________________ 180 MASAAKI HATTORI criticism, we may know the incentive that urged Prasastapada to create a new category. He intended to defend the older Vaisesika theory against Dignaga's attack. The reason for the marked difference between Prasastapada and the Vaisesikas known to Dignaga in their theories of the example may also be explained if we place Dignaga between the two. Dignaga mentions four kinds of fallacious example, among which the last one is that which simply shows the simultaneous presence or simultaneous absence of the sadhyadharma and the reason without stating the invariable relation between them 40. In the passage explaining the fallacy of this type of example, the Vaisesika definition 'ubhayaprasiddho dTstantah' is cited by Dignaga. According to Dignaga, one has to show in the example that the reason is pervaded by the sadhyadharma 41: the reason should be accompanied by the sadhyadharma on the one hand, and it should be on the other hand absent where there is no sadhyadharma. The relation of pervader and pervaded between the sadhyadharma and the reason should not be reversed. If that which pervades the sadhyadharma were stated as the reason, it would not be sufficient to prove the proposition, since it allows the case in which there is the reason but not the sadhyadharma. Thus, the example which shows the mere simultaneous presence of the sadhyadharma and the reason is not a true example, because the simultaneous presence of the two does not prove that their relation is invariable; and moreover it allows the possibility of the relation of pervader and pervaded being reversed. Prasastapada must have been well aware of Dignaga's theory when he observed, with terms similar to Dignaga's, that the exemplification (nidarsana) is the showing of the invariable conformity (anuvidhana) of the inferential mark to the object of inference, or that it is the showing of the absence of the inferential mark in that which is opposite to the object of inference (anumeyaviparyaye lingasyabhavah) 42 The classification of an example into two, the one through similarity (sadharmya) and the other through dissimilarity (vaidharmya), is found in the Nyayasutra, but the relation of pervader and pervaded between the sadhyadharma and the reason was not properly understood even by Vatsyayana 43. Dignaga emphasized his explanation of this relation, while Prasastapada simply states it without giving any explanation. This, I believe, is evidence of Prasastapada's dependence on Dignaga. 40 PS, chap. IV, K 152b.2--4, V 63 a.6--7. 41 Nyayamukha, k. 11 = PS, chap. IV, k. 2, K 148 a.6, V 63 b.8. Cf. NV, p. 129.11ff. 42 PDhS, p. 246.15-18 (p. 611.16--19). 43 Cf. Nyayabhasya, ad sutra 1.1.35--37.
