Logic Of Svabhavahetu In Dhharmakirtis Vadanyaya

Author(s): Ernat Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernat Steinkellner

Page 11

The Logic of the svabhavahetu in Dharmakirti's Vadanyaya
321
That we are allowed or rather forced to construct a model for the case of the simsapātvānumāna in accordance with that schema given for the special case of the sattvānumāna by Dharmakirti himself, can be justified by two interrelated arguments. Firstly, the assumption that the method prescribed by Dharmakirti in the Vadanyaya was meant to be valid only for the sattvānumāna but not for all other cases of possible inferences using an essential property as reason (svabhāvahetu) would imply that Dharmakirti had presented an incomplete theory of logic in both of his last works, an assumption that one can hardly defend in the face of the general meaning of these works, particularly the Hetubindu, as formulations of a theory of logical reason (hetu). Secondly, we would have to assume that instead of demonstrating the sattvänumāna as a crucial inference of especial Buddhist concern by means of, and on the basis of a logical method developed for undisputable ordinary cases of logical reasons, Dharmakirti had expounded a logical theory developed only for the sattvānumāna. An assumption of this kind would be against all historical and systematic reason. Nevertheless, I must again emphasize that what follows is an experiment of interpretation.
If we take the famous example from Dharmakirti's first work: vṛkso 'yam simsapātvāt,56 our sadhyaviparyaye badhakapramāṇam could be taken to work in the following way:
Since the pramāna which negates the logical reason in the field of this property is a non-perception of its pervading property (vyāpakānupalabdhi), we have to answer the question as to what could serve as this pervading property in the case of the property simsapātva.
Here a brief line of Dharmakirti's is of assistance: "Since only a certain particular possessor of branches etc. is known in this way (i.e. as 'simśapa")."57 What can we deduce from this sentence that is of relevance for our question?
"Tree" and "simsapa" are both designations (vyavahāra) which refer to general properties that can be understood as "the capability for the designation 'tree" (*vṛksavyavahārayogyatva) and "the capability for the designation 'Simśapā"" (śimsapāvyavahārayogyatva) respectively according to Dharmottara's explanation.58 In the sentence quoted above Dharmakirti means that the property "possessing branches etc." (sakhadimattva) as extant in the particular thing which is designated as "simsapā" is the reason (nimitta) for its designation as "tree". If this essential property, when absent, may force the property of a "capability for the designation as 'simsapa" to be absent, as stated in the main clause preceding, 59 it is evident that it is conceived as a pervading property (vyapakadharma) of the latter.
56 PVSV 2,16; NB II 16.
57 PVSV 16,30f.: sākādimadviseṣasyaiva kasyacit tathāprasiddheḥ.
58
According to Dharmottara the above inference has the following meaning: "This (thing) can be called 'tree', because it can be called 'simsapa" (vrkṣavyavaharayogyo yam simsapavyavaharayogyanvar, NBT 106,11: Cf. also the formulation of this proof in DhPr 107,9f.). And Dharmottara goes on to explain: "In this case a stupid person in an area rich in simsapās unversed in the usage of (the word) simsapa, when somebody shows him a tall simsapa and says 'this is a tree' then out of stupidity determines the simsapa's tallness too as a reason (nimitta) for the usage of (the word) 'tree', (and) then (further) determines the small simsapa which he sees as a non-tree. This block is introduced into the usage of (the word) 'tree' as having no other reason than simsapāness. Tallness etc. here [in this simsapa, or in this area?] do not constitute further reasons for the usage of (the word) 'tree', only simsapāness is the reason; that is: possessing branches etc. (sakhadimattva) as extant in a simsapa is the reason (nimitta)." (yatra pracurasimsape dese viditasimśapavyavaharo jado yada kenacid uccām śimśapām upadaryocyate yam vrksa' iti tad asau jadyac chimsapaya uccatvam api vyksavyavaharasya nimittam avasyati tada yam evanuccām pasyati Simsapām tām evavṛkşam avasyati. sa madhaḥ simsaparvamatranimitte vṛkşavyavahāre pravartyate. noccatvādi nimittäntaṛam iha viksavyaharasya, api tu simsapatvamatram nimittam -simsapāgataśākhādimattvam nimittam ity arthaḥ. NBT 106,11-107,2). Cf. also DhPr 107,22-28.
59 Therefore either an essential property (svabhava) which is connected with that [real existence of the reason] as such may cause the very essence (bhava) [which is propounded as a reason] to be absent (nivartayet). [PV 1 23a-c'(=25a-c')] - e.g. the tree a simsapa." (tasmat tanmatrasambandhaḥ svabhavo bhavam eva va / nivartayet-yatha vṛkṣaḥ simsapām. PVSV 16.2730). Cf. the prayoga formulated by Kamalasila: yo yadvyapakadharmarahitaḥ sa tadvyaptadharmavikalaḥ, yatha vṛkṣatvadharma