Jain Journal 1991 01

Author(s): Jain Bhawan Publication
Publisher: Jain Bhawan Publication

Page 9

JANUARY, 1991
107
same fourfold division which Madhva has given for kevala, 16 and from what he tells us, there seems to be no difference between kevala and pratyakşa. Later commentators have not commented on Jayatirtha's contradiction ; but it becomes understandable if we realize that Dvaiti kevala corresponds to Jaina pratyakşa. Jayatirtha must have been aware of this and at this point failed to keep Jaina and Dvaiti terminology apart.
There are more indications of Jayatirtha's familiarity with Jaina thought, e g. when he defines mokṣa twice, once in his view (bhagavatprasādād aśeșanişțānivșttivišişğānandādisvarūpāvīrbhāvalakşaņā muktirbhāvatiti)17 and once as the Jainas view it (svābhāvikātmasvarūpavirbhāvah), 18 i e. using remarkably similar wordings ; and when he discusses the various kinds of souls as accepted by Jaina thinkers, it seems that another contamination of Dvaiti and Jaina thought takes place. For details, I would like to refer to my article on the subject, which is to appear soon in the Journal of Indian Philosophy. 19
Ever since Śankara set the example in his Brahmasūtra-bhāşya, all Vedānti commentators on the Brahmasūtra criticized Jainism in a similar fashion in their commentaries in the naikasminnadhikarana of the Samayapadā in the 2nd chapter of the sutra. The criticism is aimed at two ideas : firstly, the Jaina notion of the size of the soul (considered to be as large as the body which it occupies ; but this is actually an oversimplification of the actual Jaina view), and secondly, and more importantly, the Jaina doctrine of anekārtavāda as expressed in svadvādo, one of the Jaina ideas which has been most misunderstood, distorted and satirized throughout Indian philosophical history. Sankara conveniently overlooked that the Jainas did not say that opposing predications may be made about the same object from the same point of view in the selfsame temporal and spatial circumstances, and his criticism does not go far beyond saying that the Jainas contradict themselves. All later Vedāntis have followed this model refutation of Jainism, and so we find the same recur with Madhva and Jayatirtha. But syādvāda is the natural outcome of the realistic ontology of Jainism,
16 Ibid. 17 R. S. Panchamukhi (ed.), Pramanapaddhati by Sri Sri Jayatirtha, Dharwad : Sri
Raghavendra Pratishthana, 1982, 13, p. 165. 18 Srimattikakrt padaviracita Sriman-nyayasudha, 3 vols. Mulabagalu : Srimat
prasannaraghavendra Matha, 1985-6, p. 1225. 19 Robert J. Zydenbos, “On the Jaina Background of Dvaitavedanta", in the
Journal of Indian Philosophy (forthcoming).