Note On Development Of Vaisesika Theory Of Anumana

Author(s): Masaaki Hattori
Publisher: Masaaki Hattori
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/269227/1

Page #1

PRAŠASTAPĀDA AND DIGNĀGA?
A NOTE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE VAIŠEŞIKA
THEORY OF ANUMĀNA
By Masaaki Hattori, Kyoto
In the third chapter of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, Dignāga quotes from a certain Vaiseșika treatise a definition of the logical reason (hetu), which runs: tadvaddharmasya (abhidhānam) hetuh = A reason is (a state
. In a recent issue of this journal, L. SCHMITHAUSEN published an article "Zur Lehre von der vorstellungsfreien Wahrnehmung bei Prasastapāda" (WZKSA 14, 1970, pp. 125—129) in which he criticised my paper "Two types of non-qualificative perception" (Beiträge zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens, Festschrift für Erich Frauwallner. Wien 1968, pp. 161–169) in some points. His arguments based on careful analysis of the relevant materials were very convincing, and obliged me to make emendations to my interpretation of Prasastapāda's theory of perception. This paper is not intended as a rejoinder. I only discuss Dignāga's influence on Prasastapāda's theory of anumāna, which I could not treat in my former article.
In this paper I use the following abbreviations: NS: Nyāyasūtra of Gautama, ed. by GANGĀNĀTHA JHĀ, Poona 1939
(Poona Oriental Series, No. 58) NV: Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara, ed. by VINDHYEŚVARIPRASĀDA
DVIVEDIN, Benares 1916 (Kashi Skt. Ser.). PDhS: Padārthadharmasamgraha of Prasastapāda (= Prasastapāda
bhāşya), ed. (1) together with Nyāyakandali of Sridhara, by VINDHYEŚVARIPRASĀDA DVIVEDIN, Benares 1895 (Vizianagram Skt. Ser.), (2) together with Sūkti, Setu and Vyomavati, by GOPINATH KAVIRĀJ, Benares 1930 (Chowkhambā Skt. Ser.). The page and line numbers in ed. (2) are given in parentheses. Pramāṇasamuccaya and Vștti of Dignāga, Tibetan Version, The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking ed., Reprint, Tokyo-Kyoto 1957. K = Kanakavarman's transl. (No. 5702), V = Vasudhararakṣita's transl. (No. 5701). The reconstituted Sanskrit texts in this paper are taken from MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA's edition of the Vaiseşikasūtra,
Appendix 7. VS:
Vaišeşikasūtra of Kaņāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda, ed. by MUNI JAMBUVIJAYA, Baroda 1961 (Gaekwad's Oriental Ser., No. 136).
PS:

Page #2

170
MASAAKI HATTORI
ment) of a property of tadvat2. From Dignaga's explanation, it is known that this definition was preceded by a definition of the proposition (pratijñā): sadhyābhidhānam pratijñā A proposition is a statement of that which is to be proved3. In reference to this latter, the rather ambiguous term tadvat is understood as meaning sadhyavat, that which possesses the sadhya (-dharma), i. e., the subject of a proposition (dharmin). Also in PS, chap. IV, a Vaiseṣika definition of the example (dṛṣṭanta) is quoted, most probably from the same treatise, as: ubhayaprasiddho dṛṣṭantaḥ An example is that in which both (the sadhyadharma and the reason) are well known (to be present or absent) 5. Neither the title of the Vaiseṣika work from which Dignaga quoted, nor the name of the author of that work, is given by Dignaga or by his commentator Jinendrabuddhi. However, we know from these quotations that the Vaiseṣikas built up their theory of the syllogism before Dignaga's time, giving a definition to each member of the syllogism. Our sources for the study of the early Vaiseṣika system are very scanty, and we can hardly ascertain in which period the Vaiseṣikas came to form this theory. It is not traceable in the Vaiseṣikasutra. The definition of the proposition is virtually identical with that found in the Nyāyasūtra. The definitions of the reason and the example are simpler than those in the Nyayasutra. However, this does not necessarily mean that the Vaiśeşika theories as referred to by Dignaga are older than the Nyayasutra. The existence of a series of Vaiseṣika works attested by Mallavadin and his commentator Simhasuri, who is supposed to have lived not much later than Dignaga, seems to show that the school tradition of the Vaiseṣikas was kept without interruption up to the time of Dignaga". If the more advanced theory of the syllogism had been formulated, prior to Dignaga, by the Vaiseṣikas, Dignaga ought to have referred to it.
=
2 PS, K 140b.2: bye brag pa rnams kyan "de ldan chos ni gtan tshigs so" brjod pa ses bya ba cjug go. V 56b.5: bye brag pa rnams kyi "de dan ldan paci chos gtan tshigs so" ses brjod par byed do.
3 Ibid., K 140b.3: cdir yan gal te deci sgra "bsgrub bya brjod pa" dan cbrel par byed na... V 56b.6: cdir yan gal te de ses paci sgras "bsgrub bya brjod pa" dan mnon par cbrel par gyur te...
4 Dignaga gives various possible interpretations to the word tadvat in his examination of the Vaiśesika definition of hetu, Cf. PS, K 140b.3 ff., V 56b.6ff.
5 Ibid., K 155b.7: bye brag pa rnams kyi "gñi ga rab tu grub pa ni dpeco" ses bya ba... V 70a.3: bye brag pa rnams ni "gñis ka rab tu grub pa dpeco" ses zer ro. Cf. also K 152b.3, V 67a.5.
Cf. NS, 1.1.33-37.
7 A. THAKUR, Introduction to JAMBUVIJAYA's edition of the Vaiseşikasūtra, pp. 10-14.

