that that has not happened only demonstrates its authority within the tradition (whether it derives from an individual called 'Kundakunda', or is merely sanctioned by being attributed to him, is not the point). It therefore falls to the commentators to accommodate it as best they can. The idea that there are at least two implementations of the vyavahara-niscaya distinction in the Samayasara - one compatible with anekantavada philosophy, the other (the absolute niscaya distinction) not requires further explication. I shall, therefore, now summarize some of the main ways in which the two patterns are juxtaposed in the text, and suggest some models for their development as contrasting, not to say contradictory, doctrines. 41 The specific nature of the dangers for practice and Jaina identity posed by the absolute vyavahara-niscaya distinction will be discussed below. 42 See, for example, gathas 11-12, 156, 272.

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254 Harmless Souls 7.3 Two 'two truths' doctrines As we have seen, at least two conflicting patterns of application can be outlined for the 'two truths' distinction in the Samayasara. According to one of these (I shall call it 'pattern one') the vyavahara-naya is that viewpoint which considers entities in general, and the jiva in particular, from the perspective of modes (paryaya). The niscaya-naya, on the other hand, is that viewpoint which considers entities from the perspective of pure unified substance (dravya). According to orthodox Jaina doctrine, a substance is that which has qualities and modes .(gunaparyayavad dravyam).43 The substance is the substratum for the qualities, and the qualities undergo modifications (parinama) through acquiring new and losing old modes. 44 P.S. Jaini explains : Thus, any existent must be seen on three levels: the modes, which last only a moment and belong to the qualities; the qualities, which undergo changes and yet inhere forever in their substances; and the substance, which remains the abiding common ground of support for the qualities and their modes. 45 Any complete description of an entity's nature needs, therefore, to encompass all three levels, and this is what the anekantvada purports to do, although at any particular moment 'an ordinary (non-omniscient) person' can only 'be aware of the persistent unity (ekatva) of the substance or the transient multiplicity (anekatva) of its modes'. 46 Thus, from the vyavahara view, the soul acts and experiences the fruits of action, whereas, from the niscaya view, it neither acts nor experiences fruits; yet neither statement contradicts 43 Tattvartha Sutra 5:38. 44 JPP p. 90. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 255 the other while they are sheltered under the anekantvada umbrella. Both are true from their own particular perspective. There is, therefore, a perspective from which the soul is really bound by karma, for the relation of substance to mode is a real relation. According to the other 'two truths' pattern ('pattern two'), however, the vyavahara, or conventional view - that the jiva acts and is subject to the fruits of action - is essentially a 'wrong view'. For the niscaya view, which is 'higher' in the sense of representing the complete truth, not just another aspect of it (it portrays reality), states that, by definition, the jiva can have no connection with ajiva. Thus any perceived relation between the two is nothing more than a delusion, the product of ignorance. This second pattern is clearly incompatible with the first, i.e. it is incompatible with anekantvada philosophy. Moreover, within it the niscaya view contradicts the vyavahara view, which is not the case in the first pattern. Thus, from the perspective of pattern one, pattern two is an ekanta heresy - a one-sided view; whereas, from the perspective of pattern two, pattern one is in its entirety a 'lower' or vyavahara view, unrepresentative of the truth. I am not the first to recognise that the Samayasara contains a double 'two truths' doctrine. Bansidhar Bhatt has designated every gatha in the Samayasara as falling into either a 'mystic' or a 'non-mystic' pattern, the former being attributed by Bhatt to a single individual called 'Kundakunda'.47 However, for reasons which will become clear, I consider this to be too rigid, not to say tendentious, a division of the text. Moreover, Bhatt makes no specific connection between his 'non-mystic pattern (my pattern one) and the anekantvada doctrine; and his interpretation of the niscaya view of his 'mystic' pattern (my pattern two) seems to owe more to a wish to claim Kundakunda as a Vedanta metaphysician than to reflect the actual content of the text. I shall, therefore, restrict myself to outlining the 47 Bhatt 1974, pp. 279-291.

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256 Harmless Souls different conclusions I draw from my own analysis, rather than offering any detailed criticism of Bhatt's thesis. The difficulties presented to commentators by the juxtaposition within the text of gathas containing contradictory 'two truths' doctrines should not be underestimated. Perhaps the most acute problem occurs in the attempt to accommodate the second pattern (where the vyavahara and niscaya views contradict each other) to standard Jaina teachings about bondage. If there is really no contact between the self and karma, how is bondage to be explained? (Underlying this is the even more fundamental problem of Jaina philosophy, viz. how can the immaterial (the self] and the material [karma) ever really be said to be in contact?) From the perspective of practical soteriology it might be objected that the important thing is the nonidentification of the self with karmic matter and that the ontological status of the two is not strictly relevant. That is to say, whether or not there is actual contact between them, the liberating 'action' is for the self to maintain an attitude of absolute separateness from matter. However, such a claim can hardly be sustained theoretically unless it is also claimed that in reality - i.e. ontologically - there is no relation between them. Liberating knowledge (gnosis) is knowledge of the way things really are; there has to be a correspondence between what is known and what is the case. In other words, transferred to the philosophical or theoretical level (which in the Indian tradition is where they are propagated and defended against criticism) soteriological and ethical doctrines entail ontological or metaphysical counterparts. The type of problem arising can be illustrated by the following. Gatha 19 [= 22] of the Samayasara reads: So long as there is the understanding 'I am in or I am identical with karmic and quasi-karmic [body] matter, etc. [no-karman],' there is

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 257 [also] lack of true discriminative knowledge. 48 One who knows the true nature of things (bhudattham / bhutartham), however, is not deluded (asammudho / asammudhah) in this way [Samayasara 22 (= 27)]. He knows that upayoga (jnana and darsana) is the laksana of the jiva, so how can such a self become or attribute to itself material substance (pudgala dravya) [Samayasara 24 (= 30)]? In Jayasena's recension, two extra gathas [23 and 24] are inserted after 19 (= 22), clearly with the intention of providing an explanation of how, if the jiva is really separate from ajiva, there can be such a thing as bondage. The second of these verses reads: Whatever mental state (bhava) the self produces, he (the self) is the agent (karta) of that bhava from the niscaya view. From the vyavahara view, it (the bhava) is the agent of material karmas.49 In other words, in reality, the self is responsible for its own mental states (bhava), and thus its own bondage or liberation (through attachment or non-attachment to the ajiva).50 This is evidently an attempt to distance the jiva from pudgala-karman (the ajiva) as the direct cause of bondage. From the niscaya view the binding state is selfproduced, as opposed to produced by pudgala-karman. However, this does not explain how what is pure consciousness by nature and definition (the atman) can come to manifest impure mental states (bhava). As we have seen in the Pravacanasara, the standard vyavaharaniscaya distinction of the first pattern would have explained 48 On no-karman see the Sarvarthasiddhi on Tattvartha Sutra 2:10. * 49 The grammar here is odd and the text may be corrupt, but I have translated it as it stands with kattaram in line 2 agreeing with bhavam in line 1 (see Appendix). 50 See Samayasara (23).

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258 Harmless Souls that the self is the material cause of its own modifications and the instrumental cause of other modifications, whereas the ajiva (pudgala-karman) is the material cause of its own modifications and the instrumental cause of the jiva's modifications. However, as the commentators are well aware, such an anekantvada-congruent explanation, which retains a connection with pudgala-dravya as the instrumental cause of impure bhavas, is not convincing in the context of the absolute distinction of self and other made by the second vyavahara-niscaya distinction. Thus, what we have here is an open conflict between the two patterns of the vyavahara-niscaya doctrine. Jayasena attempts to resolve this conflict by positing a new distinction - not found in the text itself, but much used by modern commentators 51. between suddha-niscayanaya, 'the pure niscaya viewpoint' and asuddha-niscayanaya, 'the impure niscaya viewpoint. So his Tatparyavrttih on Samayasara 24 (JGM) reads: From the pure niscaya viewpoint the agent is of pure bhavas, [while) from the impure niscaya viewpoint (the agent] is of impure bhavas - so the state of being an agent is just a modification of bhavas from the niscaya point of view.52 J.L. Jaini explains: impure thought-activity is attributed to the soul from the impure real standpoint (Ashuddha Nischaya Naya). From the pure real standpoint (Shuddha Nischaya Naya), the doer is the doer only of its own pure modifications.53 This may be clarified further by Niyamasara 18, which 51 Cf. Uggar Sain trans. and comm. on Niyamasara 18. 52 nicchayado: asuddhaniscayanayena asuddhabhavanam suddhaniscayanayena suddhabhavanam karteti bhavanam parinamanam eva kartytvam | Tatparyavrttih on Samayasara 24. 53 SBJ ed., p. 17 - J.L. Jaini's comments on Samayasara 24.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 259 reads: From the vyavahara view the self is the agent and experiencer (of the effects) of material karma; but from the niscaya view the self is the agent and experiencer through mental states which have arisen from karma. This differs from Samayasara (24) (see above) in that it makes it clear that, according to this niscaya view, particular bhavas which arise in the self, of which it is the agent or material cause, and which, in turn, are the causes of bondage, only do so through the instrumental influence of pudgala-karman. That is to say, the niscaya view presented here [Niyamasara 18] corresponds to what Jayasena calls the asuddha-niscaya-naya. In this way the connection between material karma and the self is kept, but mediated or attenuated through mental states (bhava). Such a reading clearly belongs to the first vyavahara-niscaya pattern. None of this, of course, comes any closer to explaining how. pure consciousness (self) can be subject to impure thought-activity in the first place; all it does do is offer an apparently arbitrary explanation of how the soul, from the niscaya point of view, can be said to be both pure and impure at the same time. In other words, faced in the same text with the two vyavahara-niscaya patterns outlined above, Jayasena tries to run them together by designating as asuddha-niscaya-naya what would be considered a vyavahara view from the perspective of the second pattern. But logically - as perhaps Amrtacandra recognised in avoiding the juxtaposition of these gathas (Samayasara 1924 and [23]-[24]) - this makes no difference. The contradictions are unresolved and the problem is left hanging. Why then did Jayasena feel it so important to attempt to reconcile the two views instead of following what would be a logical solution, that of pattern two - viz. to maintain that in reality the self does not have and cannot have impure

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260 Harmless Souls bhavas, that it is not bound, and that it is only necessary to realise the truth of that (non-) relation of the self and karma (the not-self) in order to achieve liberation? Apart from the obvious answer, that he is writing a commentary on a received text and so has to make sense of the contents as he finds them (and he is probably working on the assumption that, despite the disparate nature of the gathas, he is dealing with a work by the revered acarya Kundakunda), there is another, more compelling reason. Put simply, because the material covered by the first vyavahara-niscaya pattern comprises the whole socio-ethical content of Jainism, it is essential for the survival and cohesion of the Jaina community to maintain a connection between that content and the soteriological goal. (I shall return to this below.) 7.4 Dvikriyavada Despite the apparent impossibility of resolving it in orthodox terms, Jaina thinkers were periodically forced to confront directly the problem outlined above - namely, what can be the relation between an immaterial conscious self and material unconscious matter, and how can the latter bind or have contact with the former? One of their strategies for dealing with this involves rejection of the dokiriyavada / dvi-kriyavada doctrine, the assertion that one cause can produce two different effects in this case, the idea that the soul can be the agent of its bhavas and also of pudgalakarma or karmic modification). An examination of the way dvikriyavada is dealt with in the Samayasara thus helps to clarify the difference between the two vyavaharaniscaya patterns given above. Samayasara 83-86 [=89-92] reads: From the niscaya view the atman acts on itself alone. And again know that the atman experiences itself alone [83]. From the vyavahara view the atman acts on various kinds of pudgalakarma. Likewise, it experiences [the fruits of] the various kinds of pudgalakarma (84).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 277 knowledge In the light of this equation of knowledge, the knower, and the self, it is revealing to look at Samayasara 404 (= JGM 434). This is the verse which follows that which equates knowledge and the knower or self (403). It reads: Knowledge is right belief; self-restraint; the sutras, consisting of angas and purvas; merit and demerit; and asceticism [i.e. pravrajya - formal assumption of the mahavrata, and so initiation into mendicancy). 4 The wise agree on this. There is some confusion here about the form of sammadithi, 'right belief. Chakravarti and Jaini both give sammaditthi 1 samyagdestih (misprint in Prakrit?, nominative singular in Sanskrit); the JGM edition gives sammaditthi / samyagdrstim (nominative singular Prakrit, accusative singular Sanskrit), which is having it both ways, although it at least conforms to the metrical need for a long syllable. I have translated the verse in accordance with the reading of the commentators and translators, who take jnana to be the subject. Such a reading certainly conforms to the context. However, it is possible that verse 404 is an imported traditional gatha whose original subject was samyag-drsti, right belief. If this is so, then by the time it was incorporated into the Samayasara it must already have been very ancient, for the purvas had long since been lost.5 Thus if knowledge of the purvas is still considered a necessary part of samyag-drsti, which in turn is the prerequisite of the religious life, then, without reinterpretation, this verse is little better than a counsel of despair. Similarly, the idea that full renunciation is necessary for samyag-drsti is very ancient. Therefore, whatever the original meaning of this verse, it is both more 4 See JPP p. 243. 5 If the context were not Jain, however, the obvious interpretation of purva(kam) would be simply 'with -', and that may be the meaning here.

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278 Harmless Souls meaningful and more compatible with the new context to take jnana as the subject. Indeed, knowledge, which has just been equated with the knower (the self), is clearly too important to the overall significance of the text to revert here to being just another sub-category. In this context, therefore, Samayasara 404 states that knowledge - i.e. the knower, the self - is all these things, viz. right belief, restraint, the sutras, dharma and adharma, and full renunciation. Consequently, to know or realise the self is to know - that is to say, be - all these things. In other words, (self-) knowledge is the whole of the religious life, the moksa-marga. Through a radical internalisation a single principle subsumes all the rest, and both the path and the goal are found within the self. Jnana, which is selfrealisation or gnosis, supersedes all external discipline. (It is also interesting to note how this internalisation removes the problem of the purvas: that is to say, their loss is no longer a bar to liberation, since if you know your self you will necessarily 'know all the sutras - jnana contains them.) Liberation is thus a function of the autonomous self, i.e. of the cultivation or purification of the self through the development of greater and greater (self-) knowledge. And, as Chakravarti puts it, on perfection of knowledge the self 'becomes perfect and knowledge becomes completely co-extensive with reality'. The self is then both sarvajna and paramatma, the omniscient and absolute self. ii) Self-realisation We have seen that according to the Samayasara the self (the knower) and knowledge are in essence one. This is, as it were, the omniscient perspective. But to attain this state, to become the pure self, it is necessary to realise, i.e. to experience, this theoretical truth in the self. In more abstract terms, a description of an ontological condition is both the end of and the means to a new epistemology, the full implementation of which leads back to that ontological 6 Chakravarti p. 233.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 279 state at a new level of personal experience or attainment. And this liberation (omniscience) through self-realisation or knowledge has been made possible precisely through the equation of self and knowledge. As the Niyamasara puts it: From the vyavahara point of view the omniscient lord sees and knows everything, from the niscaya point of view the omniscient sees and knows the self.7 The clear implication is that by knowing the self one knows everything, and thus one is a liberated soul, a kevalin. The self to be known is, of course, the pure self, i.e. the self as it is in its essence or svabhava, the self as knowledge. For 'realising the pure self the jiva becomes pure; but knowing the impure self it becomes impure' [Samayasara 186). Indeed, according to the Samayasara it is only through pure (self-) knowledge that one can attain liberation. The five standard media of knowledge - sense perception, scripture, clairvoyance, telepathy, and omniscience - all refer to the one thing (or state). That is reality (paramatta / paramartha). Having attained that, one attains liberation. 8 Moreover, 'the many who are without these kinds of knowledge do not achieve this state. If you desire complete liberation (parimokkham) from karma then you must obtain this superior state' [Samayasara 205].9 The Samayasara stresses that without concentration, i.e. without at least the attempt to realise this one reality which is the realised self, all religious discipline is useless. Or as Samayasara 152 (= JGM 162) puts it: 7 Niy 159 (= SBJ 158]. Also quoted pp. 212-213, above. 8 See Samayasara 204. 9 That paramatho I paramartha in the Samayasara refers to the pure, unified or realised self - that it is the condition of 'entering into knowledge which is produced from the state of oneness' - has been established above. See p. 235ff. above, ref. Samayasara 151.

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280 Harmless Souls One who performs tapas and (observes) vrata without being fixed in reality [paramatha - the pure self], the all-knowing call that (practice) foolish tapas and foolish vrata. So even when they are 'observing vows, rules and restraints, and practising tapas, such people are devoid of knowledge because they are outside paramartha' [Samayasara 153). Outside paramartha, and ignorant of the cause of liberation, they long for merit (punya) which can only keep them in samsara.10 Knowledge or realisation of the self is thus crucial to liberation, but how is it to be attained? It has already been suggested that partial knowledge is the indispensable means to realisation of absolute knowledge, but what form does such knowledge take? As we have seen, the ignorant self binds itself through identifying with what is not self. As Samayasara 92 (= JGM 99] puts it: The soul (jiva) that is full of ignorance, (mis)taking the non-self (para) for the self (atman), and the self for what is non-self, is the agent of karmas. Conversely, The soul which consists of knowledge, not (mis)taking the non-self for the self, or the self for what is non-self, is not the agent of karmas (Samayasara 93 = JGM 100]. The essential mental act is therefore discrimination based on knowledge of the true nature of the self. Again we see the mixture of ontology and epistemology: the pure self cannot, by definition, come into contact with anything not self, yet it is precisely knowledge of this which is instrumental in separating self and not-self - i.e. such knowledge causes the self to relinquish its 'unreal' or 10 See Samayasara 154 (= JGM 164).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 281 delusory contact with the other and thus realise its real condition. As we have seen, with increasing stress on the essential purity of the self and its equation with knowledge (omniscience), the idea arises that the atman, in its essence or svabhava, cannot by definition ever really come into contact with any material substances. And what was originally true just of the individual who had attained kevala-jnana is now predicated of every atman. This points us towards something which is implied but never made explicit in Kundakunda's reformulation of the relationship between self and matter - namely, that it is impossible that the soul could ever be or ever have been really bound. Naturally, this is closely allied to the shift away from the importance of physical karma and the concomitant rise of the idea that the pure self is something to be attained by realisation of its true ontological status. It should be stressed, however, that because of the eclectic nature of the Samayasara the direct link with the path of physical austerity is never finally broken. Thus, for instance, while gatha 71 (= JGM 76) states that: When the absolute difference between asravas (inflowing karmic matter) and the self (atman) is known by this jiva, then there is no bondage for it, the following verse (72 = JGM 77) tempers this with the statement that: Having known the impurity of asravas, their contrary nature (to the self), and that they are the causes of misery, the jiva abstains from them. In other words, the jiva that knows the true relationship between the self and paradravya does not act in an asravacausing way and so is not bound. Thus in these verses, it is implied that knowledge is still at least nominally subsidiary to conduct as the means to liberation. Nevertheless, given

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282 Harmless Souls the overall trend of thought in this text, such qualifications seem little more than a holding operation in a pass which, in principle, has already been sold. If the state of purity, of omniscience, is the eternal condition of the atman (i.e. in reality it cannot and can never have been associated with the impure, knowledgerestricting not-self), and the knowledge of this truth realises or brings it about in fact (i.e. engenders liberation), then this comes very close to saying that every individual is now and always has been a kevalin. In other words, there are the same kind of premises here which gave rise in Mahayana Buddhism to the tathagatagarbha or 'BuddhaNature' theory. 11 For, in the Jain case, there is the barely concealed proposition that everyone has the Jina- or kevalin-nature (i.e. each person's atman is really omniscient), and that knowledge of this realises it ontologically. Kundakunda, of course, does not go so far as to say that samsara and nirvana are really the same thing; it is still assumed that with physical death the liberated atman is released to a nirvanic place or condition. However, the logic of this physical liberation, which was tied to the material view of the universe (and perhaps originally to the idea of a material soul), is now very vague and, significantly, no attempt is made to explicate it. Emphasis now falls upon the state of liberation rather than upon its location. (Again, the concept of liberation as a state of pure consciousness or knowledge is reminiscent of Mahayanist beliefs.) One can only speculate on the effect of such ideas on the Jaina layperson, even supposing that they were disseminated to him. But it is clear that any changes must have been largely in terms of expectation rather than practice. That is to say, if the link with physical asceticism cannot be broken without risking the identity of the community as a whole, such theoretical possibilities as that 11 On the tathagatagarbha, see, for instance, P. Williams 1989, pp. 96-115.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 283 of a 'Jina-nature' nevertheless make liberation seem closer. They are affectively satisfying. (This, of course, still leaves room for the [heretical] suspicion that practice may not be quite so important as had previously been thought, given that in reality the self is even now liberated.) And one can continue to defer realisation of the inherently liberated and omniscient self alongside an increased hope of ultimately attaining the ideal religious goal. iii) Discriminative knowledge Returning now to the concern of the ascetic or advanced layperson - i.e. the way to obtain or realise liberation in practice - it is useful to examine in more detail what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Samayasara 202 (not found in the JGM ed.) asks: How can one, not knowing the self (atman) and not knowing the non-self (anatman), not knowing the jiva and ajiva, be a rightbeliever (samyag-drsti)? In other words, one cannot even get on to the first rung of the ladder to salvation without such knowledge;12 and yet such knowledge in itself constitutes liberation. This, however, is not an impenetrably vicious circle, as becomes clear if we draw an analogy with early Buddhism's samma ditthi or 'Right Understanding'. For the Buddhist, Rahula tells us, 'Right Understanding is the understanding of things as they are ... [it] is the highest wisdom which sees the Ultimate Reality'. This understanding is, however, of two kinds: What we generally call understanding is knowledge, an accumulated memory, an intellectual grasping of a subject according to given data. This is called 'knowing accordingly' (anubodha). It is not very deep. Real deep understanding is called 'penetration' (pativedha), seeing a thing in its true nature... This 12 See JPP p. 272 on samyag-drsti as the fourth gunasthana.

