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The Origin of Mimämsä as a School of Thought
texts.42 Treating Smrti texts like the Veda implies, among other things, accepting their prescriptions without needing to justify them,43 or to worry about the intentions of their authors.44 Bhāruci's way of interpreting the Manusmrti illustrates this. Not only does he account for every statement in the Manusmrti as being vidhi, niyama, parisamkhyā or arthavāda (Derrett 1975, I: 25), as would a Mimāmsaka when dealing with a Vedic text, but also no reasons are given to justify the contents of those statements. What is more, passages where Manu himself gives reasons embarrass the commentator. Rather than taking them as reasons, Bhāruci sees them as arthavadas, "whereupon they cease to embarrass" (Derrett 1975, I: 27).45 An example is Manu 11.12(13): "He may take three or two things at his pleasure from the dwelling of a Sūdra (for the success of the sacrifice), for the Šūdra has no business with sacrifices. 46 The second half of this verse would seem to give a reason for the first half, but Bharuci explains it otherwise: it is an arthavada. Still on the same verse, Bharuci points out that Manu elsewhere forbids asking property from a Südra for a sacrifice, and obviously anticipates surprise that one can take what one cannot ask for. His response: "There is nothing which is too heavy for a text, for our śāstra is concerned to teach us."47 Derrett explains in a note: "It seems unreasonable that a Sudra's property should be forbidden if it is asked for, but suitable if purloined. But if that is what the text requires, we must accept it."
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It seems that the importance of Mimämsä in earlier Dharmaśāstra is Lingat 1973: 148 (similarly Keith 1921: 97) writes: "Vasistha (III. 20), Baudhāyana (I.1.1.8). and Manu (XII111) call a mimamsaka to sit in the parişads which are given the role of resolving controversial questions. It seems that very early the Mimāmsā was regarded as an indispensable science for the interpreter." None of these passages uses the term mimamsaka. Manu 12.111, for example, has the word tarki which some later commentators - but not Bhāruci and Medhätithi, the earliest ones - associate with Mimämsä. The fact that the Yajnavalkya Smrti (1.3) ranks the Mimamsa amongst the bases (sthana) of the knowledge of dharma, along with Nyaya and the Vedāngas, does not at all need to imply that Mimämsä is to be used in interpreting Dharmaśāstra texts (such as the Yājñavalkya Smrti itself). Cl. Lingat 1973: 107: "In the time of the commentators) the human origin of the dharma. Śástras) had ... been completely obliterated. It was an article of faith that the precepts which they contained derived from Sages of the remotest antiquity, and their authority was accord ingly beyond dispute. They appeared as if they were scripture, timeless, etemal; the whole of them, along with the epics and the puranas, brought to men the voice of a tradition which was both holy and in conformity with the order of nature. The commentators and authors of juridical treatises could not imagine their role as anything other than that of interpreters, concerned only to explain the meaning of texts whose authenticity and religious importance they did not doubt for one moment." On Medhātithi's ideas about the role of Manu, see Wezler 1998. For the way reasons are dealt with, see further Lingat 1973: 154-155. Derrett 1975, I: 234: aharet trini và dve vá kämam Sudrasya veśmanah | na hi sudrasya yajneşu kaścid asti parigrahah. Tr. Derrett 1975, II: 345-346. Derrett 1975, I: 234: na vacanasyåribhåro 'sty upadeśaparatvác chástrasya. Tr. Derrett 1975, II: 346.
