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K. C. BHATTACHARYYA
641
indefinite, which "sits lightly on the indefinite" as a detachable definite or affirmation with no existential import, is contrasted with characterless givenness or existence, its negation. To say that a determinate existent A is in one respect and is not in another respect66 "does not mean that A is A and is not B; it means that existent A, as existence universal, is distinct from its particularity"67 (I 341). The determinate existent, therefore, is being and negation distinguishably together (is and is not). The indefinite, on the other hand, which involves non-distinction of being and negation, is neither not affirmed nor non-existent nor a distinction of affirmation and existence; it is a separate mode of truth, "indeterminate" (avaktavyah) (1 341). It is not expressible by any concept, but "a truth has to be admitted if it cannot be got rid of even if it is not understood" (I 342). The four modes of truth implied by the distinction between definite and indefinite are augmented by considering the indefinite either with or distinct from each of them. We thus complete the seven truth values of Jain logic, which Bhattacharyya describes as follows: particular affirmation, universal negation, affirmation and negation distinguishably together as determinate existent, the same indistinguishably together as indefinite, this indefinite as itself an affirmation, the indefinite as many negations together, the indefinite as distinct from the determinate existent. “These modes of truth are not merely many truths but alternative truths" (I 342). Each is alternative with the others, objectively possible. This is indeterminism, not of will but of cognition. What is presented is truth even though thinkable only in alternative ways (I 343).
This treatment of Jain logic is characteristically original. Bhattacharyya's interpretation of anekantavada (non-absolutism) is quite different from that of the Jain philosophers themselves, either classical or contemporary. Jain anekantavada means that in any given case each of the seven predicates (is, is not, etc.) may be asserted, not absolutely (for that would be to reject the others) but relatively, that is, somehow, in some respect (syat).68 The purpose of research is not to
is and is not, is and is indeterminate, is not and is indeterminate, is and is not and is indeterminate. 65 Here again, negation, rather than affirmation, is associated with existence. 66 In some respect: the category "somehow" (syat) of Jain logic.
67 The categories universality and particularity (sakaladesa and vikaladesa) of Jain logic.
68 Syat, the fundamental category of Jain logic, is not mentioned in the article and is referred to only once (I 341).