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284 Harmless Souls penetration is possible only when the mind is free from all impurities and is fully developed through meditation. 13 For the Jains too, partial, intellectual knowledge puts one on the ladder which leads to absolute knowledge and liberation. It is interesting to note that, with the developing stress in Jaina theory on knowledge and self-realisation as the means to liberation, there is an increasing tendency to borrow Buddhist terminology; for Buddhism clearly has a more developed and sophisticated ready-made vocabulary for describing inner discipline and experience. One example of this which is significant in the present context occurs at Samayasara 293-299. The relevant passage reads: Having clearly known the nature (svabhava) of what binds and the nature (svabhava) of the self (atman), he who has no attachment to what binds attains liberation from karma [293]. The jiva and bondage are differentiated [lit. 'cut'] by their own essential and distinctive characteristics. Cut by the knife of discriminative wisdom (panna/prajna), they fall apart [294]. [When] the jiva and bondage are differentiated by their own essential and distinctive characteristics, bondage should be cut away and the pure self grasped [295]. How is the self grasped? The self is grasped by discriminative wisdom (prajna). Just as [the self] is separated (from bondage) by prajna, so it should be grasped by prajna [296]. The conscious being (cetayita) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality; whatever mental states (bhava) make up the remainder should be known to be other than mine [297]. The perceiver (dattha / drsta) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality, etc. [298] The knower (nada / jnata) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality, etc. [299]. 13 Rahula P. 49.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 285 Gatha 293 makes the usual distinction between the svabhava of the self and everything else, and relates liberation to non-attachment to, or separation from, the latter. This is the inescapable (i.e. ontological) separation of the jiva and what (apparently) binds it (294a), but it is prajna which is instrumental in realising that gulf between jiva and ajiva (294b). Such realisation of the pure self is liberation (295). In other words, separation of the jiva and what binds it is no longer a physical matter - i.e. it is not a matter of burning off karma through tapas and preventing further influx (asrava) through inaction - it is now an intellectual or mental concern. One realises the true nature of the self through prajna (discriminative wisdom), and that in itself releases the pure self; it enables it to attain to its true condition. The use of the term prajna here is almost certainly borrowed from Nagarjuna or from Buddhist prajnaparamita literature in general. For Nagarjuna, prajna is the means by which the higher truth (paramarthasatya) is grasped - it is 'direct, intuitive insight into reality as it is in itself. 14 For Kundakunda, the reality of the self is that it is absolutely unconnected with what is not self, and prajna isolates, in the first instance, that pure self. It is the initial and crucial intellectual means of discriminating between jiva and ajiva, self and bondage. In this sense, it is synonymous with samyag-drsti (see above). But as in the Buddhist case, prajna has, according to the Samayasara, another facet. This is spelt out in gatha 296 (see above), where it is said that just as the atman is differentiated (vibhakta) from the not self or from 'bondage' by prajna, so it is also to be realised or attained (grhitavya) by prajna. In other words, there are two stages or kinds of prajna: the intellectual knowledge of the way things are in reality, and the means to the personal realisation or attainment of that reality. This seems to correspond to the early Mahayanist 14 Puligandla p. 95; see also P. Williams 1989, pp. 42-45.

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286 Harmless Souls distinction between prajna which is knowing intellectually, through deep or meditative analysis, the way things must really be, and 'paranormal experience of a meditative absorption directed towards the results of such analysis'. 15 In summary, prajna is conceived of in two interlinked ways: as deep intellectual analysis, and as something less conceptual, the direct realisation or achievement of that state which has previously been isolated by analysis. The fact that for the Jains the liberated self is omniscient does not conflict with the non-conceptual or non-intellectual form of liberating prajna (prajna 'two'), for omniscience cannot be attained by a conscious attempt to expand one's normal limited knowledge. Rather it is only to be achieved by removing the obstacles to one's natural state of omniscience, i.e. by purifying the self, and especially by divesting oneself at a deep level of the delusion that the self is really in any way connected with what is not self. It is the experience of the pure self, rather than simply intellectual knowledge of it, that is liberating. In contrast to the Buddhist texts, this division between, on the one hand, the intellectual and conceptual, and, on the other, the meditative and non-conceptual, is never systematically analysed or even described by Kundakunda in the Samayasara. Nevertheless, the use of the term prajna in the passage given above (especially in gatha 296) implies precisely such a distinction. And what we saw when we considered dhyana in the Pravacanasara 16 is no less evident in the Samayasara; namely, that liberation is to be attained by meditation on the pure self. For instance, we have already seen in a different context) gatha 151, where it is said that mendicants who are absorbed in the realised self, their svabhava, attain nirvana.17 Similarly, gathas 187-189 state that: 15 P. William's description (1989), pp. 43-44. 16 See p. 201ff., above. 17 tamhi trhida sahave munino pavamti nivvanam - Samayasara 151. For the complete verse, see p. 236, above.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 287 The self which, having restrained itself by itself with regard to both meritorious and demeritorious actions, is fixed in perception and knowledge and is free from desire for other things, which, free from all combination [i.e. free from all attachment to what is not self], meditates on the self through the self and disregards karma and nokarma (that) sentient being reflects upon the state of oneness [187-188]. Meditating on the self, consisting of perception and knowledge and not consisting of anything else [OR 'not thinking (manah) of anything else'], he very quickly realises the self which is completely free from all karma [189].18 In other words, it is meditation on the pure or unified self which is itself instrumental in realising or attaining that pure self. You know or identify the pure self (conceptually) and then you realise (i.e. attain it) by meditating on it. Moreover, meditation on the self comes to be seen as both the acme and index of right conduct. As two gathas only found in Jayasena's recension of the Samayasara put it: Indeed, meditation should be practised on knowledge, belief (/ perception) and conduct. But these three are the self; therefore practise meditation on the self [JGM 11]. The ascetic who is constantly engaged in practising this meditation on the self attains liberation from all suffering quickly [JGM 12]. The term used for 'meditation' here is not dhyana but bhavana. In early Jaina texts bhavana is connected with the five mahavrata. It has a range of meanings, from the underlying mental disposition which leads to the right understanding of the vows, to their specific observance. 19 18 On nokarma - quasi-karmic matter which makes up the jiva's bodies, etc. - see Tattvartha Sutra 2:10. 19 See Schubring paras. 45,167,171; cf. JPP p. 243, fn. 3, and TS 7:3.

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288 Harmless Souls In the present context, however, the meaning of the term is significantly closer to the standard Buddhist use of bhavana, namely, as mental development or mental culture in general and meditation in particular.20 The important point to note here is the stress on meditation on the self as the means to liberation:21 right conduct has been redefined as atmabhavana (meditation on the self), and thus internalised. (There is probably also the implication that if one meditates on the self then one's external conduct is automatically correct.) iv) Renunciation of bhava In a similar way renunciation is also internalised: stress now falls upon the renunciation of all (mental) states or bhava (with the exception, of course, of atmasvabhava). Gatha 34 = JGM 39) reads: As (self-) knowledge renounces all (mental) states (bhava), knowing them to be other (than the self), so (self-) knowledge should be considered to be the real / definitive definition of renunciation. In other words, knowing the self, one recognises and renounces or rejects everything not self, all parabhava 22 And it is reiterated that knowledge is the svabhava of the self: The holy men, who know absolute reality, call that holy man a conqueror of delusion who, having overcome delusion, realises that the self has knowledge for its own-nature (svabhava). Seen correctly, therefore, the self, untouched by anything else, is in a natural state of renunciation. It does not have to do anything to renounce since, having no other 20 See CPD p. 36, entry on bhavana, and Rahula p.68. 21 Cf. Samayasara 151, above. 22 See Samayasara 35 (= JGM 40).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 289 states and being in contact with no other states, there is nothing to renounce. Again knowledge of one's true nature leads to attainment of that true nature; renunciation of parabhava - i.e. the realisation that they are other (para) - leads to the state of renunciation. For the delusion (moha) which is overcome is precisely that the self has anything to do with other substances. This is made clear by gathas 36 and 37 (JGM 41 and 42). The first of these states that: (When) it is realised that 'delusion has nothing whatsoever to do with me; I am one, consciousness (upayoga)', the knowers of the true definition of self (samaya) call that the state of being free from delusion. The second gatha (37) repeats this formulation with dharma etc.' (dhammadi / dharmadi) substituted for moha. In other words, the self, when truly defined, has nothing to do with the other dravya (viz. dharma, adharma, pudgala, akasa, kala, and other jiva), and to realise that is to be free from delusion.23 That the knower, the pure self, is naturally a renunciate is borne out by a further passage in the Samayasara. Gatha 210-214 read: Non-possession (aparigraha) is said to be desirelessness. The knower does not desire merit (dharma). And it is by the nonpossession of (i.e. the lack of desire for) dharma that he becomes / is a knower [210 = JGM 225]. The next three gathas [211-213 = JGM 226, 228-229] repeat this formulation, substituting demerit (adharma) [211], and food (asana) [212] and drink (pana) (213] for dharma. The passage continues: 23 At least, Amrtacandra interprets dharma here as the principle of motion, one of the five ajiva substances - see Atmakhyati on JGM 42. It could, however, simply mean 'merit'.

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290 Harmless Souls Thus the knower does not desire all these various states (bhava), for in reality his nature (bhava) is knowledge, and he is independent of everything [214 = JGM 230). As we have already seen, both meritorious and demeritorious actions keep one in samsara. Here, the desire for the fruits of such actions has the same result. More interesting in this context, however, is the internalisation of aparigraha with regard to eating and drinking. Now it is the attitude, the lack of desire for food and water, which defines fasting. The stress has been shifted from the material fact of non-consumption, so closely tied to physical ahimsa, to the underlying state, or mental attitude. And aparigraha itself is defined as desirelessness, an attitude. Thus the indices of the religious life - physical renunciation and non-possession (aparigraha) - are, through internalisation, drawn into the equation of selfknowledge and liberation. And the condition of renunciation is no longer something to be achieved through action or inaction but, being the natural state of the self, it is therefore something to be realised. In other words, the barrier to full renunciation and thus liberation is, in effect, a delusion with regard to what is not self: the delusion that it is possible in reality to have a relationship with it. Consequently, it is not the physical objects which make up the ajiva world themselves which are to be renounced, but the attitude towards those objects. As Samayasara 210 puts it, 'a person who has no parigraha is said to be desireless' [apariggaho aniccho bhanido); and it is by this kind of non-possession or desirelessness that one is a knower, i.e. liberated.24 The concomitant of this is that it is attachment or desire, an attitude, which prevents selfknowledge and thus liberation. So according to Samayasara 20 (= JGM 214): 24 See p. 289, above.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 291 If as much as an atom of desire / attachment (raga), etc., is found in someone, he does not know the self even if he knows all the scriptures. Absence of desire (raga) is the indicator of selfknowledge because only someone who knows the self, and thus the real relation of self to not self, knows that to desire is pointless, since in reality it is impossible to possess anything at all. In fact this works both ways: desire obstructs omniscience and liberation, but (partial) knowledge leads to the abandonment of desire and thus ultimately to liberation (total knowledge). How does this treatment of desire (raga) relate to the standard kasaya doctrine as found in the Tattvartha Sutra ? According to the kasaya doctrine, it is the negative emotions or passions underlying action which cause karmic particles to adhere to and thus bind the soul. And this seems to be precisely the meaning of a simile employed by Kundakunda at Samayasara 237-241 (= JGM 255-264). There, it is said of a man with an oil-smeared body, who is performing martial exercises in a dusty place and doing damage to the surrounding foliage, that the real (niscayatah) cause of the dust sticking to his body is the oil, not his bodily activity. In the same way, a wrong believer engaged in activity, who has raga, etc., as his upayoga, is smeared by karmic dust (rajasa) [241 = JGM 259]. On the other hand, when a man performs exercises with a body which is oil-free, whatever the physical destruction he causes, no dust sticks to him. Similarly, a right-believer, even though he is engaged in various activities, is not smeared by karmic dust because of the absence of raga, etc., as his upayoga [246 = JGM 264]. Chronologically, however, this passage evidently belongs to an early layer of the Samayasara, given its emphasis on the suppression of passion rather than on jnana as the means to liberation. And considering the broader context, it becomes clear that Kundakunda's other

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292 Harmless Souls teachings have entailed significant modifications to the kasaya doctrine. At one level a temporary accommodation of the kasaya and jnana doctrines is possible: the necessity of controlling the passions is recognised but the means to achieving that control is through knowledge of the true state of the jiva - its fundamental isolation. This leads to the realisation that the desire for a relationship between the self and anything else is bound to be frustrated, and thus to the abandonment of raga, etc. This accommodation can only be temporary, however, since such a formulation itself contains the doctrinal basis of Kundakunda's second niscaya pattern - the physical isolation of the self from all matter. Thus, karma and the self being totally separate and incompatible, the idea that the self is or can be bound, even by passionate behaviour, is itself a delusion. From this perspective the kasaya doctrine is intrinsically false. This illustrates very well the fact that the diverse nature of the material collected in the Samayasara leads to an ambiguity in the meaning of some individual gathas which can only be partially resolved by examining them in their immediate context. To take a further example, gatha 247 (= JGM 265), apparently continuing the passage I have summarised above (Samayasara 237-246), reads: He who thinks 'I kill' [Vhims) and 'I am killed by other beings' is deluded and ignorant; but the knower is opposed to (i.e. knows other than this. Taken as it stands, this seems to belong to the second niscaya pattern - i.e. the self is neither an agent nor a patient but simply a knower. In other words, in so far as they both stress the absolute isolation of individual souls, the difference between this and the Samkhya view, expressed famously in the Bhagavadgita (quoting Katha Upanisad 2:19-20), is nominal. The Bhagavadgita verse - almost certainly the formal model for Kundakunda's gatha - states that:

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 277 knowledge. In the light of this equation of knowledge, the knower, and the self, it is revealing to look at Samayasara 404 (= JGM 434). This is the verse which follows that which equates knowledge and the knower or self (403). It reads: Knowledge is right belief, self-restraint; the sutras, consisting of angas and purvas; merit and demerit; and asceticism [i.e. pravrajya - formal assumption of the mahavrata, and so initiation into mendicancy]. 4 The wise agree on this. There is some confusion here about the form of sammaditthi, 'right belief. Chakravarti and Jaini both give sammaditthi | samyagdsstih (misprint in Prakrit?, nominative singular in Sanskrit); the JGM edition gives sammaditthi / samyagdrstim (nominative singular Prakrit, accusative singular Sanskrit), which is having it both ways, although it at least conforms to the metrical need for a long syllable. I have translated the verse in accordance with the reading of the commentators and translators, who take jnana to be the subject. Such a reading certainly conforms to the context. However, it is possible that verse 404 is an imported traditional gatha whose original subject was samyag-drsti, right belief. If this is so, then by the time it was incorporated into the Samayasara it must already have been very ancient, for the purvas had long since been lost.5 Thus if knowledge of the purvas is still considered a necessary part of samyag-drsti, which in turn is the prerequisite of the religious life, then, without reinterpretation, this verse is little better than a counsel of despair. Similarly, the idea that full renunciation is necessary for samyag-drsti is very ancient. Therefore, whatever the original meaning of this verse, it is both more 4 See JPP p. 243. 5 If the context were not Jain, however, the obvious interpretation of purva (kam) would be simply 'with -', and that may be the meaning here.

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278 Harmless Souls meaningful and more compatible with the new context to take jnana as the subject. Indeed, knowledge, which has just been equated with the knower (the self), is clearly too important to the overall significance of the text to revert here to being just another sub-category. In this context, therefore, Samayasara 404 states that knowledge - i.e. the knower, the self - is all these things, viz. right belief, restraint, the sutras, dharma and adharma, and full renunciation. Consequently, to know or realise the self is to know - that is to say, be - all these things. In other words, (self-) knowledge is the whole of the religious life, the moksa-marga. Through a radical internalisation a single principle subsumes all the rest, and both the path and the goal are found within the self. Jnana, which is selfrealisation or gnosis, supersedes all external discipline. (It is also interesting to note how this internalisation removes the problem of the purvas: that is to say, their loss is no longer a bar to liberation, since if you know your self you will necessarily 'know all the sutras - jnana contains them.) Liberation is thus a function of the autonomous self, i.e. of the cultivation or purification of the self through the development of greater and greater (self-) knowledge. And, as Chakravarti puts it, on perfection of knowledge the self 'becomes perfect and knowledge becomes completely co-extensive with reality'. The self is then both sarvajna and paramatma, the omniscient and absolute self.6 ii) Self-realisation We have seen that according to the Samayasara the self (the knower) and knowledge are in essence one. This is, as it were, the omniscient perspective. But to attain this state, to become the pure self, it is necessary to realise, i.e. to experience, this theoretical truth in the self. In more abstract terms, a description of an ontological condition is both the end of and the means to a new epistemology, the full implementation of which leads back to that ontological 6 Chakravarti p. 233.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 279 state at a new level of personal experience or attainment. And this liberation (omniscience) through self-realisation or knowledge has been made possible precisely through the equation of self and knowledge. As the Niyamasara puts it: From the vyavahara point of view the omniscient lord sees and knows everything, from the niscaya point of view the omniscient sees and knows the self.7 The clear implication is that by knowing the self one knows everything, and thus one is a liberated soul, a kevalin. The self to be known is, of course, the pure self, i.e. the self as it is in its essence or svabhava, the self as knowledge. For 'realising the pure self the jiva becomes pure; but knowing the impure self it becomes impure' [Samayasara 186). Indeed, according to the Samayasara it is only through pure (self-) knowledge that one can attain liberation. The five standard media of knowledge - sense perception, scripture, clairvoyance, telepathy, and omniscience - all refer to the one thing (or state). That is reality (paramattha paramartha). Having attained that, one attains liberation.8 Moreover, the many who are without these kinds of knowledge do not achieve this state. If you desire complete liberation (parimokkham) from karma then you must obtain this superior state' (Samayasara 205].9 The Samayasara stresses that without concentration, i.e. without at least the attempt to realise this one reality which is the realised self, all religious discipline is useless. Or as Samayasara 152 (= JGM 162) puts it: 7 Niy 159 (= SBJ 158). Also quoted pp. 212-213, above. 8 See Samayasara 204. 9 That paramatho / paramartha in the Samayasara refers to the pure, unified or realised self - that it is the condition of 'entering into knowledge which is produced from the state of oneness' - has been established above. See p. 235ff. above, ref. Samayasara 151.

