Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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• PIOTR BALCEROWICZ
TWO SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP
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His thesis of parārtha-pratyaksa boils down to saying that things can also be directly cognised through verbal means, and verbal utterances can be classified as cases of perception under special conditions, viz. if they contribute to the generating of knowledge in the hearer that corresponds to the speaker's cognitive states derived perceptually.
In contradistinction to the above statement of NA., STP.2.28 explicitly declares that "objects cognised through testimony are not amenable to grasping (them) directly" (paccakkha-ggahanam na inti suya-nanasammiyā atthā). In other words, for Siddhasena Divakara verbal communication is incompatible with the notion of direct cognition (pratyaksa), hence must by definition be indirect (paroksa). Here we have a clear case of two contradictory concepts when one and the same sphere of verbal communication is either attributed (NA.) or denied of (STP.) the efficacy of direct cognition. Apparently Siddhasena Divākara could not have been aware of the concept of parartha-pratyakşa.
of the direct, i.e. perceptual character (pratyaksa) of verbal utterances and the question whether things communicated verbally can be grasped directly (vide supra 8)..
To this list I could add some more points of divergence, discussed already in BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), namely: (8) the assignment of either sensory (NA.) or suprasensory (STP.) character to pratyaksa, taken either as perception (NA.) or as blanket term "direct cognition" (STP.):67 (9) the importance of the essential unity of jnana and darsana at the kevala stage for the author of STP. and complete indifference to the question in NA, as well as a different treatment of kevala in both works; (10) different attitudes to the authority of the Agamas, either faithfulness to the Agamic tradition (STP.) or search for novel solutions (NA.).
I believe these points of divergence clearly demonstrate that not only were the Saunati-tarka-prakarand and the Nyāyāvatära conceived by two different persons, but also at two different historical periods.
As regards the Sarmati tarka-prakarana, it is rather dubious whether the name of its author was indeed Siddhasena Divakara, but since I see no better alternative, I would suggest keeping the name, especially in view of Abhayadevasūri's identification (vide supra n. 4). Since there is no indication that Siddhasena Divākara as the author of the Sanimati tarka-prakarana might have been familiar with the terminology of Dinnaga's school, I would maintain that he must have flourished before ca. 500 C.E.
Since the Nyayavatara was definitely composed after 620/660 C.E. (Dharmakirti) and Patrasvamin and before c. 800 C.E. (Haribhadrasuri). its author cannot be the same Siddhasena. To distinguish the two Siddhasenas, I follow the identification by Haribhadrasűri and refer to the author of the Nyayavatāra as Siddhasena Mahamati."
As I have tried to demonstrate on the preceding pages, there is a number of points that make the common authorship of STP. and NA. highly debatable, namely (1) the general outline, vocabulary and matters discussed (vide supra $5 2.1-2.2.5-6); (2) presence in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of the structured pattern of definitions and justifications (vide supra $$ 2.3-4); (3) various principles on which inference is based, viz. inference of the relatum (sambandhin) by means of a relation (sambandha) - i.e. the application of sambandhin as hetuaccepted in STP. and rejected in NA., and the "inexplicability otherwise" (anyathanupaparti) - i.e. the proper hetu- as the basis of all inference propounded in NA. (vide supra $ 4); (4) acceptance in STP.) or rejection (in NA.) of application (upanaya) as a member of the proof formula (nyayavayava, sadhana), and therefore the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the classical five-membered proof formula (paricdvayavavakya) (vide supra SS 5.1-2); (5) presence in NA.) or absence (in STP.) of notions that presuppose the authors' acquaintance with Dinnāga or Dharmakirti (vide supra SS (2.1,6.1), especially the case of the proper relation between darśana - samanya and jnana - višesa (vide supra $56.2.1-6.2.2): (6) different typological schemes of cognitive faculties (upayoga) or cognitive criteria (pramana), the question of the feasibility of assigning room to the sensuous cognition (mati-jäna, abhinibodhika jnána) in such a classification, as well as different interpretations of the true character of pratyaksa (vide supra $ 7); (7) the controversy
NOTES The Prabhavakacarita of Prabhicandra - dated from 1277 C.E. (see GRANOFF (1989-1990: 1, 329)) - seems to be the only exception, see GRANOFF (1989-1990: II, 292): "The Prabhakacarita is the only text to name in addition Siddhasena's manual of logic, his Nycyanatara.. : See GRANOFF (1989-1990. 1. 336): "The work that modem scholars consider to be Siddhasena's main philosophical work, his Sanmaritarka, is nowhere mentioned in the biographies in the prabandhas and in related sources."
See UPADHYE (1971: xxiii). Its = N avatara - P.B.) constitution (whether it had 32 verses), its authorship by Siddhasena (the author of the Sanmari and consequently its date have to remain open questions for a number of reasons."
TBVL (introductory pirt). p. 1.17-18. Sicelhasena-Divakarah r apidvalita Sarunuty-ako-prakarana kare ..