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for a direct and explicit consideration of the central problem of philosophy, the nature of the Absolute. The ruling category of this address is taken from his interpretation of Jainism, but the content obviously reflects Kant's threefold critique, the vocabulary sometimes suggests Hegel, and the epistemological approach is characteristic of Vedanta. In his own copy the author marked paragraphs 2-4, 7, 15, 27-29, 31-41, and 44 with the letter O, and Gopinath Bhattacharyya suggests that O might have meant "omit" in anticipation of an abridged version. Taking this hint, I will base my summary primarily on the paragraphs not so marked.
“Philosophy starts in reflective consciousness.” This first sentence of the address asserts Bhattacharyya's attitude toward philosophy. It needs no external motivation, either wonder as in the Western tradition or suffering as in the Hindu tradition. It is the natural activity of the human, "reflective,” consciousness. Reflection is awareness of the relation between subject and object, consciousness and its content. "It is in reference to this relation that the concept of the absolute has to be understood” (II 125).
Within reflection consciousness and content are somehow distinct, yet their identity cannot be denied (II 126). Their relation is indefinite. But whatever appears as indefinite in some respect demands to be definable in that respect, and if such indefiniteness necessarily appears to a stage of consciousness, that stage demands a higher where the indefinite is defined (II 127). The demand is for a "supra-reflective consciousness” where the distinction of consciousness and content becomes clear. The concept of the Absolute belongs to such supra-reflective consciousness. It need not involve identity of consciousness and content. It is hypothetically understood within reflection simply as “a completely definite distinction of content and consciousness” (II 128).
It is already apparent that Bhattacharyya, if not actually rejecting, is certainly transcending the doctrines of his earlier phases. The logic of the indefinite is still required, but the indefinite as such is considered a challenge rather than a position, and the demand is for defining the Absolute, instead of conceding its apparent indefinability as ultimate. The search for the Absolute leads to a higher form of consciousness, that is, to "the Subject as Freedom," but the previously presupposed superior cognitive value of the subjective attitude is questioned, and the object or content, so ruthlessly condemned as illusory in the subject-oriented dialectic of that book, is now given its day in court. This is anekantavada in action.
