Systematic Philosophy Between The Empires

Author(s): Johannes Bronkhorst
Publisher: Johannes Bronkhorst

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Reading the Past: Texts and History
Bronkhorst: Systematic Philosophy between the Empires
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of critical debate could easily be assimilated to older practices that already existed in India. Names like those of King Janaka are famous in late-Vedic literature, as are the debates which he is supposed to have organized in those early days. The debates recorded in the Upanişads are, to be sure, totally different from the ones that characterize classical Indian philosophy, and can by no means be looked upon as earlier manifestations of the same thing (Bronkhorst 2002b). But it is at least conceivable that the very memory of kings like Janaka may have encouraged later kings with Brahmanical sympathies, too, to organize debates. The result would not be an Upanişadic debate, but the organizing king would not know. Buddhism, too, preserved the memory of debates, usually between the Buddha and someone else. Being representatives of a missionary religion, Buddhist preachers could hardly avoid engaging in debates, following in this the example of their founder.
I do not think that these historical antecedents alone fully explain why debates subsequently became institutionalized. It seems yet likely that without such institutionalized debates systematic philosophy might have never arisen in India.
APPENDIX ON THE ATOMIC NATURE OF THE SAMKHYA TANMĀTRAS
These considerations anchor the development of Indian philosophy into the firm ground of the sociopolitical reality of its time. Ideas did not follow their logical developments for some abstract logical reasons, but because the philosophers concerned were under pressure to improve their own positions and find weaknesses in those of others. They were under such pressure because they might be called upon to defend their points of view. Seen in this way, the development of Indian philosophy during the period under consideration was in no small measure due to a particular custom that had installed itself at the royal courts and perhaps elsewhere: the custom to organize debates between scholars representing altogether different currents of thought.
Once such a custom has become part of tradition, it may continue even without political pressure. That is to say, scholars may go on critically refining their own positions and continue to show an interest in positions with which they disagree even when there is no king around who may oblige them to participate in a debate. Indeed, debating traditions may persist even in times when the stakes are less high. This does not change the fact that few people, and this includes scholars, will be keen to have their most sacredly held beliefs questioned in public if they are not obliged to submit to such an ordeal. In the Indian situation, it appears, they were obliged to do so.
The question therefore presents itself: Why did kings play this role? How did the custom of organizing debates establish itself in India? And which are the reasons that it maintained itself there for many centuries?
These are difficult questions which cannot be answered by merely studying the philosophical arguments presented in the texts. Quite on the contrary, an answer to these questions may help us understand why those arguments were presented to begin
vith. It is by no means self-evident that arguments are important, or indeed that they have to be considered at all. In India itself voices were heard against the dry reasoning" which was going on in the philosophical schools. These voices became particularly strong when Buddhism declined as a force in society in the second half of the first millennium. It is certainly no coincidence that precisely at that time ritual Mimarsi and the Vedānta philosophy became important, both of which claimed to base themselves on the Veda, which is essentially beyond discussion.
Let us retam to our period. I have suggested in another publication that the confrontation in debate with representatives of totally different points of view may have begun in the parts of northwestern India ruled by Bactrian Greeks. This hypothesis accounts for an important number of known facts. It seems to me the most plausible explanation so far for the appearance of the debate tradition in India.13 This does not change the fact that the presence in India of two strong religious traditions one beside the otherviz., Buddhism and Brahmanism could not but facilitate the confrontation of opinions. The circumstance that during this so-called "dark period of Indian history many rulers appear to have been of foreign origin, and perhaps for this reason less exclusively linked to any one religious tradition, may have played a role as well.
Another factor that may have been of some importance is that this new tradition
Classical Samkhya as we get to know it through its most important text, the Yuktidipikā, does not look upon the tanmatras as being atomic (Bronkhorst 1999d: 686ff.). However, by rejecting this position it indicates that it is aware of it.
The idea of tanmatras as being atomic is found in a variety of texts, both early and late. Shujun Motegi (1986) has drawn attention to the Chinese translation of this term which is more often used to translate anu (see further Imanishi 1961, 1968).
Very important evidence is provided by the Yoga Bhäsya.14 Here we read:15 "The tanmatra is the cause of the element. The single part of the latter) is an atom (paramdnu) which is itself a collection of different component parts which do not exist separately, consisting of a sämánya and a visesa. All tanmatras are like this."'16 This seems to mean that the tanmatra is an atom, the single part of an element (bhura). All, or some, clements may be composed of various tarundtras; the Yoga Bhagya is not however clear about this. It does not look upon the tanmatra as a single quality, but as a collection of a sámánya and a visesa. The višesas are the normal five qualities, sound etc. The sámányos are the five elements, but conceived of as generic qualities, they are corporeality (marti, which is earth), viscosity (sneha; which is water), heat (uprata;
14 See Dasgupta 1924: 66ff., where also some relevant passages from Vijñāna Bhiksu's Yogavdrttika are referred to.
15 YBN 3.44: tanındtram bhitakaranam 1 tasyaiko 'vayavah paramānuh sdmdnyavisesama 'yutasiddhavayavabheddnugatah samuddya ity evam sarvatanmátrán[i] I.
16 The translation consisting of a samanya and a visesa" for samanyavisesarma, rather than "consisting of sämányas and višesas" or the like, seems confirmed by YBh 3,47: sdmdnyavisesayor ayutasiddhavayavabhedanugatah samdho dravyam indriyam "the sense-organ is the substance which is an aggregate whose parts do not exist separately, of sdmdnya and a visesa": here the singular number of sdmänya and visesa is guaranteed by the dual ending of their compound.
13 Bronkhorst 1999a (improved French version 2001a: Italian tr. 2002a), 2000a: 12417. For a study of the establishment of a Greck kingdom in Bactria, see now Holt 1999.