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Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
phical traditions, particularly in Nyaya and Sankhya school, but in due course of time they got it associated with their concept of five-fold knowledge. Thus, whatever development of Jaina theory of Pramana is seen in Jainism, is the result of its synthesis with Palica januvada. While classifying the Pramana some new concepts came into existence. They are undoubtedly unique contributions of Jaina philosophy. For instance, Smrti (memory), Pratyabhijñā (recognition) and Tarka (Induction) were for the first time considered as Pramāņa.
We shall now see as to how the development of Pramāṇavāda took place in Jaina āgamas. Jaina agamas refer three and four types of Pramāņa accepted by Sankhya and Naiyayikas, respectively. Sthānanga clearly mentions three types of Vyavasaya (determinate cognition), i.e., Pratyaksa (perception), Prätyika and Anugamika (inference ) whereas Bhagavati mentions four types of Vyavasaya, i.e., Pratyaksa, Anumana, Upamana (comparison) and Agama (verbal testimony). Similarly, in Sthänänga four types of pramāṇas called Hetu are mentioned.
In this way Sthänänga mentions both, threefold and four-fold classification of Pramana in the form of Vyavasaya and Hetu, respectively. Anuyogadvarasūtra not only clearly mentions four types of Pramāņa but also elaborately discusses each of them. The details about the four Pramāņas given by Anuyogadvārasūtra is very much similar to that of Nyaya school. As I have stated earlier, Bhagavati refers to the Anuyogadvāra for more details about the Pramāņas. It indicates that at the time of Valabhi council (c. 5th A. D. ) the concept of four types of Pramana had already been accepted by Jaina philosophers but when Pramanavada got synthesized with the conception of five-fold knowledge, the Upamana (comparison) had no place in it.
Later, Siddhasena Divakara in his Nyāyāvatāra and Haribhadrasūri in his Anekāntajayapatākā
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mentioned only three types of Pramāņas. Umāsvāti (c. 3rd-4th A. D.) for the first time declared five-fold knowledge as Pramāṇa and divided it into two classes Pratyakṣa and Parokṣa. Later on, Nandisūtra divided Pratyaksa in two sub-classes Sämvyavahārika and Paramarthika, including sensory perception into the first one andAvadhi, Manah-paryaya and Kevala into the second, respectively. The four Agamic divisions of Matijana-Avagraha (the cognition of an object as such without a further positing of the appropriate name, class, ctc.); Iha (the thought process that is undertaken with a view to specifically ascertain the general object that has been grasped by avagraha ); Avaya ( when further attentiveness to final ascertainment takes place regarding the particular feature grasped at the stage of Thā) and Dharaṇā (the constant stream of the ascertainment, the impression left behind it and the memory made possible by this impression, all these operations or the form of matijina are called dharana) were accepted as the two classes of sensory perception. The indirect knowledge (Paroksa-jfäna) enumerated the cognition originated from mind (manasajanya jina) and Verbal testimony ( Śrutajñāna) with a view that Inference (Anumana) etc. are the forms of Manasajanya-jñāna.
Thus, the attempt to synthesize the concept of Pramana with the theory of five-fold knowledge in the true sense begins from the period of Umāsvāti. Acarya Umasvati maintains that these five types of cognition (knowledge) are five pramāņas and divides these five cognition into two Pramāņas direct and indirect. Pt. Malvania has observed that the first attempt of this synthesis was made in Anuyogadvarasütra, the only text accommodating Naiyayika's four-fold division of Pramana into knowledge. But this attempt not being in accordance with the Jaina view, the later scholars tried to solve this problem and ultimately succeeded in doing so. They discussed the
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