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280 Harmless Souls One who performs tapas and (observes) vrata without being fixed in reality (paramattha - the pure self], the all-knowing call that (practice) foolish tapas and foolish vrata. So even when they are 'observing vows, rules and restraints, and practising tapas, such people are devoid of knowledge because they are outside paramartha' [Samayasara 153]. Outside paramartha, and ignorant of the cause of liberation, they long for merit (punya) which can only keep them in samsara.10 Knowledge or realisation of the self is thus crucial to liberation, but how is it to be attained? It has already been suggested that partial knowledge is the indispensable means to realisation of absolute knowledge, but what form does such knowledge take? As we have seen, the ignorant self binds itself through identifying with what is not self. As Samayasara 92 (= JGM 99] puts it: The soul (jiva) that is full of ignorance, (mis)taking the non-self (para) for the self (atman), and the self for what is non-self, is the agent of karmas. Conversely, The soul which consists of knowledge, not (mis)taking the non-self for the self, or the self for what is non-self, is not the agent of karmas (Samayasara 93 = JGM 100]. The essential mental act is therefore discrimination based on knowledge of the true nature of the self. Again we see the mixture of ontology and epistemology: the pure self cannot, by definition, come into contact with anything not self, yet it is precisely knowledge of this which is instrumental in separating self and not-self - i.e. such knowledge causes the self to relinquish its 'unreal' or 10 See Samayasara 154 (= JGM 164).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 281 delusory contact with the other and thus realise its real condition. As we have seen, with increasing stress on the essential purity of the self and its equation with knowledge (omniscience), the idea arises that the atman, in its essence or svabhava, cannot by definition ever really come into contact with any material substances. And what was originally true just of the individual who had attained kevala-jnana is now predicated of every atman. This points us towards something which is implied but never made explicit in Kundakunda's reformulation of the relationship between self and matter - namely, that it is impossible that the soul could ever be or ever have been really bound. Naturally, this is closely allied to the shift away from the importance of physical karma and the concomitant rise of the idea that the pure self is something to be attained by realisation of its true ontological status. It should be stressed, however, that because of the eclectic nature of the Samayasara the direct link with the path of physical austerity is never finally broken. Thus, for instance, while gatha 71 (= JGM 76) states that: When the absolute difference between asravas (inflowing karmic matter) and the self (atman) is known by this jiva, then there is no bondage for it, the following verse (72 = JGM 77) tempers this with the statement that: Having known the impurity of asravas, their contrary nature (to the self), and that they are the causes of misery, the jiva abstains from them. In other words, the jiva that knows the true relationship between the self and paradravya does not act in an asravacausing way and so is not bound. Thus in these verses, it is implied that knowledge is still at least nominally subsidiary to conduct as the means to liberation. Nevertheless, given

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282 Harmless Souls the overall trend of thought in this text, such qualifications seem little more than a holding operation in a pass which, in principle, has already been sold. If the state of purity, of omniscience, is the eternal condition of the atman (i.e. in reality it cannot and can never have been associated with the impure, knowledgerestricting not-self), and the knowledge of this truth realises or brings it about in fact (i.e. engenders liberation), then this comes very close to saying that every individual is now and always has been a kevalin. In other words, there are the same kind of premises here which gave rise in Mahayana Buddhism to the tathagatagarbha or 'BuddhaNature' theory.11 For, in the Jain case, there is the barely concealed proposition that everyone has the Jina- or kevalin-nature (i.e. each person's atman is really omniscient), and that knowledge of this realises it ontologically. Kundakunda, of course, does not go so far as to say that samsara and nirvana are really the same thing; it is still assumed that with physical death the liberated atman is released to a nirvanic place or condition. However, the logic of this physical liberation, which was tied to the material view of the universe (and perhaps originally to the idea of a material soul), is now very vague and, significantly, no attempt is made to explicate it. Emphasis now falls upon the state of liberation rather than upon its location. (Again, the concept of liberation as a state of pure consciousness or knowledge is reminiscent of Mahayanist beliefs.) One can only speculate on the effect of such ideas on the Jaina layperson, even supposing that they were disseminated to him. But it is clear that any changes must have been largely in terms of expectation rather than practice. That is to say, if the link with physical asceticism cannot be broken without risking the identity of the community as a whole, such theoretical possibilities as that 11 On the tathagatagarbha, see, for instance, P. Williams 1989, pp. 96-115.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 283 of a 'Jina-nature' nevertheless make liberation seem closer. They are affectively satisfying. (This, of course, still leaves room for the [heretical] suspicion that practice may not be quite so important as had previously been thought, given that in reality the self is even now liberated.) And one can continue to defer realisation of the inherently liberated and omniscient self alongside an increased hope of ultimately attaining the ideal religious goal. iii) Discriminative knowledge Returning now to the concern of the ascetic or advanced layperson - i.e. the way to obtain or realise liberation in practice - it is useful to examine in more detail what is meant by discriminative knowledge. Samayasara 202 (not found in the JGM ed.) asks: How can one, not knowing the self (atman) and not knowing the non-self (anatman), not knowing the jiva and ajiva, be a rightbeliever (samyag-drsti)? In other words, one cannot even get on to the first rung of the ladder to salvation without such knowledge;12 and yet such knowledge in itself constitutes liberation. This, however, is not an impenetrably vicious circle, as becomes clear if we draw an analogy with early Buddhism's samma ditthi or 'Right Understanding'. For the Buddhist, Rahula tells us, 'Right Understanding is the understanding of things as they are ... [it] is the highest wisdom which sees the Ultimate Reality'. This understanding is, however, of two kinds: What we generally call understanding is knowledge, an accumulated memory, an intellectual grasping of a subject according to given data. This is called 'knowing accordingly (anubodha). It is not very deep. Real deep understanding is called 'penetration' (pativedha), seeing a thing in its true nature... This 12 See JPP p. 272 on samyag-drsti as the fourth gunasthana.

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284 Harmless Souls penetration is possible only when the mind is free from all impurities and is fully developed through meditation. 13 For the Jains too, partial, intellectual knowledge puts one on the ladder which leads to absolute knowledge and liberation. It is interesting to note that, with the developing stress in Jaina theory on knowledge and self-realisation as the means to liberation, there is an increasing tendency to borrow Buddhist terminology; for Buddhism clearly has a more developed and sophisticated ready-made vocabulary for describing inner discipline and experience. One example of this which is significant in the present context occurs at Samayasara 293-299. The relevant passage reads: Having clearly known the nature (svabhava) of what binds and the nature (svabhava) of the self (atman), he who has no attachment to what binds attains liberation from karma [293]. The jiva and bondage are differentiated [lit. 'cut'] by their own essential and distinctive characteristics. Cut by the knife of discriminative wisdom (panna / prajna), they fall apart [294]. [When] the jiva and bondage are differentiated by their own essential and distinctive characteristics, bondage should be cut away and the pure self grasped [295]. How is the self grasped? The self is grasped by discriminative wisdom (prajna). Just as [the self] is separated (from bondage) by prajna, so it should be grasped by prajna [296). The conscious being (cetayita) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality; whatever mental states (bhava) make up the remainder should be known to be other than mine [297]. The perceiver (dattha / drsta) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality, etc. [298] The knower (nada / jnata) to be grasped by prajna, I am that in reality, etc. [299]. 13 Rahula p. 49.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 285 Gatha 293 makes the usual distinction between the svabhava of the self and everything else, and relates liberation to non-attachment to, or separation from, the latter. This is the inescapable (i.e. ontological) separation of the jiva and what (apparently) binds it (294a), but it is prajna which is instrumental in realising that gulf between jiva and ajiva (294b). Such realisation of the pure self is liberation (295). In other words, separation of the jiva and what binds it is no longer a physical matter - i.e. it is not a matter of burning off karma through tapas and preventing further influx (asrava) through inaction - it is now an intellectual or mental concern. One realises the true nature of the self through prajna (discriminative wisdom), and that in itself releases the pure self; it enables it to attain to its true condition. The use of the term prajna here is almost certainly borrowed from Nagarjuna or from Buddhist prajnaparamita literature in general. For Nagarjuna, prajna is the means by which the higher truth (paramarthasatya) is grasped - it is 'direct, intuitive insight into reality as it is in itself.14 For Kundakunda, the reality of the self is that it is absolutely unconnected with what is not self, and prajna isolates, in the first instance, that pure self. It is the initial and crucial intellectual means of discriminating between jiva and ajiva, self and bondage. In this sense, it is synonymous with samyag-drsti (see above). But as in the Buddhist case, prajna has, according to the Samayasara, another facet. This is spelt out in gatha 296 (see above), where it is said that just as the atman is differentiated (vibhakta) from the not self or from 'bondage' by prajna, so it is also to be realised or attained (gshitavya) by prajna. In other words, there are two stages or kinds of prajna: the intellectual knowledge of the way things are in reality, and the means to the personal realisation or attainment of that reality. This seems to correspond to the early Mahayanist 14 Puligandla p. 95; see also P. Williams 1989, pp. 42-45.

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286 Harmless Souls distinction between prajna which is knowing intellectually, through deep or meditative analysis, the way things must really be, and 'paranormal experience of a meditative absorption directed towards the results of such analysis'.15 In summary, prajna is conceived of in two interlinked ways: as deep intellectual analysis, and as something less conceptual, the direct realisation or achievement of that state which has previously been isolated by analysis. The fact that for the Jains the liberated self is omniscient does not conflict with the non-conceptual or non-intellectual form of liberating prajna (prajna 'two'), for omniscience cannot be attained by a conscious attempt to expand one's normal limited knowledge. Rather it is only to be achieved by removing the obstacles to one's natural state of omniscience, i.e. by purifying the self, and especially by divesting oneself at a deep level of the delusion that the self is really in any way connected with what is not self. It is the experience of the pure self, rather than simply intellectual knowledge of it, that is liberating. In contrast to the Buddhist texts, this division between, on the one hand, the intellectual and conceptual, and, on the other, the meditative and non-conceptual, is never systematically analysed or even described by Kundakunda in the Samayasara. Nevertheless, the use of the term prajna in the passage given above (especially in gatha 296) implies precisely such a distinction. And what we saw when we considered dhyana in the Pravacanasara 16 is no less evident in the Samayasara; namely, that liberation is to be attained by meditation on the pure self. For instance, we have already seen in a different context) gatha 151, where it is said that mendicants who are absorbed in the realised self, their svabhava, attain nirvana. 17 Similarly, gathas 187-189 state that: 15 P. William's description (1989), pp. 43-44. 16 See p. 201ff., above. 17 tamhi tthida sahave munino pavamti nivvanam - Samayasara 151. For the complete verse, see p. 236, above.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 287 The self which, having restrained itself by itself with regard to both meritorious and demeritorious actions, is fixed in perception and knowledge and is free from desire for other things, which, free from all combination [i.e. free from all attachment to what is not self], meditates on the self through the self and disregards karma and nokarma - (that) sentient being reflects upon the state of oneness [18 Meditating on the self, consisting of perception and knowledge and not consisting of anything else [OR 'not thinking (manah) of anything else'), he very quickly realises the self which is completely free from all karma [189].18 In other words, it is meditation on the pure or unified self which is itself instrumental in realising or attaining that pure self. You know or identify the pure self (conceptually) and then you realise (i.e. attain it) by meditating on it. Moreover, meditation on the self comes to be seen as both the acme and index of right conduct. As two gathas only found in Jayasena's recension of the Samayasara put it: Indeed, meditation should be practised on knowledge, belief (1 perception) and conduct. But these three are the self; therefore practise meditation on the self [JGM 11). The ascetic who is constantly engaged in practising this meditation on the self attains liberation from all suffering quickly [JGM 12]. The term used for 'meditation' here is not dhyana but bhavana. In early Jaina texts bhavana is connected with the five mahavrata. It has a range of meanings, from the underlying mental disposition which leads to the right understanding of the vows, to their specific observance.19 18 On nokarma - quasi-karmic matter which makes up the jiva's bodies, etc. - see Tattvartha Sutra 2:10. 19 See Schubring paras. 45,167,171; cf. JPP p. 243, fn. 3, and TS 7:3.

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288 Harmless Souls In the present context, however, the meaning of the term is significantly closer to the standard Buddhist use of bhavana, namely, as mental development or mental culture in general and meditation in particular.20 The important point to note here is the stress on meditation on the self as the means to liberation:21 right conduct has been redefined as atmabhavana (meditation on the self), and thus internalised. (There is probably also the implication that if one meditates on the self then one's external conduct is automatically correct.) iv) Renunciation of bhava In a similar way renunciation is also internalised: stress now falls upon the renunciation of all (mental), states or bhava (with the exception, of course, of atmasvabhava). Gatha 34 (= JGM 39) reads: As (self-) knowledge renounces all (mental) states (bhava), knowing them to be other (than the self), so (self-) knowledge should be considered to be the real / definitive definition of renunciation. In other words, knowing the self, one recognises and renounces or rejects everything not self, all parabhava.22 And it is reiterated that knowledge is the svabhava of the self: The holy men, who know absolute reality, call that holy man a conqueror of delusion who, having overcome delusion, realises that the self has knowledge for its own-nature (svabhava). Seen correctly, therefore, the self, untouched by anything else, is in a natural state of renunciation. It does not have to do anything to renounce since, having no other 20 See CPD p. 36, entry on bhavana, and Rahula p.68. 21 Cf. Samayasara 151, above. 22 See Samayasara 35 (= JGM 40).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 289 states and being in contact with no other states, there is nothing to renounce. Again knowledge of one's true nature leads to attainment of that true nature; renunciation of parabhava - i.e. the realisation that they are other (para) - leads to the state of renunciation. For the delusion (moha) which is overcome is precisely that the self has anything to do with other substances. This is made clear by gathas 36 and 37 (IGM 41 and 42). The first of these states that: (When) it is realised that 'delusion has nothing whatsoever to do with me; I am one, consciousness (upayoga)', the knowers of the true definition of self (samaya) call that the state of being free from delusion. The second gatha (37) repeats this formulation with dharma etc.' (dhammadi / dharmadi) substituted for moha. In other words, the self, when truly defined, has nothing to do with the other dravya (viz. dharma, adharma, pudgala, akasa, kala, and other jiva), and to realise that is to be free from delusion.23 That the knower, the pure self, is naturally a renunciate is borne out by a further passage in the Samayasara. Gatha 210-214 read: Non-possession (aparigraha) is said to be desirelessness. The knower does not desire merit (dharma). And it is by the nonpossession of (i.e. the lack of desire for) dharma that he becomes / is a knower [210 = JGM 225]. The next three gathas [211-213 = JGM 226, 228-229] repeat this formulation, substituting demerit (adharma) [211], and food (asana) [212] and drink (pana) [213] for dharma. The passage continues: 23 At least, Amrtacandra interprets dharma here as the principle of motion, one of the five ajiva substances - see Atmakhyati on JGM 42. It could, however, simply mean 'merit'.

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290 Harmless Souls Thus the knower does not desire all these various states (bhava), for in reality his nature (bhava) is knowledge, and he is independent of everything [214 = JGM 230]. As we have already seen, both meritorious and demeritorious actions keep one in samsara. Here, the desire for the fruits of such actions has the same result. More interesting in this context, however, is the internalisation of aparigraha with regard to eating and drinking. Now it is the attitude, the lack of desire for food and water, which defines fasting. The stress has been shifted from the material fact of non-consumption, so closely tied to physical ahimsa, to the underlying state, or mental attitude. And aparigraha itself is defined as desirelessness, an attitude. Thus the indices of the religious life - physical renunciation and non-possession (aparigraha) - are, through internalisation, drawn into the equation of selfknowledge and liberation. And the condition of renunciation is no longer something to be achieved through action or inaction but, being the natural state of the self, it is therefore something to be realised. In other words, the barrier to full renunciation and thus liberation is, in effect, a delusion with regard to what is not self: the delusion that it is possible in reality to have a relationship with it. Consequently, it is not the physical objects which make up the ajiva world themselves which are to be renounced, but the attitude towards those objects. As Samayasara 210 puts it, 'a person who has no parigraha is said to be desireless' [apariggaho aniccho bhanido); and it is by this kind of non-possession or desirelessness that one is a knower, i.e. liberated.24 The concomitant of this is that it is attachment or desire, an attitude, which prevents selfknowledge and thus liberation. So according to Samayasara 20 (= JGM 214): 24 See p. 289, above.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 291 If as much as an atom of desire / attachment (raga), etc., is found in someone, he does not know the self even if he knows all the scriptures. Absence of desire (raga) is the indicator of selfknowledge because only someone who knows the self, and thus the real relation of self to not self, knows that to desire is pointless, since in reality it is impossible to possess anything at all. In fact this works both ways: desire obstructs omniscience and liberation, but (partial) knowledge leads to the abandonment of desire and thus ultimately to liberation (total knowledge). How does this treatment of desire (raga) relate to the standard kasaya doctrine as found in the Tattvartha Sutra ? According to the kasaya doctrine, it is the negative emotions or passions underlying action which cause karmic particles to adhere to and thus bind the soul. And this seems to be precisely the meaning of a simile employed by Kundakunda at Samayasara 237-241 (= JGM 255-264). There, it is said of a man with an oil-smeared body, who is performing martial exercises in a dusty place and doing damage to the surrounding foliage, that the real (niscayatah) cause of the dust sticking to his body is the oil, not his bodily activity. In the same way, a wrong believer engaged in activity, who has raga, etc., as his upayoga, is smeared by karmic dust (rajasa) [241 = JGM 259]. On the other hand, when a man performs exercises with a body which is oil-free, whatever the physical destruction he causes, no dust sticks to him. Similarly, a right-believer, even though he is engaged in various activities, is not smeared by karmic dust because of the absence of raga, etc., as his upayoga [246 = JGM 264]. Chronologically, however, this passage evidently belongs to an early layer of the Samayasara, given its emphasis on the suppression of passion rather than on jnana as the means to liberation. And considering the broader context, it becomes clear that Kundakunda's other

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292 Harmless Souls teachings have entailed significant modifications to the kasaya doctrine. At one level a temporary accommodation of the kasaya and jnana doctrines is possible: the necessity of controlling the passions is recognised but the means to achieving that control is through knowledge of the true state of the jiva - its fundamental isolation. This leads to the realisation that the desire for a relationship between the self and anything else is bound to be frustrated, and thus to the abandonment of raga, etc. This accommodation can only be temporary, however, since such a formulation itself contains the doctrinal basis of Kundakunda's second niscaya pattern - the physical isolation of the self from all matter. Thus, karma and the self being totally separate and incompatible, the idea that the self is or can be bound, even by passionate behaviour, is itself a delusion. From this perspective the kasaya doctrine is intrinsically false. This illustrates very well the fact that the diverse nature of the material collected in the Samayasara leads to an ambiguity in the meaning of some individual gathas which can only be partially resolved by examining them in their immediate context. To take a further example, gatha 247 (= JGM 265), apparently continuing the passage I have summarised above (Samayasara 237-246), reads: He who thinks 'I kill' [Jhims) and 'I am killed by other beings' is deluded and ignorant; but the knower is opposed to (i.e. knows other than) this. Taken as it stands, this seems to belong to the second niscaya pattern - i.e. the self is neither an agent nor a patient but simply a knower. In other words, in so far as they both stress the absolute isolation of individual souls, the difference between this and the Samkhya view, expressed famously in the Bhagavadgita (quoting Katha Upanisad 2:19-20), is nominal. The Bhagavadgita verse - almost certainly the formal model for Kundakunda's gatha - states that:

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 293 He who thinks that it (i.e. the purusa) kills and he who thinks that it is killed, neither of them understands; this neither kills nor is killed, 25 However, the next gatha of the Samayasara (248 = JGM 266), which immediately ties the connection between death and karma, makes it clear that there is to be no overt abandonment (i.e. transcendence) of ethics. Action is not about to lose its moral significance, and there can, of course, be no karma-transcending theological solution. In context, therefore, gatha 247 means that what one apparently does or what one has done to one is exclusively the result of one's own karma. Specifically, an individual's death is determined by the expiry of his ayus- or agedetermining karma.26 Moreover, according to Jaina doctrine a person's ayus-karma (i.e. his longevity) in this life is fixed definitively at some moment during the last third of his previous life.27 In these circumstances, the belief that you are really instrumental in killing others or that they can be really instrumental in killing you is a delusion. The moment of your death has been fixed by karma long before you were (re)born. More generally (and moving away from the difficulties posed by this quasi-fatalistic doctrine), what happens to individuals is determined solely by their own actions; each is entirely responsible for his or her own karma.28 And it is precisely the deluded belief that one can affect or be affected by others which causes one to be bound by punya 25 ya enam vetti hantaram yas cainam manyate hatam || ubhau tau na vijanito nayam hanti na hanyate || Bhagavad Gita 2:19 11 26 Samayasara 248-252 = JGM 266-270. 27 See JPP p. 126. The strong element of fatalism in this has been discussed by P.S. Jaini (1977). 28 See Samayasara 253ff. = JGM 271ff.