Page #3

Prasastapāda and Dignāga
171
Thus, it may be reasonable to consider that the theories which Dignāga takes up for criticism were maintained by the contemporary Vaišeşikas.
When we compare the Vaiseșika definition of the proposition, etc. as referred to by Dignāga with the same as explained in the Padārthadharmasamgraha of Prasastapāda, we cannot but acknowledge a distinct gap between the two. Prasastapāda is found to have introduced new ideas to the Vaišeşika system with an entirely new phraseology, but, while doing so, he does not explain at all the reason for introducing new concepts. Take for example his definition of the proposition: anumeyoddeso 'virodhi pratijñā = A proposition is a statement of the object of inference which does not involve contradiction. The new word anumeya is found employed in place of sādhya, and the meaning of anumeyoddesaḥ is deliberately explained as follows: pratipipādayişitadharmavisistasya dharmiņo 'padeśavişayam āpādayitum uddešamātram pratijñā = A proposition is a mere statement, with a view to showing that to which the reason (apadeśa) applies, of a subject as qualified by the property, which it is desired to prove. The word avirodhin is also new to the Vaiseşikas, and it is intended to mean that the proposition should be free from the five kinds of fallacy, that is to say, it should not be contradicted by perception (pratyakşa), inference (anumāna), scripture (āgama, or accepted theory: abhyupagata), one's own treatise (svaśāstra), and one's own words (svavacana).
Prasastapāda is known to have composed, besides the Padārthadharmasamgraha, an extensive subcommentary (tikā) on a certain Bhāșya, which had been written on the Vaišeşikasūtra accompanied by a Vākya'. It may be assumed that he fully explained in that lost work the 'new concepts that he introduced to the Vaiseșika system. However, even on this assumption there remains a problem to be cleared up. The views propounded by Prasastapāda are not of such kind as could be derived from the pre-Dignāga Vaiseșika doctrines with a slight modification. There must have been an incentive which induced Prasastapāda to make some essential changes in the Vaiseșika theories. On this point Dignāga's criticism of the Vaišeșika and the Naiyāyika theories of inference and syllogism seems to throw some fresh light.
Dignāga takes up for criticism the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition: sädhyanirdesaḥ pratijñā (NS, 1.1.33), which is substantially the same as the older (i. e., pre-Dignāga) Vaiseșika definition. According to him the word sādhya simply means that which is contrary to siddha,
8 PDhs, p. 233ff. (p. 599 ff.).
9 THAKUR, op. cit., p. 14; G. CHEMPARATHY, "Prasastapāda and his other names," IIJ, XII (1970), p. 252, n. 45.

