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Prasastapāda and Dignaga
understood it, to viruddha. Prasastapāda cites 'viṣāņi tasmad asvaḥ' as an example of viruddha 35.
Noteworthy is the phraseology that Prasastapada uses in his explanation of viruddha. It is surprisingly close to Dignaga's expression. Prasastapāda says: "The reason ... which is present in the opposite of the object of inference, is a contradictory reason (viruddha), because it proves the opposite of what is to be proved (viparitasadhanāt) 36" It is highly improbable that Dignaga criticized the Vaiseṣika theory with the phraseology borrowed from Prasastapāda or his Vaiseṣika predecessor. Dignaga fully discusses elsewhere the fallacies of reason on the basis of the hetucakra, which he invented to examine all the possible relations between a reason and a sadhyadharma 37. The characteristic feature of each type of fallacious reason is made clear by him through this procedure. Prasastapāda also has a clear notion of each fallacious reason, but his description of it is rather concise. He seems merely to summarize the theories elaborated by someone. But Dignaga's criticism shows evidently that the distinctive feature of viruddha was not properly known to the pre-Dignaga Vaiseşikas. It is almost certain that Prasastapada is indebted to Dignaga for his explanation of the viruddha fallacy. As for the reason that causes doubt (samdigdha), Dignaga criticizes the Vaiseṣikas for their mentioning only the one which is present both in things homogeneous with the subject of the proposition and in things heterogeneous to it, which Dignaga calls sadhāraṇānaikantika, and for their not mentioning asādhāraṇa and viruddhavyabhicārin 38. asādhāraṇa means that which is present exclusively in the subject of the proposition, as for example the audibility (śrāvanatva) of sound, while viruddhavyabhicarin signifies a pair of valid reasons which, when combined, proves two contradictory properties predicated of the same subject, thus causing doubt. These two types of doubtful reasons are classified by Prasastapāda under the head of anadhyavasita, which is not found in Dignaga's system. It has already been shown by scholars that the view to which Prasastapāda refers with 'tti kecit' when distinguishing anadhyavasita from samdigdha is the one held by Dignaga 39. In the light of Dignaga's
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35 PDhS, p. 238 (p. 604.25).
36 Ibid., p. 238.17-19 (p. 604.23-24): yo hý anumeye 'vidyamāno 'pi tatsamānajātītye sarvasmin nästi tadviparite casti sa viparitasadhanad viruddhaḥ.
37 PS, chap. III, K 131 b.6ff., V 49a.6ff.
38 Ibid., K 147b.2 ff., V 63 a.6 ff. For the same reason Dignaga criticizes the Vädavidhi, cf. PS, K 145a.7, V 61 a.5-6.
39 The explanation of viruddhavyabhicärin in the Nyayamukha is cited by Prasastapada, cf. Tucci, The Nyayamukha of Dignaga, Heidelberg 1930, p. 31, n. 58.