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294 Harmless Souls and papa karma.29 (This does not undercut the ethical imperative of ahimsa because, as we have seen, 30 it is combined with the idea that the determination (adhyavasana) to kill is enough to bind one (Samayasara 262, etc.). It does, however, make accidental himsa nonbinding.) To summarize, the distance between Jainism and Samkhya is maintained in orthodox Jaina doctrine (in Umasvati, for instance) by the connection between the self and karma. For, at some level, according to the orthodox position, there can be a real relation between the soul and karma, between self and not-self. (Such a conjunction of purusa and prakrti is, of course, an ontological impossibility for the Samkhya.) However, when that connection is abandoned as being ultimately untrue (which is the contention of Kundakunda's second niscaya pattern), then the gap between the Jaina and Samkhya positions closes. And the verses on karma we have just considered are undercut by statements such as: Thus the right-believer knows the self, whose own-nature (svabhava) is to be a knower; knowing reality (tattva), he renounces both the arising and fruition of karma. (Samayasara 200 (= JGM 212) In other words, the right-believer realises that karma and the bhavas it produces have, in reality, nothing to do with his self, so he rejects them. Then, he is instructed: Having given up the impermanent substances (dravya) and modes of thought (bhava) in the self, grasp this, your eternal, permanent, single bhava, realizable through / as your own-nature (svabhava). (Samayasara 203 (= JGM 219])31 29 Samayasara 259-261 = JGM 277-279. 30 See p. 272ff., above. 31 Cf. 297-299 = JGM 325-327, quoted p. 284, above.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 295 Negatively, therefore, renunciation is the rejection of delusion and wrong attitude (i.e. of alien bhavas); positively, it is the realisation of the true nature of self, of svabhava. Once again, if all the doctrinal elements examined above are directly juxtaposed (i.e. if they are viewed synchronically rather than diachronically) then they are clearly incompatible. The self is not an actor; it is karma which is the real agent. But in reality karma does not and cannot have any effect on the self; therefore, not only is any action by the self a delusion but so too is bondage. That is what one must realise in order to attain liberation. Clearly this threatens both the ethical basis of Jainism and the ascetic practice of physical ahimsa derived from it. In conclusion, therefore, I shall examine the Samayasara's final verses, which attempt to deal with this question of the significance of ascetic and lay practice. 9.2 Linga, practice and the path to liberation The Samayasara concludes with the following eight gathas: The deluded, having assumed the characteristic marks of ascetics (pasamdiya) or householders, which are of many kinds, say: 'This characteristic mark is the path to liberation'. (408) A characteristic mark is certainly not the path to liberation; in that the Arhats who are indifferent to the body, having given up distinguishing characteristics, devote themselves to insight, knowledge and conduct. (409) The characteristic marks belonging to ascetics and householders are not this path to liberation. The Jinas say that insight, knowledge and conduct are the path to liberation. (410) Wherefore, giving up the marks adopted by householders or ascetics, draw the self onto the path to liberation, which consists of insight, knowledge and conduct. (411) Establish the self on the path to liberation, (know it,) meditate on it,

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296 Harmless Souls and always dwell there; do not dwell among other substances. (412) The essential self is not known by those who are attached to the various kinds of ascetic or householder characteristic marks. (413) Although the conventional view holds that there are two (kinds of marks) on the path to liberation, by the absolute view one does not wish for any marks on the path to liberation. (414) That conscious being who, having read this Samayaprabhrta and understood its true meaning, holds to that meaning, will attain the highest bliss. (415) In our examination of Pravacanasara 3:5 and 3:6,32 we saw that the end of rebirth, and thus the attainment of liberation, is brought about by the adoption of certain pure modes of thought and behaviour. It is these which constitute the defining characteristic (linga) of the Jain. We also noted that, although Amstacandra splits linga into two categories, the external (bahir) and the internal (antara),33 in social terms there can only really be one set of linga, the external, since an individual's internal state can only be demonstrated and evaluated through his external behaviour. With that in mind, it becomes clear that when both Amrtacandra and Jayasena, in their commentaries on this concluding passage from the Samayasara, say that the linga being referred to are simply dravyalinga, they do little to temper the radical social implications of Kundakunda's total abandonment of linga.34 The first question to be asked of the Samayasara passage quoted above is who is being referred to by the term pasamdiya [408 = JGM 438], Jaina or non-Jaina ascetics? According to Monier-Williams, pasanda is a 32 See pp. 217-222, above. 33 See p. 219. 34 Jayasena makes the distinction between bhava and dravya linga, i.e. what belongs to the self and what does not, and perhaps also with the sense of internal' and 'external' - see Tatparyavrttih on JGM 438 and 439.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 297 'heretic'; that is to say, for Hindus it is 'one who falsely assumes the characteristics of an orthodox Hindu' (i.e. a Jaina, a Buddhist, etc.). On first consideration therefore, this would seem to be a term of denigration referring to non-Jaina ascetics (or even to non-Jains in general). Gatha 411 (= JGM 441), however, uses anagara (literally, 'homeless', and so mendicant or ascetic) as a synonym for pasamdiya, and anagara is a standard term for a Jaina ascetic. This may be an example of older verses taking on new meanings in a new context, for gatha 409 (439) makes it clear that all linga are to be abandoned. In other words, the Samayasara is not simply making a distinction here between Jaina ascetics and everybody else (perhaps the original meaning of 408 [438]), but between everybody else (lay people and ascetics) and those who have attained kevala-jnana, the Arhats (see 409 [439], above). This is supported by the Atmakhyati on 414 (444) which refers to two kinds of dravyalinga, divided between Jaina ascetics and their lay followers, 35 both of which are vyavahara views and to be abandoned in favour of the linga-less niscaya view which is the ultimate truth (paramartha) (see 414 [444] and Atmakhyati). Crucially, the purpose of this passage is not primarily descriptive but injunctive: those addressed are likewise enjoined to give up all linga (i.e. attachment to linga) and thus attain liberation. But who are those addressed? Clearly, they are advanced ascetics who are being urged on by Kundakunda to arhatship, kevala-jnana and liberation. They are linked by gatha 414 (=JGM 444) with the niscaya view, i.e. the view that the self in its svabhava cannot be touched by matter and therefore cannot be bound. So even attachment to ascetic conduct is classified as the product of a vyavahara view and does not lead one to the highest religious goal. Only self-knowledge - self-realisation - can do that. 35 sramanasramanopasakabhedena dvividham dravyalingam - Atmakhyati on Samayasara 414 (444).

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298 Harmless Souls To expand on this: the essential self (samayasara) cannot be realised by those who identify with any linga whatsoever (413 = JGM 443), but it is realised by those who devote themselves to darsana, jnana and caritra, which constitute the path to liberation (409 = JGM 411). The vocabulary here is that of the orthodox definition of what comprises the moksamarga, given by Umasvati at the beginning of his Tattvartha Sutra .36 The meaning though carries a substantially different weight; for Kundakunda, as we have seen, has redefined the ratnatraya in terms of selfknowledge: in reality there are no such things as faith (insight), knowledge and conduct, there is just the pure knower. 37 So when he enjoins devotion to faith, knowledge and conduct as the means to liberation (409, etc.), it is understood that this means self-devotion, i.e. concentration and meditation on the self (412). As the Atmakhyati on Sam. 410 (= JGM 440) puts it: (Attachment to) dravyalinga is not the path to liberation because, in being dependent on the (material) body it is (attachment to) other substance (paradravya). Therefore, it is faith, knowledge and conduct which are the path to liberation, because in being 38 dependent upon the atman they are one's own substance. What appears to be a punning allusion to vihara in gatha 412 (=JGM 442) makes the internalisation clear: it is the self which is the true vihara, the real monastery, temple and sacrificial enclosure. Prakrit vihara could be either vihara or vihara (vi hr) in Sanskrit. The allusion may be intentional; Monier-Williams gives vihara as a word for a Jain monastery or temple, but the term does not seem to have been widely used by the Jains themselves at this 36 samyagdarsanajnanacaritrani moksamargah - TS 1:1 38 na 37 Samayasara 16 (=18) - see pp. 234-235, above; cf. pp. 279ff. khalu dravyalingam moksamargah sarirasritatve sati paradravyatvat | tasmad darsanajnanacaritrany eva moksamargah atmasritatve sati svadravyatvat - Atmakhyati on JGM 440.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 299 period, so perhaps the main target here is the Buddhists. The meaning, however, is clear: it is the self alone which constitutes the path to liberation; attachment to external conduct is attachment to what is alien to the self and soteriologically counter-productive. The essential question now arises: does this mean that the seeker after kevala-jnana should actually abandon the forms of Jaina ascetic life to concentrate undistractedly on the self? That would be radical indeed, going well beyond the statement of Samayasara 152-153 (quoted pp. 279-280, above) that tapas, etc., are useless without self-realisation, and taking Kundakunda's perception that ultimately only self-realisation or meditation on the self is soteriologically effective to a logical if not necessary conclusion. The key, however, seems to be that it is attachment to linga that is to be abandoned, not linga itself.39 It is reification that is to be avoided, and the promotion of form over underlying significance. In other words, the ascetic can obtain freedom from linga through internal discipline, the cultivation of an attitude, without having to make external changes. Thus, although internalisation or concentration on the self makes external practice largely irrelevant, the fact that its full logic is not developed until the ascetic is close to kevala-jnana preserves the formal structure of monastic life. This emphasis on attachment to the thing rather than the thing itself helps us to understand what, at first sight, appear to be the two most radical, not to say antinomian, gathas in the Samayasara, namely, 306 and 307 (= JGM 334 and 335): Repentance, pursuit of the good, rejection of evil etc., concentration, non-attachment to external objects, self-censure, confession of faults, purification (by expiation) - this is the eightfold pot of poison. (306) Non-repentance, non-pursuit of the good, non-rejection of evil etc., 39 See Samayasara 413 = JGM 443.

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300 Harmless Souls non-concentration, non-abstinence from attachment to external objects, non-self-censure, non-confession of faults, nonpurification - this is the pot of nectar. (307) Clearly this eightfold list (306) constitutes a description of the conduct expected of the good ascetic. Although in this form it does not correspond exactly to any formula that I can discover, each of its elements must have been part of monastic practice from an early date. 40 What then can be meant by, for instance, describing the practice of pratisarana (glossed by Jayasena as 'the turning towards qualities such as 'right belief)41 as 'the pot of poison' and its non-performance as 'the pot of nectar'? The modern commentator, J.L. Jaini,42 explains that, although all eight practices are commendable for ascetics, for one who is bent solely on the realisation of the self, they are hindrances, and therefore like poison, because they produce bondage of good karmas which keep the soul in Samsara, and stand in the way of its self-realisation.43 He then goes on to state that the practice of self-absorption 40 In my translation of this list I have followed Jayasena's Tatparyavrttih on JGM 334-335. On pratikramana as 'ritualized confession', see JPP p. 349; see also Schubring para. 159. According to the TS (9:22) pratikramana comes under prayascitta (repentance), which itself is one of the subdivisions of internal tapas. Kundakunda's Niyamasara states that meditation (jhana / dhyana) on the self constitutes the repentance of all transgressions (pratikramana). See also Niyamasara 83-91. On parihara, see Schubring para. 161, and TS 9:22, where it occurs in the technical sense of expulsion from the order; cf. Bhargava pp. 185, 189-190. On dharana, see Schubring para. 72; it is also given at TS 1:15 as one of the four divisions of sensory knowledge. On ninda, see Schubring para. 160. On pratikramana, ninda and garha, see Bhargava p.169. . 41 samyaktvadigunesu preranam - Tatparyavrtti on Samayasara 306 (= JGM 334]. 42 On Samayasara 306 (= JGM 334, and 327 in Jaini's SBJ ed.) 43 p. 174, SBJ ed.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 301 is 'to remove the perverse belief that practical conduct of saints, i.e. repentance, etc., will lead to Liberation from bondage of karmas'.44 In other words, these gathas describe an attitude to be adopted by those on the verge of pure knowledge and liberation; and they are articulated in a way which is probably designed to shock ascetics out of attachment to those elements of their religious life which they hold most dear. (In this respect these gathas are perhaps comparable in method to the koans of Ch'an Buddhism.) Moreover, the eight practices given at Samayasara 306 are connected with lapses from perfect monastic conduct: the need for them implies lack of perfection on the part of the ascetic. Similarly, when they are not needed it is because perfection has been attained. (And once again ontology and epistemology do their dance: the state of perfection, where prescribed ascetic practices are transcended, is finally achieved by non-attachment to - i.e. by transcendence of - precisely such practices.) Another modern commentator, Chakravarti, takes these gathas to be descriptive (i.e. broadly philosophical) rather than prescriptive (religious) in tenor; he sees them as representing the perspective of the already purified 'transcendental Self, beyond good and evil, for whom the question of discipline or non-discipline is quite meaningless. For Chakravarti, the term apratikramana does not imply the mere opposite of pratikramana (which would imply the removal of discipline and giving full reign to the impure emotions), rather the negative prefix (a-) 'must be taken to signify the absence of necessity to practise the discipline'.45 For the self absorbed in its own pure nature impure psychic states are brought to a stop, so it is unnecessary to practise the various kinds of discipline.46 This interpretation saves him from the potentially 44 Ibid. 45 p.190, Chakravarti's ed. of Samayasara. 46 See ibid. pp. 189-190.

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302 Harmless Souls embarrassing concession that it is possible, even necessary, to give up orthodox ascetic practices short of actual liberation. The purpose of the Samayasara, however, is religious; and both here (Samayasara 306 and 307) and in the concluding gathas (408-415) the intention is clearly to engender an attitude of total non-attachment in the listener. Indeed, in the very last verse (415) it is stressed that those who understand and hold to the true meaning will, for those very reasons, attain the highest bliss. This implied devaluation of actual ascetic practice - from the highest perspective (the second niscaya view) it too is a hindrance to liberation - obviously has the potential to threaten that conduct which is the defining basis of Jajna religion. (In soteriological matters the inessential quickly becomes the irrelevant: what is no longer essential for liberation becomes a hindrance to be abandoned.) It is little wonder, therefore, that the Samayasara was at one time considered a text 'too sacred to be read by householders'.47 Upadhye states that 'the spiritual statements from Niscaya-naya may prove socially and ethically harmful to the house-holders who are almost absolutely lacking in spiritual discipline!.48 But it is also clear that, unless tempered by other instruction, such teachings must have also posed a threat to ascetic behaviour. The full extent of that threat perhaps only becomes apparent in such Apabhramsa works as Yogindu's Paramatmaprakasa (c. 900 C.E.?), and research is clearly required in that field before the limits of Jaina orthodoxy can be accurately defined. In the works attributed to Kundakunda, and in the Samayasara in particular, a point of maximum tension is reached between soteriological theory and social necessity, between the inner state and the outer discipline, between atman and linga. But by the time of Yogindu, the connection seems to have snapped for some, and orthodoxy 47 Upadhye p. xlvii. 48 Ibid.

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 303 (i.e. external religious practice) has been largely abandoned; for others, ascetic practice retains its dominance as the emblem and preserver of Jaina identity. The significance of Kundakunda's works is that at one level they point in the direction that was to be taken by Yogindu while at another they prescribe largely conventional practices. Their eclectic nature entails internal contradictions, but it is these very contradictions which give commentators scope to temper the full (heretical) implications of the niscaya strand in Kundakunda's thought. Thus it is ensured that, in practice, the threat to Jaina conduct and social identity is circumscribed and remains latent rather than actual. 9.3 Liberation according to Kundakunda: some conclusions As we have seen, in Kundakunda's soteriological theory liberation is a matter of knowledge (jnana), of realisation of the true nature of the self through meditation. But in Digambara as in Svetambara practice it remains a matter of largely external asceticism, the maintenance of (physical) ahimsa. This is because it is external practice that distinguishes 'Jainism' as a religious tradition. Whatever the philosophical rationale for doing so, such practices cannot be abandoned without threatening the Jaina's sense of identity. Jainism's life crisis rituals, which strictly speaking are irrelevant to soteriology, are largely taken from Hindu models;49 its doctrines, if taken to their logical conclusions (as they sometimes are by Kundakunda), become so internalised and karma is so dematerialised that the dividing line between such doctrines and those, for instance, of Samkhya and Vedanta becomes attenuated to the point of non-existence (except for a few, logically arbitrary points). It becomes crucial, therefore, to retain at some level the reality of the connection between the soul 49 See JPP pp. 291-304; R. Williams 1963, pp. 274-287; Sangave pp. 243-252, 381.

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304 Harmless Souls and physical karman, and so keep tapas as the primary means to liberation, otherwise the link with tradition is broken and the monk's discipline pointless. It is the logicians or scholastics, obliged to express themselves in broadly philosophical terms, who are confronted by the full force of this problem.50 Jaina doctrines and ascetic practices were originally formulated in the context of physicalist or materialist ideas, probably including the notion of a material or quasimaterial soul. Later, the soul is conceived of as fundamentally immaterial, but the means of bondage (karman) remains unambiguously material. The logical tensions which arise from this juxtaposition of the material and the non- material are stripped bare at times of dispute and philosophical 'system-building'. The scholastics have to retain the tradition, embodied in the practices of the ascetic, and at the same time provide a justification or doctrinal rationale for such behaviour. They also have to deal with the accumulated and accumulating rationalisation and internalisation of doctrine, derived ultimately from the contradiction between the material and immaterial at the heart of that teaching. Such a contradiction invites extreme solutions. But given prevailing Indian beliefs about the nature of the soul, and the inherent tendency of doctrines to become more rather than less sophisticated to move from ethics to metaphysics a return to the idea of a material soul was unlikely. In addition, there were other, perhaps more important reasons why the movement should have been towards greater and greater internalisation, since, at - 50 By logicians or scholastics I mean fifth century (?) writers such as Siddhasena and Samantabhadra (see JPP p. 83ff.) and those who followed them. For a list of such writers and summaries of their main works through to the seventeenth century, see Dixit 1971, pp. 88-164. Dixit characterises this period as the 'Age of Logic'. Undoubtedly, some of the works attributed to Kundakunda were at least compiled in this period (Dixit includes him in his list), but in terms of content they are far less orthodox, as Dixit himself points out when he refers to the Samayasara (see pp. 93-94, 132-135).