Page #4

172
MASAAKI HATTORI
i. e., that which has not yet been proved (asiddha). Thus, a reason and an example, which have not yet been proved to be true, should also be recognized as sādhya. Such being the case, if the Naiyāyika definition of proposition were to be accepted, there would follow the absurdity that the statement of the reason and the example of this sort would also be regarded as a proposition. For example, when one states, in order to prove that sound is evanescent, the reason because it is visible (cākṣuşatvāt)', the statement of this reason would be considered as a proposition, inasmuch as the visibleness of sound has not yet been proved (asiddha = sādhya). When one states the proposition and the reason as 'sound is eternal', 'because it is not tangible, (asparśatvāt)', and then gives the example 'like buddhi', the statement of this example is also to be admitted as a proposition, since whether buddhi is eternal or evanescent has not yet been proved 10. Thus the defining of proposition as sādhyanirdeśaḥ was found to be defective by Dignāga.
After thus refuting the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition, Dignāga states that the same criticism applies to the definition given in the Vādavidhi: sādhyābhidhānam pratijñāll. This is exactly identical with the one formulated by the pre-Dignāga Vaišeşikas. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaišeşikas had to answer this criticism either by defending their definition through finding some justification for it or by making an alteration to their definition. Uddyotakara chose the first means: he emphatically repeated that the word sādhya was explained by Vātsyāyana as signifying prajñāpaniyadharmavisistadharmin (a subject as qualified by the property, which is to be made known)12. On the other hand, Prasastapāda decided for the second means: he adopted a new expression anumeya in place of sādhya. "
The term anumeya is used by Dignāga with a purpose. In his criticism of the Naiyāyika definition of the proposition, Dignāga points out the ambiguity of the meaning of the word sādhya13. It could mean, firstly, the subject of the proposition (dharmin), secondly, a property possessed by the subject (dharma), and thirdly, the combination of the subject and the property. Dignāga then proceeds to demonstrate that any one of these three cannot be recognized as sādhya. Take for example the statement 'sound is evanescent'. As a matter of fact, the dharmin 'sound' is known to exist (siddha), and it is unnecessary to establish it
10 PS, chap. III, K 125b.2-4, V 43 b.6-44a.1. Cf. NV, p. 110.14ff.
11 PS, chap. III, K 126 a.3: ji ltar rigs pa can rnams la skyon brjod pa de ltar rtsod pa bsgrub par bśad pa la yan, bsgrub bya gtan tshigs dan dpe Itar snan ba béad pa dam bcac bar egyur ro. V 44 a.7. Cf. NV, p. 117.20.
12 NV, p. 110.14—20. 13 PS, chap. III, K 125b.4—7, V 44a.1-3.

Page #5

Prasastapāda and Dignāga
173
by means of a reason. Thus the first alternative would violate the statement in NS, 1.1.34: ... sādhyasādhanam hetuḥ (The reason is a means to establish the sādhya). If sūdhya were to mean the dharma ‘evanescence', then there would be no example that possesses a similarity to the sādhya. There are things which are similar to sound in their evanescent nature, but nothing is similar to 'evanescence since this possesses no property. Thus the second alternative would contradict the definition of the example in NS, 1.1.36: sādhyasādharmyāt ... (Through similarity with the sādhya ...). The third alternative has the defects of the first and the second. The same type of argument is made by Dignāga in his refutation of the Vaiseșika definition of the reason 14. Dignāga himself holds that what is to be proved is the subject qualified by the property (dharmavišiştadharmin), and termed it anumeya (object of inference) 15. It seems likely that Prasastapāda followed Dignāga when he used the term anumeya in his definition of the proposition and explained it by the words dharmavisüstadharmin.
It has been noticed by STCHERBATSKY and other scholars that the fallacies of the proposition removed by Prasastapāda with the word avirodhin are similar to those mentioned in the texts of Dignāga's school16. Dignagā's definition of paksa (proposition) is given in the Nyāyamukha as follows: svayam sādhyatvenepsitaḥ pakso viruddhārthānirākrtaḥ17. The last word is meant for removing the fallacies of the proposition, and it exactly corresponds to avirodhin in Prasastapāda's definition. Attention is to be drawn to the similarity of sādhyatvenepsita with Prasastapāda's expression pratipipādayişita. Prasastapāda had no precedent to follow in the use of this desiderative form, but Dignāga evidently derived it from the definition of paksa in the Vādavidhāna of Vasubandhu, which runs: pakşo yaḥ sādhayitum iştah = A proposition is that which it is desired to prove18. Uddyotakara, who takes up this definition for criticism, understands that the word ista is intended for distinguishing the proposition from the reason and example which are
14 Ibid., K 140b.3ff., V 56b.6 ff.
15 Ibid., K 111a.6: rjes su dpag pasr bya ba) ni chos khyad par can gyi chos can yin te. V 30a.1: rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du byas pa'i chos can no. Cf. Pramāņavārttikabhāşya, ed. by R. SĀNKĘTYĀYANA, Patna 1953, p. 580.14.
16 STCHERBATSKY, ,,Rapports entre la théorie bouddhique de la connaissance et l'enseignement des autres écoles philosophiques de l'Inde," le Muséon, V, p. 129ff. (Cf. Buddhist Logic, vol. I, p. 346, n. 2); RANDLE, Indian Logic in the Early Schools, London 1930, p. 216.
17 Nyāyamukha, k. 1, cited in NV, p. 116.7, 9, 17. 18 NV, p. 113.6.

