Jaina Literature and Philosophy a Critical Approach

Author(s): Sagarmal Jain
Publisher: Parshwanath Vidyapith

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Aspects of Jainology: Volume VI
commences from the period of Akalanka, who for the first time expounded Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as independent Pramānas. The Jaina theory of Nyāya was given a new direction in the c. 8th A. D. Akalanka not only established Smrti, Pratyabhijña and Tarka as independent Pramāņa but also revised the definitions or meanings of Perception, Inference and Āgama, given by Siddhasena and Samantabhadra. In his definition of Pramāņa, he introduced a new term avisamvădi in place of svapara-avabhāşaka. Most probably, this characteristic of changing defini- tions was borrowed from the Buddhist tradition. It was an especiality of Akalarka that he logically evaluated even the pre-established conceptions, hence rightly called the father of Jaina Nyāya. His works Laghiyastraya, Nyāyaviniscaya, Siddhi- viniscaya and Pramāṇasangraha are related to the Jaina Nyāya. Pramāṇasangraha is the Akalanka's last work in which matured Jaina Nyāya, especially Pramāņa-sastra, is elaborately discussed. Though in his earlier works he mentioned Smsti, Pratyabhijñā and Tarka as Pramāna yet as independent Pramānas, these are established only in this work. As such from the point of view of the history of Jaina Pramāņaśāstra this is a valuable work giving new dimension to the concept of pramana.
In the history of Indian logic the Jaina logicians, in the c. 8th A. D., for the first time accepted memory (Smrti ), recognition (Pratyabhijña ) and induction ( Tarka ) as a Pramāna. This is Jaina's special contribution to the field of Indian Pramāņaśästra. Not even a single tradition of Indian logic accepts memory (smrti ) as an independent Pramāņa. Only Vedanta-paribhasa, a work of c. 16th A. D., mentions Smrti as Pramāņa. Though Naiyāyikas had accepted recognition (pratyabhijña ) as a kind of perception (pratyaksa pramāna ) yet neither they regarded it as an independent Pramāņa nor accepted Smrti as its cause (hetu ). Jainas maintained, in case
Smrti is not Pramāna, how recognition (Pratyabhijña ) can be accepted as Pramāna because in absence of memory (Smrti ), Pratyabhijña is not possible. If memory (Smrti ) is not Pramāna, Pratyabhijñā also a combination of past memory and present perception can not be considered as Pramāņa, because Pratyabhijña is based on Smrti. Similarly, Jainas established Tarka as independent pramāna because in the absence of Tarka Pramāņa, Vyāpti ( universal relation ) is not possible and without Vyāpti, inference (Anumāna) is quite impossible. To solve this problem Naiyāyikas accepted Sāmānya Lakşaņa Pratyāsatti (generic nature of individuals ). Jainas accepted Tarka Pramāņa at the place of Naiyāyika's Sāmānya Laksana Pratyāsatti which is more extensive than that and may be called Inductive leap ( āgamana). Jainas maintained induction (āgamana ) and deduction (nigamana ) of Western Logic and introduced them in the name of Tarka and Anumāna as an independent Pramāna, respectively. An independent Tarka Pramāna was needed because acquisition of Samanya (generality) through perception is not possible and without Samānya, Vyāpti is not possible. Similarly in absence of Vyāpti, Inference (anumāna ) is impossible. Since in Jainism, Sāmānya Laksana Pratyāsatti is no where mentioned as a kind of perception, Jainas established Tarka as independent Pramāņa to solve the problem of Vyāpti. As Pratyabhijña was needed for Tarka and Smrti for Pratyabhijña, Jainas accepted all these three as independent Pramāņa.
It was Akalanka (c. 8th A. D. ) who for the first time referred these three types of independent Pramāņa in Digambara tradition. Before Akalanka, his predecessors Samantabhadra (c. 5th A. D. ) and Pūjyapāda (c. 6th A.D.) do not make any mention of it. In Svetambara tradition, Siddhasena Divākara (c. 4th A. D. ), Jinabhadra (c. 6th A. D. ), Siddhasena Gani (c. 7th A. D.) and Haribhadra (c. 8th A. D.)