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 305 least on the surface, this strategy provides the 'easier' or graded route to liberation, and, as we have seen, lowers the soteriological ladder into the territory of the laity. However, as has been made clear, to take this process to its logical conclusion threatens to disintegrate the tradition, and with it 'Jaina' identity. The scholastics, therefore, have to maintain the tension without falling into either camp (the real danger, of course, being from the kind of total internalisation, with its attendant 'dematerialisation of karman, which Kundakunda approaches in parts of the Samayasara). Given this, I would suggest that a major reason for the peculiar content and form of what is technically considered to be 'Jaina philosophy' - syadvada, anekantavada, and the (orthodox) naya doctrine - is precisely the need to retain a raison d' etre for the ascetic practices which constitute Jaina identity in the face of a progressive tendency to rationalise and internalise doctrinal formulations. In the works ascribed to Kundakunda, however, internalisation threatens at times to break the controls imposed by Jaina philosophy. If the 'orthodox' naya doctrine allows neo-Vedantic teachings to be propagated (at one level) without precipitating a collapse into the vacuum created by the implications of a non-material soul doctrine, Kundakunda's heterodox reading of the niscaya-vyavahara distinction in the Samayasara) removes that philosophic restraint. By doing so it provides a glimpse of the full, 'heretical' implications for Jaina practice and doctrine of radical internalisation deriving from the conviction that the soul really has no connection with matter whatsoever. For the predominant view in Kundakunda is that what counts soteriologically is what happens internally, in consciousness. Instrumental in this are upayoga (in the Pravacanasara) and bhava (in the Samayasara); stress thus falls on meditation (dhyana) leading to realisation (jnana) of the self's total separation from matter - indeed, the pure self is defined in both the Pravacanasara and the Samayasara as (such) knowledge - rather than on the

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306 Harmless Souls practice of tapas. Consequently, caritra comes to be seen in terms of 'attitude' rather than physical action / inaction. For ascetics, himsa is redefined as harm caused (internally) to the self through neglect of or offence against the monastic rules. This is significant for two paradoxical, although ultimately complementary reasons. On the one hand, it permits the 'formalisation' or 'ritualisation of the monks' conduct: that is to say, it is now fulfilment of the role, not behaviour as such, that counts, for by following the prescribed rules the desired end will inevitably be achieved. On the other hand, it opens the way for intention to become the the chief instrument of bondage and liberation. To put it differently, himsa is only himsa if it is intended; but, by definition, as long as one's behaviour accords with the rules laid down for ascetics then himsa cannot be intended. Therefore, as the texts remark, there can be no himsa for proper ascetics regardless of the harm done to living creatures. When this formulation is combined with Kundakunda's upayoga doctrine - and to some extent the former clears the way for the latter - then, from that internalised perspective, it becomes clear that it is impure consciousness which leads to wrong intention and thus ultimately to violation of the ascetic rules. There can be no violation by accident; transgression has to be preceded by intention, and thus by impure consciousness. So asuddhopayoga is at the root of all himsa, and all himsa is himsa to one's self. Seen from this perspective, external, physical behaviour in the world is essentially irrelevant to soteriology: bondage and liberation begin and end with consciousness, external conduct is merely the outward sign of an inner state. Thus on the one hand there is the belief that simply by following the external rules to the letter one will achieve the religious goal, and on the other there is the belief that the only soteriologically significant behaviour is that which brings about inner purity. But by asserting that if the monk is following his rules exactly then ipso facto he must be internally pure, one brings about a meeting or balance

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 307 between the extremes of total internalisation and total externalisation; one becomes a reflex of the other, and depending upon which component is given causal preference or emphasised, the external or the internal, a different view is obtained of the institution of renunciation. We may call these views the 'social' and the 'personal'; the former is to do with questions of Jaina identity (for the Jains themselves, and therefore necessarily vis a vis the wider community), the latter is a question of personal soteriology for individuals (sramanas and advanced laity). In Kundakunda and his commentators, when the question is raised of why one should go on with physical asceticism when everything of soteriological significance is internal, a matter of realisation, the reply is that one should continue to behave in the prescribed ways because they provide an outward sign of inner purity. Philosophically this is less than compelling, but it is a line of argument with an underlying social imperative; for, as we have seen, what distinguishes Jainism as a religious tradition is the behaviour of its ascetics. So to behave in such a way is not merely the external sign of an ideal Jaina religious, it is actually to embody and perpetuate the unique socioreligious identity of the Jaina community. From the point of view of the laity, therefore, the function of the ascetic is to provide them with a symbol or emblem of their own tradition, one which it is essential to preserve. And this is probably the underlying motivation for the laity's diligence in ensuring that the sramanas perform their ascetic practices to the letter.51 (The ascetic also, of course, provides the laity with a constant reminder of the soteriological ideal towards which they may more or less urgently aspire.) This is the 'social' view of renunciation which I have connected with external ascetic behaviour. The 'personal' view I see as being concerned with internal transformation and gnosis, as exemplified in the teachings of Kundakunda, 51 See JPP P. 208.

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308 Harmless Souls i.e. with soteriology. These two views do not necessarily coincide with the further distinction between the views of the laity and those of the sramanas themselves. It is clear that both originally and throughout most of Jaina history the soteriological emphasis for ascetics and advanced lay followers falls upon external practice. Thus internal practices may be taken on as extra vrata, or because the correct internal attitude is required before external practice is effective, but they do not replace external tapas. One may surmise that for the majority of ascetics the practical implication of the internalisation of doctrine - viz. liberation through self-realisation - itself remained an ideal, to be achieved or even attempted only by the most advanced sramanas. Most hoped to approach liberation and attain at least a better rebirth by following the rules for ascetics to the letter (from the 'social' view their proper role), a formidably difficult undertaking even in its ritualised form. There are indications in the texts that this process of ritualisation started at a relatively early date.52 From one perspective this may be seen as a quest for greater autonomy on the part of the renouncers, the need for their soteriological progress to be in their own hands and less subject to the fortuitous and accidental. The drive towards greater and greater control over the process of one's own liberation is probably also one of the contributory reasons for a progressive internalisation of practice. Furthermore, it may be remarked that through 'ritualising' external behaviour the way is cleared for a greater concentration on obtaining inner purity. For simply by following the rules the monk's external considerations are taken care of; he does not have to 'think about his behaviour, and so his consciousness can be engaged elsewhere, in the realisation 52 E.g. in Viyahapannatti, Sarvarthasiddhi and in Book 3 of the Pravacanasara, parts of which are probably derived from older material

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Kundakunda: The Samayasara 309 of his own inner nature or self. And it may be that the doctrines expounded by Kundakunda were in part intended as an antidote to excessive 'ritualisation', a reformation through radical internalisation, emphasising that it is not the external form that counts but the internal transformation of consciousness. Such a reading is borne out by the fact that this teaching was aimed specifically at sramanas, i.e. at those who had to some extent already mastered the external forms. We can see from the above that, although doctrines such as Kundakunda's undercut external asceticism at a theoretical level to the extent that the rationale for such asceticism becomes slender, there are overriding social reasons which ensure the retention of traditional practice. For it is the practice of ascetics which carries the tradition and which provides the Jainas with their socio-religious identity. With the acknowledged loss of most of their original canon, such ascetic practice is thus a particularly important vehicle for the Digambaras. Consequently, although Kundakunda is acknowledged and revered as being virtually the initiator or compiler of their 'new' scriptural and doctrinal tradition, the implications of his less orthodox teachings are not permitted to destabilise or threaten established ascetic practice; for the tradition that provides the Digambaras with their identity is already in place, embodied in that same ascetic practice, in the behaviour and monastic rules of the sramanas themselves. So while suddhopayoga or the pure self may become the inner emblem or ideal of the aspiring ascetic, it does not replace or negate the outer emblem of ascetic practice. The new philosophical and doctrinal reasons for this retention may be weak but the social or communal reasons are stronger. In addition, it should be remembered that the spiritually advanced laity also undertake numerous ascetic practices, so they too carry the tradition. Thus although internalisation of doctrine gives them a foothold on the soteriological ladder, the actual ascent requires external

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310 Harmless Souls practice, with the full 'logic' of internalisation coming to the fore only for those to whom external ascetic practice is already second nature. To put it another way, it may be the case that external practice itself represents the path to inner purity for the laity and less advanced ascetics, while for the ideal ascetic it is merely the outer sign of an already achieved inner state. In this fashion the recurrent ambiguity of ritual is demonstrated, for the question of whether it is instrumental or expressive is not answered: it is simply ambiguous.

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Table samrambha (impulsion / determination to do violence) can be done by the 3 yogas speech activity samarambha (collecting means / preparation to do violence) can be done by the 3 yogas arambha (actually undertaking violence / commencement of violence) bodily activity can be done by the 3 yogas mind activity oneself can be done by one's agent can be done by ibid ETC. others with one's approval can be done by ibid krodha (anger) mana (pride) due to maya (deceitfulness) lobha (greed) due to ibid due to ibid [= 108 ways in which a jiva is counted as the adhikarana of asrava - i.e. 108 ways in which the jiva can cause injury]

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Appendix 1 Niyamasara 18 katta bhotta ada poggalakammassa hodi vavaharo | kammajabhavenada katta bhotta du nicchayado || 103 jam kimci me duccarittam savvam tivihena vosare | samaiyam tu tiviham karemi savvam nirayaram || 104 sammam me savvabhudesu veram majjham na kenavi| asae vosarittanam samahi pativajjae || 133 jo du dhammam ca sukkam ca jhanam jhaedi niccasa|| tassa samaigam thai idi kevalisasane || 159 (SBJ 158) janadi passadi savvam vavaharanaena kevali bhagavam | kevalanani janadi passadi niyamena appanam ||

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Appendix 2 Pancastikaya 115 sammattam saddahanam bhavanam tesim adhigamo nanam || carittam samabhavo visayesu virudhamagganam II 147 (SBJ 154) jam suhamasuham udinnam bhavam ratto karedi jadi appa || so tena havadi bamdho poggalakammena vivihena || 148 (SBJ 155) joganimittam gahanam jogo manavayanakayasambhudo. bhavanipitto bamdho bhavo radiragadosamohajudo || 162 jivo sahavaniyado aniyadagunapajjao dha parasamao jadi kunadi sagam samayam pabbhassadi kammabamdhado ||

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Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 1:7 carittam khalu dhammo dhammo jo so samo tti niddittho | mohakkhohavihino parinamo appano hu samo || 1:9 jivo parinamadi jada suhena asuhena va suho asuho || suddhena tada suddho havadi hi parinamasabbhavo || 1:11 dhammena parinadappa appa jadi suddhasampayogajudo | pavadi nivvanasuham suhovajutto va saggasuham || 1:23 ada nanapamanam nanam neyappamanam uddittham neyam loyaloyam tamha nanam tu savvagayam || 1:26 savvagado jinavasaho savve vi ya taggaya jagadi attha| nanamayado ya jino visayado tassa te bhaniya ||| 1:27 nanam appa tti madam vattadi nanam vina na appanam | tamha nanam appa appa nanam va annam va || 1:29 na pavittho navisho nani neyesu ruvam iva cakkhu| janadi passadi niyadam akkhatido jagam asesam || Upadhye takes na pavittho navittho as Sanskrit. na pravistah na avistah, as against the commentators who take na avistah (na apravistah) - see his fn. 2, p. 4.

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Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 315 1:30 rayanam iha imdanilam duddhajjhasiyam jaha sabhasae | abhibhuya tampi duddham vattadi taha nanam atthesu || 1:32 genhadi neva na mumcadi na param parinamadi kevali bhagavam | pecchadi samamtado so janadi savvam niravasesam || 1:35 jo janadi so nanam na havadi nanena janago ada | nanam parinamadi sayam attha nanatthiya savve || 1:43 udayagada kammamsa jinavaravasahehim niyadina bhaniya || tesu vimudho ratto duttho va bamdham anubhavadi || 1:46 jadi so suho va asuho na havadi ada sayam sahavena | samsaro vi na vijjadi savvesim jivakayanam || 1:52 na vi parinamadi na genhadi uppajjadi neva tesu asthesu | janannavi te ada abamdhago tena pannatto || 1:69 devadajadigurupajasu ceva danammi va susilesu | uvayasadisu ratto suhovaogappago appa || 1:72 naranarayatiriyasura bhajamti jadi dehasambhavam dukkham | kiha so suho va asuho uvaogo havadi jivanam || 1:77 na hi mannadi jo evam natthi viseso tti punnapavanam|| himdadi ghoram aparam samsaram mohasamchaano ||

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316 Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 1:78 1:85 2:29 2:30 2:58 2:59 2:63 2:64 evam vididattho jo davvesu na ragam edi dosam va uvaogavisuddho so khavedi dehubbhavam dukkham || 2:65 atthe ajadhagahanam karunabhavo ya manuvatiriesu | visaesu a ppasamgo mohassedani limgani || ada kammamalimaso parinamam lahadi kammasamjuttam tatto silisadi kammam tamha kammam tu parinamo || parinamo sayam ada sa puna kiriya tti hodi jivamaya | kiriya kamma tti mada tamha kammassa na du katta || ada kammamalimaso dharedi pane puno puno anne na cayadi java mamattam dehapadhanesu visayesu || jo imdiyadi vijai bhaviya uvaogam appagam jhadi | kammehim so na ramjadi kiha tam pana anucaramti || appa uvaogappa uvaogo nanadamsanam bhanido | so vi suho asuho va uvaogo appano havadi || uvaogo jadi hi suho punnam jivassa samcayam jadi | asuho va tadha pavam tesim abhave na cayam atthi || tadha (line 2) emended to tadha jo janadi jinimde pecchadi siddhe taheva anagare | jivesu sanukampo uvaogo so suho tassa ||

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Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 317 2:67 asuhovaogarahido suhovajutto na annadaviyamhi hojjam majjhattho 'ham nanappagam appagam jhae || 2:68 naham deho na mano na ceva vani na karanam tesimi katta na na karayida anumamta neva kattinam || 2:80 arasam aruvam agamdham avvattam cedanagunam asaddam | jana alimgaggahanam jivam aaidditthasamthanam ||| 2:81 mutto ruvadiguno bajjhadi phasehim annamannehim tavvivarido appa bajjhadi kidha poggalam kammam || 2:83 uvaogamao jivo mujjhadi rajjedi va padussedi | pappa vividhe visaye jo hi puno tehim sambamdho || 2:86 sapadeso so appa tesu padesesu puggala kaya|| pavisamti jahajoggam citthamti hi jamti bajjhasti || 2:87 ratto bamdhadi kammam muccadi kammehim ragarahidappa|| eso bamdhasamaso jivanam jana Nicchayado || 2:88 parinamado bandho parinamo ragadosamohajudo asuho mohapadoso suho va asuho havadi rago || 2:89 suhaparinamo punnam asuho pava tti bhaniyam aanesu | parinamo nannagado dukkhakkhayakaranam samaye ||

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318 Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 2:90 bhaaida pudhavippamuha jivanikayadha havara ya tasa|| anna te jivado jivo vi ya tehimdo aano || 2:91 jo navi janadi evam paramappanam sahavam asejja kiradi ajjhavasanam aham mamedam ti mohado || 2:92 kuvvam sabhavam ada havadi hi katta sagassa bhavassa | poggaladavvamayanam na du katta savvabhavanam ||| 2:93 genhadi neva na mumcadi karedi na hi poggalani kammani | jivo puggalamajjhe vattann avi savvakalesu ||| 2:97 eso bamdhasamaso jivanam nicchayena siddittho 1 arahamtehim jadinam vavaharo annaha bhanido || 2:98 na cayadi jo du mamattim aham mamedam ti dehadavinesu | so samannam catta palivanno hodi ummaggam || 2:99 naham homi paresim na me pare santi nanam aham ekko idi jo jhayadi jhane so appanam havadi jhada || 2:101 deha va davina va suhadukkha vadha sattumittajana| jivassa na samti dhuva dhuvovaogappago appa || 2:102 jo evam janitta jhadi param appagam visuddhappa || sagaro 'nagaro khavedi so mohaduggamthim ||

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Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 319 2:104 jo khavidamohakaluso visayaviratto mano nirumbhitta | samavasthido sahave so appanam havadi jhada || 2:108 tamha taha janitta appanam janagam sabhavena | parivajjami mamattim uvatthido nimmamattammi || 3:5 jadhajadaruvajadam uppadidakesamamsugam suddham | rahidam himsadido appalikammam havadi limgam || 3:6 muccharambhavimukkam juttam uvajogajogasuddhihim limgam na paravekkham apunabbhavakaranam jenham || 3:16 apayatta va cariya sayanasanathanacamkamadisu | samanassa savvakale himsa sa samtattiya tti mada || 3:17 maradu va jiyadu va jivo ayadacarassa nicchida himsa | payadassa natthi bamdho himsamettena samidassa il All editions have jiyadu, although the chaya gives jivatu. 3:17b uccaliyamhi pae iriyasamidassa niggamatthae | abadhejja kulimgam marijja tam jogam asejja || 3:17c na hi tassa tannimitto bamdho suhumo ya desido samaye | muccha pariggaho cciya ajjhappapamanado dittho ljummamil 3:18 ayadacaro samano chassu vi kayesu vadhakaro tti mado caradi jadam jadi niccam kamalam va jale niruvalevo ||

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Appendix 3 Pravacanasara 320 3:19 havadi va na havadi bamdho madamhi jive 'dha kayacetthamhi bamdho dhuvam uvadhido idi samana chaddiya savvam || 3:20 na hi niravekkho cago na havadi bhikkhussa asayavisuddhi| avisuddhassa ya citte kaham nu kammakkhao vihio || 3:20c vatthakkhamdam duddiyabhayanam annam ca genhadi niyadam | vijjadi panarambho vikkhevo tassa cittammi:|| 3:27 jassa anesanam appa tam pi tayo tappadicchaga samana | annam bhikkham anesanam adha te samana anahara || 3:45 samana suddhuvajutta suhovajutta ya homti samayamhi | tesu vi suddhuvajutta anasava sasava sesa || 3:54 esa pasatthabhuda samananam va puno gharatthanam | cariya paretti bhanida taeva param lahadi sokkham || 3:74 suddhassa ya samannam bhaniyam suddhassa damsanam nanam | suddhassa ya nivvanam so cciya siddho namo tassa ||

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Appendix 4 Samayasara Text compiled from Chakravarti's and JGM editions, following Chakravarti's numbering system unless otherwise stated. The bracketed numerals refer to the Sanatana Jaina Grantha Mala (JGM) and, in one instance, the Sacred Books of the Jainas (SBJ) equivalents. 2 (2) jivo carittadamsanananatthido tam hi sasamayam jana poggalakammuvadesatthidam ca tam jana parasamayam || 3 (3) eyattanicchayagado samao savvattha sundaro loge 1 bamdhakaha eyatte tena visamvadini hodi || vavaharenuvadissadi nanissa carittadamsanam nanam | navi nanam na carittam na damsanam janago suddho || 8 (8) jaha navi sakkam anajjo anajjabhasam vina u gahedum | taha vavaharena vina paramatthuvadesanam asakkam || 11 (13) vavaharo 'bhudattho bhudattho desido du suddhanao | bhudattham assido khalu samadithi havadi jivo || 11 (JGM only) nanamhi bhavana khalu kadavva damsane caritte ya| te puna tinni vi ada tamha kuna bhavanam ade 11 12 (14) suddho suddhadeso nadavvo paramabhavadarisihim| vavaharadesido puna je du aparame thida bhave ||