Page #6

174
MASAAKI HATTORI
not yet proved 19. A disputant does not set forth a reason and an example with the desire to prove, but he mentions them as a known property of the subject of the proposition and as a known fact in which both the reason and the sadhyadharma are present or absent. Thus the word ista is effective to characterize the proposition as distinct from the yet unproved reason and example. As we have seen above, this idea underlies Dignaga's criticism of the Naiyayika definition of the proposition, and we may assume that Dignaga inherited it from Vasubandhu. In his Ţikā on the Vādavidhāna, Dignaga slightly modified Vasubandhu's definition by adding the word svayam to it, as he thought it necessary to make clear that it is the disputant himself, and not an opponent, who desires to prove his proposition in a debate 20. The definition found in the Nyayamukha was formulated through this process. In the Pramanasamuccaya 21 we find the expression svarupena in place of sadhyatvena. But this does not make an essential change, because Dignaga himself explains in the commentary that svarupena means 'in its own form as a sadhya' but not 'as a yet unproved sadhana'. The essential term ista is of course not omitted in the Pramaṇasamuccaya. Thus in the case of Dignaga, the process through which he came to formulate his definition of the proposition is clearly traceable. On the contrary, in the Vaiseṣika system, there is no internal evidence to explain a considerable change from the older theory to Prasastapāda's. It is highly probable that Prasastapāda was conscious of the implication of the word ista (or ipsita) in Dignaga's definition when he expressed his thought with the desiderative form pratipipadayiṣita.
It has already been remarked by scholars that the theory of the three necessary conditions that an inferential mark should satisfy (linga-trairupya), which Prasastapāda sets forth in a verse and ascribes to Kasyapa, is exactly identical with the theory generally acknowledged as being expounded by Dignaga. It has also been pointed out that there
19 Cf. NV, p. 113.5-7: sadhyayor hetudṛṣṭantayoḥ prasanga iti manyamanaiḥ kaiścid anyatha pakṣalakṣaṇāni kriyante tadyatha pakso yaḥ sadhayitum ista iti.
20 Cf. NV, p. 117.1-2: yad api vadavidhānaṭīkāyām sädhayatiti sabdasya svayam parena ca tulyatvät svayam iti viśeşanam. For the authorship of this tikā, see FRAUWALLNER, "Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyayavārttikam," WZKM 40 (1933), pp. 294-296.
21 PS, K 124b.7-8 (V 43a.4-5): de yan ran gi no bo kho na batan bdag cdod (cf. Nyayabindu, ed. by D. MALVANIA, Patna 1955, III.38: svarūpeṇaiva svayam isto 'niräkṛtaḥ paksa iti). ran gi no bo ses bya ba ni bsgrub bya yi no bos yin gyis sgrub byed ma grub paci no bos ni ma yin no (cf. Nyayabindu, III.39-40: svarupeneti sadhyatveneṣṭaḥ, svarupenaiveti sadhyatvenaivesto na sadhanatvenapi).

