Two Siddhasenas And Authorship Of Nyayavatara And Sammati Tarka Pprakarana

Author(s): Piotr Balcerowicz
Publisher: Piotr Balcerowicz

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14 Here: visitha viflista bhinna. Cf. TBV. ad loc.: nästi sad-dravya-mrt pṛthivītvādibkyo vilisto bhinnäḥ so 'pi va... On the meaning of the term visittho cf. also: (1) STP.2.42: Jivo annai-nihano "jiva" ni ya niyamao na vattavvo / jam purisäüya-jīvo devaiya-jiviya-visitho II (TBV. ad loc. has: jīvo 'nādi-nidhano jiva eva videza-vikala iti niyamato na vaktavyam yataḥ puruṣayuska-jivo devayuska-jiväd vidisto jiva eva iti...) and (2) jaha sambandha-visittho so puriso purisa-bhavaniraiasao I taha davvam imdiya-gayam rival-visesanam lahai // (TBV. ad loc. has: yatha pradarfita-sambandha-visistam piträdi-vyapadesom äiritydsau purusa-rüpataya niratidayo 'pi san tatha dravyam api ghräna-rasana-caksus-tvak-frotra-sambandham avapya rupa-rasa-gandha-sparta-sabda-vyapadefa-matram labhate...),
NBh.1.1.38: udaharandpeksas tathēty upasamhäro na tathēti vä sädhyasyopanayaḥ. 36 STP.3.69: baddam miccha-damsana-samaha-maiyassa amaya-sarassa / jina-vayanassa bhagavao samvigga-suhdhigammassa II
37 NA.20: antar-vydpryaiva sädhyasya siddher bahir-udährtih/ vyartha syat tad-asadbhave 'py evam nydya-vido viduḥ !!
38 Cf. FRAUWALLNER (1933) and FRAUWALLNER (1957).
39 See STP.3.8 (the question of the gunas as located in a dravya) and the refutation of Vaisesika in STP.3.9 (there are parydyas in addition to gunas), STP.3.14, 3.24, 3.31 (the notion of anyonyabhava, or mutual non-existence), STP.3.39-40 (the Vaiseșika notions of anu, dvy-anuka and try-anuka, combination and disintegration of the atom). STP.3.49-50.
Samkhya in referred to in STP.3.48, Buddhists in STP.3.48 and 3.50. 41 STPT ad loc. correctly explains visesiyam as visesitam ini videsa-grahanam. 42 Le. the substantial, or substance-expressive viewpoint (dravyarthika-naya, dravyästika-naya), and attributive, or mode-expressive viewpoint (paryayarthika naya, paryāyāstika-naya). See STP.1.3.
43 STP.2.1: jam samanna-ggahanam damsanam eyam visesiyamı* ṇāṇam / donho vi naydna eso padekkam attha-pajjäö II TBV, ad loc. correctly explains visesiyam as videṣitam ini videṣa-grahanam. "STPT ad 2.21 (p.617.27) correctly supplies: mati-jñānam.
45 The verse STP.2.22 refers, in my opinion, to the alleged distinction between kevala-jñāna and kevala-darśana in view of the second hemistich of STP.2.21 that introduces it: "Just like [sensation], in the same manner, the difference between both the absolute (cognition and insight] is this much only...".
In view of the phrase sesimdiya (sesendriya) in STP.2.24, the sensation here must refer to caksur-avagraha (*cakkhuggahia alocana).
The form gheppai corresponds to ghrp I ghrpryate, a root paralel to √grbk (see: PISHEL (1981: § 212. p. 182, § 534. p. 434 and § 548, p. 441).
a The idea of the opponent is that if one accepts that there should be only respective sensory cognition, e.g., olfactory cognition (ghräṇa-jñāna), and the idea of an olfactory insight (ghrana-darśana) be rejected, the same rule should be applied to the sense of sight: one should accept only ocular cognition (cakyur-jñāna) and reject the idea. of ocular insight (caksur-darśana). In the preceding section (STP.2.20) Diväkara - following tradition recognises cakur-darśana as one of four subdivisions of darsana.