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322 Appendix 4 Samayasara 12 (JGM only) jo adabhavanam inam niccuvajutto muni samacaradi | so savvadukkhamokkham pavadi acirena kalena || 14 (16) jo passadi appanam abaddhaputtham anannayam niyadam| avisesam asamjuttam tam suddhanayam viyanihi || 16 (19) damsanananacarittani sevidavvani sahuna niccam| tani puna jana tinni vi appanam ceva nicchayado || 19 (22) kamme nokammamhi ya aham idi ahayam ca kamma nokammam ja esa khalu buddhi appadibuddho havadi tava || 24 (JGM only) jam kunadi bhavam ada katta so hodi tassa bhavassa || nicchayado vavahara poggalakammana kattaram || 32 (37) jo moham tu jinitta nanasahavadhiyam* munadi adam | tam jidamoham sahum paramasthaviyanaya vimti || *All editions give adhiyam, which looks doubtful. 34 (39) nanam savve bhave paccakkhadi ya pare tti naduna | tamha paccakkhanam nanam niyama munedavvam || 36 (41) natthi mama ko vi moho bujjhadi uvaoga eva aham ekko tam mohanimmamattam samayassa viyanaya vinti || 38 (43) aham ekko khalu suddho damsanananamaio sadaruvi | navi atthi majjha kimcivi annam paramanumittam pi || www.jaintelibrary.org

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Appendix 4 Samayasara 323 46 (51) vavaharassa darisanam uvadeso vannido jinavarehim | jiva* ede savve ajjhavasanadao bhava ||| * Although the texts print jiva, nominative, this makes no real sense and should, I suggest, be emended to jive. 71 (76) jaiya imena jivena appano asavana ya taheval. nadam hodi visesamtaram tu taiya na bamdho se || 72 (77) naduna asavanam asucittam ca vivariyabhavam ca dukkhassa karanam ti ya tado niyattim kunadi jivo || 83 (89) nicchayanayassa evam ada appanam eva hi karedi | vedayadi puno tam ceva jana atta du attanam| - 84 (90) vavaharassa du ada poggalakammam karedi aneyaviham | tam ceva ya vedayade poggalakammam aneyaviham || 85 (91) jadi poggalakammam inam kuvvadi tam ceva vedayadi ada | dokiriyavadittam pasajadi so jinavamadam || 86 (92) jamha du attabhavam poggalabhavam ca do vi kuvvati | tena du micchaditthi dokiriyavadino honti || 92 (99) param appanam kuvvadi appanam pi ya param karamto so annanamao jivo kammanam karago hodi || 93 (100) param appanam akuvvi appanam pi ya param akuvvamto so nanamao jivo kammanam akarago hodi ||

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324 Appendix 4 Samayasara 127 (137) annanamao bhavo ananino kunadi tena kammani| nanamao nanissa du na kunadi tamha du kammani || 141 (151) jive kammam baddham puttham cedi vavaharanayabhanidam | suddhanayassa du jive abaddhaputtham havai kammam || 142 (152) kammam baddham abaddham jive edam tu jana nayapakkham pakkhatikkamto puna bhannadi jo so samayasaro || 143 (153) donha vi nayana bhaaidam janai navarim tu samayapalibaddho | na du nayapakkham ginhadi kimci vi nayapakkhaparihino* || *Sheth gives parihina. 144 (154) sammaddamsanananam eso (= edam JGM] lahadi tti navari vavadesam | savvanayapakkharahido bhaaido jo so samayasaro || 151 (161) paramattho khalu samao suddho jo kevali muni nani | tamhi thida sahave munino pavamti nivvanam 152 (162) paramasthammi ya athido jo kunadi tavam vadam ca dharayadi tam savvam balatavam balavadam vinti savvahnu* || Savvahnu looks odd. Pischel, para. 105, gives savvannu for sarvajna. He also gives an instance of savvanhu, which should perhaps be the form here.

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Appendix 4 Samayasara 325 153 (163) vadasiyamani dharamta silani taha tavam ca kuvvamta | paramatthabahira jena tena te homti annani || 156 (166) mottuna niccayattham vavahare na vidusa pavatthamti | paramatham assidanam du jadina kammakkhao vihio || JGM 166 prints hodi for vihio. I have printed pavatthamti as this is the version given in all editions and commentaries, although there seems to be no linguistic explanation for the presence of the aspirate. 183 (176) edam tu avivaridam nanam jaiya du hodi jivassa taiya na kimci kuvvadi bhavam uvaogasuddhappa || 185 (178) evam janadi nani annani munadi ragam evadam| annanatamocchanno adasahavam ayanamto ||. 186 (179) suddham tu viyanamto suddham evappayam lahadi jivo! janamto du asuddham asuddham evappayam lahadi || 187 (180) appanam appano rumbhiduna dosu pun apavajogesu damsanananamhi tthido icchavirado ya asnamhi || 188 (181) jo savvasamgamukko jhayadi appanam appano appa || navi kammam nokammam ceda cistedi eyattam || 189 (182) appanam jhayamto damsanananamao anannamao || lahadi acirena appanam eva so kammanimmukkam ||

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326 Appendix 4 Samayasara 198 (213) udayavivago viviho kammanam vannido jinavarehim | na du te majjha sahava janagabhavo du aham ekko || 200 (212) evam sammaitthi appanam munadi janagasahavam | udayam kammavivagam ca muadi taccam viyanamto || 201 (214) paramanumittiyam pi hu ragadinam tu vijjade jassa | navi so janadi appanayam tu savvagamadharo vi || 202 (-) appanam ayanamto anappayam ceva so ayanamto kaha hodi sammadithi jivajive ayanamto | 203 (219) adamhi davvabhave athire mottuna ginha tava niyadam | thiram ekam imam bhavam uvalabbhamtam sahavena || 204 (223) abhinisudohimanakevalam ca tam hodi ekkam eva padam | so eso paramattho jam lahidum nivvudim jadi || 205 (224) nanagunehim vihina edam tu padam bahu vi na lahamti|| tam ginha supadam edam jadi icchasi kammaparimokkham || 210 (225) apariggaho aniccho bhanido nani ya nicchade dhammam apariggaho du dhammassa janago tena so hodi || 211 (226) as 210, except adhamma is substituted for dhamma 212 (228) as 210, except asana is substituted for dhamma

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213 (229) as 210, except pana is substituted for dhamma 214 (230) evamadu* edu vivihe savve bhave ya nicchade nani | janagabhavo niyado niralambo du** savvattha || Jayasena has* ivvadu and ** ya 247 (265) jo mannadi himsami ya himsijjami ya parehim sattehim | so mudho annani nani etto du vivarido || 262 (280) ajjhavasidena bandho satte mareu ma va mareu | eso bandhasamaso jivanam nicchayanayassa || 263 (281) Appendix 4 Samayasara 327 evam aliye adatte abramhacere pariggahe ceva | kirai ajjhavasanam jam tena du bajjhae pavam || 264 (282) tahavi ya sacce datte bambhe aparigahattane ceva | kirai ajjhavasanam jam tena du bajjhae punnam || 265 (283) vatthum paducca jam puna ajjhavasanam tu hodi jivanam | na ya vatthudo du bamdho ajjhavasanena bamdho tti|| 270 (294) edani natthi jesim ajjhavasanani evam adini | te asuhena suhena va kammena muni na lippanti || 271 (295) buddhi vavasao vi ya ajjhavasanam madi ya vinnanam | eyattam eva savvam cittam bhavo ya parinamo ||

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328 Appendix 4 Samayasara 272 (296) evam vavaharanao paaisiddho jana Nicchayanayena | nicchayanayassida puna munino* pavanti nivvanam || *JGM has the alternative reading: nicchayanayasallina munino 293 (321) bandhanam ca sahavam viyanio* appano sahavam ca bamdhesu jo virajjadi** so kammavimokkanam kunai || JGM has *viyanidum and **jo na rajjadi 294 (322) jivo bamdho ya tahachijjamti salakkhanehim niyaehim | pannachedanaena u chinna nanattam avanna || 295 (323) jivo bamdho ya taha chijjamti salakkhanehim niyaehim | bamdho cheyayavvo suddho appa ya ghittavvo 11 296 (324) kaha so ghippai appa pannae so u ghippae appa | jaha pannae yibhatto taha panna eva ghittavvo || 297 (325) pannae ghittavvo jo ceda so aham tu nicchayado | avasesa je bhava te majjha pare tti nayavva || 298 (326) pannae ghittavvo jo dattha so aham ... ibid. || 299 (327) pannae ghittavvo jo nada so aham ... ibid. || 300 (328) ko nama bhanijja buho naum savve paroyaye bhave majjham inam ti ya vayanam janamto appayam suddham ||

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Appendix 4 Samayasara 329 306 (334) padikamanam padisaranam pariharo dharana niyatti ya| ninda garuha sohi atthaviho hoi visakumbho || 307 (335) apalikkamanam apadisaranam apariharo adharana ceva aniyatti ya aninda agaruha 'sohi amayakumbho || 324 (-) vavaharabhasiena u paradavvam mama bhanamti vidiyattha || janamti nicchayena u na ya mama paramanumettam avi kimci || 325 (-) jaha kovi naro jampai amha gamavisayanayararatham | na ya honti tassa tani u bhanai ya mohena so appa || 326 (-) em eva micchaditthi nani nissamsayam havai eso jo paradavvam mama idi janamto appayam kunai || 345 (357) kehi ci du pajjayehim vinassae neva kehi ci du jivo jamha tamha kuvvai so va anno va neyamto || 346 (358) kehi ci du pajjayehim vinassae neva kehi ci du jivo jamha tamha vedadi so va anno va neyamto || 347 (359) jo ceva kunai so ceva vedako jassa esa siddhamto so jivo nayavvo micchadithi anarihado || 348 (360) anno karei anno paribhumjai jassa esa siddhamto | so jivo nayavvo micchaditthi anarihado ||

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330 Appendix 4 Samayasara 356 (385 SBJ): jaha setiya du na parassa setiya setiya ya sa hoi|| taha janao du na parassa janao janao so du || 390 (420) sattham nanam na havai jamha sattham na yanae kimci | tamha annam nanam annam sattham jina vinti || 403 (433) jamha janai niccam tamha jivo du janao nani| nanam ca janayado avvadirittam muneyavvam || 404 (434) nanam sammadithi du samjamam suttam amgapuvvagayam! dhammadhammam ca taha pavvajjam abbhuvamti buha || 408 (438) pasamdiyalimgani va* gihalimgani va bahuppayarani | ghittum vadamti mudha limgam inam mokkhanaaggo tti || *JGM ed. has pakhamdiya - see Pischel para. 265: pakhamdi is the erroneous writing of kha for sa. 409 (439) na du hoi mokkhamaggo limgam jam dehanimmama ariha limgam mucittu damsanananacarittani sevamti || 410 (440) navi esa mokkhamaggo pasamdigihamayani limgani | damsanananacarittani mokkhamaggam jina vinti || 411 (441) jamha jahittu linge sagaranagaraehim va gahie damsanananacaritte appanam jumja mokkhapahe || 412 (442) mokkhapahe appanam thavehi tam ceva jhahi tam ceva* | tattheva vihara niccam ma viharasu annadavvesu ||

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Appendix 4 Samayasara 331 * JGM ed. reads: thavehi vedayadi jhayahi ceva, which is preferable. 413 (443) pasamoilimgesu va gihalimgesu va bahuppayaresu | kuvvamti je mamattam tehim na nayam samayasaram || 414 (444) vavahario puna nao donni vi limgani bhanai mokkhapahe | oicchayanao na icchai* mokkhapahe savvalimgani || * JGM ed. reads: niccayanao du nicchadi 415 (445) jo samayapahudam inam pathiuna atthataccao naum* | atthe thahidi ceya so hohi** uttamam sokkham || * JGM ed. reads: pathidunaya acchataccado nadum and **pavadi, which must be right

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Apabhramsa Yogindu Pali Bibliography Primary Sources and Translations Dhammapada Majjhima-nikaya Samyutta-nikaya Suttanipata Vinaya-pitaka Visuddhimagga Prakrit Ayaramga Sutta Paramatmaprakasa and Yogasara, ed. A.N. Upadhye, Bombay, 1937. S. Radhakrishnan (ed. and tr.), Oxford, 1950. Pali Text Society edition, London. Pali Text Society edition, London. - trans. V. Fausboll [Sacred Books of the East, Vol. X, Pt. 1] Oxford, 1881. Pali Text Society edition, London. Pali Text Society edition, London. - Suttavibhanga tr. I.B. Horner in The Book of the Discipline (VinayaPitaka), Vol. I [Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. X] London, 1938. Pali Text Society edition, London. in Puppha Bhikkhu (ed.), Suttagame I, Gurgaon, 1953, pp. 1-99. H. Jacobi (ed.), The Ayaramga Sutta of the Svetambara Jains, London [Pali Text Society], 1882. tr. with an intro. by H. Jacobi as 'The Acaranga Sutra', in Jaina Sutras Pt. I, [Sacred Books of the East, Vol.XXII] Delhi, 1980 [reprint of 1st ed., Oxford, 1884], pp. 1-213. M. Jambuvijaya (ed.), Ayaranga

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Bibliography 333 suttam, Jaina-agama Series No. 2(1), Bombay, 1976. - W. Schubring (ed.), AcarangaSutra:Erster Sruta Skandha (Text, Analyse und Glossar), original ed. Leipzig, 1910), reprint Liechtenstein, 1966 [Abhandlungen fur die Kunde des Morgenlandes herausgegeben von der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Band XII, No. 4). Suyagadamga Sutta in Puppha Bhikkhu (ed.), Suttagame I, Gurgaon, 1953, pp. 101-182. - Studien zum Suyagada: die Jainas und die anderen Weltanschauungen vor der Zeitwende. Textteile, Nijjutti, Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen, W.B. Bollee, (Schriftenreihe des Sudasien-Instituts der Universitat Heidelberg, Band 24] Teil I, Wiesbaden, 1977. - Studien zum Suyagada. Textteile, Nijjutti, Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen, W.B. Bollee, [Schriftenreihe, etc., Band 31] Teil II, Stuttgart, 1988. M. Jambuvijaya (ed.), Suyagadamga-suttam, Jaina-Agama Series No. 2(2), Bombay, 1978. - tr. with an intro. by H. Jacobi as 'The Sutrakrtanga Sutra' in Jaina Sutras Pt. II, [Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV] Delhi, 1973 [reprint of 1st ed., Oxford, 1895), pp. 235 435. Dasaveyaliya Sutta in Phulchandji Maharaj (ed.), Suttagame II, Gurgaon, 1954, pp.

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334 Bibliography Uttarajjhayana Sutta in Phulchandji Maharaj (ed.), Viyahapannatti (Bhagavai) Kundakunda (1) Kundakunda (2) Kundakunda (3) 947-976. - tr. by K.C. Lalwani, Delhi, 1973. - E. Leumann (ed.), W. Schubring (tr.), Ahmedabad, 1932. Suttagame II, Gurgaon, 1954, pp. 977-1060. - tr. with an intro. by H. Jacobi as 'The Uttaradhyayana Sutra' in Jaina Sutras Pt. II, [Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XLV] Delhi, 1973 [reprint of 1st ed., Oxford, 1895], pp. 1-232. - J. Charpentier (ed. with an intro., critical notes and a commentary), The Uttaradhyayanasutra, Uppsala, 1922. in Puppha Bhikkhu (ed.), Suttagame I, Gurgaon, 1953, pp. 384-939. J. Deleu (intro., critical analysis, commentary and indexes), Belgium, 1970. - Niyamasara, Prakrit text, ed. and tr., with intro., notes and comm. by Uggar Sain, [Jagmandarlal Jaini Memorial Series, Vol. V] Lucknow, 1931. - Niyamasara - reprint of above, critically edited by Padmashri Sumatibhai Shah, Solapur, 1988. Pancastikayasara, Prakrit text, ed. and tr., with intro., notes and an original comm. in English by A. Chakravartinayanar, [The Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. III] Arrah, 1920. Pravacanasara, Prakrit text, tr. and ed. with an intro. by A.N. Upadhye

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Bibliography 335 Kundakunda (4) (includes Sanskrit commentaries of Amotacandra (Tattvadipika) and Jayasena (Tatparya-vrtti), and Pande Hemaraja's Hindi commentary), (2nd ed.) Bombay, 1935. - The Pravacana-sara of Kundakunda Acarya, together with the commentary, Tattva-dipika, by Amrtacandra Suri, English tr. by B. Faddegon, ed. with an intro. by F.W. Thomas, Cambridge, 1935. Samayasara, Prakrit text, ed. and tr. with intro. and comm. by A. Chakravarti, Banaras, 1950. - Samayasara, Prakrit text, tr., comm. and intro. by J.L. Jaini, [Sacred Books of the Jainas, Vol. VIII] Lucknow, 1930. - Samayaprabhrtam, G. Jain (ed.) [includes Sanskrit commentaries of Amotacandra (Atmakhyati) and Jayasena (Tatparya-vrtti)], (Sanatana Jaina Grantha Mala 3) Benares, 1914. Sanskrit Amstacandra Bhagavadgita Jayasena - see Kundakunda (3), Tattvadipika. - see Kundakunda (4), Atmakhyati. R.C. Zaehner (ed.), Oxford, 1969. - see Kundakunda (3), comm. on Pravacanasara. - see Kundakunda (4), comm. on Samayasara. Patanjala Darshana (Yoga Sutras), (with the commentary of Vyasa), J. Vidyasagara (ed.), Calcutta, 1940. Patanjali

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336 Bibliography Pujyapada (Devanandin) Umasvati Sarvarthasiddhi, P.S. Shastry (ed.), [Sanskrit Grantha No. 13] Banaras, 1955. - Reality, tr. of Sarvarthasiddhi by S.A. Jain, Calcutta, 1960. Tattvarthadhigama Sutra, ed. and tr. by J.L. Jaini, [Sacred Books of the Jains, Vol. II] Arrah, 1920. - Tattvarthadhigama (with bhasya), ed.. K.P. Mody, Calcutta, 1903. Tattvartha Sutra, ed. Pt. Sukhlalji with his comm. and tr., with an intro. by K.K. Dixit, [L.D. Series 44) Ahmedabad, 1974. The Nyaya-Sutras with Vatsyayana's Bhasya, ed. G.S. Tailanga [Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Vol. IX] Benares, 1896. - Gautama's Nyayasutras (With Vatsyayana-Bhasya), tr. G. Jha, Poona, 1939. Vatsyayana Dictionaries and Reference Works Ardha-magadhi kosa Buddhist Dictionary A Critical Pali Dictionary Ratnachandra (ed.), intro. by A.C. Woolner, Vol. I, Ajmer, 1923. compiled by Nyanatiloka, 4th revised edition, Kandy, 1980. begun by V. Trenckner, revised, continued and edited by D. Andersen, H. Smith and H. Hendricksen, Vol. I, Copenhagen, 1924-1948. A Grammar of the Prakrit Languages R. Pischel, tr. from the

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Paia-Sadda-Mahannavo: A Prakrit-Hindi Dictionary A Sanskrit-English Dictionary Bibliography 337 German by S. Jha, 2nd revised edition, Delhi, 1981. compiled by H.D.T. Sheth, Calcutta, 1928. M. Monier-Williams, Oxford, 1979 (reprint). Works Cited (excluding primary sources in classical languages and dictionaries, for which see above) Alsdorf, L. 1958 'Itthiparinna: A Chapter of Jain Monastic Poetry, Edited as a Contribution to Indian Prosody', Indo-Iranian Journal, Vol. II, The Hague, pp. 249-270. 1962- 'Uttarajjhaya Studies', Indo-Iranian Journal, 1963 Vol. VI, The Hague, pp. 110-136. 1965 Les Etudes Jaina, College de France. 1966 The Arya Stanzas of the Uttarajjhaya, Wiesbaden. 1977 'Jaina Exegetical Literature', in A. N. Upadhye, et al. (ed.), Mahavira and His Teachings, Bombay, pp. 1-8. Basham, A.L. 1951 History and Doctrine of the Ajivikas, London. Bhatt, B. 1974 'Vyavaharanaya and Niscayanaya in Kundakunda's Works', Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft, Suppl. 2, Leipzig, pp. 279-291.

