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or practically all of them. Such shared convictions existed. Practically all philu pners of Classical India, for example, believed in the doctrine of karma and Delieved in the close correspondence between language and reality. The reflect analysis of these two convictions exerted a profound influence on the doctrines the various schools. Some of these doctrines can indeed be looked upon as the direct outcome of this intellectual confrontation. In this essay I will concentrate the second of these two convictions: the belief in the close correspondence between
vel in the close correspondence between language and reality
Correspondence between language and reality means first of all that the objed_ in uie pnenomenal world correspond to the words of language. This observation may sound innocent enough, but it was given quite amazing twists by certain thinkers. Many Buddhists, for example, had come to believe that the obiects o pnenomenal world do not really exist. They do not exist because they are composite they consist of constituent parts. For reasons that cannot be dealt with at this moment these Buddhists maintained that only the constituent parts exist, but anything that is made up of them, that is, macroscopic -any of the things that fill
that is, macroscopic-any of the things that fill phenomenal reality-does not. This led them to ask the question: what are these mar
them to ask the question: What are these macroscopic objects, and wny do we tend to think they exist? The answer is that they are nothing but words-or, if you like, notions imposed upon reality by the words of language
upon reality by the words of language Most Branmanical thinkers disagreed with the imputed unreality of the phenomena world, but agreed that there is a close correspondence between words and thine Some of them went to the extent of analyzing the use of words in order to arrive at deeper understanding of objective reality.
All of these developments, although important cannot be dealt with her However, the belief in the correspondence between language and reality w extended, during the early centuries of the common era, from a mere belief in the correspondence between words and things to something more encompassing that
ning more encompassing that includes the conviction that statements as well correspond to the situations they de scribe. Or, more precisely (but still not perfectly): the words that make up a statement correspond to the "things" that constitute the situation described. Once again this conviction looks relatively harmless at first sight. After all, a statement like "John alle an apple" might be taken to describe a situation that is constituted of the three
c ments John, the act of eating, and an apple. Many, perhaps most, statements are such that they do not necessarily clash with this conviction. But some do. Take "John makes a pot." This statement describes a situation in which John and the acto making have their place, but the pot is not yet there. In other words, the words that make up the statement "John makes a pot" do not correspond to the things tha constitute the situation described. The same difficulty arises whenever something said about something coming into being. If we say "The pot comes into being there is clearly nothing in the situation described corresponding to the word "pot"
I am sure that many people nowadays would conclude from statements like "John makes a pot" and "the pot comes into being" that apparently the w
HU e por comes into being" that apparently the words of statement do not always correspond to the elements that make up the situation described. This would certainly be my reaction Interesting
u. Inis would certainly be my reaction. Interestingly, to the best of
knowledge all Indian thinkers of say, the first five centuries of me comm n nt draw this conclusion. I have studied the question in some clear com the writings of authors belonging to all currents of Indian philosophy. 86 all three maior religions of that period: Brahmanism, Budonist, onwine surprise I found that all these thinkers held on to this position and med various ways to resolve the difficulties to which it gave rise. All of the bene the words of a statement correspond to the elements that make up the situation the words of a statement corres described, also in the case of statements like "John makes a pot" and the pot comes into being."
Shortly I will discuss some of the solutions that were onero c o n arise in this manner. First, however, I wish to deal with a question that may cross u r minds at this point. Why did the Indian thinkers of that period hold on to a conviction that is so obviously in contradiction with every ance is this another example of intellectuals accepting a position wnosc acum visible to a child? Is this one more case of philosophers
l am not at all inclined to draw any such conclusions, and I would like to draw attention to two factors that no doubt encouraged the thinkers on that time not to give in their position simply because it seemed to contradict every one thing a number of thinkers, most notably the Buddhists, had already for other
one thing a number of thinkers, m acons come to the conclusion that the phenomenal world is ac n ntradiction between phenomenal reality and the conviction they che con not therefore, endanger this conviction. Equally important is the presence that time of a tradition of rational inquiry, which I mentioned earlier. Philosophers had hecome convinced that their reasons and arguments were end taken seriously-as seriously or even more so than tradition, revelation, and insight. We know that in ancient Greece one group of thinkers, the Eleatics, did not hesitate to reject perceived reality on the basis not of tradition, revelation, or special insight but of mere argument. The early Indian thinkers, too, proceeded on the basis of their newly acquired confidence in the power of human reason. Those of us who feel superior to them might do well to recall that our phenomenal reality, too, hidesa
plethora of entities--molecules, atoms, subatomic particles-the existence of which o willinoly accept on the basis of reasons provided and experiments can others.
What solutions did the Indian thinkers offer to the difficulties they thus encount tered, and which we might be tempted to consider to be of their own making? What does the word "pot" refer to in the sentences "John makes a pot" and "the pot fomes into being"? The literature concerned contains a variety of answers, earlier. Here I will concentrate on only a few of them.
Perhaps the simplest and in a way most obvious answer was adopted by the Samkhya school of Brahmanical philosophy, mentioned earlier. We are relatively well informed about the early history of this school. Most elements of its classical teachings figure in early works, such as the great epic of India, the Mandoidaan other texts. One important element, however, I never meno accounts and must have been a rather recent innovatio n
Philosophy East & West
Johannes Bronkhorst