Page #7

Prasastapāda and Dignaga
is a close affinity between Prasastapāda and Dignaga in their theories of fallacious reasons. And the dependence of Prasastapāda on Dignāga was accepted by STCHERBATSKY and other scholars on the basis of the fact that these theories are ascribed by the later Bauddhas and their opponents always to Dignaga and never to Prasastapāda 22. However, some other scholars like FADDEGON and RANDLE did not admit the chronological priority of Dignaga to Prasastapāda and assumed that both of them had a common source from which each derived his theory independently of the other 23. When we examine Dignaga's criticism of the Vaiseṣika view of fallacious reasons, we cannot but believe that Prasastapada changed the older Vaiseṣika theory under the influence of Dignaga. I will show some evidence below.
Dignaga quotes VS, 3.1.10-11, which he understood as mentioning three kinds of anapadesa (fallacious reason), i. e., aprasiddha, asat and samdigdha. According to Dignaga's interpretation as explained by Jinendrabuddhi, a reason is to be recognized as aprasiddha when its relation to what is to be proved is 'not well known'. Suppose, in order to prove the proposition 'there is fire on the mountain', one states the reason because of smoke'. If the causal relation between smoke and fire is not well known to either or both of the disputants through previous experiences, this reason is called aprasiddha. On the basis of this interpretation, Dignaga points out that aprasiddha is not a fallacy of the reason. The relation of smoke with fire is not well known when one has never seen or does not remember a hearth and the like, in which smoke is co-present with fire, or when he, though experiencing the co-presence of smoke with fire, does not realize that smoke is the effect of fire. Thus the fallacy of aprasiddha is to be found not in the reason but in the example: the fallacy lies either in the fact that there is no example to be cited (dṛṣṭāntābhāva) or in the fact that smoke is not well known in the example as a cause for proving fire (hetvarthenaprasiddhaḥ). Another possible interpretation may be that aprasiddha refers only to the object to be proved: if fire is not well known, the reason 'because of smoke', which is stated to prove the existence of fire, is characterized as aprasiddha. However, this interpretation would violate VS, 3.1.9: prasiddhipūrvakatvād apadeśasya, which is intended to say that one should have perception of fire as related with smoke before he mentions smoke in the reason 24.
175
22 STCHERBATSKY, op. cit.; FRAUWALLNER, "Candramati und sein Daśapadarthaśāstram," Studia Indologica, Festschrift für W. Kirfel, Bonn 1955, pp. 71-73.
23 FADDEGON, The Vaiśeşika System, Amsterdam 1918, pp. 319-320; RANDLE, op. cit., p. 188.
24 PS, chap. III, K 1478.4-7, V 62b.8-63a.3.

Page #8

176
MASAAKI HATTORI
Prasastapāda also quotes VS, 3.1.10–11, and interprets them, like Dignāga, as mentioning three kinds of anapadeśa. However, he differs from Dignāga in his understanding of the meaning of aprasiddha, etc. He bases his explanation of fallacious reasons on the theory of the triple-conditioned inferential mark (trirūpalinga), and adopts the terms asiddha (unreal reason), viruddha (contradictory reason) and samdigdha (dubious reason) for aprasiddha, etc. in the Vaiseșikasūtra 25. It is not clear which one of these three was recognized by Prasastapāda himself as corresponding to aprasiddha. Since samdigdha'is common to the Vaiseşikasūtra, he must have understood by the word aprasiddha either asiddha or viruddha. He distinguished from samdigdha the fourth type of fallacious reason, i. e., anadhyavasita (inconclusive reason) and states that the word aprasiddha in the sūtra is to be applied also to this type of fallacious reason 26. His explanation that anadhyavasita is asiddha in either direction seems to show that he identified aprasiddha with asiddha27. However, his commentators Vyomasiva and Sridhara take aprasiddha as standing for viruddha, for the reason that viruddha is not known to exist (aprasiddha) in the instances similar to what is to be proved (sapaksa) 28. This interpretation is also acceptable as representing the idea of Prasastapāda himself, because he explains the second condition of the inferential mark that a viruddha does not satisfy with the words: yad ... anumeyadharmānvite ... prasiddham ... (that ... which is known to exist ... in things possessing the property of what is to be proved ...) 29. Whichever the case may have been, it is noticed that the interpretation of aprasiddha proposed by Prasastapāda or his commentators is entirely different from that given by Dignāga.
25 PDhs, p. 204.24-26 (p. 562.14—17), p. 238.9—10 (p. 604.13-14).
26 Ibid., p. 239.13 (p. 605, 15—16): ayam aprasiddho 'napadesa iti vacanăd avaruddhah.
27 Ibid., p. 239.11—12 (p. 605.14-15): so 'nyatarāsiddho 'nadhyavasāyahetutväd anadhyavasitaḥ. For the meaning of the term anyataräsiddha in this passage, see RANDLE, op. cit., p. 213, n. 1. anadhyavasita is illustrated by Prasastapāda as follows: satkāryam utpatteh — Proposition: An Effect exists in its cause), Reason: Because it originates (from its cause), PDhS, p. 239.12 (p. 605.15). This reason is mentioned in the Vādavidhi as an example of viruddha. In his criticism of the Vādavidhi theory of fallacious reason, Dignāga points out that this reason is either asiddha or asädhāraņānaikāntika. Cf. PS, K 145a.6, 145b.1-2, V 61 a.4, 61 a.5-6.
28 Vyomavati, p. 569.25—27: aprasiddho 'napadesa iti viruddhāvaro. dhah, tasya sapakşe 'prasiddhatvät. Nyāyakandali, p. 205.2-3: aprasiddha iti viruddhāsādhāranayoh parigrahaḥ tayoḥ sādhyadharmeņa saha prasiddhyabhāvād ahetutvam. Cf. Candrānanda on VS, 3.1.10.
29 PDhs, p. 201.18-20 (p. 562.10-12). Cf. also ibid., p. 237.16-17 (p. 603.4—5): yad ... tatsamānajātiye sarvatra sämänyena prasiddham ...