STP2.21-24: danisanam oggahamettam "ghado" ni nivvannaṇā havai ṇāņa! jaha ettha kevalána vi visesanam ettiyam ceva ll
damsana-puvvam ninam nana-nimittain tu dainsanan natthi I tena suvinicchiyamo damsaṇa-nānāṇa annatton
IWU SIDDHASENAS AND THE AUTHORSHIP
jai oggahamettam damsanam ti mannasi visesiām nāṇam/ mai-ṇānam eva damsanam evam sai hoi nipphannam II evar sesimdiya-damsanammi niyamena hoi na ya juttam / aha tattha nāṇamettam gheppai cakkhummi vi taheva II
575
50 Cf. NBh.1.1.4: ripam iti jänite rasa iti jänite [p. 20.8] and rupam iti jñanam rasa iti jñānam iti (p. 21.4-5): and NBh.2.1.2 [p. 220.1-2): caksusy asati rúpam na grhyate sati ca grhyate, yac ca yasminn asati na bhavati sati (ca) bhavati tasya tad iti vijñāyate... See also the claim of NBh.2.1.30: yad idam indriya-sannikarşad utpadyate jñānam "vrkṣaḥ" iti etat kila pratyakşam (p. 119.7), with regard to which the doubt is immediately raised (tat khalu anumanam - kasmär? - p. 119.7-8) and eventually resolved (tasmad vrksa-buddhir anumanam na bhavati - p. 120.6). Cf. PBh.2.12.2.a [234] (p. 44): dravye tavat tri-vidhe mahaty aneka-dravyavattvodbhūta-rūpa-prakāśacatustaya-sannikarsad dharmadi-samagrye ca svarupa-locana-matram (this statement goes back to VS.4.1.6). See also the discussion on the non-conceptual and conceptual kinds of perception in NAV.4.4: svalakṣaṇa-visayēndriyaja-nirvikalpaka-jñāna-sadbhave 'pina tavad idam-tayānidaṁ-tayā vārtha-vyavasthitir, yavad vidhi-pratiṣedha-dvāreṇa vikalpa-yugalakam pacaryam nodayate... ("even if the non-conceptual cognition, [which is] produced by the senses [and] whose province is an individual thing, is present, so long there [can be] no determinate cognition of an object [in the form:] "it is this [object]" or "is it not this [object]", as long as a pair of conceptualisations is not resolved by means of confirmation and negation...").
In fact, the constatation of the kind "this is] a pot" ("ghado" tti nivvannaṇā), etc... constitutes a part of the Nyaya definition of perception (NS.1.1.4) and corresponds to what is technically called vyavasdya. This defining characteristic of pratyaksa is described in NBh. ad loc. [p. 22.4-91: düräc cakṣuşd hy ayam artham pasyan navadharayati dhama iti va renur iti va tad etad indriyärtha-sannikarsotpannam anavadharana-jñānam pratyakşam prasajyate ity dha vyavasayamakam iti... Clearly, this defining characteristic of perception corresponds to the Jaina stage of perceptual judgement (apaya, avaya), see TBh.1.15 and SSi.1.15: [2] Tha: yatha suklam rupaṁ kim balākā patākā vēri ("[Speculation questions:] 'Is [this], say, white form a crane or a banner?"); [3] avaya: utpatana-nipatana-pakṣa-vikṣepädibhir balākā evayam na patākēti ("[Perceptual judgement resolves:] 'due to beating with wings, etc., this [white form] is nothing but a crane, not a banner, due to the upward and downward flight"."); [4] dhärand: avetasya käläntare 'vismaraṇa-kāraṇaṁ dhäraṇā yathā sīvāyam balākā pūrvähne yäm aham adrākṣam iti ("Retention is the cause of not forgetting. [even] when some time elapsed, for instance: This is exactly that very crane I saw this morning".").
51 Avagraha-as the first stage of the sensuous cognition (mari-jñāna) - unequivocally implies that the author of STP. accepted the remaining three stages, viz. ihā, apaya
and dharana
52 Cf. TATIA (1951: 77): Siddhasena then quotes an opinion which recognized darsana as "avagraha, simple and pure', and jñana as 'determinate description" of the form 'This is a jar.....
Cf. §§ 2.1-2.2 of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming).
Here I merely recapitulate the conclusions of BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming), where
I dealt with this question at length in §§ 3-5.
35
See BALCEROWICZ (2000: 27-28).
Typically, manah-paryaya is explicitly denied its darsana counterpart (nirdista= nirdarśana).
cf. STP.2.19: jena mano-visaya-gayāṇa damsanaṁ natthi davva-jāyāna | to manapajjava-nanam niyama naṇam tu niddinham II