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The above definition of good or śubha presented by the Jaina ethics avoids the two extremes of naturalism and nonnaturalism, subjectivism and objectivism which are the metaethical trends. Now, when the Jaina ethics says that 'Subha' is an experience in tune with Ahimsā, it is accepting the merit of both naturalism and non-naturalism. The statement that Subha is an experience in tune with Ahimsā accepts value in the world as related to consciousness and leaves room for ‘ought' experience. For example, to say that kindness is an experience in tune with Ahirsā implies that we ought to be kind. Besides, that experience is not of the type 'liked by me' and so is not subjective or reducible to feeling but possesses an objective character, and at the same time this experience is not simple, unanalysable but complex and analysable, and therefore definable as has been explained above.
The second question of meta-ethics that draws our attention is What is the nature of ethical judgements according to the Jaina ethics? The question under discussion reduces itself to this. Are ethical judgements expressive of any cognitive content in the sense that they may be asserted true or false? Or do they simply express emotions, feelings, etc. When we say that Hissa is evil, are we making a true or false assertion or are we experiencing simply a feeling? Or are we doing both? According to the cognitivists, the ethical judgement, 'Hiṁsā is evil' is capable of being objectively true and thus moral knowledge is objective, whereas the non-cognitivists deny both the objectivity of assertion and knowledge in as much as, according to them, ethical Judgements are identified with feeling, emotions etc. Here the position taken by the Jaina ethics seems to me to be this that though the statement, 'Himsā is evil' is objectively trus, yet it cannot be divested of the feeling element involved in experiencing the truth of the statement. In moral life knowledge and feeling can not be separated. By implication we can derive from the Tattvārtha Sūtra that the path of goodness can be traversed through knowledge. (Jñāna) and feeling and activity. Thus the conviction of the Jaina ethics is that the knowledge of good and right is tied up with our feelings, and that in their absence we
Jaina Mysticism and other essays
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