Page #9

Prasastapāda and Dignāga
177
It seems that Dignāga understood the meaning of aprasiddha in accordance with the traditional interpretation of the same term by the Vaišeşikas. In Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on PS, chap. II, there is a passage cited from a certain Vaiseșika work, which explains anapadesa with the following words: "Smoke, for instance, is an anapadeśa for a person to whom the relation of smoke with fire is aprasiddha"30. Apparently the thought that is expressed in this passage is reflected in Dignāga's criticism of the aprasiddha fallacy. The work is named Bhāṣya. It may be the Bhāşya of Rāvaņa, whose theory of perception is referred to in PS, chap. I, or the Bhāsya of an anonymous author, on which Prasastapāda is said to have written an extensive subcommentary. Certainly it is not the Padārthadharmasamgraha which is called Prasastapādabhāşya, nor is it a post-Prasastapāda work, because the interpretation of the word aprasiddha given in it is acknowledged, in contrast with that in the Padārthadharmasamgraha, to be more faithful to the original idea of the Vaišeşikasūtra. Originally the Vaišeşikas recognized only two kinds of fallacious reason, i. e., asat and samdigdha mentioned and illustrated in VS, 3.1.11—1231 The sūtra 3.1.10: aprasiddho 'napadeśaḥ immediately follows the sūtra which states that a valid reason is preceded by the universal knowledge (prasiddhi) of the relation of an inferential mark (linga) to its possessor (lingin)32. Therefore it seems clear that the sūtra 3.1.10 is meant for giving a definition of fallacious reason in general with the word aprasiddha: = A mark whose relation to its possessor is aprasiddha is a fallacious reason. Perhaps the same sūtra came to be interpreted by some of the Vaišeşikas before Dignāga's time as mentioning aprasiddha as a type of fallacious reason distinct from asat and samdigdha. However, the import of the word aprasiddha as referring to the relation of an inferential mark to its possessor was not changed by them. Dignāga states that three kinds of fallacious reason are recognized by the Vaišeşikas, but evidently he does not know any new interpretation of the word aprasiddha. In his criticism
30 Viśālāmalavati 'Pramāṇasamuccayaţikā, Tibetan version, Peking ed., Mdo-hgrel CXV Re, 132 b.6—133 a.1: de ltar ni bśad Ogrel las"... gan sig gi du ba la soge pa rnams me la sogs pa rnams dar brel pa rab tu grub pa ma yin pa deci nor du ba la sogs pa rnams dmige kyis bstan pa ma yin paoo" ses pa ...
31 Cf. STCHERBATSKY, op. cit., p. 168; FADDEGON, op. cit., p. 302; RANDLE, op. cit., pp. 190 191.
32 It is stated in VS, 3.1.8 that a linga is samyogin, samavāyin, ekārthasamavāyin, or virodhin of the lingin. In reference to this sūtra, the word prasiddhi in VS, 3.1.9 is understood as signifying the universal knowledge concerning the relation of a linga to the lingin.
12 WZKSA XVI

