Studies in Jainism

Author(s): Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture Culcutta
Publisher: Ramkrishna Mission Institute of Culture Culcutta

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STUDIES IN JAINISM
important aspect of that school. The fundamental principle of this logical doctrine implies the possibility of a positive and negative predication about the same thing. This doctrine is generally referred to as asti-nāsti, is and is not. According to Jaina logic, affirmative predication about a thing depends upon four conditions-svadravya, svakşetra, svakala, and svabhāva, i.e. its own substance, its own locality, its own time or duration, and its own nature or modification. Correspondingly, the negative predication about the same thing is conditioned by the four things of an opposite nature-paradravya, parakṣetra, parakāla, and parabhava, i.e. other substance, other locality, other time, and other nature. This ornament is made of gold, and it is not made of any other metal-are two obvious predications about the same gold ornament, the affirmation (asti) from the point of view of itself (svadravya) and the negation (năsti) from the point of view of other substances (paradravya). Similarly, it may be said, Socrates was born in Athens, and he was not born in Rome-affirmative predication from svakṣetra and negative predication from parakṣetra point of view, both referring to the same individual. Likewise, we may affirm the historical period of an individual when we refer to his proper time in history (svakala), and deny his relationship to any other period of time (parakala). Tennyson lived in the Victorian age, and he did not live in Elizabethan period. In the same way, the last condition, bhava or mode may be explained. Charles I died on the scaffold, and he did not die in his bed.
From these examples, it is quite obvious that both affirmative and negative predications are possible about the same thing from different points of view. From the same point of view. certainly it would be absurd to talk of affirmation and negation. The affirmative predication is conditioned by one aspect and the negative predication is conditioned by another. It is this difference of aspect that makes the asti-năsti doctrine quite reasonable and enables us to have an affirmative and negative predication about the same object of reality. It may be urged that both asti and nāsti, affirmation and negation, being applicable to the same thing, the doctrine has to apply even to non-existent