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338 Bibliography Bhargava, D. 1968 Jaina Ethics, Delhi. Bollee, W.B. 1977 Studien zum Suyagada: die Jainas und die anderen Weltanschauungen vor der Zeitwende. Textteile, Nijjutti, Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen [Schriftenreihe des SudasienInstituts der Universitat Heidelberg, Band 24], Teil I, Wiesbaden. 1988 Studien zum Suyagada. Bronkhorst, J. Textteile, Nijjutti, Ubersetzung und Anmerkungen [Schriftenreihe, etc., Band 31], Teil II, Stuttgart. 1985 'On the Chronology of the Tattvartha and some Early Commentaries', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, Band XXIX, Vienna, pp. 155184. Caillat, C. 1974 'Jainism', in C. Caillat, A.N. Upadhye, B. Patil (ed.), Jainism, Bombay, pp. 1-48. 1975 Atonements in the Ancient Ritual of the Jaina Monks, Ahmedabad. 1987 'Jainism', in M. Eliade (ed. in chief), The Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 7, New York, pp. 507-514. Chatterjee, A.K. 1978 A Comprehensive History of Jainism, Vol. I, Calcutta. Collins, S. 1982 Selfless Persons, Cambridge. Deleu, J. 1970 Viyahapannatti (Bhagavai): Introduction, Critical Analysis, Commentary and Indexes, Belgium. 1977 'Lord Mahavira and the Anyatirthakas', in A.N. Upadhye et al. (ed.), Mahavira and His Teachings, Bombay, pp. 187-193.

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Bibliography 339 Deo, S.B. 1956 History of Jaina Monachism, Poona. Dixit, K.K. 1971 Jaina Ontology, [L.D. Series 31] Ahmedabad. 1978 Early Jainism, [L.D. Series 64] Ahmedabad. Doshi, S. 1985 Masterpieces of Jaina Painting, Bombay. Eliade, M. 1988 'Yoga', in M. Eliade (ed. in chief), The Encyclopedia of Religion, Vol. 15, New York, pp. 519-523. Frauwallner, E. 1953 Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, Band 1 [Band 2, 1956], Salzburg. 1973 History of Indian Philosophy, (2 Vols.), trans. V.M. Bedekar, Delhi. Glasenapp, H. von 1942 The Doctrine of Karma in Jain Philosophy, trans. G.B. Gifford, Bombay. Gombrich, R.F. 1971 Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Rural Highlands of Ceylon, Oxford. 1984 'Notes on the Brahmanical Background to Buddhist Ethics' in G. Dhammapala, R. Gombrich, K.R. Norman (ed.), Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalava Saddhatissa, Sri Lanka, pp. 91-102. 1988 Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo, London. Jacobi, H. 1884 See Ayaramga Sutta. 1895 See Suyagadamga Sutta / Uttarajjhayana Sutta. Jaini, J.L. 1940 Outlines of Jainism, Cambridge. " Jaini, P.S. 1977 'Bhavyatva and Abhavyatva: A Jain Doctrine of "Predestination", in A.N. Upadhye, et al. (ed.), ,

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340 Bibliography Mahavira and His Teachings, Bombay, pp. 95 111. 1979 The Jaina Path of Purification, Delhi. 1980 'Karma and the Problem of Rebirth in Jainism', in W. O'Flaherty (ed.), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, California, pp. 217 238. Jain, S.A. 1960 Reality: (English translation of Shri Pujyapada's Sarvarthasiddhi), Calcutta. Johnston, E.H. 1974 Early Sankhya, Delhi (reprint of original edition, 1937, London). Keith, A.B. 1936 Review of A.N. Upadhye's edition of the Pravacanasara in The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, pp. 528-9. Lamotte, E. 1988 History of Indian Buddhism: From the Origins of the Saka Era, trans. S. Webb-Boin, Paris (original French edition, 1958, Paris). Matilal, B.K. 1981 Central Philosophy of Jainism (Anekanta Vada), [L.D. Series 79] Ahmedabad. 1986 The Logical Illumination of Indian Mysticism', in N.J. Allen, R.F. Gombrich, T. Raychaudri, G. Rizvi (ed.), Oxford University Papers on India, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, Oxford. Norman, K.R. 1977 "Kaviliyam: A Metrical Analysis of the Eighth Chapter of the Uttaradhyayana-Sutra', in A.N. Upadhye et al. (ed.), Mahavira and His Teachings, Bombay. Ohira, S. 1982 A Study of Tattvartha Sutra with Bhasya, (L.D. Series 86] Ahmedabad.

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Bibliography 341 Olivelle, P. 1974 The Origin and Early Development of Buddhist Monachism, Ceylon. Pischel, R. 1981 A Grammar of the Prakrit Languages, tr. from the German by S. Jha, 2nd revised edition, Delhi, 1981. Poussin, La Vallee 1923- L'Abhidharma de Vasubandhu, IV, Paris. 1931 Puligandla, R. 1975 Fundamentals of Indian Philosophy, New York. Rahula, W. 1978 What the Buddha Taught, [2nd edition] London and Bedford. Rice, B.L. 1914 Epigraphia Carnatica I, Coorg Inscriptions No. 1, [revised ed. 1972], Madras. Sangave, V.A. 1980 Jaina Community: A Social Survey, Bombay. Schubring, W. 1935 Die Lehre der Jainas, Berlin and Leipzig. 1957 'Kundakunda echt und unecht', ZDMG, Vol. 107, Leipzig, pp. 537-574. 1962 The Doctrine of the Jainas, trans. W. Beurlen [of Die Lehre der Jainas], Delhi [reprint 1978]. 1966 The Religion of the Jainas, Calcutta. Singh, R.J. 1974 The Jaina Concept of Omniscience, [L.D. Series 43] Ahmedabad. Tatia, N. 1951 Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Ahmedabad. Tieken, H. 1986 'Textual Problems in an Early Canonical Jaina Text', Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens, Band XXX, Vienna, pp. 5-25.

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342 Bibliography Upadhye, A.N. 1935 'Introduction' to Pravacanasara (see Kundakunda (3)], Bombay, pp. i-cxxvi. Williams, P. 1989 Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, London. Williams, R. 1963 Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Sravakacaras, London. 1966 "Before Mahavira', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, pp. 2-6. Zydenbos, R.J. 1983 Moksa in Jainism, According to Umasvati, [Beitrage zur Sudasienforschung, Band 53] Wiesbaden

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Glossary and Index Alsdorf, L., 4, 14 Amrtacandra, 94, 113-114, 116, 129-130, 133, 157, 160161, 164, 168, 170-171, 173, 175, 179-180, 203, 206-207, 220, 228, 231, 233, 236, 240-242, 250, 259, 289n, 296 anagara - homeless (ascetic), 297 anasana - fasting, 223 anekanta(vada) - (doctrine of) manifold aspects, 103, 137, 183n, 232, 244, 247-248, 251-255, 258, 262-265, 305 anubhava - fruition of karma, 55 abhavya - souls incapable of attaining liberation, 245-246 acarya - religious teacher, 260 acetana - non-consciousness, 262 acetana - non-conscious substance, 262 activity (of body, speech and mind), 7-12, 15-16; in the Tattvartha Sutra, 47-90; see also yoga adana-niksepana-samiti - care in picking things up and putting them down, 69-70 adharma - demerit, 289 adhikarana - substratum (of karmic influx); of jiva type, 64-66; of ajiva type, 67-72; 68, 209 adhyavasana - intention, resolution, will, 272-274; synonyms for, 273, 275, 294 Adipurana, 89 ahimsa - non-injury, non violence, 1, 11, 20, 25, 63, 73, 81, 83-84, 89, 156, 158, 166, 169, 177-179, 182, 189, 221, 230, 264, 290, 294-295, 303 ; ajiva - insentient, 64, 67-68, 103, 120n, 129, 139, 142, 146, 148, 150, 161, 170, 173, 205, 212, 215, 217, 243, 255, 257, 268, 271, 283, 285, 290; five ajiva-dravya, 275 . Ajivikas, 41 ajnana - ignorance, 111, 268 akusala - karmically unwholesome, 13 alms, 27-29, 222-223 anukampa - see compassion anupreksa - reflection, 192, 196 anuvrata - partial vows (taken by laity), 73-74, 74n, 78; see also mahavrata Apabhramsa, 302; use of, 93, 95 aparigraha - non-possession, non-possessiveness, non-. attachment (fifth anuvrata of lay person), 74-75, 74n, 88, 169, 219, 289-290 appamada - mindfulness, 52 arambha - 'undertaking', premeditated action, violence, 5-6, 26, 31-33; meaning of, 38-40; 65-66,.. 66n, 72, 154, 173-174, 220, 311 arhat - 'worthy of worship', omniscient being, Jina, 35, 172, 210, 211, 247, 295, 297 asat - unreal, 142, 148 !

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344 Harmless Souls asava - four cankers, corruptions, 14; see also asrava ascetic (Jain), 20-24, 27, 33, 37, 63, 72, 76-78, 80-89, 11112, 115, 117, 163, 165-168, 189, 195, 198, 217-230,271, 283; characteristic marks of, 295-303; ascetic practice, 217-224, 295-310; see also monks, nuns asrama - stage of life (in orthodox Hinduism), 89 asrava influx of karmic matter, 10, 14-15, 25, 48-49, 56, 58-59, 62-63, 65, 71-72, 86, 163, 242, 281, 285; see also asava asravadvara - cause of asrava, - 56 asraya - substratum, base, 104105 asubha-upayoga - inauspicious manifestation of consciousness, 98, 106n, 108-109, 112, 114-115, 118, 120, 122, 133-134, 139, 143, 145, 219, 225-226 asubha-yoga-wicked (inauspicious) activity, 49, 49n, 138 asuddha-upayoga - impure manifestation of consciousness, 108, 112-115, 117, 120, 122, 138, 141, 146, 154, 156, 158-159, 161-162, 170, 172-177, 180, 182-183, 205, 219, 225-226, 306 Atmakhyati, 96, 231, 236-237, 248-249, 289n, 297-298 atman - self, 112-114, 118 122, 124, 132, 135-136, 138139, 142n, 143, 146-148, 170, 181, 183, 195, 203-204, 209, 211, 215, 217, 226, 238, 243, 246, 257, 260-261, 280285, 298, 302; atmanbrahman, 126; incorporeal (amurta), 128-129; paramatman, 139-140, 148, 278; suddhatman, 174, 228 Atthapahuda, 94-95 atthikaya (asti-kaya) - fundamental entity, 99 avasyaka - obligatory duty of monk, 43n, 191, 193n Avasyaka-niryukti, 190 avidya- ignorance, 111, 142, 149-150, 154-156,; avijja, 151n avirati - non-restraint; cause of bondage, 54-56, 58 avrata - non-observance of the five vows (vrata), 58; see also vrata avyakta - karmically indeterminate acts (Buddhist), 13 Ayaramga Sutta, 4-5, 21-24, 26, 31, 34-35, 39, 43-44, 84, 97, 177-178, 188-189 ayus-karma - age-determining karma, 293 B bandha - bondage, 56, 129 Barasa-Anuvekkha, 92-94 Bhagavai (Viyahapannatti) - see Viyahapannatti Bhagavadgita, 228, 292-293 bhakti - devotion, 232 Bharata, 93 bhasa-samiti - care in speaking, 69-70 Bhatt, B., 243, 255-256, 263, 265 bhavu - disposition, mental state, nature, state of the

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Glossary and Index 345 164, 167, 180, 232, 265, 273, 285, 296, 299; attitude to karmic bondage, 11-17, 30, 38, 42, 52 C soul; five kinds, 103-105; 107-109, 118, 131, 132, 186, 273, 275; bhava-karman, 143; asubha-bhava, 107109, 118; jiva-bhava, 99, 104; parama (suddha)-bhava - liberated self, 267; parinamika-bhava, 106-107, 106n, 116; renunciation of, 288-295, 305; in Samayasara, 231, 249, 257261, 267-273; subha-bhava, 107, svabhava -own-nature, essence, 118, 203, 209-210, 234-235, 239, 244n, 276, 279, 281, 284-286, 288, 294 295, 297 bhavabandha - efficient cause of bondage, 107, 131, 133. 134 bhavana - mental disposition, mental development, 287288; atmabhavana - meditation on the self, 288 Bhikhanji, 183n-184n bhikkhu - Buddhist monk, 167 bhutartha - really existent, truth, 242-243, 257 bondage - see karmic bondage brahman - Upanisadic and Vedantic absolute, 238; see also atman Brahmanical ritual, 9-10, 77 Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 120 Bronkhorst, J., 47 Buddha (Gotama), 9, 12-13, 180n Buddhism, 164, 284; Ch'an, 301; early, 38, 283; Madhyamika, 137, 249-250, 252-253; Mahayana, 180, 282, 285-286; Theravada, 208 Buddhists, 96, 135, 154-155, Caillat, C., 14, 18-20, 233n caitanya - consciousness, 101, 104-105, 170; see also cetanon carefulness, 52, 52n, 161, 165 carelessness, 42-43, 160-161, 166; see also pramada caritra - conduct, 118-119, 196, 234-235, 298, 306; in the Pravacanasara, 185-187; samayika-caritra, 188-193 caritra-mohaniya karma - right-conduct deluding karma, 56-57, 149, 150-151 cetana - consciousness, 125 127, 262; volition, 13; cetana-dravya - conscious substance, 262 Chakravarti, A., 237, 278, 301 Chatterjee, A.K., 93-94 cheda - infringement, offence against the monastic rules, 157-160, 162, 171, 173; antaranga (internal) cheda, 160-161; bahiranga (external) cheda, 160-161 Chedasutras - see Cheya Suttas Cheya Suttas, 19, 85 compassion, 10, 17, 175-184 consciousness - see upayoga, caitanya, etc. D damsana - see darsana danda - inflictions, violence, punishment, 12-13 darsanal- perception, insight, faith, 98-109, 112-113, 140,

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346 Harmless Souls 186, 209, 234-235, 257, 298; four kinds of, 105-108; see also upayoga darsana2- religion, school of thought, 80, 124 darsana-mohaniya karma - perception-deluding karma, 149-152 Dasaveyaliya Sutta, 4, 8, 1011, 20-22, 24-26, 28-29, 31, 33, 35-37, 43n, 72, 97, 157 Deleu, J., 40-42, 100-101 demerit (papa), 98, 115-116, 138, 143, 226, 272, 287, 294; papa-karma, 48-49, 49n, 88 Devanandin - see Pujyapada dharma (dhamma)1 - teaching, law; Jain, 27-28, 169, 186187, 192-193, 196, 214; defined in the Pravacanasara, 118-119; parama-dharma - highest dharma, 170; svadharma, 228 dharma2- principle of motion, 289 dharma3- merit, 289 dhyana (jhana) - meditation, concentration, 153, 156, 186-188, 196-205, 208, 286, 305; four types listed, 198200; dharma-dhyana, 194; sukla-dhyana, 194 Digambara - 'sky-clad' Jaina sect, 265, 309, passim; cf. Svetambara Dixit, K.K., 5-9, 23-24, 29, 3132, 35, 61, 144, 244 doctrinal development, 80-90, 128 dosa - hatred, aversion, 13, 138, 154-155; see also dvesa dravya-substance, 104, 129, 131, 209, 212, 247, 254, 267, 276, 294; listed, 289; acetana-dravyaunconscious substance, 204 dravya-bandha - material cause of bondage, 107, 131, 133-134 Dravya-samgraha - 126-127 duhkha, - suffering, 98, 119, 138 dvesa-hatred, aversion, 129, 132-135, 141, 145, 150, 152155, 180; see also dosa dvikriyavada (dokiriyavada) - doctrine that one cause can produce two different effects, 260-266 E ekagra - one-pointed thought, concentration, 207, 210 ekanta - one-sided, 244, 247, 253, 264; ekantavadin - one who has a single view of reality, absolutist, 244; cf. anekanta ekendriya - single-sensed beings, 17-18, 26; see also sthavara Eliade, M., 207 Eliot, T.S., 164 emblem - see linga esana- desire, alms, 222-223 esana-samiti - care in accepting alms, 69-70, 223 evil (violent) act, 7-11, 20 evil-doers, 6; behaviour of, 711 F Faddegon, B., 155, 157, 171, 179, 215 fatalism, 293

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Glossary and Index 347 Frauwallner, E., 79, 233, 240 gati - birth (four possible), 23 gnosis, 122, 141, 153, 156, 264, 272, 307 Gombrich, R.F., 28n, 29n, 36, 164-165, 238 guna - essential property, quality, 99, 101, 104, 114, 126, 254, 276 Gunacandra, 94 gunasthana - fourteen stages on path to liberation, 83-84, 83n, 88-89, 199 gupti - three kinds of restraint. 44, 69n, 71, 191-192, 194, 196, 203 279 Indra, 177 indriya - sense(s), 58 intention - see volition internalisation (of doctrine, practice), 303-310, passim iryapatha - four postures (in Buddhism), 62 iryapatha asrava - short-term karmic influx, 56, 59-60 iryapatha karma - short-term karma, 48, 49n, 50-51, 65, 86-87; in the Tattvartha Sutra, 57-64 iryapathakriya - walking carefully, 59-62 irya-samiti (iriya-samii) - care in walking, 41-44, 61-62, 69 70, 168-169; see also samiti iriyavahiya kiriya - action of a monk conforming to the monastic rules, 41, 43n, 44; cf. samparaiya kiriya Sun.acanda 276 H Hardy, F., 233n hata - relinquisher, 143 hinsa - violence, harming action, injury, 1, 11 19-22, 25-26, 29, 35, 37, 39, 42, 5152, 54, 62-63, 65, 68, 72, 7577, 152, 202, 219, 292, 294, 306; defined in the Tattvartha Sutra, 51-52; in the Pravacanasara, 156-184 Hindus, 228, 232, 297, 303 householders, 5-6, 32, 32n, 37 38, 63-64, 72-78, 80-89, 11112, 115, 168, 198, 26-230, 282-283,304-310; characteristic marks of, 295303; practice of samayika, 189-190; status in earliest texts, 23-31 Jacobi, H., 12, 32, 44 Jaini, J.L., 231-238, 258, 300 Jaini, P.S., 5, 9, 14-15, 46, 54, 73-74, 85-86, 101, 104, 121, 128, 131, 149-151, 183n, 188-191, 195, 211-212, 254 Jayasena, 94, 96-97, 168, 171, 176, 231, 233, 236, 242, 257-260, 287, 296 jina - spiritual conqueror, 213 214, 235, 261, 275, 282-283, 295 Jinasena, 89 jiva - soul, life-monad, sentient being, 1, 6, 10, 17, 18, 2426, 36, 38, 48, 50-51, 61, 6364, 67-68, 72, 75, 81, 87, 98, 101-106; 109-110, 113, 116118, 122, 124-131, 133-140, identity, socio-religious, passim impurity, 77, 136, 205-206,