Page #10

178
MASAAKI HATTORI
of the Vaiseșika theory, there is no trace to show that aprasiddha was taken to imply asiddha or viruddha. The asiddha fallacy is not acknowledged to have been known to the Vaišeşikas or to the Naiyāyikas before a systematic classification of fallacious reasons based on the theory of linga-trairūpya was made by Prasastapāda. The explanation given by Vyomasiva and Sridhara for identifying aprasiddha with viruddha is obviously foroed. That which is a prasiddha in similar instances is not always a viruddha. What constitutes the characteristic feature of viruddha is that it proves the opposite of what is to be proved.
Thus it seems quite likely that Dignāga's criticism impelled Prasastapāda to abandon the older Vaiseșika theory of the fallacious reason. Instead of introducing modifications to the older theory, Prasastapāda found it more convenient to adopt wholly Dignāga's classification of fallacious reasons based on the theory of lingatrairūpya. Apparently aprasiddha was no longer recognized by him as a type of fallacious reason. He cited the sūtra with a pretence of following the tradition, but his commentators were compelled to a forced interpretation of the older terminology.
The other two fallacious reasons, asat and samdigdha, are illustrated in VS, 3.1.12: vişāni tasmäd aśvo visāni tasmād gauḥ (It is a horse, because it has horns; It is a cow because it has horns). Dignāga says first that the reason itself, i. e., hornedness (vişānitva) in both illustrations, is neither absent (asat) nor doubtful (samdigdha): it is a well-known property of the subject of the proposition. This is no more than a quibble: it is clear that asat and samdigdha in the sūtra are meant for expressing the reasons which prove respectively that which is absent and that which is doubtful. But, Dignāga continues, that which is absent (asat) is not proved by this type of reason: what is proved by the reason ‘hornedness' is not the absence of a horse, but it is that which is contrary. (viparita) to a horse. "Therefore, this reason) is called a contradictory reason (viruddha) as it proves the opposite (of what is to be proved] (viparitasādhanāt) 33.”
Both Vyomasiva and Sridhara identify asat with asiddha for the reason that asiddha is absent in the subject of the proposition 34. But, as stated above, the asiddha fallacy was not known to the older Vaiseșikas. Evidently asat in the Vaišeşikasūtra corresponds, as Dignāga
33 PS, K 147 a.7-147b.2 (V 63a.3-6): ... deci phyir edi ni Ogal ba yin te bzlog pa sgrub par byed paci phyir ro.
34 Nyāyakandali, p. 205.4: ... dharmiņi vrttyabhāvät... Vyomavati, p. 569.26-27: asann ity asiddhah, tasya hi pakşadharmatvenāsattvät. Cf. Candrānanda on VS, 3.1.11.

