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(I 331). The purpose of the paper is to show the necessity of this "indeterministic extension" of ordinary realism, and that togetherness, the fundamental category of realism, is itself manifold, signifying fundamentally different aspects of truth not subsumed under a universal or making a unity (I 332). The Jain category "distinction from distinction" has alternative values, only one of which is the togetherness of ordinary realism. We can think of a composite and its components alternatively but not simultaneously: if the former be given, the latter are its analysis; if the latter, the former is their plurality (I 332). Hegel subordinates distinction to identity, Nyaya (Hindu logic) subordinates identity to distinction, but Jainism makes them coordinate.
Jain logic, like Bhattacharyya's, involves the indefinite, which is thought and therefore objective. Anekantavada contrasts the difference between two definites with the difference between definite and indefinite, "and obtains from their contrast certain other forms of truth, simpler and more complex" (I 338). The objective, and therefore definite, indefinite, with these incompatible elements, is a togetherness of unrelated elements, neither one nor many, to be thought only as alternation (1 339). Anekanta, "the indeterminism or manifoldness of truth," appears primarily in the two forms of difference and nondifference, consecutive presentation and co-presentation." The logical predicament of Jain logic, that "distinction from distinction is other than mere distinction and yet asserts the distinction" (I 339), is grounded in the epistemological predicament that the subject is distinct from the object yet knows the distinction (I 340). This "of-relation," the relation between knowing and content (no-content and content,. no-being and being), is intelligible only by the category of indetermination. Distinction and identity (differenced and undifferenced togetherness, particularity and thinghood) are related by indetermination or alternation; they are in each relation without being in the other relation at the same time. "Identity is distinct from distinction and yet implies it, i.e. is in alternation with it" (I 340).
Ordinary realism, he says, is based on the category of distinction; certain forms of realism, on distinction from distinction; Jain realism, on the indetermination of the two. This indetermination is developed into seven alternative modes of truth." The definiteness of the given
62 Two modes of truth in Jain logic: successive affirmation and negation distinguished from each other (both is and is not), simultaneous affirmation and negation rejecting an incompatible synthesis (is indeterminate).
63 The Jain categories part-expression (vikaladesa) and whole-expression (sakaladesa).
64 The seven truth values of Jain logic: somehow it is, is not, is indeterminate,