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348 Harmless Souls 142n, 143, 146-147, 149150, 152, 154, 163, 165, 169-170, 181, 186, 200-202, 205-206, 212, 215, 234-235, 243, 248, 255, 257, 261-263, 267-269, 271-276, 280-281, 283-285, 292; involvement with karma, 124-149; qualities of, 101-106 jnana - knowledge, realisation, 98-109, 112-113, 117, 140, 156, 167, 185, 187, 192, 198, 200, 209, 212-217, 234-235, 257, 275-278, 291-292, 298, 303, 305; eight kinds of, 105-109; jnana-cetana, 195; matijnana, srutajnana, 102; see also upayoga Johnston, E.H., 95 K kamma (Pali) - action, deed, 12 karma(n) - action, matter which binds the soul, 16-17, 20-21, 86, 105, 106n, 107, 109, 111, 115-116, 120, 122, 124-125, 128, 130, 134-135, 137, 139-145, 150-151, 154, 163-164, 182, 185, 196, 198, 201-203, 206, 208, 211-212, 217, 236, 242, 255-257, 261, 268-271, 275, 281, 285, 291, 293-295, 300-301, 303-305; dematerialisation of, 145149; dravya-karma, 135, 144; karma-pudgala, 129, 132-137, 142 karmic bondage, 1-2, 11-21, 33, 37, 64, 75, 77, 81, 85; five causes of, 54-55, 58; in the Pravacanas ara, 124-184, 212; in the Samayasara, 267-274; short-term, 41-44; in the Tattvartha Sutra, 46 90 karta - agent, 143, 261 karuna (kaluna), 177; see compassion kasaya - 'stain', passion, four moral vices, 13, 18, 31-38, 44, 48, 49, 50-51, 55-59, 61, 63, 65-66, 68, 72-78, 83, 86-88, 107-108, 110, 117, 130, 150-154, 169, 175, 268n, 273, 291-292; see also passion, krodha (anger), mana (pride), maya (deceit), lobha (greed) Kasayaprabhrta, 127 Katha Upanisad, 292 kaya-danda - infliction of the body, 12 kaya-samrambha - bodily impulsion, 65-66 kayotsarga- abandonment of the body, meditative posture, standing motionless, 39, 190 kevaladarsana - perception without karmic obstruction, 106-109 kevalajnana - omniscience, knowledge without karmic obstruction, liberation, 103, 106-109, 116, 181, 209, 211212, 217, 276-278, 281-281, 297, 299 kevalin - one who has attained omniscience and liberation, 147n, 213, 215, 279, 281282; see also siddha kiriya - action; types of, 40-41, 44, 58; see also kriya, iriyavahiya kiriya, samparaiya kiriya knowledge - see jnana kriya - action, 58-61, 61n; see also kiriya krodha - anger, 34-35, 66, 150, AI THI DOI THE KHONG T

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Glossary and Index 349 152-153; see also kasaya Kundakunda, 52, 86, 89-91, 91-310 passim; date of 91-98 kusala - karmically wholesome, 13 labdhi - dormant consciousness, 102 lakkhana - see laksana laksana - distinguishing characteristic, 99, 102; visesa-laksana, 113 lay Jains - see householders lesya - colour (of soul), 130 liberation, 182, 184-185, 215 216, 245, 264-265; in Samayasara, 275-310; see also moksa linga - emblem, defining characteristic (of ascetic or householder, 217-222, 295. 303, 309-310 lobha - greed, 13, 34-37, 66, 72, 75-77, 150, 152-154, 219; see also kasaya lokakasa - inhabited universe, 132 material soul, 129-130, 143, 262-263, 304 Matilal, B.K., 244n maya - deceit, 34-35, 66, 150, 152-153; see also kasaya mechanism of bondage - see karmic bondage meditation, 140, 147, 181, 197 200, 286-288, 303; in Pravacanasara, 200-217 mendicants - see ascetics, sramanas merit (punya), 26-31, 48-49, 49n, 81, 88, 98, 115-116, 138, 143, 226, 272, 280, 287, 293-294; punya-karma, 30, 273 Merkara (Mercara) copper plates, 92-94 mithya-darsana - wrong-belief (cause of bondage), 54-56, 58, 150 mithyatva (karman) - perversity, 150-151 moha - delusion, false consciousness, 13, 119, 122, 129, 132, 134-135, 138-142, 145-156, 169-170, 176, 179180, 209, 268, 270, 289; darsana moha, 150, 156 mohaniya karma - deluding karma, 149, diagram 150, 151, 155-156, 205 moksa - liberation, 23, 72, 82, 115, 122, 141, 183n, 185, 198, 278-279, 298; see also liberation Monier-Williams, M., 296-298 monk (Jaina); behaviour of, 18-26, 37, 63-64, 72, 76-77, 81, 83, 157, 164, 168, 176; monastic rules, 41-44, 158 172; see also ascetic muhurta - period of 48 M madhyastha - neutral position, 251 Mahavira (Nigantha Nataputta), 12, 15-16, 41-42, 79-80, 99, 188, 190-191 mahavrata - major vow (five taken by ascetics), 31, 73, 78, 84, 169, listed 189, 195, 273, 287; see also anuvrata Majjhima Nikaya, 12, 15 Malamoud, C., 238 mana - pride, 34-35, 66, 150, 152-153; see also kasaya manas - mind, 71, 104

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350 Harmless Souls minutes, 189, 198 mula - roots (unwholesome), 154 muni - ascetic, mendicant, 245, 250, 273 murccha - infatuation, the delusion of possession, 7374, 152, 169, 173-174, 219220; see also parigraha murta - the embodied, material objects, 124, 128 N Nagarjuna, 250, 253, 285 nana - see jnana Natyasastra, 93 naya - view, aspect of truth, 123n, 127, 136-137, 149, 224, 305; suddha-naya, 242, 246, 248 Nemicandra, 126-127 Nigantha Nataputta - see Mahavira; see also nirgrantha nigoda - submicroscopic and lowest form of life, 163 niksepa - placing, putting down, 67, 69-71 nimitta - instrumental cause, 261 nirgrantha - unattached, without possessions; name of Mahavira and the Jain community, 19 nirjara - shedding of karmic matter, 134, 156, 196 nirvana - final liberation, 108, 119, 186-187, 228, 236, 245, 282, 286 nirvartana - production, performance, 67, 69-71 nisarga - movement, urging, operating, 67-71 niscaya-naya - higher view, non-conventional (absolute) view, 95, 109, 120, 121n, 122n, 123n, 125, 126n, 127, 130 133-135, 137-138, 142144, 146, 201-212, 206, 212, 216-217, 224, 232, 239-266, 269, 272-274, 279, 291-292, 294, 297, 302-303, 305 Niyamasara, 188, 193-195, 212, 215, 251-252, 258-259, 279 no-kasaya - subsidiary passions, 57, 74, 74n, 150 nuns, 64, 72, 76-77, 81, 168; see also ascetic Nyayabhasya, 233 O Ohira, S., 49, 49n, 58, 67 omniscience - see kevalajnana P Pali Canon, 154, 180n Pancastikaya, 95, 101-102, 105, 107, 187, 234, 238 panna - wisdom, 180 Pannavana Sutta, 99 papa - see demerit para - other (than the self), 270, 274, 280 paradravya- other substance, 142, 148, 173-174, 181, 183, 203-206, 243, 281, 298 paramartha - reality, 279-280, 297 paramartha-satya - higher truth (= liberation) in Madhyamika Buddhism, 250, 285 Paramatmaprakasa, 302 parigraha - possession, attachment to possessions, possessiveness, 5-6; objects of, 6; 31-38, 72-78, 152,

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Glossary and Index 351 193 Pravacanasara, 52-54,91-230, 231, 232, 239, 257, 267, 286, 296, 305-306 pudgala - matter, 67, 71, 125, 128, 131, 138, 143, 201, 204, 257-261, 268, 271, 275 Pujyapada (Devanandin), 46, 49, 52-54, 92, 160, 189, 192, 196; see also Sarvarthasiddhi punya - see merit purity, 76-77, 114, 117, 128, 136, 160, 164-165, (of mind) 173, 176-177, 179, 206, 217220, 224-225, 279, 282, 286, 306-310; see also sauca * Purusartha-siddy-upaya, 250 purvas - 'original' Jain canon, subsequently lost, 200, 277278 154, 169, 171, 174, 176, 219-220 parinama - modification, transformation, 95, 104, 113, 118, 135, 144, 170, 254, 261, 273 parisahajaya - victory over the 22 afflictions, 192, 196 paryaya - mode, modification, 104, 132, 212, 246-247, 254, 267 pasamdiya (pasanda) - ascetic, 295-297 passion, 11, 13, 18, 44, 51, 54 55, 57, 65, 72; see also kasaya Patanjali, 207 paticca-samuppada - dependent origination, 135, 151n Pischel, R., 93 pradesa (paesa) - space-points, 55, 100, 132-134 prajna - wisdom, direct realisation of truth, 256, 284 286 prajnaparamita literature - Buddhist wisdom literature, 285 Prakrit, use of, 93 prakrti - matter (karmic), 55 pramada - carelessness, negligence, 41, 52, 54-56, 58, 152 pramats - knower, 101 prana - life-essentials, animating principles, 202 202 pratima - 11 stages of renunciation for a lay person, 78, 78n, 83, 85-86, 88 pratikramana - ritualised confession of faults, 299-302 pratyakhyana - renunciation, R raga - passion, attachment, desire, 118-119, 129, 131135, 137, 141, 143, 145, 150, 152-155, 180, 228, 268, 291 292 Rahula, W., 180, 283 ratnatraya - see three jewels rebirth, 23-31, 73, 81, 119, 170; see also gati, samsara renunciation - passim ritualisation (of ascetic conduct), 86, 158-159, 163, 166, 182, 308-310; passim roles (socio-religious in the Pravacanasara, 224-230 ruksa - dry (of matter), 128 129, 131 rupa - form, 124, 128-129, 133 sadhu - Jain ascetic,

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352 Harmless Souls mendicant, 240 sagara-uvaoga - see upayoga Sain, U., 194 sallekhana - ritual death by fasting, 84 sama (sama) - equanimity, 118-119, 186, 188, 193, 195 samadhi - deep meditation, 193-195, 207-208 samarambha - preparation to do vilence, 66, 66n, 311 samaya - essential or realised self, true definition, (doctrine, religion), 95, 192, defined 233-239, 252, 265, 289, 298 Samayasara, 91, 95-97, 109, 123n, 124, 130, 137, 144, 147, 156, 167, 211, 216, 230-310 samayika - total physical restraint, attaining equanimity, 187-196, 208 samiti - 5 rules of conduct, types of carefulness, 44, 62, 68, listed 69-71, 163, 192, 196; see also irya-samiti samjvalana - smouldering passions, 54 Samkhya, 95, 232, 263, 292, 294, 303 samklesa - defilement, 138 sammaditthi - right understanding, 283 samparaiya kiriya - action characteristic of a lay person, samrambha - impulsion, determination to do violence, 66, 66n, table samsara - cycle of rebirth, worlds in which the soul is bound by karma, 1, 23-24, 35, 38, 50, 59, 81, 108, 121122, 135, 137, 142n, 147, 183. 201. 226. 243, 244n. 273, 280, 282, 290, 300; see also gati samskara - life-crisis ritual, 89 samvara - stoppage of karmic influx, 62, 69, 69n, 76, 134, 156, 192, 196, 202 samyag-darsana - right faith/belief/view, 185 samyag-drsti - right belief, 242, 277, 283, 285 samyag-jnana - right knowledge, 185-186 samyak-caritra - right conduct, 185-186 samyama - self-control, restraint, 119, 188 samyoga - combining, mixing up, 67, 69-71 Sankara, 96, 154 Sanskrit, use of 80, 93 sapta-bhangi-naya - sevenfold predication, 247 Sarvarthasiddhi, 46-47, 50-53, 57, 60-61, 64-65, 67, 71, 7374, 76-77, 88, 92, 102, 150, 152-153, 160, 168, 174-175, 182, 185, 192, 196-200, 218, 220; see also Pujyapada (Devanandin) sastra - texts, 275 sat - existent, 104 Satkhandagama, 126 sauca - purity, complete freedom from greed, 76-77, 218 00 41 samparayika asrava - rebirth causing karmic influx, 56, 59-61 samparayika karma - rebirth causing karma, 48, 49n, 50, in the Tattvartha Sutra 5764, 86-87

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Glossary and Index 353 122, 138, 156, 158-159, 218 219, 225, 229, 267, 309 sukha - happiness, bliss, 98, 101, 119 Sukhlalji, Pt., 59-61, 64 Suyagadamga Sutta, 4-6, 15 19, 26-28, 30-35, 44, 97 svayambhu (sayambhu) - self existent, 120 Svetambara - 'white-clad' Jaina sect, passim; cf. Digambara Svetambara Canon, 2, dating of 4-5, 177 syadvada - doctrine of qualified assertion, 232, 244, 247-248, 251, 253, 262, 264, 305 T Sauraseni (Jaina), 93 scholastics, 304-305 Schubring, W., 4, 9, 94-95, 100, 191 self-modification, 145 siddha - liberated soul, 211; see also kevalin sila - morality, 164 Singh, R.J., 238 skandha fkhamdha) - molecules, 124-125; see also pudgala snigdha - sticky, moist (of matter), 128-129, 131 Somila, 99 sparsa - touch, 131, 134 sramana - ascetic, 31, 32n, 11, 115-117, 119, 120n, 134, 140, 157-158, 160-162, 166168, 172, 176-178, 190, 219 220, 225-230, 306-310 srauta brahman - brahman qualified to perform the higher sacrifices, 77 sravakacara - texts dealing with lay discipline, 190 Sthanakavasi (Svetambara sub sect), 183n sthavara - static jiva with only one-sense, element body, 25 26, 138, 161, 161n, 162-163 sthiti - duration of karma, 55 subha-upayoga - auspicious manifestation of consciousness, 98, 106n, 108-109, 112, 114-116, 118120, 122, 133-134, 143, 145, 177, 181-182, 219, 225-228 subha-yoga - virtuous activity, 49, 49n, 81, 138 suddha-upayoga - pure manifestation of consciousness, 106, 108, 112-115, 117-119, 120n, tanha - thirst, craving, grasping, 38, 154 tapas - austerity, 20, 109, 153, 155-156, 186-188, 196-200, bahya (external) listed 196197, uttara (internal) listed 197, 202-203, 222-223, 280, 285, 304, 306, 308 Tapassi, 12 tathagatagarbha - Buddha Nature, 282 Tatia, N., 150, 185 Tatparya-vrtti, 171, 231, 242, 258, 296 tattva - real, existent, 187, 199, 24, 294; svatattva, 214 Tattvadipika, 96, 113, 118-119, 121, 125, 128-129, 131-136, 138-139, 141-145, 148, 154, 157, 161, 169,-170, 172-174, 179, 186, 201-202, 204-205, 208-210, 213-215, 218-220, 222, 228 Tattvartha Sutra, 2, 5, 11, 14, 36, 44-45, bondage in 46-90, 121, 120. 141-145, 172-174,

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354 Harmless Souls 91-92, 102-104, 107, 109110, 114, 116-117, 149-150, 152-156, 160, 168-169, 174, 182, 185, 187, 189, 192, 196-197, 200, 208, 220, 231, 291, 298; see also Umasvati Tattvarthadhigama Bhasya (Svopajna Bhasya), 46-47, 47n, 102, 150 Terapantha (Svetambara sub sect), 183n-184n Thanamga Sutta, 49 three jewels (ratnatraya), 185, 187, 235, 298 trasa - mobile jiva with 2 or more senses, 6, 25-26, 73, 138, 161n, 161-163 two truths doctrine, 95-96, 232, 239-266; two 'two truths' doctrines, 254-260 140, 147, 154, 156-157, 160, 162, 167, 169, 175, 177, 209, 219-221, 224, 229, 231, 257, 267, 269, 289, 291, 305-306; development of doctrine, 97111; sagara and anagarauvaoga, 100-101; see also darsana, jnana, asubhaupayoga, subha-upayoga, suddha-upayoga utsarga-samiti - care in performing excretory functions, 69-71 Uttarajjhayana Sutta, 4, 30. 49, 57, 97-99, 171 uvaoga - see upayoga U Umasvati, 2, 5, 38, 44, 46-90, 108, 110, 152, 175, 182, 196, 273, 294, 298; see also Tattvartha Sutra upacara - metaphor, figure of speech, 243 upadata - appropriator, 143 upadhi (uvadhi) - attachment to possessions, 171-175 upadhika - limiting adjunct, Vatsyayana, 233 Vavahara Pithika, 19 Vedanta, 120, 126, 139, 141 142, 238, 243, 244n, 256, 265, 303, 305; Advaita Vedanta, 137, 154 vihara - monastery, temple, 298-299 vikalpa - false notion, 268 vinaya - rules of conduct for Buddhist monks, 164 violence, 5-11, 32; see also himsa, arambha viriya - see virya virya - will, energy, 99, 101 visuddhi - purification, 138 Viyahapannatti (Bhagavai), 40-42, 44-45, 38, 86, 99-101, 104 volition, 13, 15, 22, 29-30, 54, 66, 273, 306; see also cetana, vrata - vow, restraint, 84-86. 166, internalisation of 189, 226, 280, 308; see also anuvrata, mahavrata 132 Upadhye, A.N., 91-96, 115 116, 157, 159, 168, 171, 179, 201, 218, 302 Upali, 12 Upalisutta, 12-13 upaya - means, 251 upayoga (uvaoga) - manifestation of consciousness, defining characteristic of the jiva, 97123, 129, 132-134, 138n,

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Glossary and Index 355 vratin - one who takes a vow, 85 Vyasa, 207 vyavahara-naya - conventional view, 95, 109, 120, 122n, 123n, 126n, 130, 133-135, 137, 142, 144, 201-202, 206, 212, 224, 232, 239-266, 269, 272, 279, 297, 305 W Williams, R., 190 Y yati - ascetic, 134 yogal-action, activity, vibration of body, speech, and mind, 5-15, 20, 41, 49, 55, 59, 71, 75, 83, 88, 107, 109, 145, 152, 185, 204, 219-220; defined in the Tattvartha Sutra 47-51, 49n yoga2- meditative exercise, 207 Yoga Bhasya, 47, 207 Yoga Sutra, 47, 52, 207 Yogindu, 302-303

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Will Johnson was educated at the University of Sussex and Wolfson College, Oxford, where he was Michael Coulson Research Fellow in Indology from 1991 to 1992. He is now Lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Wales, Cardiff. He is currently working on a book on Jaina art, and a translation of the Sauptikaparvan of the Mahabharata. He has recently published a new translation of the Bhagavad Gita. 21 -8.98 2421147 SA

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Lala S. L. Jain Research Series . General Editor: Prof. Dayanand Bhargava Vol. I: Jaina Yoga: A Survey of the Mediaeval Sravakacaras-R. Williams Vol. II: A Comparative Study of the Jaina Theories of Reality and Knowledge_Y.J. Padmarajiah, Vol. III: Dravya-Samgraha of Nemichandra Siddhanta Chakravarti-Ed. S.C. Ghoshal Vol. IV: The Essentials of Bhagavan Mahavira's Phi losophy: Ganadharavada --Acharya Vijay Bhuvanbhanusuri Vol. V: The Scientific Foundations of Jainism -KV. Mardia Vol. VI: Lord Mahavira and His Times - Kailash Chand Jain Vol. VII: The Jaina Theory of Perception -Pushpa Bothra Vol. VIII: The Jaina Iconography --B.C. Bhattacharya Vol. IX: Harmless Souls-Karmic Bondage and Religious Change in Early Jainism with Special Reference to Umasvati and Kundakunda -W.J. Johnson MOTILAL BANARSIDASS PUBLISHERS PRIVATE LIMITED