Logic Of Svabhavahetu In Dhharmakirtis Vadanyaya

Author(s): Ernat Steinkellner
Publisher: Ernat Steinkellner

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E. Steinkellner
(vyāptisadhana): "If everything existent or produced were not perishing at every moment, it would be only non-existent because it would be excluded from what is defined by capability for causal efficiency, since for a non-momentary (thing) causal efficiency is neither possible successively nor simultancously, For that which is defined such that no capability can be stated (of it), is a non-existent. 52
The cognitive function of the badhakapramāņa which negates the reason thereby "conceptually establishing" its contradictory is exemplified with regard to the reason "existence" (sattva) as establishing its contradictory "incapability as the defining characteristic of a non-existent":53 "Where (causal efficiency) is not possible successively or simultaneously, that is incapable for every (effect); and this (impossibility) is extant in a non-momentary (thing)."
And finally Dharmakirti exemplifies the argument for the particular pervading property (vyāpakadhama): "In this case the capability (for causal efficiency), is proven as pervaded by the possibility to produce an effort) successively or simultaneously, because there is no other way (of producing)."
From these exemplifications the following structure results in case of the sattvänumāna: the logical pervasion (vyāpti) between the essential properties (svabhāva) "existence" (sattva) as logical reason (hetu) and "momentariness" (kşaņikatva) as argued property (sādhya) is proven by a non-perception of the reason's pervading property "possibility of successive or simultaneous (efficiency) (kramayaugapadyayoga) in the case of "non-momentariness" (akşanikatva) as the contradictory of the argued property, because this non-perception negates (badhaka) the reason thereby conceptually establishing "non-existence" (asattva) as its contradictory property (svaviruddha).
In this way the non-perception of the pervading property (vyāpakānupalabdhi) proves the contradictory of the reason (h) in the contradictory of the argued property (-s) and thereby establishes the pervasion between reason (h) and argued property (s):
This is the schematic model that can be drawn for the sattvānumăna on the basis of the information available in the Vadanyaya. For the Šimšapātvānumana or comparable inferences we are not given any specific indications as to what the schematic model should look like: there are no trees or simsapas in either the Vadanyāya or the Hetubindu. So we are forced to construct a schematic model on the basis of whatever information is available in Dharmakirti's work as a whole, in order to find out whether the newly developed method for the ascertainment of the logical nexus (vyāpti) can be applied at all in this case. This is, of course, an experiment whose result will either prove or disprove the assumption that the proposed method is valid for every essential property used as logical reason (svabhāvahetu).
52 VN 6,6-8.2: yadi na sarvam sat korakam va pratikşaņavinasi syat, akşaņikasya kramayaugapadyabhyam anhakriyayogad arthakriydsamarthyalaksanato nisam iry asad eva syat. sarvasamarthyopakhydvirahalaksanam ni ninupakhyam iti.
> VN 9,3-5: badhakam punah pramäņam ...... iti pravartamanam asamarthyam asallaksaņam akarsari. S4 VN 9,3-4: yatra kramayaugapadyayogah, na tasya kvacit samarthyam, asti caksaņike sa iti. > VN 8,5f.: tatra samarthyam kramakramayogena vydpiam siddham, prakarantarabhavdi.