Logic Of Svabhavahetu In Dhharmakirtis Vadanyaya

Author(s): Ernat Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernat Steinkellner

Page 12

322
E. Steinkellner
Therefore we can assume that this property would have been Dharmakirti's candidate for the position of the vyapakadharma of the vyāpakānupalabdhi had he cared to explain the simsapātvānumāna as well.
We can therefore consider as a property contradictory to the argued property (sadhyaviparyaya) in the case of the simsapatvānumāna thc property "non-capability for the designation 'tree" (*vsk$avyavahārāyogyatva) and the property "possessing branches etc." (fakhadimattva) as the pervading property (vyāpakadhanna) of the logical reason "capability for the designation 'simśapa" (simśapavyavaharayogyatva).
The logical nexus between the properties "treeness" and "Simšapāness" is then clearly ascertainable by means of the viparyaye badhakapramānam: in the case of non-capability for the designation 'tree' a capability for the designation 'Simšapā' is denied because of the non-perception of its pervading property "possessing branches etc."
Thus we would arrive at the same schematic model as in the case of the sattvānumāna with the only difference being that the argued property (sādhya) and the proving property (sādhana) are not coextensive:60
In this way the difference between these inferences from two kinds of essential properties as reasons would not be constituted by different methods in ascertaining their logical nexus with the respective argued properties. In both cases the logical nexus (vyāpti) of the reason and the argued property would be ascertained by an additional inference, the vyāpakānupalabdhi-argument, which proves the absence of the first logical reason (sattva or simsapatva) in the contradictory of the argued property (akşanikatva or vyksavyavahardyogyatva) by a non-perception of the first reason's pervading property (kramayaugapadyayoga or sākhadimattva) as a second logical reason.
This ends our experiment, I feel successfully, and we are now able to draw the following conclusion: the method proposed in the Hetubindu and explained in more detail in the Vadanyāya for an ascertainment of the logical nexus (vyāptiniscaya) in the case of an essential property as logical reason (svabhāvahetu) is in fact, as should be expected, prescriptive for every logical reason. Towards
fanyo ghafadis tadwydptasimsapan adharmavikalah. (Tattvasangrahapanjika, ed. D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968: 1025, 17-19).
60 It is not of logical relevance here that a part of the argued property's loci, i.e. trees other than simsapds would also be loci of the absence of the reason, because the logical nexus is established only with regard to the absence of the argued property proper.
Moreover, Dharmakirti defined the pervasion (vydpri) in the Hetubindu as an asymmetric relation: "Pervasion is the necessary existence of the pervading (property) where the pervaded property exists) or the existence of the pervaded (property) only when the pervading property exists)." (HB 2.7f.: vydptir vyāpakasya tatra bhava ala vydpyasya vd tatrana bhavah.) These two definitions can be written as (x) (hx sx) meaning "For all x is valid: if (is) h. then x (is) s. and as (x) (-5X -hx) meaning "For all x is valid: if (is) not s, then x (is) not h'.