Jain Journal 1992 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 37

182
JAIN JOURNAL
develops through three stages. Firstly, the nature of the object is finally determined, secondly, the determination of the object is retained, and thirdly, the object is recognised on future occasions. Jinabhadra defines
ce of the lapse of perceptual cognition'.8 At this stage the judgment which has been acquired in perception, becomes so firm that it does not lapse. Like Umāsvāti he also admits three stages of retention. As he says : 'The absence of lapse of the perceptual judgment of the object, the formation of mental trace, and the recollection of it again in the future constitute retention. All of them follow in the wake of perception.' Pajyapāda defines retention as the condition of the absence of forgetting in the future of what has been cognised in the state of perception'.5 Akalanka defines it as 'the absence of forgetting the same of what has been cognised by perception'.8 Vidyananda defines it as 'the condition of recall’.? Vadideva gives a different definition. According to him, 'retention is the consolidation of perception'.8 It is the gradual consolidation and the absence of the lapse of perceptual cognition for some time because of the mindfulness of the cogniser.' He criticises the view of those who regard retention as the condition of recall in the future. It has been observed by him that retention is nothing but the consolidation of perception for a certain length of time. It is not the condition of recall in the future, since it is a category of perceptual cognition and, hence, cannot last up to the time of recollection, Furthermore, if it were to last up to that time, it would be impossible to cognise anything else during that interval, inasmuch as even the exponents of the said view are not prepared to admit the presence of two conscious activities at the same time, Thus, how can retention be defined as the condition of recall? We recollect our past experience on account of the special capacity of the soul to remember past events. The faculty of retention cannot be regarded as the cause of recollection. Retention, however, can be admitted as a remote cause of recall, and not as the immediate one, since it is not an impossibility to admit so many remote causes of an event. 10 According to Hemacandra, 'retention is the condition of recollection'. 11 This condition is nothing but the causal stuff capable of
3 .........aviccui dharana tassa-Visesavas yaka-bhasya, 180. 4 Ibid., 291. 5 avetasya katantare avismaranakaranam dharana-Sarvarthasiddhi, I, 15. 6 nirjnatarthavismrtirdharana--Tattvartha-varttika, I, 15, 4. 1 .........smrtihetuh sa dharana - Tattvartha-sloka-varttika, I, 15, 4. 8 sa eva drdhat amavasthapanno dharana-Pramana-naya-tattvaloka, JI, 10. 9 Syadvada-rat nakara, II, 10. 10 Ibid. 11 smrtihet urdharana - Pramana-mimamsa, I, I, 29.