Page #11

Prasastapāda and Dignaga
understood it, to viruddha. Prasastapāda cites 'viṣāņi tasmad asvaḥ' as an example of viruddha 35.
Noteworthy is the phraseology that Prasastapada uses in his explanation of viruddha. It is surprisingly close to Dignaga's expression. Prasastapāda says: "The reason ... which is present in the opposite of the object of inference, is a contradictory reason (viruddha), because it proves the opposite of what is to be proved (viparitasadhanāt) 36" It is highly improbable that Dignaga criticized the Vaiseṣika theory with the phraseology borrowed from Prasastapāda or his Vaiseṣika predecessor. Dignaga fully discusses elsewhere the fallacies of reason on the basis of the hetucakra, which he invented to examine all the possible relations between a reason and a sadhyadharma 37. The characteristic feature of each type of fallacious reason is made clear by him through this procedure. Prasastapāda also has a clear notion of each fallacious reason, but his description of it is rather concise. He seems merely to summarize the theories elaborated by someone. But Dignaga's criticism shows evidently that the distinctive feature of viruddha was not properly known to the pre-Dignaga Vaiseşikas. It is almost certain that Prasastapada is indebted to Dignaga for his explanation of the viruddha fallacy. As for the reason that causes doubt (samdigdha), Dignaga criticizes the Vaiseṣikas for their mentioning only the one which is present both in things homogeneous with the subject of the proposition and in things heterogeneous to it, which Dignaga calls sadhāraṇānaikantika, and for their not mentioning asādhāraṇa and viruddhavyabhicārin 38. asādhāraṇa means that which is present exclusively in the subject of the proposition, as for example the audibility (śrāvanatva) of sound, while viruddhavyabhicarin signifies a pair of valid reasons which, when combined, proves two contradictory properties predicated of the same subject, thus causing doubt. These two types of doubtful reasons are classified by Prasastapāda under the head of anadhyavasita, which is not found in Dignaga's system. It has already been shown by scholars that the view to which Prasastapāda refers with 'tti kecit' when distinguishing anadhyavasita from samdigdha is the one held by Dignaga 39. In the light of Dignaga's
179
35 PDhS, p. 238 (p. 604.25).
36 Ibid., p. 238.17-19 (p. 604.23-24): yo hý anumeye 'vidyamāno 'pi tatsamānajātītye sarvasmin nästi tadviparite casti sa viparitasadhanad viruddhaḥ.
37 PS, chap. III, K 131 b.6ff., V 49a.6ff.
38 Ibid., K 147b.2 ff., V 63 a.6 ff. For the same reason Dignaga criticizes the Vädavidhi, cf. PS, K 145a.7, V 61 a.5-6.
39 The explanation of viruddhavyabhicärin in the Nyayamukha is cited by Prasastapada, cf. Tucci, The Nyayamukha of Dignaga, Heidelberg 1930, p. 31, n. 58.

Page #12
180 MASAAKI HATTORI criticism, we may know the incentive that urged Prasastapada to create a new category. He intended to defend the older Vaisesika theory against Dignaga's attack. The reason for the marked difference between Prasastapada and the Vaisesikas known to Dignaga in their theories of the example may also be explained if we place Dignaga between the two. Dignaga mentions four kinds of fallacious example, among which the last one is that which simply shows the simultaneous presence or simultaneous absence of the sadhyadharma and the reason without stating the invariable relation between them 40. In the passage explaining the fallacy of this type of example, the Vaisesika definition 'ubhayaprasiddho dTstantah' is cited by Dignaga. According to Dignaga, one has to show in the example that the reason is pervaded by the sadhyadharma 41: the reason should be accompanied by the sadhyadharma on the one hand, and it should be on the other hand absent where there is no sadhyadharma. The relation of pervader and pervaded between the sadhyadharma and the reason should not be reversed. If that which pervades the sadhyadharma were stated as the reason, it would not be sufficient to prove the proposition, since it allows the case in which there is the reason but not the sadhyadharma. Thus, the example which shows the mere simultaneous presence of the sadhyadharma and the reason is not a true example, because the simultaneous presence of the two does not prove that their relation is invariable; and moreover it allows the possibility of the relation of pervader and pervaded being reversed. Prasastapada must have been well aware of Dignaga's theory when he observed, with terms similar to Dignaga's, that the exemplification (nidarsana) is the showing of the invariable conformity (anuvidhana) of the inferential mark to the object of inference, or that it is the showing of the absence of the inferential mark in that which is opposite to the object of inference (anumeyaviparyaye lingasyabhavah) 42 The classification of an example into two, the one through similarity (sadharmya) and the other through dissimilarity (vaidharmya), is found in the Nyayasutra, but the relation of pervader and pervaded between the sadhyadharma and the reason was not properly understood even by Vatsyayana 43. Dignaga emphasized his explanation of this relation, while Prasastapada simply states it without giving any explanation. This, I believe, is evidence of Prasastapada's dependence on Dignaga. 40 PS, chap. IV, K 152b.2--4, V 63 a.6--7. 41 Nyayamukha, k. 11 = PS, chap. IV, k. 2, K 148 a.6, V 63 b.8. Cf. NV, p. 129.11ff. 42 PDhS, p. 246.15-18 (p. 611.16--19). 43 Cf. Nyayabhasya, ad sutra 1.1.35--37.